

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

SAFETY CULTURE PUBLIC MEETING AND HEARING

AUGUST 27, 2014

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

625 INDIANA AVENUE

ROOM 352

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20004

Before: LINDA D. METCALF, CER, REPORTER

- - - - -

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
 Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 I N D E X	
2	
3	REMARKS/PANELS PAGE
4	
5	Opening Remarks
	By Chairman Peter S. Winokur, Ph.D. 3
6	By Mr. Sean Sullivan 8
7	
	Introduction of Panel
8	By Chairman Peter S. Winokur, Ph.D. 9
9	
	Panel Discussion: The U. S. Navy's Approach
10	to Ensuring the Safety of Its Nuclear Fleet
	Operations
11	By Rear Admiral Kenneth J. Norton, U.S. Navy 14
	By Rear Admiral Thomas Eccles, U.S. Navy Retired 88
12	
13	Afternoon Session 134
14	
	Introduction of Panel
15	By Chairman Peter S. Winokur, Ph.D. 137
16	
	Panel Discussion: Role of the Organizational
17	Leaders in Establishing and Maintaining
	a Robust Safety Culture
18	By Mr. Mark Griffon 142
	By Dr. Naj Meshkati 186
19	By Dr. Kathleen Sutcliffe 226
20	Closing Remarks
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 - - - - -

3 DR. WINOKUR: Good morning. My name is Peter
4 Winokur, and I am the Chairman of the Defense Nuclear
5 Facilities Safety Board. I'll preside over this public
6 meeting and hearing.

7 I would like to introduce my colleagues on the
8 Safety Board. To my immediate right is Ms. Jessie
9 Roberson. Ms. Jessie Roberson is the Board's Vice
10 Chairman. To my immediate left is Sean Sullivan. We
11 three constitute the Board.

12 Mr. John Batherson, representing the Board's
13 Office of the General Counsel, is seated to my far left.
14 Mr. Steven Stokes, the Board's Technical Director, is
15 seated to my far right.

16 Several members of the Board's staff closely
17 involved with the Safety Culture Oversight at the
18 Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities are
19 also here.

20 Today's meeting and hearing was publicly noticed
21 in the Federal Register on August 14th, 2014. The
22 meeting and hearing are held open to the public per the
23 provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act. In
24 order to provide timely and accurate information
25 concerning the Board's public and worker health and

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 safety mission throughout the Department of Energy's
2 defense nuclear complex, the Board is recording this
3 proceeding through a verbatim transcript, video
4 recording and live video streaming.

5 The transcript, associated documents, public
6 notice and video recording will be available for viewing
7 in the public reading room here at our headquarters in
8 Washington, D.C. In addition, an archive copy of the
9 video recording will be available through our website
10 for at least 60 days.

11 Per the Board's practice, and as stated in the
12 Federal Register Notice, we will welcome comments from
13 interested members of the public at the conclusion of
14 testimony, which will be at approximately 11:30 a.m.
15 following this morning's session, and 4:00 p.m.
16 following this afternoon's session.

17 A list of those speakers who have contacted the
18 Board is posted at the entrance to this room. We have
19 generally listed the speakers in the order in which they
20 have contacted us, or if possible, when they wish to
21 speak.

22 I will call the speakers in this order and ask
23 that speakers state their name and title at the
24 beginning of their presentation. There is also a table
25 at the entrance to this room with a sign-up sheet for

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 members of the public who wish to make a presentation
2 but did not have an opportunity to notify us ahead of
3 time. They will follow those who have already
4 registered with us in the order in which they have
5 signed up.

6 To give everyone wishing to make a presentation
7 an equal opportunity, we ask speakers to limit their
8 original presentations to five minutes. I will then
9 give consideration for additional comments, should time
10 permit.

11 Presentations should be limited to comments,
12 technical information or data concerning the subject of
13 this public meeting and hearing. The Board members may
14 question anyone making a presentation to the extent
15 deemed appropriate. The record of this proceeding will
16 remain open until September 27, 2014.

17 I would like to reiterate that the Board
18 reserves its right to further schedule or regulate the
19 course of this meeting and hearing, to recess,
20 reconvene, postpone or adjourn this meeting and hearing
21 and to otherwise exercise its authority under the Atomic
22 Energy Act of 1954 as amended.

23 This public meeting and hearing is the second of
24 a series of hearings the Board will convene to address
25 safety culture at Department of Energy Defense Nuclear

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Facilities and to address the Board's Recommendation
2 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and
3 Immobilization Plant. Later hearings will be announced
4 by separate notices.

5 In this hearing, the Board will hold two
6 sessions. In this morning's session, the Board will
7 receive testimony from current and former Navy officers
8 where they focus on safety practices and tools that the
9 Navy uses to improve and sustain a robust culture of
10 safety, both in operations and in the design and
11 construction of nuclear submarines.

12 The Board will also explore the applicability of
13 the Navy's safety practices and tools to other
14 organizations such as the National Aeronomics and Space
15 Administration, and the Department of Energy.

16 In the afternoon session, the Board will hear
17 testimony from a panel composed of a member of the
18 United States Chemical, Safety and Hazard Investigation
19 Board and two experts in human organizational factors
20 and management of high reliability organizations. This
21 panel will discuss the role of the organizational
22 leaders in establishing and sustaining a robust culture
23 of safety within organizations conducting complex and
24 high hazard operations.

25 In a follow-on session later this fall, we will

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 discuss with officials from the Department of Energy how
2 these approaches and lessons learned might be used to
3 guide their efforts in continuing to assess and improve
4 safety culture at the Department of Energy's defense
5 nuclear facilities.

6 This concludes my opening remarks. I will now
7 turn to the Board members for their opening remarks.
8 Ms. Roberson?

9 MS. ROBERSON: None at this time, Mr. Chairman.

10 DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Sullivan?

11 MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, briefly. Mic not on? Okay,
12 I'm not technical here. Okay. I am technical.

13 Yes, good morning. The first of these hearings
14 we had seemed to focus to me a lot on assessments of
15 safety culture, which I wasn't particularly interested
16 in, quite frankly, so my participation was limited, and
17 I said then I thought safety culture was mostly about
18 leadership, and so today's focus seems to me to be a lot
19 on leadership, so I will be quite interested in that,
20 and I do not intend to limit my participation, and I
21 look forward to the testimony that we will receive.

22 I'm still not exactly clear how as an oversight
23 organization we will use that information to try to
24 apply it to the Department of Energy, but nevertheless,
25 I'll be very interested in the information that we do

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 receive. Thank you.

2 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. This
3 concludes the Board's opening remarks. At this time I
4 would like to invite our two Navy officers to the
5 witness table. Each officer will be provided 30 minutes
6 to make a presentation that addresses some initial lines
7 of inquiry provided by the Board in advance of this
8 hearing.

9 The Board will then question each witness.
10 Gentlemen, please.

11 Our first witness is Rear Admiral Kenneth J.
12 Norton. Admiral Norton has been the commander of the
13 Navy Safety Center since January 2013. The Navy Safety
14 Center reports to the Chief of Naval Operations, and its
15 mission is to prevent mishaps, to save lives and to
16 preserve resources by providing advice, policies,
17 services and risk management information and tools that
18 enhance command structure, combat readiness and global
19 warfighting capabilities.

20 The Navy Safety Center addresses the safety of
21 essentially all aspects of Navy Operations, whether
22 afloat, ashore, in aviation or occupational in nature.
23 Among his previous command tours, Admiral Norton
24 commanded the nuclear powered aircraft carrier, the USS
25 Ronald Reagan, and was the executive officer of the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 nuclear powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson.

2 Under his command, the USS Ronald Reagan was
3 awarded the 2008 and 2009 battle effectiveness award, as
4 well as the 2009 Chief of Naval Operations Afloat Safety
5 Award.

6 Admiral Norton also has accumulated over 4,500
7 hours in rotary wing aircraft and has nine overseas
8 deployments.

9 Admiral Norton will speak to the Navy's efforts
10 to monitor, improve and sustain a robust culture of
11 safety within its wide range of operations, and speak to
12 the role that the Navy Safety Center provides in
13 supporting those efforts.

14 Our second witness is Rear Admiral Thomas
15 Eccles, who retired from the Navy in 2013. At the time
16 of his retirement, Admiral Eccles was the chief engineer
17 and deputy commander for Naval Systems Engineering in
18 the Navy Sea Systems Command. During previous
19 assignments, Admiral Eccles was the Seawolf program
20 manager for the USS Jimmy Carter, and he was the program
21 manager for advanced undersea systems.

22 Admiral Eccles has also served onboard two
23 nuclear submarines and is a qualified deep sea diver and
24 salvage officer. In 2010, Admiral Eccles was appointed
25 to the National Academy of Engineering Committee

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 examining the Deepwater Horizon explosion and fire and
2 the subsequent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. He also
3 led the U.S. technical team in a joint international
4 investigation with the Republic of Korea on the loss of
5 the warship Cheonan. I hope I pronounced that
6 correctly.

7 He is a fellow of the Society of Naval
8 Architects and Marine Engineers, and was the recipient
9 of the 2012 Gold Medal of the American Society of Naval
10 Engineers. One of the programs that many organizations
11 view as the benchmark for excellence for ensuring the
12 safety of the nation's submarine fleet is the Navy's
13 SUBSAFE program. As the Navy's chief engineer, Admiral
14 Eccles played a key role in that program.

