"and enhance the safety of operations of DOE's nuclear facilities and to restore public confidence that these facilities are operated without undue risk to public health and safety."

These hearings are in accordance with that mandate from the Congress, and we are holding these public hearings in order to ensure the public that we are doing our job, and that the DOE is moving ahead and doing its job in a safe manner. So that is part of the reasons we are holding this series of hearings.

Dr. Eggenberger?

VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: I have no questions at this time. When the first witness appears, I have an extensive line of questioning.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. Dr. Mansfield?

DR. MANSFIELD: Nothing at this time.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Dr. Matthews?

DR. MATTHEWS: Just a quick comment.

First of all, thanks to our colleagues from Pantex and Y-12 for coming today.

But I just want to state my overarching issue, which in my mind is the balance between safety and productivity and how much safety oversight is really needed to accomplish the mission efficiently and safely that we all have to -- that you work on.
And I just want to quote from lessons learned from the Columbia accident that I thought was relevant, and I’ll just read this. "The human space flight program is comprised of the many redundant processes, checks, and balances that should identify and correct small errors. Redundant systems essential to every high risk enterprise have fallen victim to bureaucratic efficiency. Years of workforce reductions and outsourcing from NASA’s [National Aeronautics and Space Administration] workforce, the layers of experience and hands-on systems knowledge that once provided a capacity for safety oversight. Safety and mission assurance personnel have been eliminated, careers in safety have lost organizational prestige, and the program now decides on how much safety and engineering oversight it needs."

Sounds sort of similar to some of the policy and the actions that we’re hearing out of the Department, and really that the safety and mission responsibilities have been somewhat transferred to the sites. And so, really, I’ll be interested in hearing how you folks think about how much safety emphasis is really required to do the mission efficiently. That will be one of the things I’ll be looking for during the testimony.
Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. Our first witness this morning is Dan Glenn, Manager of the Pantex Site Office, who is an employee of DOE/NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration]. And, Dan, I will put in the record your background, which will go into the record prior to your speaking.

Welcome, Dan.

MR. GLENN: Thank you, sir.

Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and members of the audience.

Thank you for this opportunity to provide testimony on the Pantex Site Office’s current practices for oversight and management of our management and operating contractor activities at the Pantex Plant.

Transition from the long-standing roles and responsibilities to the re-engineered NNSA presents some challenges, but these challenges are needed as we strive to improve the effectiveness, the efficiency, and most importantly the safety of our site operations. I fully support the NNSA re-engineering effort and believe that the appropriate level of contractor oversight to ensure adequate