whatever oversight system you want to put on 1 adequate performance is going to depend on us putting 2 the systems in that everything else rides on. 3 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Let i.t me put 4 different way then. What changes, if any, are you now 5 going to implement because NNSA is requiring you to do 6 something different, or because of their changes that 7 they are making from their point of view? So I've 8 concluded you would be doing this anyway. 9 ADMIRAL NANOS: Yes. No, I can't think of 10 anything that I'm going to change, unless they decide 11 to forbid us from doing things. If you're trying to 12 And Ralph has indicated he's going to 13 forbid me making any improvement. 14 15 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: With that, then I want to thank you very much for the time and effort you put 16 into preparing your testimony, and we wish you success 17 in your operations. Thank you all. And with that, 18 19 we'll ask for the contingent from Livermore. We'll start with you, Camille, if I may. 20 MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Okay. That's fine. 21 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: If you want to at any 22 23 time put your statement in the record to summarize, they'll do it whichever way you want to do it. 24 25 MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: I shall do that.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Board, thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony in regards to the Livermore Site Office's oversight of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Because I have submitted for the record, I will go ahead and summarize.

As you are aware, in the December Fiscal Year 02, realignment of NNSA, one of the major missions of the Site Office is for operations oversight, contract administration, as well as the [risk] acceptance official for NNSA.

In that role as the Site Manager, I take my responsibilities in the area of safety and security extremely seriously. I am committed to a technically sound and effective safety program.

I'm going to describe to you today the federal organization, as well as the staffing capabilities that I've put together towards this oversight role, as well as our model for oversight.

And I will also make some comments on the lessons learned from the Shuttle Columbia accident.

When I first became Site Manager, I looked internally within our organization, and I wanted to determine what I needed to do within the organization so that I could be the "risk acceptor" and do that job

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In such, I looked at the organization, I looked at the staffing, as well as our technical capability of the staff, such that it can provide me with the analysis, and the advice and recommendations for me to make the final decisions as the "risk acceptor" for NNSA.

that end. for the Livermore Site To Office, as far as our organization is concerned, I have implemented a structure that has been approved by Ambassador Brooks of a two Deputy concept. One Deputy for National Security Operations, and one technical Deputy for the Safety and Environmental Programs area. And the first Deputy for the National Security is responsible for all program oversight at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, including the projects, our safeguard infrastructure activities, security, business management, and the overall coordination of the contract performance evaluation process.

The second deputy is a technical Deputy, responsible for all the areas that you're looking at, which is in the areas of nuclear safety, ES&H, the implementation of ISM, the Environmental Management [EM] Programs. And that Deputy is responsible for having a system in place to assure that the nuclear

safety Authorizations Bases are adhered to at the Site.

With those two technical deputies, I rely on them, as well as other professionals within our organization and outside of our organization to provide me with the advice to make the final decisions that I need to make.

In regards to staffing, I believe you were out at our Site in September of `02. At that point in time, we committed to you that we would move subject matter experts into our Site Office in the areas of fire protection, Quality Assurance, seismic, as well as fill a systems engineering position, as well as a senior ES&H advisor. To this date, we have completed all of those actions within the NNSA Approved Staffing Plan of 90 FTEs, approximately 35 people are devoted to the area of ES&H. That is up from 29 in 2002.

I currently have five FRs in the nuclear facilities, and three in the non-nuclear facilities. We are down by two FRs, and that is the recent departures. The two FRs received promotions elsewhere within the NNSA and DOE system. I am in the process of backfilling those positions.