15 In this session, we've asked the Admiral to
16 discuss the SUBSAFE program and how it is used to create
17 a culture of safety within the Navy's submarine forces
18 and those responsible for designing and constructing
19 submarines.

20 Let me add that I, for one, am appreciative of
21 the willingness of Admiral Norton and Admiral Eccles to
22 testify today on a topic that I think is vitally
23 important to this nation. I believe there is a great
24 deal that can be learned from each of the panel members
25 about how to manage and improve safety culture at DOE's

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Defense Nuclear Facilities.

2 I look forward to these presentations and
3 discussions. We will begin the presentations with
4 Admiral Norton. Welcome, Admiral.

5 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Thank you, Dr. Winokur,
6 and Mr. Sullivan, Ms. Roberson and everybody else on the
7 panel there. Welcome for those out in the audience.

8 As said, I was honored to be asked to come up
9 here and testify concerning the Naval Safety Center. I
10 want to emphasize the word naval there meaning United
11 States Navy and the United States Marine Corps, so we
12 actually work in both services there.

13 This is the agenda that I have today. I'm going
14 to talk a little bit about the background information
15 from the command, our safety practices and procedures,
16 tools, metrics and current initiatives and the way
17 ahead, because the one thing we found about when you
18 apply safety best practices, you can't stand still.
19 There's always innovation going on. There's always ways
20 to improve to make sure that you have a strong safety
21 culture.

22 This is the background. Back in 1951, for most
23 of us that can remember back there, and certainly those
24 that were into the '60s, we were having just a
25 horrendous safety record when it came to aviation, so we

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 stood up the Naval Aviation Safety Activity with a group
2 of about 30 folks and tried to get out this mishap rate
3 that was going on in naval flight activities. And as
4 we've progressed through the years, we've added more and
5 more what I would call exacting procedures and
6 techniques to the organization.

7 In 1992 we included the United States Marine
8 Corps. We added the Navy Safety Environmental Training
9 Center back in 2003. We became the operational risk
10 management model manager in 2010, and then just last
11 year, I assumed the responsibility to take control of
12 the Naval School of Aviation Safety.

13 This is what Secretary Mabus has to say on
14 safety. This was his vision statement, and it still
15 holds true today. His goal for the department is to
16 become the best military safety organization in the
17 world. Investments in safety have shown great payback.
18 We must aggressively fund safety research, implement
19 proven safety technology. Mishaps, hazards, near-miss
20 events, must be quickly identified, analyzed and openly
21 communicated so that those lessons learned will prevent
22 reoccurrence.

23 And then the Department of Navy objectives for
24 this past year: Maintain war fighter readiness, safety
25 will continue to be a focus as the Department strives to

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 reduce accidents and mishaps. So that's what Secretary
2 Mabus has to say about safety. This is our ETHOS.

3 The mission at the Naval Safety Center: Prevent
4 mishaps, save lives, preserve resources. The advice,
5 policy services and risk management information and the
6 tools that the Naval Safety Center provides enhance
7 command culture, combat readiness and global warfighting
8 capabilities. Let me just repeat that: enhances
9 command culture, combat readiness and global warfighting
10 capabilities. That's the mission.

11 This is basically the Venn diagram showing where
12 I am at the Naval Safety Center. You can see all the
13 folks there, but I just want to kind of outline here in
14 the lower left, we have about 100 military persons
15 onboard, we have about 100 civilians, you can see
16 including 21 Marines, and then we have the schools, et
17 cetera, but I just wanted to show you our command and
18 control structure there.

19 This is the environmental school. What's
20 important to note there is we conduct 458 classes at 74
21 worldwide locations. We do a lot of global online
22 classes. We have close to 9,200 students a year that
23 are graduating from those classes.

24 Down at the school of Naval Aviation Safety,
25 which is in Pensacola, Florida, you can see that also we

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 put the throughput there, the customers include the
2 Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard. We have foreign
3 students, the Naval Postgraduate School, flight schools,
4 allied nations and other agencies, including the
5 Department of Homeland Security.

6 This is our safety culture. This is from Mr.
7 Ron McKinnon, Changing the Workplace Safety Culture, and
8 this is what I think the Department of Defense,
9 certainly the Department of Energy are trying to get at,
10 an organization safety personality, and here's that
11 word, leadership, and Mr. Sullivan mentioned that.

12 Leadership has to commit to the integrating the
13 practices of safety in the culture of the organization.
14 All day, all night, it's a 24/7 way of looking at the
15 way we conduct our work.

16 Leadership and safety culture, from McKinnon:
17 "Management's Commitment in Involvement in Leadership,"
18 and that's the key. Many of us talk about leadership or
19 management by walking about. When I was the captain
20 over the USS Ronald Reagan or as the executive officer
21 of the Carl Vinson, that was a lot of my daytime was
22 considered walking about.

23 I didn't trap myself up in the pilot house, I
24 had people up there who know how to drive the ship, so I
25 would walk around through the ship, as big as it is,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 through all the different levels, through the propulsion
2 plant area, on up to the fo'c'sle hole, wherever it
3 happened to be. See what people are doing, talking to
4 my sailors and making sure that I had an exacting eye to
5 make sure that things were being done, but they were
6 being done safely.

7 Any attempt to change or improve the safety
8 culture at any workplace will fail if there is not total
9 commitment by leadership. So that, I think, is key
10 right there.

11 Military: Here's some of our challenges that
12 we've found in the Department of the Navy. We have this
13 can-do and we have this high-risk mentality. Think of
14 the young men and women that we are recruiting to come
15 into the military, especially coming into the Marines or
16 coming into the Navy. These are people who are
17 generally involved with some of the X Games type of
18 affairs. They like to go out on their off-duty hours.
19 They like to take risks, whether it's snowboarding or
20 bungee jumping, whatever it happens to be, and we want
21 those men and women in our service.

22 Do more with less mindset. Well, I don't have
23 to remind anybody here that we all went under
24 sequestration last year. We had a hiring freeze. We
25 had less O&M, which is the operational management and

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 operational funds, and yet nowhere was there a reduction
2 in the demand signal for our services, so we were asked
3 to do more with less, and the reality is we were trying
4 to make sure that we could answer the combatant
5 commander's requirements, but we had less training hours
6 to do it, to prepare our forces, and in some cases we
7 had less manpower to put at the problems.

8 We have distinctly different subcultures in the
9 United States Navy and the Marine Corps. I know that
10 sounds kind of unusual, but we have aviation, we have
11 submarine forces, and we have the afloat forces, the
12 surface warfare officers and the surface warfare
13 sailors. So, they had varying approaches to hazard
14 management and reporting.

15 When I came into the job a year and a half ago,
16 I decided I was going to homogenize all the best
17 practices through all what we call our tribes:
18 Aviation, submarine forces, surface forces, and then our
19 Navy expeditionary forces, including divers.

20 Part of trying to meld these different
21 communities or cultures together was the fear of
22 reporting. Many times people would fear that if they
23 had a near miss, it would be like a bad mark on like a
24 report card to their higher reporting seniors.

25 The concept of privilege of information versus

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 need-to-know in web-enabled safety system shortfalls, so
2 we couldn't necessarily share all the near misses that
3 we had out there. So, these were some of the challenges
4 I had when I came into the job.

5 Here are some of the leadership examples right
6 now. We have two Echelon II commanders that are fully
7 onboard with making sure we operationalize safety. We
8 have Admiral Harris, who is the commander of the Pacific
9 Fleet. He came through the Naval Safety Center en route
10 to taking over the job. This was his brief when he took
11 over the job: Professional execution, safety, it
12 underpins all we do, and also at Fleet Forces Command,
13 Admiral Gortney, basically you see right there the lines
14 of operation that he has: Warfighting, sailors,
15 partnerships, management and operations. Underpins all
16 that is safety.

17 Bottom line, we have the leadership driving the
18 organizational climate. The organizational climate
19 drives the long-term cultural change.

20 Human Factors: This is what we're trying to
21 tackle. Seventy-five percent of the mishaps have human
22 factors. You can call that human error as a causal
23 factor. So we, at down to the unit level -- and when I
24 talk to the unit level, I mean squadrons, I mean ships,
25 including submarines. They need to understand and

1 acknowledge that people at the sharp end are not usually
2 the instigator of the incidents, but are more likely to
3 inherit bad situations that have been developing over a
4 long period, and Admiral Reason made that comment back
5 in 1997.

6 So let's talk about practices, procedures, tools
7 and metrics. This is how we're getting at it. This is
8 what the Naval Safety Center does annually. We go out
9 and conduct between 350 and 400 safety surveys at the
10 unit level. I'll repeat myself. The unit level is at
11 the squadron level, the ship level or the submarine.

12 Unfortunately, we also have to send our
13 investigators out in the field or out in a float
14 situation to help conduct the mishap investigations. We
15 do assist visits, engagements. I consider this an
16 engagement, obviously. We do cultural workshops where
17 we go in and we talk to the command, and we view their
18 culture, their command climate and view their current
19 culture.

20 Now, let me just pause here a second to talk a
21 little bit about the way that I view culture and
22 climate. Climate is you talk to a sailor and you ask
23 him does he like being there, and I'll give you a great
24 example. We had a ship, the USS Cowpens. The sailors
25 loved being there, and that was the climate. The

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 sailors loved being there. Why? Because the culture
2 was so poor, they didn't have to do zone inspections.
3 They didn't have to do what's called 3M, a preventative
4 maintenance program.

