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ACHRE Report

Part II

Chapter 10

Introduction

Human Research at the Bomb Tests

The Bomb Tests: Questions of Risk, Records, and Trust

Conclusion

Chapter 10: Footnotes

1 . See Department of Energy, Announced United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 Through December 1992 (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, May 1993); Department of Energy, Expanded Test Information for Nuclear Tests With Unannounced Simultaneous Detonation (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, 20 June 1994).

2 . Thomas L. Shipman, Los Alamos Laboratory Health Division Leader, to Dr. Harry G. Ehrmentraut, Committee on Medical Sciences, Research and Development Board, Department of Defense, 25 July 1951 ("Dr. Robert Grier has passed on to me . . .") (ACHRE No. DOE-033195-B), 2.

3 . See the July 1949 transcript of a meeting convened by the NEPA [Nuclear Energy for the Propulsion of Aircraft] Medical Advisory Panel to discuss the "Psychological Problem of Crew Selection Relative to the Special Hazards of Irradiation Exposure," 27. NEPA Medical Advisory Panel, Subcommittee IX, proceedings of 22 July 1949 (ACHRE No. DOD-121494-A-2).

4 . Richard L. Meiling, Chairman, Armed Forces Medical Policy Council, to the Deputy Secretary of Defense et al., 27 June 1951 ("Military Medical Problems Associated with Military Participation in Atomic Energy Commission Tests") (ACHRE No. DOD-122794-B), 1.

5 . Ibid.

6 . Ibid.

7 . Department of the Army, September 1950 ("Atomic Energy Indoctrination") (ACHRE No. DOD-020395-D), 73.

8 . Ibid.

9 . Richard L. Meiling, Chairman, Armed Forces Medical Policy Council, to the Chairman, Research and Development Board, 23 February 1951 ("Department of Defense Biomedical Participation in Atomic Weapons Tests") (ACHRE No. NARA-071194-A), 1.

10 . The Joint Panel was created in 1949 by the Committee on Medical Sciences and the Committee on Atomic Energy, which were committees of the Research and Development Board. (See the Introduction and chapter 1 for further discussions of the Joint Panel.)

11 . The agenda noted that while civilians were polled in the preparation of the draft, "very few" responded. The draft was therefore " offered not as a proposed statement, to be accepted after only minor revisions, but as a general guide to the type of paper which is expected of the Joint Panel." Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare, 20 September 1951 ("Agenda, 8th Meeting, Item 3 - Preparation of Statement on Biomedical Participation in Future Weapons Tests") (ACHRE No. DOD-072294-B), 1-2.

12 . Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare, 20 September 1951 ("Biomedical Participation in Future Atomic Weapons Tests [Attachment to Agenda, 8th Meeting]") (ACHRE No. DOD-072294-B), 2. The quoted language appears to have come from Dr. Thomas Shipman of Los Alamos. See Thomas Shipman, Los Alamos Laboratory Health Division Leader, to Shields Warren, Director, AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, 15 September 1951 ("Permissible Exposures, Test Operations") (ACHRE No. DOE-120894-C).

13 . The draft stated a concern that "actual animal exposures should be limited as much as possible," but did not expressly address human experimentation. Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare, 20 September 1951, ("Biomedical Participation in Future Atomic Weapons Tests"), 3.

14 . Ibid., 5-7.

15 . We discuss the data gathering on radioisotopes in the body fluids in chapter 13, in the context of a discussion of secret human data gathering on fallout.

16 . Joint Panel on Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare, 20 September 1951 ("Program Guidance Report") (ACHRE No. DOD-072294-B), 23.

17 . Ibid., 20. A further section on "Psychological Studies" recommended the following:

4.1.3 Continue studies in psychology of panic.

4.1.4 Seek technics [sic] for reducing apprehension and for producing psychologic resistance to fear and panic, especially in presence of radiation hazard (emotional vaccination).

4.1.5 Spread knowledge of radiation tolerance, technics [sic] of avoidance, and possibility of therapy through military and civilian populations and measure their acceptance.

4.1.6 Prepare to make psychologic observations at and after bomb tests.

Ibid., 14.

18 . Colonel Michael Buckley, Acting Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, Research and Development, to Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 20 August 1951 ("Proposed Study of Behavior of Troops Exposed to A-Bomb") (ACHRE No. NARA-013195-A), 1.

19 . Peter A. Bordes et al., February 1953 ("DESERT ROCK I: A Psychological Study of Troop Reactions to an Atomic Explosion [HumRRO-TR-1]") (ACHRE No. CORP-111694-A), 3.

20 . Dr. Meredith Crawford, interview by Dan Guttman and Patrick Fitzgerald (ACHRE), transcript of audio recording, 1 December 1994 (ACHRE Research Project Series, Interview Program File, Targeted Interview Project), 6-7. Dr. Crawford was recruited to head the new HumRRO by psychologist Harry Harlow, an Army adviser who was famed for his work with monkeys. HumRRO was a private contractor created at the Army's behest and initially affiliated with George Washington University. In the 1951 experiments, HumRRO worked with the Operations Research Organization (ORO), which was affiliated with Johns Hopkins University.

21 . In 1994, Dr. Crawford prepared a retrospective memorandum titled "HumRRO Research During Four Army Training Exercises." Based on the 1953 report, "A Psychological Study of Troop Reactions to an Atomic Explosion," Dr. Crawford estimated that 633 service personnel were involved in the maneuvers at Desert Rock I. Meredith P. Crawford to William C. Osborn, 27 January 1994 ("HumRRO Research During Four Army Training Exercises Involving Atomic Weapons--1951-1957") (ACHRE No. CORP-112294-B), 8. In addition, hundreds of additional troops were involved as the "nonparticipant" group (which did not attend the test maneuvers, but was given psychological tests). The "experimental paradigm" for the HumRRO tests is described in this 1994 memorandum. Ibid., 4.

22 . "Armed Forces: Exercise Desert Rock," Time, 12 November 1951, 21-22.

23 . New York Times, 1 November 1951, 4.

24 . Bordes et al., "DESERT ROCK I: A Psychological Study of Troop Reactions to an Atomic Explosion," 6.

25 . Interview with Crawford, 1 December 1994, 57.

26 . Bordes et al., "DESERT ROCK I: A Psychological Study of Troop Reactions to an Atomic Explosion," 5.

27 . Ibid., 103.

28 . Ibid., 107-108.