In addition, I am advertising for a Health Physicist position. The SME that we had has been

1	reassigned and, therefore, our Radiation Protection
2	Program has suffered. And this is an area that I need
3	to pay particular attention to until we fill that
4	position, and get someone capable to take on the
5	responsibilities.
6	DR. MANSFIELD: Let me ask a question I
7	asked of Mr. Erickson. The two FRs who have moved on
8	due to promotions, how long did it take them to become
9	qualified?
10	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: It took them around 12
11	to 18 months to become qualified.
12	DR. MANSFIELD: How long did they stay in
13	the FR positions?
14	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: They were fairly new.
15	They were about three years.
16	DR. MANSFIELD: Okay. Well, that's longer
17	than the six months we were talking about.
18	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Yes. And again, they
19	did move onto other FR positions at other Site Offices
20	[one as an FR and one to Headquarters].
21	DR. MANSFIELD: All right. That's good.
22	That's all right.
23	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Yes, so they're still
24	within the NNSA-DOE system.
25	DR. MANSFIELD: That's good. On the issue

of the radiological SME, was he assigned at his own 1 initiative, or did you just need to pick him up for 2 the Radiological Systems Program? In other words, 3 since he was doing SME work for Radiation Safety 4 5 Oversight, why wasn't it possible for him to do the Radiological Assistance Program at the same time, 6 without giving up the SME? 7 MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: I see. Yes, we had him 8 doing both at the same time. 9 The Radiological after 9/11, the activities Assistance Program 10 increased significantly. And Headquarters has decided 11 that they want to designate full-time Radiological 12 Assistance people. And, therefore, he was designated 13 as one who is full-time. That is why I am in the 14 process of backfilling. 15 Okay. For a subject DR. MANSFIELD: 16 matter expert, do you have a formal qualification 17 program, it's not like a fac rep where you need to 18 19 know every pipe and cable run. A subject matter expert is qualified immediately, in effect, by being 20 an expert? 21 MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Exactly, through their 22 education, as well as their experience. 23 DR. MANSFIELD: Thank you. 2.4 25 Okay. I also -- and, MS. YUAN-SOO HOO:

Mr. Chairman, you have asked previously to dwell on the NNSA Service Center for experts from time to time where those positions are not needed full-time on And I do have a Service Level Agreement with the Service Center for that.

In terms of our Technical Qualifications Program, that was the other thing that I looked into, and am aggressively pushing on. This is a program where I think statistically, we are behind, but there's a reason for that. In terms of our Technical Qualification Program, we totally have revamped that program, to bring more structure, formality, and rigor into the program. And as a result, we have asked everyone to re-qualify, and so people have been re-qualifying. We're about over 50 percent qualified as of this date, and that's been aggressive effort. And I expect to continue with that will effort. And we meet that 75 qualification from a departmental average, I think early sometime next year.

In terms of my role as the Risk Acceptance Official, that is delegated to me through NNSA, and through the official NNSA Functions, Responsibilities, and Authority Manual, or the FRAM. And I carry out those responsibilities through my role а

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To assist me in terms of the Contracting role, Ι do have Contracting Officer Officer Representatives that have been formally appointed both within Site Office, as well as NNSA at. And in that role, I do integrate the Headquarters. direction to the Laboratories, as well as provide contract requirements where it comes to ES&H, as well as nuclear safety, and so on.

And, as well as, as part of my responsibility in terms of the ultimate acceptor of risk, I need to also assure myself that I have a oversight model in place that will provide me with the feedback that the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory is performing as expected by the Department.

So with that, I will describe our oversight model, and give you some indications as to the maturity, or whether it's in the developmental stages or not.

Our oversight model is based on it being constructive, as well as value-added. And we focus on metrics, observations, assessments, and validations, certifications to assure ourselves that the elements of risk are controlled. And we separate our oversight model into five different components.

The first one is our operational awareness activities. And that is simply defined as day-to-day activities to determine how well the contractor is performing their requirements. And we do that via walk-throughs, surveillances, validations, checking on corrective actions to determine whether it's been done, looking at some of the documentation, and also the meetings and communications with contractors from a real-time standpoint.