5 The commanding officer of that ship decided that
6 he wasn't going to enforce those preventative programs.
7 They had no safety program onboard. So the climate was
8 the sailors loved it. When they were done with their
9 watches, they could go back to their berthing areas,
10 play video games, et cetera.

11 But the climate was very, very poor, so what
12 eventually happened was that -- and it was in the news a
13 couple, three weeks ago. That commanding officer was
14 eventually relieved for cause, all right? So that's how
15 important we view to have the culture right. When you
16 have the climate right, sailors want to be there, and
17 the culture right, that's when you have your great
18 ships.

19 We also put out some media things in four
20 magazines, the schoolhouses we talked about, and the 200
21 personnel that are working day in and day out to prevent
22 mishaps, save our resources and save lives.

23 Safety survey, it's not an inspection. We're
24 kind of way ahead. We go in and we look at how a
25 command is operating, and we look to see if safety

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 underpins everything they do. We adjust our focus for
2 the problem areas. We'll do basically mentoring and
3 tutoring while we're there, and we do a comprehensive
4 debrief to the commanding officer, the executive
5 officer, and the senior enlisted advisor, normally the
6 command master chief or the chief of the boat. It helps
7 the units achieve and maintain more fighting readiness
8 via the on-spot training and advice.

9 Typical Year: 106 units, 30 discrepancies per
10 survey. It seems like a lot. Most of those are pretty
11 minor. A lot of them have to do with things like having
12 personal electronic equipment safety checked, so when
13 someone brings aboard that video game or perhaps
14 something that they have, their computer that they want
15 to be able to recharge the batteries, et cetera, we make
16 sure that those things get safety checked so when
17 they're plugging it into the system onboard the ship,
18 that it's safe to operate.

19 We publish the results. We aggregate the top 10
20 survey results through all these similar units, and we
21 put that out, so they have safety system working groups
22 to address those.

23 Cultural Workshop: We rely heavily on the
24 United States Navy Reservists for this. Candid
25 meetings, small groups. It allows the commanding

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 officers to identify the human factors and concerns
2 before they become problems. Once again, we look at the
3 culture, and we look at the climate.

4 The Department of Defense human factors analysis
5 and classification system. When we have to go out and
6 review everything from what we call class A mishaps,
7 which is any sort of mishap that is \$2 million or more,
8 all the way down to hazardous reports. Hazardous
9 reports can -- would be called, let's say, a near miss
10 or maybe something below the cost of about \$50,000. We
11 go out there and see, using human factors, what it was
12 that was caused. We don't want to know what happened,
13 we want to know why it happened, and that's the key
14 right there.

15 Down at the Naval School of Aviation Safety, one
16 of the things we have in every aviation unit is a safety
17 officer. He goes through a rigorous school, so he can
18 be at the squadron. His primary duty is to run all the
19 safety programs there. This is something that is
20 migrating to the surface and subsurface communities, and
21 I'll talk about that a little bit later.

22 Strengthening the Culture. The aviation safety
23 command course required for every prospective commanding
24 officer, and I might add that I go up to Newport, Rhode
25 Island to talk to all the prospective commanding

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 officers for the surface forces. I also go to Groton,
2 Connecticut, to talk to all the prospective commanding
3 officers for submarines, emphasizing safety and the
4 safety programs that they will be required to
5 administer.

6 Concept of Privilege. Once again, we want to
7 have an open forum where people are willing and able to
8 come forward. Nothing is worse than having a situation
9 where a commanding officer is in a pilot house and is
10 about ready to do something with his ship, and there's
11 people on the pilot house who are assisting him in the
12 operations of the ship, and they don't have the courage
13 to ask that they don't understand or they feel
14 uncomfortable because the command climate is such that
15 they're afraid that the commanding officer won't listen
16 to their specific concerns.

17 So we talk about that, and we talk about a
18 culture that allows that most junior sailor who is at
19 helm or lee helm to be able to say I don't understand or
20 I don't know or I'm uncomfortable.

21 Strengthening the Culture. We have safety
22 stand-downs quarterly. We have an anymouse program.
23 It's an anymouse, anonymous. A person can say, you
24 know, I saw the commander write a note, put it in the
25 anymouse box, the safety officer, the aviation safety

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 officer and the command gets it, and it will say, I saw
2 the executive officer manning up an aircraft today, his
3 sleeves were rolled up, he didn't have his visor down,
4 he didn't have his chin strap on his helmet snapped, and
5 yet he expects all of us on the flightline to have our
6 sleeves rolled down, our goggles on, and our helmets
7 snapped, those type of things.

8 And so it gets at it to make sure that everyone
9 has an opportunity when they see an unsafe condition, if
10 they feel uncomfortable coming forward with it, they do
11 have a venue to report it.

12 And these are some of the other things we have
13 at the unit level, aviation safety council, enlisted
14 safety council, ORM stands for operational risk
15 management, we'll talk about that a little bit later.
16 HAZREPS, as we talked about, those are presents. Those
17 are near misses. We have a critique. What nearly
18 happened? It could have been catastrophic, if we dodged
19 a bullet, whatever it happens to be, and we'll talk
20 about those things to prevent those from happening
21 again.

22 Assessing Safety Culture. This is where we come
23 in as a group, and we have the United States Marine
24 Corps helping us out there for ground climate assessment
25 as well. We talk about the lead-in about this, but we

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 do the data analysis to identify trends and leading
2 indicators. What we want to try and do is get left of
3 the kill chain. We don't -- if the mishap is the kill,
4 we want to get to the left of that. We want to prevent
5 the things that would lead us up to that point where we
6 have a mishap.

7 This is how we assess the Naval aviation safety
8 culture. This is how we assess the command climate.
9 Well, the takeaways there -- excuse me, team debriefs.
10 Every time you go flying, every time you go about
11 executing a flight schedule, you plan. It seems very,
12 very simple. You plan the event, you brief the event,
13 you execute the event, and probably the most important
14 thing is you debrief the event, and you talk as a flight
15 crew, and you talk to maintenance control, and you say,
16 this is how we planned it. This is what we planned to
17 do. This is during the brief. This is what was
18 executed, and when we got done with the execution, did
19 we accomplish what we set out to do?

20 And that, I think, is one of the -- it seems so
21 simple, but so often people don't do the debrief part,
22 and I think that's where you get your lessons learned,
23 that's where you can pass along some of the most
24 critical information to make sure that things didn't go
25 quite right or quite as expected that you would be able

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 to plan for that the next time you are in a similar
2 situation.

3 Afloat Community. I talked about the tribes,
4 the different cultures. This is what's going on with
5 surface, submarine and diving communities. This is
6 where we're going with it, where they're going to start
7 putting a full-time safety officer with safety training
8 and operational expertise. We're taking that from the
9 aviation sort of blueprint, and we're putting that in
10 the afloat community.

11 We're going to have a process existing for
12 people to come forward and, without retribution, be able
13 to say, you know, the bless me Father for I have sinned,
14 this is what occurred, it didn't go right, we tried to
15 cut a corner, and we ended up putting ourselves in
16 extremis, and because of that, we're here today to talk
17 about that.

18 Current initiatives are the way ahead, and this
19 is what I am very, very excited about. We just
20 initiated the Safety Campaign Plan. This was my
21 commander's intent. You can see at U.S. Pacific Fleet
22 and Fleet Forces Command as well. Our desired end
23 straight, a proactive, predictive risk management
24 culture exists fleetwide that operates a comprehensive
25 safety management system. Our model has the four

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 components, which is safety policy, which I'm
2 responsible for; safety risk management, I'm also the
3 model manager for operational risk management; safety
4 assurance; and then safety promotion.

5 We are going to formalize into all lines of
6 operations, integrated at all chain of command levels,
7 all the way down to the unit level, all the way down to
8 the single sailor, all the way down to the single
9 Marine.

10 Preventable Mishaps are Eliminated. That is our
11 goal. There is a safety management system model. You
12 can see safety promotion basically is the outer ring.
13 Policy, safety assurance evaluates the continued
14 effectiveness of implemented risk control strategies.

15 By the way, we didn't develop this, we stole
16 this from the FAA, from the Federal Aviation
17 Administration. This is one of those things, though,
18 that the Secretary of Defense said all services will go
19 to this model, and this is why we have jumped on this
20 waiting to be told in 2015, we decided to implement it
21 early.

22 Safety Risk Management. Determines the need for
23 and the adequacy of new or revised risk controls based
24 on the assessment of acceptable risk. You cannot
25 eliminate all risk. Let's be frank, this is the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Department of Defense, but you can mitigate risk that
2 perhaps to a tolerable level so you can execute mission.

3 We have a saying in the Department of Defense
4 and the Department of Navy, operational necessity.
5 Well, quite frankly, even as a one-star admiral or a
6 two-star Admiral as the Carrier Strike Group Commander,
7 you don't have the authority to invoke Operational
8 Necessity. It has to be done much higher in the Chain
9 of Command. What operational necessity means
10 essentially is that the risk to crew outweighs risk to
11 mission.

12 In other words, risk -- I have to get the
13 mission complete, and so I'm willing to put the crew,
14 the ship, that air crew, that aircraft, into harm's way
15 in order for mission accomplishment. That really rarely
16 gets invoked.

17 We have implied operational necessity, and
18 that's where we get in trouble for folks to believe that
19 the mission has to be done at all costs, when, in fact,
20 if the aircraft isn't ready to be launched or the ship
21 doesn't have the weapon system working at full mission
22 capability, perhaps we have to pause and tell our Chain
23 of Command, it's time to come back and do it another
24 day, but right now, as you know, we've been winding down
25 from two long wars, and we tend to see in the Fleet that

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 there's this implied operational necessity being applied
2 out in the Fleet.