29 . Interestingly, the troops evidently did not buy the "correct" answer; only about 40 percent of the troops at the maneuver were reported to have been correctly indoctrinated. Bordes et al., "DESERT ROCK I: A Psychological Study of Troop Reactions to an Atomic Explosion," 130.

30 . The Committee asked the DOD to review the 1951 questionnaire and comment on whether the information presented regarding the effect of an airburst is, based on DOD's current expert understanding, still correct. DOD provided "changes/corrections/clarifications" on nine items. In the case of items 1 and 6, quoted in the text, DOD commented:

1) As stated, the answer is wrong. The ground zero hazard 1 day after an atomic explosion depends on the yield. At 20 kt, there would be no fallout for a burst at 2000 feet, but there would be induced activity. . . .

6) There is the same problem with this answer as with 1, above.

In one case the DOD reported that the 1951 questionnaire erred on what might be called the side of caution; where a 1951 answer stated that a posited detonation would not kill anybody beyond the range of three miles, the answer today would be one mile. Department of Defense, Radiation Experiments Command Center, 26 April 1995 ("ACHRE Request 032795-A, HumRRO Questionnaire and Air Burst Material") (ACHRE No. DOD-042695-A), 1.

31 . Colonel R. G. Prentiss, Executive Officer, Office of the Army Surgeon General, to Chief, Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 9 January 1952 ("Psychiatric Research in Connection with Atomic Weapon Tests Involving Troop Participation") (ACHRE No. DOD-080594-A), 1. The memo recorded:

1. For your information in connection with planning for future exercises and operations in which atomic weapons tests will be used and troops will participate, this office has a continuing interest in the conduct of psychiatric observations regarding the effects of the weapons on the participating troops.

2. Funds for the conduct of psychiatric observations which may be approved for future atomic weapons tests will be made available through the Surgeon General.

The memorandum bears concurrences from the "Medical Research and Development Board," "Medical Plans and Operations," "Fiscal Division," and "Chief, Psychiatry and Neurology Consultants Division." It is not clear what role Army psychiatrists (i.e., medical doctors) played in the implementation of the "psychological" experiments.

32 . Major P. C. Casperson, for the Chief of Army Field Forces, to First Army et. al., 7 March 1952 ("Extracts, Final Report Exercise DESERT ROCK I") (ACHRE No. NARA-013195-A), 122. In an age of "polls and questionnaires," the report suggested, the overpsychologized troops may have been putting the psychologists on:

The psychological evaluators, of whom there were many and various, were perhaps too obvious and eager. This is an era of polls and questionnaires and here was a new and untried field with unlimited possibilities. The ultimate response, finally, was a humorous and deliberate program in the troops to confuse the psychological people with fictitious reactions.

Ibid.

33 . Brigadier General A. R. Luedecke, AFSWP, to Director, AEC Division of Military Application, 7 March 1952 ("Reference is made to your letter of 28 December 1951 . . .") (ACHRE No. NARA-010495-A), 2.

34 . Interview with Crawford, 1 December 1994, 12-13.

35 . Dr. Crawford's 1994 reconstruction of events estimated that 672 soldiers witnessed the shot, and 914 served in the control group as nonparticipants. Crawford to Osborn, 27 January 1994, 10.

36 . Motivation, Morale, and Leadership Division, Department of the Army, August 1953 ("Desert Rock IV: Reactions of an Armored Infantry Battalion to an Atomic Bomb Maneuver [HumRRO-TR-2]") (ACHRE No. CORP-111694-A), ix, 17.

37 . Benjamin W. White, 1 August 1953 ("Desert Rock V: Reactions of Troop Participants and Forward Volunteer Officer Groups to Atomic Exercises") (ACHRE No. CORP-111694-A), 10.

38 . Department of the Army, "Desert Rock IV: Reactions of an Armored Infantry Battalion to an Atomic Bomb Maneuver [HumRRO-TR-2]," 72.

39 . "Armed Forces: Exercise Desert Rock," Time, 12 November 1951, 22. At Desert Rock I, physiological testing, including the use of a polygraph, sought to measure anxiety before and after D-Day. Bordes et al., "DESERT ROCK I," chapter 6. At Desert Rock IV, before and after "sweat tests" measured troops' hand sweating as a possible index of fear. Department of the Army, "Desert Rock IV: Reactions of an Armored Infantry Battalion to an Atomic Bomb Maneuver [HumRRO-TR-2]," 10.

40 . Joint Panel on the Medical Aspects of Atomic Warfare, 9 September 1952 ("Minutes: 9, 10, 11 and 12 September 1952, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory") (ACHRE No. DOD-072294-B), 3-4. The panel's statement was in the form of a motion to be transmitted to the DOD Research and Development Board's Committee on Human Resources, to which the advisory role on the HumRRO effort was being turned over.

41 . The available research reports do not indicate the numbers of participants in the research.

42 . Defense Nuclear Agency, 8 August 1995 ("Atmospheric Test Series/Activities Matrix") (ACHRE No. DOD-081195-A).

43 . Robert D. Baldwin, March 1958 ("Staff Memorandum: Experiences at Desert Rock VIII") (ACHRE No. CORP-111694-A). Also at Plumbbob was an experiment to test the efficiency of fallout shelters. Sixteen men were confined in four shelters to collect fallout samples, so that their ability to collect samples could be studied and so that they could be studied for the psychological effect of confinement. The study concluded that the shelters were well suited for both manned stations at nuclear weapons tests and for single-family fallout shelters. J. D. Sartor et al., 23 April 1963 ("The Design and Performance of a Fallout-Tested Manned Shelter Station and Its Suitability as a Single-Family Shelter [USNRDL-TR-647]") (ACHRE No. CORP-032395-A). See also Nevada Test Organization, Office of Test Information, 24 July 1957 ("For Immediate Release") (ACHRE No. DOE-033195-B); Nevada Test Organization, Office of Test Information, 15 July 1957 ("For Immediate Release") (ACHRE No. DOD-030895-F).

44 . Baldwin, "Experiences at Desert Rock VIII," 39.

45 . Ibid., 12. The troops were not to be told the amount of contamination present, which would depend upon actual fallout amounts. The course was marked by radiation hazard markers, which might or might not reflect the actual fallout. Ibid., 23.

46 . Ibid., 7.

47 . Interview with Crawford, 1 December 1994, 52.

48 . Bordes et al., "DESERT ROCK I: A Psychological Study of Troop Reactions to an Atomic Explosion," 20.

49 . Crawford to Osborn, 27 January 1994, 15.

