DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

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THIRD BOARD PUBLIC MEETING

THURSDAY,

OCTOBER 23, 2003

The meeting came to order at 9:00 a.m. in the third floor of 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., the Honorable John T Conway, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT:

JOHN T. CONWAY

A.J. EGGENBERGER

JOHN E. MANSFIELD

R. BRUCE MATTHEWS

CHAIRMAN

VICE CHAIRMAN

BOARD MEMBER

BOARD MEMBER

STAFF PRESENT:

RICHARD A. AZZARO GENERAL COUNSEL

J. KENT FORTENBERRY TECHNICAL DIRECTOR

JAMES J. McCONNELL DIRECTOR

DIRECTOR

KENNETH M. PUSATERI GENERAL MANAGER

ALSO PRESENT:

MAJ. GEN. JOHN L. BARRY, BOARD MEMBER
USAF COLUMBIA ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION BOARD

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CONWAY:

CHAIRMAN

Okay.

8:58 a.m.

I've been

requested to ask the audience to turn off your beepers and anything else that might interfere with our proceedings today. If you have one of these beepers that just vibrates, you're all right.

We have this scheduled to begin at 9:00, and it's about two minutes before 9:00, but we will get started anyway. Today's meeting and hearing were publicly noticed in the Federal Register on September 26 of this year. The meeting and hearing are held open to the public in accordance with the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Today's meeting is an extension of the hearings held on September 10 and October 21. It constitutes the third in a series during which the board is examining the Department of Energy's [DOE] current and proposed models of safety oversight and management of the contracts and contractors it relies upon to safely accomplish the mission assigned to the Department of Energy (DOE) under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

The Board welcomes today the presenter,
Major General John L. Barry, executive director of

1	the Columbia Accident Investigation Board [CAIB].
2	The Board also welcomes members of the public,
3	members of the press in our audience, and those
4	viewing our proceedings electronically. In
5	accordance with the Board's practice and as stated
6	in the Federal Register notice, we will welcome
7	comments from interested members of the public at
8	the conclusion of the testimony.
9	This concludes my opening remarks. A.J.?
10	VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: I have none,
11	thank you.
12	DR. MATTHEWS: Oh yes, I appreciate your
13	coming to testify. And we're looking forward to
14	hearing the parallels between what you discovered and
15	where the Department of Energy is going with their
16	changes in oversight and contract control. Thank you.
17	CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay.
18	DR. MANSFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
19	And thank you, General Barry for coming. I thank both
20	of you for coming. I had the privilege of being
21	Associate Administrator of the National Aeronautics
22	and Space Administration [NASA] for a few years. I
23	learned something of the NASA culture, but I tell you,
24	I learned nowhere near as much as your Commission did.
25	I commend you on especially Chapters VII
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and XI of the reports which contrast the NASA culture with other high-reliability cultures. And there's much to learn from this. And we expect in the course of these hearings to try to distill what's the best lessons that the DOE should learn from that.

Thank you particularly for taking the time to do this because I know that you're running toward the end of your commission on the Columbia Board, and your time's valuable, and I'm glad you chose to spend it with us. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Jim, anything?

MR. McCONNELL: No, nothing.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay, General?

MAJ. GEN. BARRY: Okay. Well, good morning Mr. Chairman, and ladies and gentlemen. It is indeed an honor to be here today. My intent here is to go through some introductory remarks, and then I'm going to show some slides, and then we'll open it up for questions and answers as you see fit.

I would like to also just state at the very beginning here that what I think I'll be able to present here is a summary of about nine months of work by some very dedicated Americans in trying to come to the root cause of what caused the Columbia accident. You'll find that we have basically arrived at two