3 That's operationalizing safety culture. This is
4 where we're at today. The safety outboard has been
5 released. The objectives and tasks are being worked on
6 right now. We essentially gave the entire Fleet an
7 operational order, and this is to implement the Safety
8 Management System through the Safety Campaign Plan for
9 us to do best practices, which include putting safety
10 officers at all our operational units.

11 The campaign, plan way ahead, we'll start seeing
12 the frag, that's the fragmentary orders, so these are
13 spinoffs from the operational orders. We'll publish the
14 Joint U.S. Fleet Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet Safety
15 Management System Instruction, and I've got folks there,
16 we're building that instruction now, to develop and
17 refine Mature Safety Analytics, and we do that via
18 software programs.

19 Bottom Line. Our Navy safety culture is strong,
20 but continues to evolve and improve, campaign plans,
21 surveys, workshops. Getting back to what Mr. Sullivan
22 said, effective leadership in a healthy command
23 organizational climate set the stage for a strong safety
24 culture.

25 I can't emphasize this, this is the foot

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 stomper. Senior Leadership is critical. Establishing
2 the culture cannot be the safety officer's job. It's
3 the Commanding Officer's job. It's the Executive
4 Officer's job. It's the Senior Enlisted Advisor's job.
5 It's the Admiral's job. You can see our Chief of Naval
6 Operations said as recently as a couple of years ago,
7 Safety Programs do not replace leadership, they are the
8 tools for the leaders. We need the foundation of proper
9 practices to ensure the safety of our military and the
10 Department of Navy civilian personnel.

11 So, I know I kind of blew through that kind of
12 quick, but I wanted to give time for questions and
13 answers, and so with that, I'll open the floor.

14 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you, Admiral Norton, for
15 your very excellent and insightful presentation, and the
16 Board would like to follow up that information with some
17 questions. We have a series of questions for you, but I
18 want to be flexible on this panel. I know that we have
19 Admiral Eccles with us, so if there is some additional
20 insight or information you would like to provide during
21 the questioning, we will have plenty of questions for
22 you later, but if during Admiral Norton's questions you
23 want to chime in, please just seek the recognition of
24 the Chair, I'll be happy to do that.

25 And I think with that, the questions will begin

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 with Vice Chairman Roberson.

2 MS. ROBERSON: Good morning, and thank you for
3 your comments.

4 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Yes, ma'am.

5 MS. ROBERSON: I enjoyed it greatly. So, just a
6 few questions, recognize we are looking for what we can
7 gain from your experience and your activities to help us
8 in our interactions with the Department of Energy in
9 this area.

10 So, questions that may seem a foregone
11 conclusion, I am going to ask anyway, just because I'd
12 like for you to elaborate a bit.

13 So, the Navy Safety Center performs, I'm going
14 to call them white hat surveys, because I like that
15 term, I think it's very good, to provide the different
16 platforms with non-mandatory safety evaluations.

17 And how do they use that information to inform
18 and improve their own culture?

19 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: What they will see and
20 what my team will do in the field is they will look at a
21 program, and let's say if something is -- something you
22 may not consider, but we have a motorcycles riders
23 safety program, and they will see that, let's say a
24 unit -- let's call it a squadron, had a couple of
25 motorcycle mishaps, not fatalities necessarily, but

1 mishaps. So we'll say, you know, we've seen other
2 squadrons or other ships that have a mentorship program,
3 and they have experienced riders here at the command
4 that'll take some of these beginner riders, and they
5 will do weekend rides together or things like that, so
6 we'll share with them what we have seen as best
7 practices.

8 When it comes to motorcycle ridership, for
9 instance, we have a basic ridership safety course and a
10 more advanced course that we provide at no charge, and
11 all the services do this, by the way, to our young men
12 and women who want to ride motorcycles.

13 That's great, but we found out from talking with
14 the insurance companies of the United States that really
15 the only thing that makes a motorcycle rider safe is
16 experience. So, that's why we grab the mentorship of
17 other riders, perhaps in the command or a sister
18 squadron, or a sister ship, and have them develop a
19 rider club, let's say, where they can go out on a
20 Saturday, not during rush hour traffic, and do a ride
21 and show them some of the safe best practices. And we
22 apply that also at the deck level or up at the tarmac or
23 launch and recovery of an aircraft or whatever it
24 happens to be.

25 MS. ROBERSON: And I assume, I was especially

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 interested in your comments about how determinations
2 were made about the command climate, and the fact that
3 you do have different subcultures on the different
4 platforms, and I'm sure the aviation is viewed as an
5 entirely different animal from the divers or submarine.

6 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Yeah, and what we're
7 trying to do, of course, is kind of homogenize that, but
8 when we go in to do a cultural workshop or assess a
9 command climate, we'll actually put together small
10 groups based on demographic, and it's usually based on
11 rank, you know, because you've got a Navy Commander or
12 perhaps a Captain in a major command who may believe
13 that his culture is one way, but when you start talking
14 to the young Sailors or Marines, kind of the ones who
15 are doing the heavy lifting, and you ask them what they
16 believe the culture is, you will find them perhaps
17 having a different perspective than what the commanding
18 officer might have.

19 And then we're able to -- and it's not
20 attribution, and it's usually anonymous inputs, and so
21 the people feel good about being, I think, truthful, and
22 they'll say, you know, we're working 12-hour shifts, and
23 it's tough, seven days a week when you're under way, and
24 we'll hear things like that. So the Commanding Officer
25 needs to sort of be sensitive to that.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Sometimes if you're off the coast of Pakistan or
2 something like that, it may require that type of hard
3 work or something like that, but the commanding officer
4 needs to be aware of that, needs to be aware of the
5 fatigue factor, and be able then maybe to talk to their
6 Admiral in their Strike Group or whoever it happens to
7 be and say, hey, you know, I'd like to have a day just
8 for captain's day where I can have everyone take a knee
9 over here and have a day off, and we can do that while
10 we're under way usually off in the Middle East or in the
11 South China Sea or something like that.

12 MS. ROBERSON: You know, the training obviously
13 is always an important element of reinforcing and
14 improving changing and processes and procedures, and I
15 know you've touched on this in your presentation, but I
16 did want you to just comment a little bit more about the
17 sufficiency of training and changes to processes and
18 procedures as it compares to leadership.

19 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Well, that's kind of
20 what's nice about being the model manager for a couple
21 of the training programs when it comes to safety is it
22 evolves over time, and as whether it's software programs
23 or other tools that are out there, for instance for
24 myself in aviation, the safety of flight at night became
25 what I would say incredibly better with the introduction

1 of night vision goggles, and flying at night no longer
2 was primarily just on instruments. And, so, we see
3 technology being added to all the training and software
4 programs that make, hopefully, jobs easier and whether
5 it's for navigation or whether it's monitoring systems
6 in a propulsion plant where sailors would have to
7 normally go with a clipboard and a pencil and a sheet of
8 paper and read gauges, now we have software programs
9 that do it.

10 So, the training itself has evolved over time,
11 with the emphasis for the sailors and the Marines that
12 whatever training we give you to apply to the weapon
13 system that you work with, that you understand there's a
14 certain integrity involved, and in that integrity
15 includes watch standing principles, not the least of
16 which is verbatim compliance with the procedures that
17 have been developed to operate that weapons system.

18 MS. ROBERSON: Okay. Would you like to take a
19 break?

20 DR. WINOKUR: Let me follow up with a couple of
21 questions. I saw that you put a definition from James
22 Reason, you said Admiral Reason actually, up on the
23 chart of safety culture. Does the Navy have its own
24 definition of safety culture, a formal definition of
25 safety culture? Does the Navy feel there's a need to

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 have a formal definition of safety culture?

2 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: No. It's sort of like we
3 look at industry, you know. I've read a lot about --
4 since I had the chance to be at the Safety Center, we
5 looked at, for instance, what was going on in Alcoa,
6 what has gone on down in Houston, places like Phillips
7 and BP, and we have looked at their best practices and
8 applied those as well.

9 But I'll tell you, Doctor, it all comes down to
10 leadership. It's the willingness of leadership to
11 invest in that safety program or that safety -- what I
12 want to say is safety culture because I don't think
13 safety is a program, I think it's a culture. It
14 underpins everything we do. And that's why for a
15 definition, is it's difficult sometimes to say, well,
16 this is our own definition.

17 Now, it's one that's broadly, I think, hugged or
18 wrapped around by many different industries or many
19 different services as well. When I read the safety
20 culture definition by the United States Air Force and
21 the United States Army, it's very, very similar to ours,
22 you know, saving lives and preserving resources.

23 DR. WINOKUR: I think there's a lot of reasons
24 why we should talk to you today, and I'm sure that there
25 are ways that the Board can improve and understand

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 oversight of the Department of Energy, and the
2 Department of Energy can improve, and hopefully we'll
3 get to that, but I was really interested when you talked
4 about operational necessity and what that concept meant
5 because the Board, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
6 Board, is an oversight organization because the people
7 in Congress didn't want the Board to have the power to
8 tell the Secretary of Energy, who has this awesome
9 responsibility for assuring the nation's nuclear
10 deterrent, when he or she could and couldn't do
11 something. But it is a very, very burdensome, very,
12 very important power that we have. And we constantly
13 look to the Department of Energy to see when and if
14 they're ever going to implement that idea and say that,
15 yes, safety is important, but we have a mission here
16 that needs to be performed irregardless, and to be
17 frank, in my years on the Board, we haven't seen that
18 yet, and in today's climate that hasn't happened.