50 . CG Cp Desert Rock to CG Sixth Army, 28 March 1953 ("Reference message G3, OCAFF No. 423") (ACHRE No. NARA-013195-A), 1. The office volunteers participated in three detonations in the 1953 "Upshot-Knothole" series--shots Nancy, Badger, and Simon. "DNA Fact Sheet Operation Upshot-Knothole," January 1992.

51 . Captain Robert A. Hinners, USN, Headquarters, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 25 April 1953 ("Report of Participation in Selected Volunteer Program of Desert Rock V-7") (ACHRE No. DOE-033195-B), 2.

In an 11 February 1953 letter, the Army informed the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the "steps being taken by the Army in connection with exposure of troops at tests of atomic weapons." Lieutenant General L. L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, to Honorable Carl T. Durham, House of Representatives, 11 February 1953 ("The Secretary of the Army has asked that the Joint Committee . . .") (ACHRE No. NARA-112594-A), 1. The Army explained that deployment in foxholes at as close to 1,500 yards was needed to confirm that commanders could risk troops at this distance. The Army assured the committee that experts deemed it "highly improbable that troops will suffer any injury under these conditions." Ibid., 2.

Assurance was given to Congress that no more than twelve volunteers would be used at one shot. G3 DEPTAR, to CG Cp Desert Rock, 15 April 1953 ("Reference your msg AMCDR-DPCO 0498") (ACHRE No. NARA-013194-A), 1.

52 . Brigadier General Carl H. Jark, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Organization and Training Division, to Distribution, 20 February 1953 ("Instructions for Positioning DA [Department of Army] Personnel at Continental Atomic Tests [Attachment to 20 February 1953 memo]") (ACHRE No. NARA-120694-A), 2.

53 . White, "Desert Rock V: Reactions of Troop Participants and Forward Volunteer Officer Groups to Atomic Exercises," iii.

54 . CG Sixth Army Presidio of SFran Calif, to OCAFF Ft Monroe Va, 24 April 1953 ("Reference Desert Rock msg AMCDR-CG-04237") (ACHRE No. NARA-013195-A), 1.

55 . Major R. C. Morris, for the Commanding General, to Chief of Research and Development, 15 November 1955 ("Amendment to Proposed Project Regarding Blast Injury Evaluation") (ACHRE No. DOD-030895-F), 1.

56 . Major Benjamin I. Hill, for the Director, Terminal Ballistics Laboratory, to Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 13 December 1955 ("Amendment to Proposed CONARC Project Regarding Blast Injury Evaluation") (ACHRE No. DOD-030895-F), 1.

57 . Colonel Irving L. Branch, for the Chief, AFSWP, to Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, 20 January 1956 ("Annex 'A' to 2nd Endorsement: Detailed Explanation of AFSWP Comments on Feasibility of Human Volunteer Program") (ACHRE No. DOD-030895-F), 1.

58 . Ibid.

59 . Colonel Irving L. Branch, for the Chief, AFSWP, to Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, 20 January 1956 ("Amendment to Proposed Project Regarding Blast Injury Evaluation") (ACHRE No. DOD-030895-F), 1-2.

60 . National Military Establishment, Military Liaison Committee, to the Atomic Energy Commission, 24 March 1949 ("Planning for 1951 Atomic Bomb Tests") (ACHRE No. DOE-120894-C).

61 . Howard Brown to Shields Warren, 20 August 1951 ("Larry Tuttle advised that he had learned from his agents in AFSWP . . .") (ACHRE No. DOE-040395-A), 1.

62 . Thomas L. Shipman, Los Alamos Health Division Leader, to Shields Warren, Director, AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, 20 January 1952 ("Since Wright's return from the meeting in Washington . . .") (ACHRE No. DOE-120894-C), 2.

63 . Thomas Shipman, Los Alamos Laboratory Health Division Leader, to Charles Dunham, Director, AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, 9 June 1956 ("This is a rather belated reply . . .") (ACHRE No. DOE-120894-C), 1. In response to the suggestion that Los Alamos participate in another effort, Shipman urged that the committee should

either be given some real responsibility or will at least be able to speak in a loud, strong voice against any proposed program which appears to be poorly or inadequately planned . . . or which appears to be an out and out waste of the taxpayers' money.

Ibid.

64 . T. L. Shipman to Alvin Graves, 9 August 1952 ("Meeting of Biomedical Test Planning and Screening Committee") (ACHRE No. DOE-120894-C), 1. DOD records show flashblindness research at Buster-Jangle (1951), Tumbler-Snapper (1952), Upshot-Knothole (1953), Plumbbob (1953), Hardtrack II (1958), and Dominic I (1962), in Defense Nuclear Agency, 8 August 1995, "Atmospheric Test Series/Activities Matrix."

65 . The topic of the bomb's effect on vision merited instruction. The 1951 HumRRO questionnaire included: "Watching an A-bomb explode five miles away can cause permanent blindness. (False)." Bordes et al., "DESERT ROCK I: A Psychological Study of Troop Reactions to an Atomic Explosion"), 109. In a 1995 comment on this question, DOD noted that "[i]n the strictest sense the correct answer is 'true'. Some permanent retinal damage will occur, but complete vision loss will not." Department of Defense, Radiation Experiments Command Center ("ACHRE Request 032795-A, HumRRO Questionnaire and Air Burst Material"), 1.

66 . Colonel Victor A. Byrnes, USAF (MC), 15 March 1952 ("Operation BUSTER: Project 4.3, Flash Blindness") (ACHRE No. DOD-121594-C-4), 2.

67 . The objectives were

(a) To evaluate the visual handicap which might be expected in military personnel exposed, during daylight operations, to the flash of an atomic detonation.

(b) To evaluate devices developed for the purpose of protecting the eye against visual impairment resulting from excessive exposure to light.

Ibid., p.1. 68 . J. C. Clark, Deputy Test Director, to Colonel Kenner Hertford, Director, Office of Test Operations, 5 March 1952 ("Attached is an outline of approved Project 4.5 . . .") (ACHRE No. DOE-020795-C), 1. The letter noted that at Buster-Jangle the AEC had sought and received "release of AEC responsibility" in the event of such damage and requested the same release for Tumbler-Snapper.

69 . Defense Nuclear Agency, 1952 ("Operation Tumbler-Snapper") (ACHRE No. DOD-102194-C), 92.

70 . Ibid.

71 . Colonel Victor A. Byrnes, March 1953 ("Operation Snapper, Project 4.5: Flash Blindness, Report to the Test Director") (ACHRE No. DOD-121994-C), 12.

