The meeting came to order at 9:00 a.m. in the third floor of 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., the Honorable John T Conway, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT:

JOHN T. CONWAY
A.J. EGGENBERGER
JOHN E. MANSFIELD
R. BRUCE MATTHEWS

CHAIRMAN
VICE CHAIRMAN
BOARD MEMBER
BOARD MEMBER

STAFF PRESENT:

RICHARD A. AZZARO
J. KENT FORTENBERRY
JAMES J. McCONNELL
KENNETH M. PUSATERI

GENERAL COUNSEL
TECHNICAL DIRECTOR
DEPUTY TECHNICAL DIRECTOR
GENERAL MANAGER

ALSO PRESENT:

MAJ. GEN. JOHN L. BARRY,
USAF

BOARD MEMBER
COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
Opening Remarks
Chairman Conway ...................... 3

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Presentation
Major General John L. Barry, USAF ............. 5

Questions and Answers ...................... 61

Final Remarks and Recess .................. 109
CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay. I've been requested to ask the audience to turn off your beepers and anything else that might interfere with our proceedings today. If you have one of these beepers that just vibrates, you're all right.

We have this scheduled to begin at 9:00, and it's about two minutes before 9:00, but we will get started anyway. Today's meeting and hearing were publicly noticed in the Federal Register on September 26 of this year. The meeting and hearing are held open to the public in accordance with the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act.

Today's meeting is an extension of the hearings held on September 10 and October 21. It constitutes the third in a series during which the board is examining the Department of Energy's [DOE] current and proposed models of safety oversight and management of the contracts and contractors it relies upon to safely accomplish the mission assigned to the Department of Energy (DOE) under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

The Board welcomes today the presenter, Major General John L. Barry, executive director of
the Columbia Accident Investigation Board [CAIB].
The Board also welcomes members of the public,
members of the press in our audience, and those
viewing our proceedings electronically. In
accordance with the Board's practice and as stated
in the Federal Register notice, we will welcome
comments from interested members of the public at
the conclusion of the testimony.

This concludes my opening remarks. A.J.?
VICE CHAIRMAN EGGENBERGER: I have none,
thank you.

DR. MATTHEWS: Oh yes, I appreciate your
coming to testify. And we're looking forward to
hearing the parallels between what you discovered and
where the Department of Energy is going with their
changes in oversight and contract control. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay.

DR. MANSFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General Barry for coming. I thank both
of you for coming. I had the privilege of being
Associate Administrator of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration [NASA] for a few years. I
learned something of the NASA culture, but I tell you,
I learned nowhere near as much as your Commission did.

I commend you on especially Chapters VII
and XI of the reports which contrast the NASA culture with other high-reliability cultures. And there's much to learn from this. And we expect in the course of these hearings to try to distill what's the best lessons that the DOE should learn from that.

Thank you particularly for taking the time to do this because I know that you're running toward the end of your commission on the Columbia Board, and your time's valuable, and I'm glad you chose to spend it with us. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Jim, anything?

MR. McCONNELL: No, nothing.

CHAIRMAN CONWAY: Okay, General?

MAJ. GEN. BARRY: Okay. Well, good morning Mr. Chairman, and ladies and gentlemen. It is indeed an honor to be here today. My intent here is to go through some introductory remarks, and then I'm going to show some slides, and then we'll open it up for questions and answers as you see fit.

I would like to also just state at the very beginning here that what I think I'll be able to present here is a summary of about nine months of work by some very dedicated Americans in trying to come to the root cause of what caused the Columbia accident. You'll find that we have basically arrived at two