19 But just an example of some of the similarities
20 between the concepts that you deal with and the concepts
21 that we see.

22 I wanted to follow up on another question. You
23 talked about the fact that the way people see things,
24 whether they're an Admiral, maybe an officer seeing a
25 leader, and whether you're on the flight deck can be a

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 little bit different, and we often see surveys where we
2 see a marked difference in terms of how people view
3 things at different levels of the organization. First
4 of all, what do you think attributes to those
5 perceptions?

6 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Well, you know I think as
7 leaders, and maybe I'm putting this in military speak,
8 so if I need to explain myself, you know we as leaders
9 kind of work at the strategic level, and so you know we
10 kind of have -- the term we use in the Navy is kind of
11 the wave, the top of the waves kind of, the wave top
12 view of how things are going. Whereas sort of your
13 rank-and-file sailor or Marine who's in charge of maybe
14 some mundane job sees things at the tactical level, you
15 know, kind of the day-to-day operations that contribute
16 to mission effectiveness.

17 And, so, you know at the strategic level, we're
18 seeing that, well, there hasn't been any mishaps, or
19 major mishaps, hardly anyone is not executing to the
20 point where the mission accomplishment is being
21 compromised, so everything must be going along pretty
22 well.

23 Well, when you go back down to the Sailor or the
24 Marine at what we call the deck plate level, we will
25 find that maybe they're tired. They're perhaps using

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 shortcuts in order to meet the demand signal, and then
2 you find that they have an extremely different view than
3 what the leadership has.

4 In order for the leadership to understand that,
5 they have to get down to maintenance control, or they
6 have to get down there in the hangars and have the
7 opportunity to talk to the individuals who are actually
8 the ones who are tired or feel that the demand signal is
9 so strong that they have to compromise or cut corners in
10 order to meet the demand. Those type of things.

11 DR. WINOKUR: Yeah, when I look at the
12 definition of safety culture that the nuclear industry
13 uses or DOE uses, we talk about the role of the
14 leadership, which you've already emphasized how
15 important it is, but in the end, it's the attitudes and
16 the values of the workers, so in your case it could be
17 the attitudes and the values of the Sailors.

18 Do you see their views as the actual final
19 measure of whether or not you've established the culture
20 of safety you're looking for? Are they the final -- and
21 based upon their behaviors and attitudes, is that the
22 final measure of whether you're being successful in what
23 you're trying to do?

24 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Well, that's a part of it,
25 but I think it has to be systemic, from leadership,

1 front office, all the way down to the deck level where
2 everyone feels they're sort of part of mission
3 accomplishment, but they're doing it in accordance with
4 published operational instructions, maintenance
5 instructions, that they have the tools, they have the
6 equipment, they have the manning, and they have the
7 funding in order for them to get it done.

8 You know, part of what we look at is the
9 training, manning and equipping of the units, and what
10 we find out is if they're not manned to the required
11 level or they don't have the required equipment, that's
12 where we see people trying to meet the demand signal
13 because it's still there, but they can't do it
14 effectively, and so they will tend to try to cut
15 corners.

16 So, rather than throttling back on the demand
17 signal, and that's where it takes the courage of the
18 commanding officer of the unit to be able to go up his
19 chain of command and say, we can't do everything you're
20 asking for right now because we don't have the training,
21 manning and equipment that is required right now to do
22 all these things.

23 DR. WINOKUR: And maybe one final question: How
24 do you work on those perceptions at the different
25 levels? I mean, how do you actually in the end get down

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 to where you need to be in terms of what you're looking
2 for in the culture?

3 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Well, I'll go back, not to
4 my current job, but back to when I was the Commander in
5 one of my squadrons, and I was at the commander pay
6 grade, but I was the Executive Officer. In the Navy
7 what we do is you go in as the Executive Officer, and
8 you're there for about a year and a half, and then you
9 fleet -- what we call fleet up to be the Commanding
10 Officer.

11 I had a commanding officer at the time, so I was
12 second in command of the squadron, where we had a
13 sailor, a young sailor, that I was getting ready to go
14 fly, and I was already strapped into the aircraft, the
15 co-pilot was in, the crew were in the back. We were
16 starting up the engines, and this -- they call him plane
17 captain, you know, fresh out of boot camp. He gave me
18 the cut sign on the rotor system, and I shut her down,
19 and he said, Sir, I see an oil leak, and he goes, And my
20 recommendation is that you not go fly, that we down this
21 aircraft.

22 And sure enough, I unstrapped, and I climbed up
23 on the aircraft and saw that a quick disconnect fitting
24 had backed off, and we had a little bit of an oil spill.
25 That commanding officer at the next all-hands or

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 quarters we call them brought that sailor up, and he
2 didn't know it, brought the sailor up out of the ranks
3 and presented him with a Navy Achievement Medal for
4 essentially having the courage to basically down an
5 aircraft that the executive officer was going to go fly.

6 That's how you establish a safety culture, you
7 know, a carrot and stick. I've seen other commands
8 where people have taken shortcuts, whether it was for
9 malicious or laziness or shoddy work or whatever it is,
10 that they've gone to -- under the UCMJ, they have gone
11 to mast, captain's mast, non-judicial punishment, and
12 been held accountable for not complying with established
13 procedures as well.

14 So, I have seen that, and that's kind of the
15 stick approach as well. So, when you have kind of the
16 reward when obviously it is deserved, but also to hold
17 people accountable when it is deserved as well, I
18 believe that's how you kind of get from the whole
19 spectrum of people understanding that safety is critical
20 and important in this command.

21 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you. I mean, the Department
22 of Energy has its work force, also, has stop work
23 authority because they, like you, deal with very
24 complex, high hazard nuclear operations, and the
25 department, I think, acknowledges the fact that workers

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 in the field, more than anybody, knows what's going on,
2 and they have to have those kinds of authorities, so I
3 think it's healthy they do that.

4 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Yeah, and I think it has
5 to be without fear of reprisal, and it might be a lack
6 of knowledge. Somebody says, you know, I see something,
7 and I thought -- just because I'm uncomfortable or I
8 believe it's unsafe, until someone explains to them
9 saying, no, you know, this is actually normal, normal
10 operations, here it is in chapter and verse, it says
11 it's okay for this to have that rating or for it to
12 operate that way, yeah.

13 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you.

14 Mr. Sullivan?

15 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, and good morning,
16 Admiral, and thank you for being here, and I know that
17 you have a very important job and a lot to do, and I
18 really thank you for taking time out of your busy day to
19 come here and help us.

20 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Yes, sir.

21 MR. SULLIVAN: I want to ask you about the
22 relationship between technical competence and
23 leadership, especially as it applies to safety and being
24 able to make the right decisions in safety. I was
25 particularly struck by your background because you're a

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 helicopter pilot, and yet you were put in command of an
2 aircraft carrier, it's a ship, had a nuclear power
3 plant. Well, it does launch helos. Most of the
4 aircraft were jets, so you didn't grow up flying jets,
5 you didn't grow up operating nuclear power plants, you
6 didn't grow up -- when I say grow up, in your time as a
7 junior officer in the Navy, driving ships.

8 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Right.

9 MR. SULLIVAN: Yet you got in charge of all of
10 that. So, I would like you to talk about, well, what
11 preparations did the Navy give you for that role, did
12 you feel technically competent in that job? I'm sure
13 you did, but I would like you to talk about how you
14 acquire -- how you felt you acquired the right level of
15 knowledge to make the right decisions and how that
16 impacted in your ability to maintain safe operations.

17 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Thanks. I'll get a chance
18 to maybe wax poetic here a little bit about my
19 background. I started out in aviation, went through the
20 helo pipeline, and there's a rigorous flight training,
21 including a flight manual that we call NATOPS for
22 standardization and training, operational training
23 standardization is what NATOPS stands for.

24 In order to make aircraft commander, you
25 essentially had to have the technical expertise that you

1 could draw and speak competently and critically and
2 technically on all of the systems onboard the aircraft.
3 So, when it came to emergency procedures when you're in
4 flight -- and keep in mind that in a helicopter, unlike
5 most of our fixed-wing aircraft, if you launch in a
6 helicopter, you're going to land. There is no such
7 thing as a ejection seat. There is no parachutes that
8 you are going to be able to count on should things go
9 really, really bad.

10 So, in order to make aircraft commander, you
11 study all those systems, and then you have a board, and
12 it's very critical, and you get to that point, and then
13 you're essentially given the keys to fly that aircraft
14 in all the mission areas. And usually you achieve that
15 during your first tour, operational tour out in the
16 fleet.

17 So, I did that, and as time went on, with more
18 experience and more mission areas and competency, I was
19 able to become the model manager for the type model
20 series of the aircraft I was flying at the time, which
21 was the Seahawk.

22 After my command tour, I got selected into the
23 Nuclear Propulsion Program because they looked at my
24 undergraduate background as well as the success I had in
25 my command tour and felt that I could get through the

1 training, the technical part of the nuclear propulsion
2 curriculum.

3 So, I did that. I went down to Charleston,
4 South Carolina, where we had what I call our ground
5 school, and I went through the basics of the nuclear
6 propulsion, went to prototype then, after I got done
7 with that part of the training, up to Ballston Spa in
8 upstate New York, and worked in a propulsion plant up
9 there, the SAG for the folks here that know that program
10 or submarine system, and was able to really do the
11 hands-on part of the nuclear propulsion application, the
12 lab work, let's say, everything from chemistry to
13 scrambling the reactor to doing in-plant emergency
14 response drills, all the things that you would do.