72 . Ibid., 15.

73 . Ibid. The DOD reported that it does not have the ability to retrieve the names of experimental subjects. Thus, the long-term outcome of those involved in flashblindness tests (estimated by DOD to approximate 100) is not known to the Committee.

74 . Colonel Victor A. Byrnes, USAF (MC), et al., 30 November 1955 ("Operation Upshot-Knothole, Project 4.5: Ocular Effects of Thermal Radiation from Atomic Detonation--Flashblindness and Chorioretinal Burns") (ACHRE No. DOD-121994-C), 3.

75 . Ibid.

76 . Colonel Irving L. Branch, USAF, Acting Chief of Staff, to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Medicine), 5 March 1954 ("Status of Human Volunteers in Bio-medical Experimentation") (ACHRE No. DOD-042595-A), 2.

77 . Ibid, 3.

78 . Colonel John Pickering; interview by John Harbert and Gil Whittemore (ACHRE), transcript of audio recording, 2 November 1994 (ACHRE Research Project Series, Interview Program File, Targeted Interview Project), 55. DOD did not locate any documents showing written consent.

79 . Defense Atomic Support Agency, 15 August 1962 ("Operation Plumbbob: Technical Summary of Military Effects, Programs 1-9") (ACHRE No. DOD-100794-A),137

80 . Defense Nuclear Agency, 1962 ("Operation Dominic I: Report of DOD Participation") (ACHRE No. DOE-082294-A).

81 . John R. McGraw, Deputy Commandant, USAF, to Director, AEC, 20 March 1954 ("Examination of the Retina of Individuals Exposed to Recent Atomic Detonation") (ACHRE No. DOE-090994-C). The memorandum stated that it "can be assumed that all persons who viewed the actual fireball" of a recent hydrogen bomb test "without eye protection have received permanent chorio-retinal damage." The memorandum went on to recommend that "[p]opulations and observers within an approximate radius of 100 miles from ground zero should be surveyed."

82 . See, for example, Byrnes, "Operation Snapper, Project 4.5," 16-17.

83 . Roy B. Snapp, Secretary, AEC, minutes of meeting no. 623, 6 November 1951 (ACHRE No. DOE-033195-B), 526.

84 . Defense Nuclear Agency, 23 June 1982 ("Shots Sugar and Jangle: The Final Tests of the Buster-Jangle Series") (ACHRE No. DOE-082294-C), 46.

85 . John R. Hendrickson, July 1952 ("Operation Jangle, Project 6.3-1: Evaluation of Military Individual and Collective Protection Devices and Clothing") (ACHRE No. DOE-121594-C-14), 5.

86 . Ibid.

87 . Ibid., 5, 20.

88 . Ibid., 19.

89 . Ibid., v.

90 . U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, 26 May 1958 ("Supplement [1] to AEC-313 [2-57] USNRDL") (ACHRE No. DOD-091494-A), 1.

91 . Lieutenant Colonel Gordon L. Jacks, CmlC Commanding, to TSG, DA, 12 April 1963 ("Beta Hazard Experiment Using Volunteer Military Personnel") (ACHRE No. DOD-122294-B), 1.

92 . Commanding Officer and Director, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, to Secretary of the Navy, 26 May 1958 ("Authorization for use of radioisotopes on human volunteers, request for") (ACHRE No. DOD-091494-A), 1.

93 . Ibid.

94 . Jacks to TSG, 12 April 1963, 1.

95 . "Research and Development: Use of Volunteers as Subjects of Research," AR 70-25 (1962).

96 . Office of Information Services, Air Force Special Weapons Center, to Headquarters, Air Research Development Command, 27 January 1956 ("Early Cloud Penetration") (ACHRE No. DOE-122894-B), 1.

97 . Air Force Systems Command, January 1963 ("History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling [AFSC Historical Publication Series 61-142-1]") (ACHRE No. DOD-082294-A), 23.

98 . Ibid., 229.

99 . Air Force Systems Command, "History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling," 121.

100 . E. A. Pinson [attr.], 1956 [attr.] ("Gentlemen: this morning I will discuss the following topics . . .") (ACHRE No. DOE-033195-B), 3.

101 . Harold Clark, "I Flew Through an Atomic Hell," Argosy, December 1955, 63.

102 . J. E. Banks et al., 30 April 1958 ("Operation Teapot: Manned Penetrations of Atomic Clouds, Project 2.8b") (ACHRE No. DOE-111694-A), 18.

103 . The researchers found: "There appears to be no significant difference between the dose received inside and outside of the body. This indicates that the radiation which reaches the body surface is of sufficiently high energy that it is not greatly attenuated by the body. If this is the case, then measurements made on the surface of the body are representative of the whole-body dose." Ibid.

104 . James Reeves, Test Manager, to Colonel H. E. Parsons, Deputy for Military Operations, 11 April 1955 ("Radiation Dosage--Project 2.8, Operation Teapot") (ACHRE No. DOE-122894-A), 1.

105 . Ibid.

106 . Banks et al., "Operation Teapot, Manned Penetrations of Atomic Clouds Project 2.8b," 5.

107 . Ibid.

108 . One received 21.8 R and another received 21.7 R. Undated document ("On-Site Personnel Overexposure") (ACHRE No. CORP-091394-A), 6.

109 . Pinson [attr.], 1956 [attr.], "Gentlemen: this morning I will discuss the following topics . . . ," 3.

110 . "The aircraft were B-57Bs. No special filters were installed in the cockpit pressurization system. The pilots and technical observers were given free choice of the setting of their oxygen controls." Colonel E. A. Pinson et al., 24 February 1960 ("Operation Redwing--Project 2.66a: Early Cloud Penetrations") (ACHRE DOE-122894-B), 41.

111 . William Ogle, Headquarters, Task Group 7.1, to Commander Joint Task Force Seven, 8 November 1955 ("Maximum Permissible Radiation Exposure for Personnel Participating in Projects 2.66 and 11.2, Operation Redwing") (ACHRE No. DOE-013195-A), 2.

112 . Pinson et al., "Operation Redwing--Project 2.66a: Early Cloud Penetrations," 5.

113 . Ibid., 41.

114 . Ibid., 51.

115 . E. A. Pinson, interviewed by Patrick Fitzgerald (ACHRE), transcript of audio recording, 21 March 1995 (ACHRE Research Project Series, Interview Program File, Targeted Interview Project), 106.