And this is a fairly mature system for us. We do also have standard operating procedures within our office. FRs are stationed in the nuclear facilities. We do have space, and they're stationed there. The subject matter experts are also required to do walk-throughs on at least a monthly basis. Even Senior Managers, including myself, are required to do walk-throughs. And the walk-through results are documented and fed into the system for review.

The second area that we do are in the form of reviews and audits. And the reviews and audits take from the form of external reviews, to internal reviews are done by the Site Office. External reviews could be from entities, such as the California state, the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency], the Office of Performance Assurance (Glenn Podonsky's

organization), IG [Inspector General], GAO [General Accounting Office], that type of reviews.

In addition, that is complimented by our own internal reviews, and those reviews could be periodic reviews to for-cause reviews. And again, those reviews are always coordinated in terms of notify to Headquarters so that they are aware of the reviews. And for the reviews that we conduct ourselves, we generally ask whether the Headquarters organizations would like to participate. There is an opportunity for that.

Thirdly, in terms of reporting system monitoring, as you're well aware, the Department has a number of systems in place for reporting safety issues. And we do do that, and we do communicate with NNSA in terms of the areas that we have issues with, as well as real-time notification when the issues are significant. And this is an area where we need to put a little more work into, in the regard that while the data is in the system, we have not done as well as we should in terms of analyzing the data, and in tracking and trending it. And that is one area where we're in the process of making sure that we can put systems together to improve upon that.

The fourth area is in terms of contractor

performance measures and metrics. And that, in itself, deals with the University of California contract, the Appendix F process, which we have developed so-called top objectives that have been accepted by the NNSA Senior Leadership, the University of California, as well as the Laboratory Directors. And specifically, in the area that you're interested in, we have a performance objective dealing with maintaining a secure, safe, environmentally sound, and effective and efficient operations in terms of the mission objectives.

And tiered down from that particular objective, we do have performance measures in terms of continuing improvement in the ISM area, as well as in terms of improvements in the performance of the nuclear safety area. So those areas are specifically evaluated on an annual basis, and with Ambassador Brooks being personally involved.

The review is supported not only by lessons learned self-assessments, but also by results of the areas that I mentioned before in terms of internal-external reviews, our operational awareness, tracking and trending of data that is in the current system.

Lastly, in terms of our contractor

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assurance is the new Contractor Assurance System. And that is in the developmental stages. Both Lawrence Livermore is putting together an extensive effort to get a solid Contractor Assurance System in place, and we are working with them. And that is, again as I said, it's evolving.

Now I also wanted to make some comments in regards to the Headquarters interactions, as well as their role in terms of oversight. I have never found, from standpoint, lack ofinterest my а from Headquarters, may it be Ambassador Brooks, or Dr. Beckner on down, in terms of the activities on Site, whether they're ES&H or program activities. They are always accessible in terms οf telephone calls, e-mails, etcetera.

And we do keep them aware, and we generally use staff within Dr. Beckner's office as the focal point when we have safety issues. We call, report, either e-mail or what, discuss it with them. And that is usually where the requests go in as far as if anyone would like to participate in any of our own on-Site reviews.

I consider myself as the Site Manager, part of NNSA, an extension of Ambassador Brooks. So from that standpoint, while the NNSA realignment

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strived to reach clarity in terms of roles and responsibilities, from the Headquarters' standpoint as well as Site Office standpoint. And again, we're in the process, and I think we get better day by day from that standpoint.

I don't see it as a Headquarters versus Field or Site Office standpoint. We all perform the same function, but we just have different roles and responsibilities. We're accountable for different things.

As far as our own self-assessment program is concerned, we have had a self-assessment program. It can be improved, but I think that it has been a fairly structured self-assessment process; especially in the ES&H area. What is still in the developmental stages is in all the other functional areas. for not done as well in the other areas However, we have conducted ISM self-assessments. self-assessments, and I would say on almost an annual We're in the process of conducting one now, as basis. well as the Service Center has just finished up a QA But before they came, we performed a assessment. self-assessment ourselves.