15 From there, I went down to the Navy Yard where
16 Naval Reactors is located, and then started working
17 specifically on the plant for the Nimitz-class carrier,
18 and keep in mind on the Nimitz-class carrier, there is
19 actually two propulsion plants, the A4W. Went through
20 the curriculum there, went through a pretty intense oral
21 board and written exam, and then eventually was allowed
22 and got certified to operate as a nuclear operator for
23 that particular plant, and that's when I showed up as
24 the XO of the USS Carl Vinson.

25 The requirement to stay in the propulsion plant,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 whether you're the executive officer or whether you're
2 commanding officer, is driven by Naval Reactors, and so
3 you're down there and you're participating in the
4 training, you participate in the drills, you participate
5 in maintenance, mostly monitoring maintenance that is
6 going on. You watch the operations of the plant, and
7 you do this on a recurring basis throughout your tour,
8 and you continue to do this training, whether you're
9 actually under way or whether you're in a maintenance
10 phase, and that kind of keeps you sort of in the game.

11 There is always an operational reactor safeguard
12 exam coming around the corner, you have to be prepared
13 to do that, you do multiple prep work to get your
14 propulsion plant team ready for the reactor safeguards
15 exams by doing mobile training team at sea periods, and
16 so it goes.

17 I remember as a commanding officer, I was
18 writing a letter every month to the four-star admiral,
19 in that case -- right now it's Admiral Richardson, but
20 back in those days it was Admiral Donald, and I would be
21 telling him as a commanding officer not only all the
22 training that my propulsion plant sailors were doing,
23 but also what I did to participate in there and the
24 training that I gave and the lectures that I'd also
25 give, et cetera, and the run time you would do and the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 boards that I sat on to get people qualified, et cetera.

2 So, the technical expertise is part of the
3 environment. It starts with that integrity and verbatim
4 compliance and forceful watch backup, all those pillars
5 of proper watch standing.

6 For Mr. Sullivan, who is obviously aware of the
7 propulsion plant exams, the USS Ronald Reagan, while I
8 was there, and I attribute this mostly to my reactor
9 officer, we got an excellent on our ORSE, so the first
10 excellent in over seven years for an aircraft carrier,
11 so that's kind of where the Ronald Reagan was sitting at
12 that time.

13 MR. SULLIVAN: Well, thank you for that,
14 Admiral. So, just as a follow-up, just imagine a
15 scenario, since you didn't have to live through one,
16 imagine a scenario where somebody was in the leadership
17 position who didn't have the technical background. Do
18 you think that would have an impact on the ability to
19 make the right decisions for safety or provide the right
20 safety culture?

21 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: I've only been in
22 leadership positions where I've had the technical
23 expertise to apply to making decisions when it came to
24 propulsion plants or aircraft maintenance, et cetera. I
25 would feel, me personally, very uncomfortable if I

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 didn't have that technical baseline and I was asked to
2 make a decision affecting safety, affecting safety of
3 the people around me and my own safety, if I didn't
4 understand the technology that was applied towards it.

5 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Thank you. I think that's
6 a very fair answer.

7 Mr. Chairman?

8 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. Let me
9 talk to you a little bit about metrics and assessment.
10 You have a new U.S. Navy Fleet Safety Campaign Plan that
11 was signed out on the 25th of June, and in it it
12 requires a safety assessment mechanism that is metrics
13 based and measurable, and I think you've already pointed
14 out that you can't manage what you can't measure, right?

15 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Right.

16 DR. WINOKUR: So, tell me a little bit about,
17 from your perspective, about metrics. I mean, you're
18 the head of this center, are there metrics on your desk
19 every morning when you come in to work, things that
20 you're looking at to give you a sense of how things are
21 going?

22 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: It's not a daily report,
23 but we have a weekly report where we're seeing -- we
24 compare to where we are today, and we do -- we call it,
25 for lack of a better term, we do sort of seasonal

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 campaigns, like right now we're in what we call the
2 critical days of summer, you know, because this is a
3 time where most of our sailors, Marines, do a lot of
4 off-duty, high-risk recreational activities, and so we
5 want to make sure that they apply risk management to
6 that.

7 And, so, we will see what they're doing out
8 there in the Fleet, and whether it's waterborne or
9 whether it's climbing cliffs or bungee jumping or
10 whatever it happens to be, but we compare those mishaps
11 or people getting hurt, and we get the reports in that
12 compare to other years, and I think we're having an
13 effect because we see compared to 10, 12 years ago, our
14 rates, our mishap rates are going down. So, it shows me
15 that people are applying sort of risk management to not
16 only what they do operationally when they have their
17 uniforms on, but perhaps when they're going out the main
18 gate and they're looking for some recreation, whether it
19 be riding dirt bikes or water skiing or whatever it
20 happens to be. So, I'm very, very pleased with that.

21 We have other things, tools for our sailors and
22 Marines to use. One is a lot of people do a lot of
23 driving in the summer, obviously for time off, vacation
24 time. We have a program that assesses the risk of them
25 being on the road compared to like how much rest they

1 had the night before, the driving conditions, the length
2 of the drive, all those things, and the name of the
3 program is called TRiPS, of all things.

4 And at the end of it, you assess your trip, and
5 it says, yeah, it's low risk. But usually in the
6 commands at the unit level, a sailor will have to take
7 that up their chain of command, usually to their chief
8 petty officer or one of their sergeants, and they will
9 have to say, see, this is the trip I'm taking this long
10 weekend, Labor Day weekend coming up, I'm driving 500
11 miles, but rather than going straight through, I'm only
12 driving 250 miles and stopping at the Motel 6 and
13 getting some more rest and continuing on the next
14 morning, or something like that, to get approved at that
15 level.

16 So, you know, the last thing we need is a sailor
17 driving home from a three-day weekend trying to make
18 roll call on Monday or Tuesday morning and driving
19 through the night and fatigued, and he ends up having a
20 mishap.

21 DR. WINOKUR: But you've got these surveys and
22 assessments, which I want to talk a little bit more
23 about, and you have a new campaign plan to get these
24 metrics-based metrics and having them measurable. Do
25 you think you will be putting more effort into that in

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 the future, or do you think you have what you need right
2 now?

3 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: We have an adequate system
4 right now, what's called a Web-enabled Safety System,
5 where the users put in the data and then our analysis
6 can extract that data to make comments based on mishap
7 rates or perhaps in particular like a geographical area.

8 For instance, there was a spike this year in the
9 San Diego area for both sailors and Marines for
10 motorcycle mishaps, for whatever reason. And, well, it
11 turned out that a lot more people are buying motorcycles
12 because the cost of a gallon of gas in Southern
13 California is over \$4 a gallon, and they were using it
14 to commute, and especially in the fall through the
15 winter and the spring, it's dark. And we were able then
16 to talk to the units out there and say, hey, do you
17 understand when you expect sailors to be in at 6:30 in
18 the morning so they can muster at 7:00, they're driving
19 their motorcycles in the dark, and that's a higher risk
20 environment.

21 If you, perhaps, shifted your hours and they
22 didn't have to muster until 8:00, well then they could
23 ride to work in daylight. And, so, you can just do
24 things like that for them. So that's one of the ways we
25 approached it.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 DR. WINOKUR: So, you do assessments. Do you
2 have any regimen about when you do follow-up
3 assessments, or are follow-up assessments basically
4 driven by what you find the first time you look?

5 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: We do -- the surveys, for
6 instance, are on a recurring basis. Units, float units,
7 are once every two years, and the aviation units are
8 once every three years, but what we're going to get to
9 is we have the Operational Fleet Response Plan, which is
10 a 36-month cycle, and one of the things we want to do
11 for our assessment, you can walk down the peer, walk
12 onboard a ship when it's doubled up, which means the
13 lines are crossed, and the ship's not really
14 operationally tasked. And you can look at their
15 programs, but if you really want to get an idea of the
16 safety culture, it's better to see a ship when it's
17 under way and it's doing operations.

18 And then you can see whether they apply best
19 tactics, procedures, operational risk management when
20 there are sort of this fog and friction of war kind of
21 thing going on out there, watch them during a sea and
22 anchor detail, watch them when the ship is doing an
23 under way replenishment.

24 So, we're going to start doing our surveys at a
25 specific time in this Operational Fleet Response Plan,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 so we get them about the intermediate phase of work-up,
2 as the crew comes together, as the ships come together
3 as a strike group, and so we can assess better the
4 safety culture on those ships.

5 DR. WINOKUR: How important do you think
6 independent assessments are? I'm sure the folks who run
7 the ships do their own internal assessments to get ready
8 for some external Navy group to come in and look at
9 them, but is that enough, or do you really need an
10 independent assessment, an independent set of eyes to
11 come in and look at their version?

12 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: I think you do. I think
13 you do, Doctor, and I'll tell you why. We have the
14 ability to see trends across the Fleet, but also we see
15 what I would call best practices or worst practices, and
16 when we go from, let's say from one destroyer to the
17 next destroyer to the next destroyer, we can talk about
18 similar programs, and we can pass on to a commanding
19 officer or an entire command, you know, we think this
20 works, we've seen it work over here, a sister ship, I
21 think it could be applied here, it would be better for
22 your safety culture if perhaps you applied this as well.