116 . Ibid., 121.

117 . Office of Information Services to Headquarters, Air Research Development Command, 27 January 1956, 3.

118 . Clarke, "I Flew Through an Atomic Hell," 62.

119 . Interview with Pinson, 21 March 1995, 94.

120 . Air Force Systems Command, "History of Air Force Atomic Cloud Sampling," 66.

121 . Interview with Pinson, 21 March 1995, 15.

122 . Pinson [attr.], 1956 [attr.], "Gentlemen: this morning I will discuss the following topics . . . ," 8.

123 . Raymond Thompson, "A Select Group of ARDC Men Collects Samples from the Mushrooms," Baltimore Sun--Magazine Section, 1 May 1955, 17.

124 . Interview with Pinson, 21 March 1995, 38.

125 . "Center Scientists Fly Through Atom Clouds," Atomic Flyer, 29 April 1955 (ACHRE No. DOE-122894-B), 1.

126 . Office of Information Services to Headquarters, Air Research Development Command, 27 January 1956, 2.

127 . Captain Paul M. Crumley et al., 11 October 1957 ("Operation Teapot--Project 2.8a: Contact Radiation Hazard Associated with Contaminated Aircraft [WT-1122]") (ACHRE No. DOE-111694-A), 9.

128 . Ibid., 20.

129 . Ibid., 21.

130 . Colonel W. B. Kieffer, Deputy Commander, Air Force Special Weapons Center, to K. F. Hertford, Manager, AEC Albuquerque Operations Office, 21 March 1957 ("Recent discussion within the Air Force Special Weapons Center . . .") (ACHRE No. DOE-033195-B), 2.

131 . Thomas Shipman, Los Alamos Laboratory Health Division Leader, to Al Graves, J-Division Leader, 29 March 1957 ("Decontamination of Aircraft at Tests") (ACHRE No. DOE-040595-A), 1. Thomas Shipman also argued that the new procedures could compromise the scientific projects.

Without decontamination there will be inevitable migration of contamination carrying activity to other areas where it may be very undesirable. This letter has completely overlooked the fact that people working at tests invariably have neighbors with special requirements.

Ibid., 2.

132 . Harold F. Plank, to Alvin C. Graves, Los Alamos Laboratory J-Division Leader, 24 April 1957 ("Col. Kieffer's Proposal for the Decontamination of Sampling Aircraft") (ACHRE No. DOE-040595-A), 2.

133 . Colonel W. B. Kieffer, Deputy Commander, Air Force Special Weapons Center, to Colonel Wignall, 22 April 1957 ("Decontamination of Sampler Aircraft at Plumbbob") (ACHRE No. DOE-040595-A), 1.

134 . James Reeves, Test Manager, Nevada Test Organization, to Commander, Air Force Special Weapons Center, Attention: Colonel W. B. Kieffer, Deputy Commander, 14 May 1957 ("Reference is made to your letter of March 21, 1957 . . . ") (ACHRE No. DOE-032895-A), 2.

135 . First Lieutenant William J. Jameson, 7 October 1957 ("Aircraft Decontamination Study") (ACHRE No. DOE-022395-B), 1.

136 . The decontamination experiment had several further components. Lead vests were tested and found to provide a 6.0 percent reduction in exposure levels for air crews. In addition, the experiment tested the consequences of using a fork lift to remove air crews from contaminated planes versus the consequences of letting them climb out with a standard ladder. It concluded that the fork lift was unnecessary. Ibid., 5-6.

Also at Plumbbob a project was undertaken "to measure the radiation dose, both from neutrons and gamma rays, received by an air crew delivering an MB-1 rocket." The report on the research states: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the conduct of a test as a part of Operation Plumbbob in order to obtain the necessary experimental measurements." The report indicates that six studies were involved. Captain Kermit C. Kaericher and First Lieutenant James E. Banks, 11 October 1957 ("Operation PLUMBBOB--Project 2.9: Nuclear Radiation Received by Aircrews Firing the MB-1 Rocket") (ACHRE No. DOD-082294-A), 9.

137 . The Advisory Committee is also aware of three more research activities involving atomic veterans. As noted, the body fluid sampling research is discussed in chapter 13. In addition, as mentioned in endnotes in this chapter, the Advisory Committee notes experiments involving fallout shelters and the measurement of radiation exposure to air crews delivering the MB-1 rocket. The inclusion of the subjects of these three types of experiments, however, does not change our estimate that human research in connection with bomb tests involved no more than 3,000 subjects.

138 . DOD records did not permit the identification of individuals who participated in particular research projects, and remaining reports do not always indicate the number of subjects. The basis for the very rough estimate of 2,000 to 3,000 research subjects in the activities reviewed by the Committee including those noted in endnote 137 is (l) 1,500 to 2,200 test-site subjects in the psychological and physiological testing, based on reports, as cited in this chapter, for three experiments and an estimated maximum of 800 for the fourth; (2) a dozen test-site subjects in the 1955 body-fluid-sampling research, as cited in the report on this research referenced in chapter 13, and an assumed comparable number for the 1956 research, for which no similar figures appear available; (3) about 100 participants in the flashblindness research, an estimate DOD provided to the Committee; (4) in the range of perhaps one dozen or two dozen participants in aircrew experiments, and perhaps a dozen to several dozen participants in decontamination experiments; (5) perhaps several dozen participants in the protective equipment research; (6) sixteen participants in shelter research; and (7) several dozen participants in the officer volunteer program. See further endnotes for citations related to particular research.

139 . The permissible level of risk to which humans could be exposed in connection with bomb tests lay at the balance point of several factors. Radiation was not the only risk at issue; harm from blast and thermal burn were also possible.

140 . Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 118.

141 . Marion W. Boyer, AEC General Manager, to Honorable Robert LeBaron, Chairman, Military Liaison Committee, 10 January 1951 ("As you know, one of the important problems . . .") (ACHRE No. DOE-040395-B-1).

142 . Shipman to Warren, 15 September 1951, 1.

143 . Shields Warren, Director, AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, to Carroll Tyler, Manager, Sante Fe Operations Office, 11 October 1951 ("Permissible Levels of Radiation Exposure for Test Personnel") (ACHRE No. DOE-013195-A), 1.

144 . Warren's concern was not radiation risk, but injury from the blast. Shields Warren, Director, AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, to Brigadier General K. E. Fields, Director, Division of Military Application, 25 March 1952 ("Draft Staff Paper on Troop Participation in Operation Tumbler-Snapper") (ACHRE No. DOE-040395-A), 1.