So it's my expectation that we perform self-assessments, and what we need to do now is to

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make sure that the self-assessments we do are of good quality, high standards. We defined the craft to be used, and conduct them. And also have outside participants where resources are available to do that.

Now as far as the Shuttle Columbia is concerned, when that report came out, and I read the report, and it gave me great concern in terms of making sure that we within NNSA take lessons learned, and we benefit from those lessons learned, difficult of an accident as it was. So from that standpoint, we talked with the Laboratory. The Laboratory also read the report, got the teams together. Our Senior Nuclear Safety Advisor is a part of the team with General Haeckel, and is working actively in terms of looking at NNSA-wide Lessons learned. While we also have an internal team within our Site Office that is looking at areas that we could learn from from a Site Office standpoint. team also works with the Livermore contractor in terms of their efforts, in terms of the lessons learned.

So I guess in conclusion, let me just say that I am committed to a technically sound and effective Safety Operational Oversight Program. And I believe that there is continuous improvement that we will continue to undertake. And in the areas of

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safety, it takes a commitment, a culture, and a continuous practice. And for me to do my job well in the long-run, I think, Mr. Chairman, you've said in previous testimony, is that we're all here in terms of the long-term viability of the science at our national laboratories. And so if I do my job well, that is an indication in terms of their long-term viability. But at the same time, if I do my job well, I think that the workers at Livermore, as well as the community and the general American public, can be assured that NNSA is performing its federal role.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Thank you. Dr. Eggenberger.

VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: With respect to the Columbia accident, and with respect to safety, are there any changes that you anticipate or can see in your organization with respect to how it does assessments and analysis of safety data?

MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: What we are seeking in our organization is that there are several factors that can be learned. One is in terms of the communication process, and I, for one, do not want to have any indication from folks that they cannot come to me with a difference in opinion in terms of any safety issues. And so from that standpoint, from an

open door standpoint, whenever we review any safety document, the team is invited to present to me their recommendations and advice. And that's all team members. And so, that's one lesson from the Shuttle Columbia, but we've already implemented that, and had that in place prior to the report coming out.

In addition, some of the other issues related to whether safety professionals are considered as support staff, or an integral part of conducting the mission of the Laboratories. And that is one that I think that we, as well as the Laboratory, have to work on more, because I think whenever you're in an area where there are specific rules and regulations that you have to comply with, there is always the perception that you are dealing with compliance, for the sake of compliance, versus mission accomplishment. And I think that is a culture that we need to continue to move with, from the standpoint that safety is not -- it's not one or the other - safety or mission accomplishment. Safety is integral to mission accomplishment, and we do both together.

VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Dr. Mansfield.

DR. MANSFIELD: Nothing.

DR. MATTHEWS: Your role as the Risk

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	Acceptance Official, it's a powerful statement, in my
2	opinion.
3	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Yes, it is.
4	DR. MATTHEWS: And I'll ask the same
5	question I asked Mr. Erickson. What do you see as the
6	three biggest risks at the Livermore Site? And how do
7	you convince yourself that the risks are acceptable?
8	In fact, what processes do you use to assure that?
9	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Okay. I would say that
10	the three that I probably am most concerned about,
11	certainly the Superblock activities, our plutonium
12	activities. The second one would be the explosive
13	activities that we have at Site 300. Can I give you
14	four?
15	DR. MATTHEWS: Sure. Two will do, but
16	four
17	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Certainly, we also have
18	our Waste Operations. The other one that I continue
19	to be concerned with, and I know that Mike is actively
20	working with, is the integration of ISM, and the
21	integration of corrective actions across the whole
22	laboratory, as opposed to just looking at it in a
23	stovepipe fashion between each directorate.
24	DR. MATTHEWS: So the second part of my
25	question is: what process do you use to convince

yourself that the risk is acceptable?

MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Oh, yes. Okay. The process I use is through a number of factors; the advice that I obtain from my technical professionals within the Site Office; and that is through their day-to-day surveillance, walk-throughs, my personal walk-throughs. For instance, whenever I am about to approve a particular safety document, there have been times where I have gone out to take a look at exactly what that entails.

I also, whenever I look at the risk associated with things, I also do not hesitate to call some of my counterparts, or folks within NNSA to discuss on a more generic basis, the issues that I'm faced with, to just get some outside opinion.

I also have experts within the Lawrence Livermore Lab that I also seek out advice from, so that I make sure that I get advice and recommendations from all sorts before I make that recommendation, so that I can better assess the level of risk that I'm accepting.

DR. MATTHEWS: Do you use any formal risk-based criteria that looks at the consequence and likelihood?

MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Our Nuclear Safety

## **NEAL R. GROSS**

1	Experts do.
2	DR. MATTHEWS: Okay. And one final
3	question. Mr. Erickson testified that he has no
4	programmatic responsibilities in his role. Is that
5	true for you too?
6	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: It is true from the
7	sense that we do not have delegated programmatic
8	responsibilities from Dr. Beckner in the DP [Defense
9	Programs] side of the house. We do have some
10	delegated programmatic responsibilities on the EM
11	side of the house, outside of NNSA.
12	DR. MATTHEWS: Thank you.
13	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Did I understand you to
14	say you've entered into an agreement with Albuquerque
15	Service Center?
16	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Yes. The NNSA Service
17	Center, we have Service Level Agreements for each of
18	the functional areas. And that would entail what do
19	we expect from the Service Center; for instance, in
20	the area of ES&H, or in the area of security, and so
21	on.
22	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: So these are formal
23	agreements?
24	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Yes, they are. And
25	these agreements are intended for and, obviously,

this last year was the first year that we've put these 1 things in place, but they are intended that we would 2 update it periodically, about a year basis, 3 to determine, you know, as we mature in terms of this new 4 5 Site Office concept, as the Service Center gets more 6 established, then what type of services can be drawn from them. 7 CHAIRMAN CONWAY: If you ran into a 8 problem, and it's not specifically mentioned in your 9 agreement, you can't just call upon them to send you a 10 Subject Expert? 11 12 MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: No, it's not as formal 13 as that. We provide, basically, an outline expectations in terms of what type of services we 14 would like. That way, the NNSA Service Center can 15 16 also determine their manpower, staffing requirements 17 based on what the customers may need. However, occasion, there will be things that will not be 18 19 written down, that will just happen. And what we do is, we can just simply call the Service Center, and talk with them. And then determine where best to get those resources. CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. Kent, did you

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MR. FORTENBERRY: Yes. Just, I would like

have a question?

a little better understanding, both Admiral Nanos and 1 yourself talked a lot about Appendix F. 2 MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Yes. 3 MR. FORTENBERRY: I believe those are very 4 5 similar, if not identical. MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: They are basically 6 identical. 7 MR. FORTENBERRY: Right. And there's sort 8 of a sense that that Appendix drives the performance 9 10 assessments. And looking at it, you read off a couple of things which were, in fact, probably, at least half 11 continual οf the safety-related items: achieve 12 improvement in ISM, continue to comply and improve 13 14 performance with the CFR 830 Rule, manage inventories of material consistent with approved plans, maintain a 15 purchasing management program. And that's the level 16 of detail, and there may be -- maybe I left out an EM 17 item here. 18 That's not really a lot of detail -- in 19 other words, your contract, the contract with the 20 Laboratory, doesn't provide you the mechanism to where 21 you've communicated exactly what needs to be done in 22 23 this area. It's very difficult to do. You have to rely on a lot of hands-on activity. For example, you 24 25 had some USQ issues that came up earlier in the year.