23 And that's, I think, part of the reason we can
24 be honest brokers. And like I say, we're kind of white
25 hats, we can go in and tell a Commanding Officer that he

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 may feel he has a strong safety culture, and we can go
2 in and say, well, compared to your sister ships, you're
3 kind of right in the middle. That type of thing.

4 DR. WINOKUR: Makes sense to me. You talked
5 about the fact that even though you're very busy, you
6 actually go down and you walk around and you see things
7 for yourself.

8 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Oh, yeah, right.

9 DR. WINOKUR: I've heard people express the
10 opinion to me that a leader should really, just by that,
11 understand what's going on, that surveys and assessments
12 are nice, but pretty much you should be able to figure
13 it out for yourself.

14 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: I think sometimes the
15 surveys and the assessments sort of reaffirm what you
16 think you know, and I think those leaders that get down
17 and talk to their team members, whether it's on the deck
18 plates or wherever it happens to be on their ship or in
19 their squadron, it can be reaffirming. So, you can kind
20 of get the, well, I'm going to keep doing what I'm doing
21 kind of thing, and that's also a real positive.

22 DR. WINOKUR: All right. Thank you very much,
23 Admiral.

24 Ms. Roberson?

25 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Just a couple of finishing questions. When you
2 do your investigations and your surveys, you're looking
3 at contract organizations that are a part of the whole
4 program, right?

5 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Um-hmm.

6 MS. ROBERSON: How do you, in looking at the
7 data from the surveys and investigations, do you see or
8 have you identified trends that provide more helping
9 influence in the behavior of, say, the contractors?
10 Have their culture of safety in aligning that?

11 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Yeah. It's kind of a --
12 we don't have a whole lot of what I would call core
13 responsibility to what contractors do. When I put my
14 ship, the USS Ronald Reagan, into maintenance
15 availability and we had contractors onboard, I had a
16 ship supervisor sort of that worked with me as the
17 captain of the ship that kind of handled the
18 contractors. However, when I walked around and I saw
19 contractors that were doing things and they weren't, for
20 instance, wearing their personal protection equipment or
21 they would have a harness on but they wouldn't, like,
22 have a lanyard and they went out on scaffolding and they
23 wouldn't basically snap in, those type of things.

24 I've been accused of having an Irish temper a
25 little bit, and it's usually when things are unsafe that

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 sort of it kind of riles me a little bit. And it was to
2 the point where I had the ship supervisor ask a
3 subcontractor not to come back because they failed to
4 comply with the safety requirements during that
5 maintenance availability.

6 Well, because it got to that point and the
7 subcontractor obviously asked for forgiveness, et
8 cetera, and ended up having a couple of their employees
9 no longer come back to the ship, but they were able to
10 continue on with their contract. But I set the safety
11 center. We don't really have direct oversight to that.
12 I believe NAVSEA and NAVAIR have more of that when it
13 comes to ship construction, et cetera.

14 MS. ROBERSON: Okay.

15 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: But we don't have as much.

16 MS. ROBERSON: Okay. I'll ask that question
17 again later. And I had one final question for you: You
18 emphasized a lot in your briefing that, my words, not
19 yours, safety really is an enabler for the mission, and
20 I believe that. I think the entire Board and the
21 Department of Energy believes that, but we also know
22 there's no 100 percent safety assurance, and there are
23 mission essentials.

24 So, can you just speak for a moment about the
25 balance in safety and mission and its relationship to

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 accountability?

2 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Sure. There's a sign over
3 my door down in my office down in Norfolk that says "Our
4 aim is zero."

5 I don't believe, personally, that we should have
6 an approach towards safety that says, we're going to cut
7 our mishap rate in half, because if you're saying that
8 you're going to cut a rate in half, you're essentially
9 sending a signal that some mishaps are okay to have.

10 There are some things that you can't get around.
11 I had a situation early in my flight career in a
12 helicopter that I talked about, that if you are going to
13 launch, you are going to land. I had to do a water
14 landing in a helicopter because I lost my tail rotor
15 drive shaft, and it was metal fatigued at the quick
16 disconnect.

17 So, you're going to have mishaps due to
18 mechanical failure, and there is -- that's difficult to
19 prevent, though we have put programs in place now to
20 monitor, for instance, vibrations on aircraft, et
21 cetera, and look at metal fatigue and say, hey, after so
22 many hours we're going to replace certain components,
23 dynamic components, because at this point it appears
24 that the risk of failure increases.

25 So, you can put programs like that in place, and

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 hopefully not have those type of mishaps.

2 Mission accomplishment. Well, that is what we
3 are paid to do when it comes to supporting this
4 Administration or any administration in our national
5 security objectives. As I said earlier though,
6 operational necessity is something that, quite frankly,
7 those decisions are made here in this city and not
8 necessarily out there. Where we have to be careful is
9 that we don't interpret orders that we receive from the
10 Pentagon or from the Oval Office that are anything other
11 than -- or interpreted anything other than operational
12 necessity.

13 So, I guess what I'm saying is, don't imply
14 operational necessity down the chain of command when
15 it's really not there.

16 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you, very much.

17 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Yes.

18 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you. We are holding these
19 hearings obviously to learn things from you about what
20 might be applicable to the Department of Energy, and we
21 know that the Navy and the Department of Energy have
22 different cultures, but the Navy is often called upon
23 when the nation has a tragedy or there's any kind of a
24 problem to provide its insights on safety.

25 I think many people recognize the Navy as having

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 a strong safety record, a strong culture of safety, so I
2 want to try to probe a little bit and understand what
3 about your culture of safety could be applicable to the
4 Department of Energy, could be something they could
5 benefit from, and I want to start out the discussion by
6 pointing out that in 2000 I think there was a Navy/NASA
7 interaction.

8 What had happened is NASA had just lost the
9 Space Shuttle Challenger, and this interaction began
10 because the Administrator of NASA wrote a letter to the
11 head of the Department of the Navy, Mr. England, and
12 said, can you help us, can you give us some insight. Do
13 you have any information on that interaction, how well
14 it worked or didn't work?

15 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Well, yeah, it actually
16 works pretty well, and I've been down to the Johnson
17 Space Center. I'm part of their Safety Investigation
18 Board for NASA. And they used the Air Force as well,
19 but they liked our approach to not only safety, but the
20 way we use the HAZREP, hazardous reporting system.

21 We don't wait for mishaps to occur in order for
22 us to make changes. We try to be anticipatory, and try
23 and get at sort of what I would call the low-hanging
24 fruit, the small things that could -- if they are left
25 to sort of develop over time, could, in fact, lead to a

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 catastrophic mishap.

2 They also like the way we do our investigations
3 are separate from sort of the legal aspects. For
4 general counsel there, as you're probably aware, we do
5 JAG investigations for mishaps, but we also do a safety
6 investigation, and they're completely divorced of each
7 other. And, so, we're talking to people that know that
8 they have, quite frankly, a frankness that they can
9 apply to -- we want to get to the what, and we want to
10 get to the why, and we keep asking, why, why, why.

11 And it may work its way up the chain of command,
12 and a lot of times it gets to that training, manning and
13 equipping part, and we didn't get it quite right. Well,
14 the responsibility for the training, manning, and
15 equipping part generally eventually falls to people who
16 are wearing gold shoulder boards like me, and so it
17 works its way up the chain of command.

18 So, we want to have that openness and frankness,
19 and people feel that there won't be repercussions,
20 whether they be administrative or from a legal
21 standpoint, for them to be able to say, this is truly
22 what happened, I cut a corner or I didn't do as what the
23 procedurals said to do, I skipped a step, or whatever it
24 happened to be. And, so, they can have that, and that's
25 why I think NASA was pretty comfortable with that. Of

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 course, a lot of their astronauts come from the Navy.

2 DR. WINOKUR: Right, and I was going to get to
3 it later, but I'll just briefly get to it now. I mean,
4 there are similarities between the Navy and the
5 Department of Energy, in that you're both very diverse.
6 I mean, you have a very diverse structure, you've talked
7 about it here today.

8 The Department of Energy has production
9 facilities and research facilities and it has cultures
10 that were born during the Cold War, and it's really --
11 and, so, are there lessons hopefully in terms of how you
12 manage and create a climate of safety in such a diverse
13 organization and what the Department of Energy might do.

14 And you've already pointed out in a sense that
15 the gentlemen who fly the planes, they likely risk a
16 little bit more, right?

17 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Right.

18 DR. WINOKUR: And that culturally dealing with
19 them must be a little bit different than dealing with
20 other aspects of your command.

21 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Well, as you said, Doctor,
22 I kind of grew up and joined the Navy and got
23 commissioned in 1981 at, arguably, the height of the
24 Cold War, and everything was very much very secretive
25 when it came to our nuclear weapons. I was part of that

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 program early in my career for anti-submarine warfare
2 weapon system that was out there, all the way through to
3 nuclear propulsion.

4 I think what we see today, and I think it's
5 healthy is, when we have near misses, we do critiques,
6 and we have the ability to talk to everyone from the
7 most senior person on the watch team to the most junior,
8 for them to be able to sit down and say, this is what
9 occurred, and this is how it occurred, and this is what
10 we need to fix it.

11 And, you know -- some of it, it's not
12 comfortable. A person may lose their -- temporarily
13 have to go through remedial training or to get their
14 qual back so they can stand watch, et cetera, which
15 actually puts the burden on other people to fill in the
16 watch. You know, we don't have this deep bench,
17 especially on submarines, where people who are disqualified
18 because of a mistake they made, and rightly so, they
19 need to go maybe back under instruction to get that qual
20 back, but somebody else then has to fill that
21 watch-standing requirement, et cetera.