145 . Gordon Dean, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to Brigadier General H. B. Loper, Chief, Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, 2 April 1952 ("Reference is made to letter of March 7, 1952 . . . ") (ACHRE No. DOD-100694-A), 2.

146 . Captain Harry H. Haight to General Fields, 21 August 1952 ("Exercise--Desert Rock IV") (ACHRE No. DOE-013195-A), 1. According to this review of Desert Rock activities, "The military importance of permitting major personnel exposures or decreases in drifting distances is not evident from the report. For the Commission to prescribe one limitation for the test personnel and allow greater latitude for the DOD would seem to be unwise and unnecessary. The Commission should strongly object to any special dispensation to the DOD which could possibly result in personnel casualties whether immediate or delayed." Ibid.

147 . Colonel John C. Oakes, by direction of the Chief of Staff, to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 5 June 1952 ("Indoctrination of Personnel in Atomic Warfare Operations") (ACHRE No. NARA-112594-A), 1.

148 . C. D. Eddleman, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, 15 December 1952 ("Complete Discussion" [attachment to "Positioning of Troops at Atomic Weapons Tests"]), 1. In a 1953 memorandum to an AEC committee created to study the Nevada Test Site, Division of Biology and Medicine Director John Bugher similarly wrote:

While it may be stated with considerable certainty that no significant injury is going to result to any individual participating in test operations at the levels mentioned [3.9 R], and while it is true that the same thing would probably have to be said were the limits to be set two or three times as high, it nevertheless is true that there is no threshold to significant injury in this field, and the legal position of the Commission at once deteriorates if there is deliberate departure from . . . the accepted permissible limit.

John C. Bugher, Director, AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, to Members of the Committee to Study NPG, 8 September 1953 ("Interpretation of the Standards of Radiological Exposure") (ACHRE No. DOE-040395-A), 3-4.

149 . M. W. Boyer, AEC General Manager, to Major General H. B. Loper, Chief, AFSWP, 8 January 1953 ("Reference is made to letter from Chief . . .") (ACHRE No. DOE-121594-C-8), 2.

150 . Jark to Distribution, 20 February 1953, "Instructions for Positioning DA [Department of Army] Personnel at Continental Atomic Tests," 1.

151 . Ibid., 2-3.

152 . General Cooney presented this view at a July 1951 conference on Past and Future Atomic Tests. Major Sven A. Bach, Development Branch, Research and Development Division, 12 July 1951 ("Conference at OCAFF, Fort Monroe, Virginia, re Past and Future Atomic Weapons Tests") (ACHRE No. NARA-042295-C), 1.

153 . Atomic Energy Commission, minutes of meeting no. 862, 13 May 1953 (ACHRE DOE-013195-A), 2.

154 . Ibid.

155 . Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, to Chief of Naval Operations, 14 February 1952 ("Radiological Defense Training, comments and recommendations on") (ACHRE No. DOD-080295-B), 1. The proposal would have limited "the dosage of all personnel to 0.3 roentgens per week." Chief of Naval Operations to Chief, Bureau of Medicine, 23 January 1952 ("Atomic Defense Training") (ACHRE No. DOD-080295-B), 1. The proposal originated with the Pacific Fleet. See Commander, Mine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 17 December 1951 ("Radiological Defense Training") (ACHRE No. DOD-080295-B), 1. In counseling against the use of "area contamination," BuMed solicited advice from the AEC on an isotope that "would have such characteristics that the internal hazard involved would be minimized even though amounts to be used would produce as much as 10 mr/hr, gamma radiation, three feet from the surface of the contaminated area." Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, to Director, AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, February 1952 ("Radiological Defense Training, use of radioisotopes in") (ACHRE No. DOD-080295-B), 1.

156 . Shipman's comments were specifically directed at the establishment of standards for exposure to the general public. Thomas L. Shipman, Los Alamos Laboratory Health Division Leader, to Gordon Dunning, AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, 14 August 1956 ("Thanks for sending the draft concerning exposure . . .") (ACHRE No. DOE-022195-C), 1.

157 . Department of Energy, Announced United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 Through December 1992 (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, May 1993), 65 (shot Climax in 1953). In the early days, when entirely new types of experimental weapons were being rapidly developed and tested, it was not uncommon for a particular yield to exceed estimates by 50 percent or more. In an October 1957 memorandum to AEC Division of Biology and Medicine director Charles Dunham, Shipman explained that the unpredictability of weapons effects was making biomedical experimentation increasingly difficult. "All too often preshot estimates of yields etc. are just enough in error to make the results of effects tests useless." Thomas L. Shipman, Los Alamos Laboratory Health Division Leader, to Charles Dunham, AEC Division of Biology and Medicine, 7 October 1957 ("Payne Harris is planning to attend the meeting . . .") (ACHRE No. DOE-120894-C), 2.

158 . T. L. Shipman, Los Alamos Laboratory Health Division Leader, to Alvin C. Graves, J-Division Leader, 6 August 1956 ("Permissible Exposures") (ACHRE No. DOE-021095-B), 1.

159 . Summary information provided by DOD in August 1995 provides a total of 216,507 participants in atmospheric tests, beginning with Trinity in 1945 and concluding with Dominic II in 1962. This tabulation shows about 1,200 instances of exposure in excess of 5 rem. The "total dose may have been measured by one or more film badges, may have been reconstructed, or may be the sum of both film badge data and reconstruction." Some individuals participated in more than one test. Defense Nuclear Agency, 8 August 1995 ("Summary of External Doses for DOD Atmospheric Nuclear Test Participants as of 24 February 1994") (ACHRE No. DOD-081195-A). See also testimony of Major General Ken Hagemann: Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Human Radiation and Other Scientific Experiments: The Federal Government's Role, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 25 January 1994, 49-50.

Coincident with the beginning of epidemiological studies discussed in the text above, and growing congressional and public interest in the atomic vets, the Defense Department undertook an information-gathering effort called the "NTPR" (Nuclear Test Personnel Review). The NTPR includes a database, which seeks to include those who participated at tests in an effort to reconstruct the doses they received at tests, and a multivolume history of the bomb tests, which is available in many libraries.

160 . Stafford L. Warren, Radiological Safety Consultant, Joint Task Force One, to Admiral Parsons, 6 January 1947 ("Hazards from Residual Radioactivity on the Crossroads Target Vessels") (ACHRE No. DOE-033195-B), 2.