I think you were fairly disappointed in what you saw 1 in terms of USQ implementation from the laboratory. 2 3 You mentioned you've now initiated an assessment of 4 that program. MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: 5 MR. FORTENBERRY: Appendix F wouldn't say 6 7 anything about that. You might get there somehow 8 through the 830 Rule compliance, but we're not talking 9 about being out of compliance. We're just talking about poorly implemented programs. And I just want to 10 make sure I've got the right sense of that. 11 12 You really have to have 13 interaction with the contractor. Your contract itself 14 doesn't really specify in any level of detail the kind 15 of self-assessments or performance assessments that are needed. 16 17 MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Yes. Let me clarify 18 that. The intent of the Appendix F, in terms of the 19 broad objectives - and the objectives were developed broadly, so that it can be all-encompassing. And that 20 is the agreement between the University, as well as 21 22 NNSA, in terms of the areas that we deem important and would like them to focus on. 23 MR. FORTENBERRY: 24 And in fact, I quess

both Livermore and LANL, just because of the way

they're written, depending on the expectation of the Department, or maybe the expectation of the contractor itself, could meet Appendix F. Currently, last year, the year before. You could say, "Yes, we've continued to improve ISM; we're improving performance on 830 Rule; we have an Emergency Management Plan."

MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Yes.

MR. FORTENBERRY: The point I'm trying to make is that the contract is just a very fundamental outline. It takes a lot of interaction, hands-on. You've got to communicate, the Department has to communicate very specific expectations. And you can't go to the contractor with a checklist that comes from the contract. There's a lot of interaction there.

MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: The Appendix F provides the basic framework. However, it is tiered down below to have the specific measures, as well as the contractor provides basically an evaluation plan that details out the areas. And we work with them in terms of that, so from the broadest sense that you see, in terms of the objective and what I read, it does appear broad. However, it does provide the details that is not -- it doesn't show up, I guess, in the top nine to twelve objectives that we have developed. However, it does provide the Site Office with the opportunity to

look at specific areas, as well as provide them with 1 the feedback and the final assessment in those areas, 2 3 that will eventually be consolidated at that upper level. 4 MR. FORTENBERRY: Okay. Thanks. 5 And the reason I was interested in that is the focus on 6 7 managing the contract that we're seeing, particularly 8 in the EM side, as being sufficient. You've got a 9 good contract. All you have to do is manage the 10 It's extremely difficult to provide the level of specificity that you need to just manage the 11 12 contract in this area. 13 DR. MANSFIELD: Could I follow-up on that? 14 As I understand it, the only thing that's made part 15 of the contract is the negotiated Appendix F. there is a mutually agreed set of details that support 16 that. 17 18 MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Exactly. We need that. 19 DR. MANSFIELD: Okay. 20 MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: Yes. 21 And that's true for DR. ANASTASIO: 22 safety, and for the program, and for everything. you said, milestones are achievable goals. 23 They're set up at a lower level than what you see in the 24 25 contract that we agree with the Site Office.

1	DR. MANSFIELD: How are they maintained?
2	Do you jointly sign something that is not part of the
3	contract, that includes details like that? Are they
4	memorialized somehow?
5	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: They are in writing.
6	They are maintained by the Laboratory. They're the
7	basis for how they perform their self-assessments.
8	DR. MANSFIELD: So they can't change
9	willy-nilly.
10	MS. YUAN-SOO HOO: No.
11	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. With that, we'll
12	turn to you, Dr. Anastasio.
13	DR. ANASTASIO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
14	I hope that in the interest of time, you'll accept my
15	written document, and I'll try to do a quick summary.
16	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Very good.
17	DR. ANASTASIO: Mr. Chairman and Members
18	of the Board, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
19	our systems we have to assure work is performed safely
20	at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Of
21	course, these systems are dynamic. We strive to
22	continuously improve safety through self-assessments
23	and corrective actions.
24	We vigorously try to identify deficiencies
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and fix them.

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But, of course,