161 . Jonathan M. Weisgall, Operation Crossroads: The Atomic Tests at Bikini Atoll (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1994), 210-214, 270-271. Only fragmentary records of the Medico-Legal Board remain.

162 . The Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory, the new research laboratory, was established at the Hunter's Point Naval Shipyard in San Francisco, the port to which some ships contaminated in the 1946 Crossroads tests were sent.

163 . George M. Lyon, Assistant Chief Medical Director for Research and Education, to Committee on Veterans Medical Problems, National Research Council, 8 December 1952 ("Medical Research Programs of the Veterans Administration") (ACHRE No. VA-052594-A), 553.

164 . Ibid.

165 . Ibid.

166 . J. J. Fee, Commander, USN, as quoted in Weisgall, Operation Crossroads, 273-274.

167 . Lyon to Committee on Veterans Medical Problems, 8 December 1952, 554.

168 . Ibid.

169 . Ibid.

170 . Ibid. The report was retrieved by the VA at the time of the Advisory Committee's formation in 1994. In an April 1994 statement to the Committee, VA Secretary Jesse Brown stated his determination to find the facts related to the Confidential Division. To this end the VA reviewed significant amounts of documentary information and called on its inspector general to conduct a further review.

171 . Ibid., 554.

172 . Ibid., 553-554.

173 . Major General Herbert B. Loper, Chief, AFSWP, to the Administrator, Veterans Administration, Attention: George M. Lyon, 8 August 1952 ("This activity has received information . . .") (ACHRE No. DOD-100694-A), 1.

174 . Ibid. The specific rule or policy that provided for the record keeping referred to in this letter was not located. Thus, it is not clear whether the record keeping referred only to nuclear war-related exposures or more generally to exposures at bomb tests or other nuclear weapons-related activities as well.

175 . William Middleton, VA Chief Medical Director, to the VA Administrator, 13 May 1959 ("Recommendation for Administrator's Exceptional Service Award") (ACHRE No. VA-102594-A), 1.

176 . Ibid.

177 . "12 January 1995 Review of Effort to Identify Involvement with Radiation Exposure of Human Subjects," Inspector General, Department of Veterans Affairs. The inspector general (IG) found that "an 'Atomic Medicine Division' was discussed as a means to deal with potential claims from veterans as a result of exposure to radiation from atomic bomb testing and to be the focal point for VA civil defense planning and support in case of nuclear war. However, claims did not materialize at that time and evidence indicates that the Division was not activated." Stephen A. Trodden, VA Inspector General, to VA Chief of Staff, 12 January 1995 ("Review of Effort to Identify Involvement with Radiation Exposure of Human Subjects") (ACHRE No. VA-011795-A), 1.

With regard to the 1952 history prepared by Dr. Lyon for the National Research Council, which has been previously quoted in the text, the IG stated that "the reference to the Atomic Medicine Division should not be taken literally as documentation that a Division was ever established." Ibid., 4.

178 . In communications with Defense Department officials two alternatives were offered: (l) that the records may have been confidential medical examination data taken from participants in Crossroads, pursuant to a regulation providing for such exams; (2) that the records may have related to exposures of military scientists or technicians who worked at the Manhattan Project and were confidential because they contained weapons design or production-related data.

Navy regulations in 1947 provided that

All personnel, both military and civilian, who may be exposed to radiation or radioactive hazard, will be required to have a complete physical examination prior to commencing such duty. Special medical records separate from the normal individuals' health records will be set up and they will be classified as confidential, until declassification is permitted.

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 31 January 1947 ("Appendix B--Current Directives; Subject: Safety Regulations for Work in Target Vessels formerly JTF-1") (ACHRE No. DOD-020795-A), B-22. The Navy was not able to locate the records referred to.

The VA told the Committee that "the volume of classified records that are unaccounted for by the VA is too small to have constituted a defense against liability claims." Susan H. Mather, M.D., M.P.H., letter to Dan Guttman (ACHRE), 17 July 1995. Based on discussions with the VA, the basis for this statement appears to be the fact that there were more than 200,000 test participants, and the safe maintained by Dr. Lyon (in which secret documents would presumably have been kept) was relatively small. In the absence of the documents themselves, the VA's statement appears to be only one of several possible speculative alternatives. For example, the VA also explained that few claims eventuated in the period of Dr. Lyon's service; thus, the magnitude of necessary filekeeping may not have been great. Alternatively, documents kept by Dr. Lyon could have been summary documents, which referred to materials in other files. Finally, the VA's statement is also consistent with the possibility that files were kept but that their contents were deemed inadequate to constitute a defense against potential claims.

179 . NEPA Medical Advisory Panel, Subcommittee IX, proceedings of 22 July 1949 (ACHRE No. DOD-121494-A-2), 17-18. The meeting is further discussed in the Introduction.

180 . Ibid., 18.

181 . Ibid.

182 . Department of Defense, Research and Development Board, Committee on Medical Sciences, proceedings of 23 May 1950 (ACHRE No. DOD-080694-A), 10.

183 . Caldwell et al., "Leukemia Among Participants in Military Maneuvers at Nuclear Bomb Tests," Journal of the American Medical Association 244, no. 14 (1980).

184 . Caldwell et al., "Mortality and Cancer Frequency Among Military Nuclear Test Participants, 1957 through 1959," Journal of the American Medical Association 250, no. 5 (1983).

185 . C. D. Robinette et al., Studies of Participants in Nuclear Weapons Test: Final Report (Washington, D.C.: National Research Council, May 1985).

186 . See U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Health and Safety: Mortality Study of Atmospheric Nuclear Test Participants Is Flawed (Gaithersburg, Md.: GAO, 1992), 4. Helen Gelband, Health Program, Office of Technology Assessment, Mortality of Nuclear Weapons Tests Participants (Washington, D.C.: Office of Technology Assessment, August 1992), 4.

187 . The data appear in table 1 of Clark W. Heath, Chairman, Institute of Medicine (IOM) Committee on the Mortality of Military Personnel Present at Atmospheric Tests of Nuclear Weapons, and John E. Till, Chairman, IOM Dosimetry Working Group, to D. Michael Schaeffer, Program Manager, DNA Nuclear Test Personnel Review, 15 May 1995 ("A Review of the Dosimetry Data Available in the Nuclear Test Personnel Review [NTPR] Program: An Interim Letter Report of the Committee to Study the Mortality of Military Personnel Present at Atmospheric Tests of Nuclear Weapons") (ACHRE No. NAS-051595-A), 9.

188 . Hacker, Elements of Controversy, 96.

189 . The memo explained that the need had been foreseen, but the request for dosimeters had only been partially filled. The memo recorded that 175 "0-5 R dosimeters" were on hand at the Nevada Test Site, but a minimum of 325 were needed for an operation the size of Upshot-Knothole. Colonel Leonard F. Dow, Acting Director, Weapons Effects Tests, to Manager, AEC Santa Fe Operations, 19 February 1954 ("Rad-Safe Equipment for Nevada Proving Grounds") (ACHRE No. DOE-020795-D), 1.

190 . Irving L. Branch, Chief of Staff, AFSWP, to Chief of Research and Development, OCS, Department of the Army, 20 January 1956 ("Annex 'A' to 2nd Indorsement: Detailed Explanation of AFSWP Comments on Feasibility of Human Volunteer Program") (ACHRE No. DOD-030895-F), 2.

191 . Clark W. Heath and John E. Till, IOM, to D. Michael Schaeffer, DNA, "An Interim Letter Report of the Committee to Study the Mortality of Military Personnel Present at Atmospheric Tests of Nuclear Weapons," 15 May 1995.

192 . K. K. Watanabe, H. K. Kang, and N. A. Dalager, "Cancer Mortality Risk Among Military Participants of a 1955 Atmospheric Nuclear Weapons Test," American Journal of Public Health 85 (April 1995).

193 . S. Raman, G. S. Dulberg, R. A. Spasoff, and T. Scott, "Mortality Among Canadian Military Personnel Exposed to Low Dose Radiation," Canadian Medical Association Journal 136 (1987): 1051-1056.

194 . S. C. Darby, G. M. Kendall, T. P. Fell et al., "A Summary of Mortality and Incidence of Cancer in Men from the United Kingdom Who Participated in the United Kingdom's Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Tests and Experimental Programs," British Medical Journal 296 (1988): 332-338.

195 . Human Radiation Experiments: The Federal Government's Role, Hearings before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 25 January 1994, 160.

196 . DNA, "Summary of External Doses for DOD Atmospheric Nuclear Test Participants as of 24 February 1994."

197 . These laws are further discussed in the Committee's recommendations. In enacting the 1984 Veterans' Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, Congress, among other items, found

(8) The 'film badges' which were originally issued to members of the Armed Forces in connection with the atmospheric nuclear test program have previously constituted a primary source of dose information for . . . veterans filing claims . . . .

(9) These film badges often provide an incomplete measure of radiation exposure, since they were not capable of recording inhaled, ingested, or neutron doses (although the DNA currently has the capability to reconstruct individual estimates of such doses), were not issued to most of the participants in nuclear tests, often provided questionable readings because they were shielded during the detonation, and were worn for only limited periods during and after each nuclear detonation.

(10) Standards governing the reporting of dose estimates in connection with radiation-related disability claims . . . vary among the several branches of the Armed Services, and no uniform minimum standards exist.

198 . For example, Frances Brown, of Southwick, Massachusetts, told the Committee of her late husband's experience as a navigator who flew through clouds at weapons tests. Colonel Brown was assigned the duty and was given no protective clothing; he died of cancer in 1983. Ms. Brown shared with the Committee the story of years of inquiry, and her continuing inability to obtain all documents that might shed light on the duty he undertook in the service of his country.

Nancy Lynch, of Santa Barbara, California, told the Committee of her late husband's involvement in the Desert Rock exercises at Operation Teapot in 1955 and her questions regarding the dose reconstruction that was ultimately provided by the government.

Vernon Sousa, a San Francisco veteran, told of years of government "stonewalling" of his information requests. He explained that the oath of secrecy he had taken limited his own ability to discuss the tests for decades after his time in the service ended.

Charles McKay of Severna Park, Maryland, a Navy diver at Operation Crossroads, recalled that he received no briefing on radiation risks before his participation. Mr. McKay said that he received a very low dose reconstruction report from the government, which he believed to be highly inaccurate because it did not take into account diving experiences on Crossroads wrecks.

Rebecca Harrod Stringer of St. Augustine, Florida, wrote to the Committee about the Navy service of her late father in Operation Dominic I, a nuclear weapons test in the Pacific, and the fifteen years it took to obtain copies of his military and medical records.

Linda Terry of California talked of obtaining information about her late father's experiences at the Buster-Jangle tests in 1951-52. She called for full disclosure of information about the weapons tests "so that families do not have to live in the darkness" of not knowing.

Harry Lester of Albuquerque, New Mexico, testified that he was responsible for cleanup at Operation Castle and that he experienced radiation sickness as a result of his exposure. After his involvement in Castle, he was shipped to an Albuquerque hospital every six months for examinations. He told the Committee that his full records remain to be found.

Langdon Harrison of Albuquerque told the Committee about his experiences in cloud flying activities at Operations Redwing and Plumbbob. He recalled routine carelessness in the handling of the film badges of the pilots of cloud flythroughs and occasions when significantly different dose readings were recorded on film badges and personal dosimeters.

Representatives of "atomic veterans" organizations also shared with the Committee information collected in years of research on behalf of themselves and others. These included Pat Broudy of California, whose late husband died of lymphoma and had served at the occupation of Nagasaki, Bikini, and in three Nevada tests; Dr. Oscar Rosen of Massachusetts, who participated in Crossroads; and Fred Allingham of California, whose father served in the occupation of Nagasaki and died several years later of leukemia.

199 . The new rules stemmed from the development of a new howitzer. Late in the development cycle a medical hazards review found that alteration to the firing routine was needed if the weapon was to be employed without injuring U.S. soldiers. The discovery caused a long and expensive delay while biomedical studies of blast overpressure effects were done in animals and man and engineering solutions were sought to reduce the hazard. After this experience, the Army determined to conduct health hazard assessments (HHAs) early in the development of weapons and equipment, so that new material is not brought on line with unnecessarily great health and safety risk to the troops using it.

Relevant DOD directives (DODD) and Army regulations are the following: DODD 5000.1, "Defense Acquisition"; DODD 5000.2," "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures"; AR 70-1; "Army Acquisition Policy"; AR 602-1, "Human Factors Engineering Program"; AR 602-2, "Manpower and Personnel Integration (MANPRINT) in the System Acquisition Process"; AR 385-16, "System Safety Engineering and Management"; AR 40-10, "Health Hazard Assessment Program in Support of the Army Material Acquisition Decision Process"; and AR 70-75, "Survivability of Army Personnel and Material."

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