22 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you very much.

23 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Yes.

24 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you. Admiral, I would like
25 you to expound on some things that you've mentioned

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 earlier. One of them was accountability, I think you
2 talked about rewards and a stick, but you also talked
3 about the fear of reporting, so people might not report
4 things that they knew were wrong or safety situations.

5 And my experience is that those can be in
6 conflict. If you try to encourage everybody to report,
7 then you may get reports of people who did something
8 wrong who might otherwise be punished. Talk to me about
9 it, how does a leader balance that?

10 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: It's a tough balance. You
11 know, you want -- hopefully the integrity of your
12 sailors and your Marines are such that they're
13 self-reporting, and they can go back, rather than having
14 other sailors sort of reporting on them, though that
15 happens from time to time as well.

16 I truly believe if you give them the time and
17 the tools and the training for them to accomplish
18 whatever you expect them to do, they will do it right
19 because they understand -- they have to also understand,
20 I believe, what your mission is, and I think that's
21 where it's important for the commanding officer at
22 whatever unit level is to make sure that they understand
23 exactly what it is they're doing, why you're being
24 extended on deployment, why it's important to our
25 nation, why it's important to the Navy for us to

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 continue to strive day in and day out to support and
2 fill in the blank of the mission that you're doing, you
3 know.

4 I think when people understand that they're
5 contributing to a greater cause, I think they truly will
6 embrace the opportunity to do things right, and it's fun
7 being part of that type of an organization. You just
8 enjoy being there.

9 I remember my Air Wing Commander came down to my
10 squadron late in my command tour, and he walked in the
11 squadron, and he just looked at me, because he was going
12 to go flying with us that day, and he goes, you know,
13 KJ, he goes, I walked through your hangar here and I
14 talked to your sailors, and I can just tell that they
15 want to be here, that they enjoy what they're doing.
16 And that was a great compliment from my ISIC, my
17 immediate superior in my chain of command, and I think
18 that's when you understand that you probably got it
19 right.

20 MR. SULLIVAN: So, I guess what I'm trying to
21 ask, Admiral, though is, if, in a perfect world, say you
22 have a great leader who is doing great things, but there
23 are occasions where the leader has to take over in a
24 situation where there's an existing climate with
25 problems or an existing culture with problems, and then

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 people aren't doing the right things.

2 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Right.

3 MR. SULLIVAN: So you still have to face these
4 decisions.

5 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: You hold them accountable.

6 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. And, so, I'll just make my
7 statements and then I'll ask if you agree with me. So,
8 if you said, well, we're just going to punish everybody
9 proportionally, that leads to certain problems where
10 people don't report. And on the other hand, if you
11 don't punish anybody, then people won't fear any
12 reprisals from doing the wrong thing, so a balance is
13 required, and a balance isn't always easy.

14 Would you agree with all of that?

15 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: I agree to the extent that
16 I believe you have to hold people accountable. You have
17 to make sure they understand your expectations, and then
18 I believe you hold them accountable if it's -- I don't
19 want to necessarily say malicious, but due to maybe
20 malingering or just shoddy work or a bad attitude or
21 whatever you're saying, if they're not meeting your
22 expectations that you have been very, very clear on
23 delivering to the entire crew, then you have to hold
24 them individually accountable.

25 We have seen recently Admiral Richardson, for

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 instance, hold a bunch of instructors accountable for an
2 issue down in Charleston where he had to -- because
3 people were sharing questions on an exam back and forth,
4 et cetera, and I know that was difficult probably for
5 him to do, but that was the right thing to do because it
6 was an issue of integrity and the integrity of the
7 entire program.

8 So, as difficult as it is, sometimes you do have
9 to hold some demographic, however large or small it is,
10 accountable if it's kind of this group think or there
11 was a certain tolerance going on and people didn't bring
12 to their leadership in a timely fashion things that were
13 other than right, yeah.

14 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you very much, Admiral.

15 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Yes.

16 DR. WINOKUR: Ms. Roberson?

17 MS. ROBERSON: I don't have any further
18 questions at this time.

19 DR. WINOKUR: All right. I think we want to
20 thank you, we have a couple more, but I think we have to
21 move on here. I want to thank you for your presentation
22 today. It was excellent. I think we had a great
23 dialogue with you, and everybody learned a lot, and I
24 would just encourage you to maybe take a question for
25 the record or if you have a moment, we're just

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 interested in any additional insights you have about how
2 an oversight organization like the Board might do a
3 better job assisting the Department of Energy and
4 helping it to establish a robust culture of safety.

5 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: Well, as you know, going
6 through the Navy Nuclear Program, I had a chance to sort
7 of kind of see behind the curtain on what the Department
8 of Energy does when it comes to the nuclear programs as
9 well. Admiral Richardson has a role there in the
10 Department of Energy, as you know, and I feel that the
11 protocols that we have in place, whether it applies to
12 the Navy Nuclear Program or to the Department of Energy
13 Nuclear Program, or one and the same, and from what I
14 can tell, they're the best in the world.

15 So, it's been a real honor for me, and I'm
16 somewhat humbled by the opportunity to be able to talk
17 to you folks here as the oversight for the Department of
18 Energy concerning how we view safety programs in the
19 United States Navy.

20 So, I want to thank you again for allowing me
21 the opportunity to speak frankly about some things, and
22 if there's any follow-up questions, et cetera, after
23 this Board basically reports out, I would be more than
24 happy to follow up with any other questions you might
25 have.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you, Admiral Norton. I
2 think we'll turn now to the presentation from Admiral
3 Eccles.

4 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Okay. Thanks very much.
5 Thank you, and good morning. Am I live? I think so.
6 You guys can hear in the back? I'll just try to put
7 this thing about halfway down my throat.

8 Well, good morning. Thank you for having me
9 here today. As the sign says, I'm retired from the
10 Navy, and I just want to amplify for a second that
11 point, that while I had the privilege of wearing the
12 nation's cloth for an awfully long time and I had a
13 wonderful time doing it, today I speak on my own behalf,
14 and my views are mine and not representing the United
15 States Navy, as Admiral Norton is, and I'll speak from
16 my experiences certainly gained over many years of
17 service, but my time today is as a private citizen, in a
18 sense.

19 What I'm going to speak about today differs
20 quite a bit from the perspectives that Admiral Norton
21 and his team bring because rather than looking across
22 safety as the complete, broad spectrum of everything
23 that entails the slightest bit of injury or mishap at a
24 low level, whether that's in dollar value or
25 consequences to people, all the way to the largest

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 catastrophes, that's the scope, I think, of what Admiral
2 Norton and his team deal with in the Navy, that is full
3 spectrum.

4 In my case, I'm going to talk to you in
5 particular about one program, as you've said in your
6 introduction, sir, the Submarine Safety Program or
7 SUBSAFE, and about that I'll speak a little about
8 origins, a bit about the fundamental building blocks of
9 the program, as it was developed about 50 years ago, and
10 then what that might mean, in my opinion, about ways
11 that other high reliability organizations might consider
12 those facets of that particular program in securing
13 submarine safety and apply it elsewhere.

14 I do not have any firsthand experience in the
15 Department of Energy or in the nuclear facilities that
16 you oversee, but I have an interest in all of that, so
17 let me see if I can pull it together and offer something
18 of some value.

19 So, just over 50 years ago, the Submarine
20 Thresher was lost at sea, and it was lost with all of
21 her crew and 17 civilians. The ship was on a sea trial,
22 and the failure was not pinned down to a particular
23 failed joint, but it was determined that the ship
24 suffered a flooding casualty, and then the consequence
25 of the systems that were affected by that flooding

1 caused the ship to lose its ability to stay afloat and
2 propelled, and, importantly, design flaws, which not
3 only led to the flooding perhaps, but also led to the
4 failure of systems that could have been used in
5 recoverability prevented the ship from coping with that
6 flooding.

7 So, there was a twofold effort then undertaken
8 to consider a system of putting in place to prevent
9 future losses like this, something that would have these
10 attributes, to assure hull integrity to preclude
11 flooding in the first place, and, of course, if that was
12 100 percent successful, then there would be no purpose
13 in the second, but knowing that all of these are systems
14 of machines and men and women, there is no way to
15 completely assure 100 percent likelihood of one or
16 another thing.

17 So, operability and integrity of critical
18 systems and components that are used to control and
19 recover from flooding, bringing the ship safely to the
20 surface, that was the second aspect of this.

21 In the underlined italics there with quotes
22 around it is an important phrase used in the Submarine
23 Safety Manual, the book that came out of the loss of the
24 Thresher, and that is "maximum reasonable assurance."

25 Many people have observed that in and of itself,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 that's a conflicted phrase, and I'd say yes, and
2 purposefully. That is, it was purposefully -- ah,
3 thanks, I didn't know I had a button for that one,
4 maximum assurance would be one thing, and few could
5 argue what maximum assurance is, but, of course, if we
6 really sought maximum assurance, ships wouldn't sail,
7 planes wouldn't fly, people wouldn't engage in the
8 application of lethal force for the purposes we use.

9 It's all a part of the mission to accept some
10 level of risk, but maximum assurance, tempered by what
11 is reasonable, while it's a phrase intention, it often
12 gives people the opportunity then to make the right
13 judgment in the face of challenges that have to be
14 weighed on both sides, to what Mr. Sullivan said,
15 finding the balance. So, we'll speak more about that in
16 a few minutes.

17 Basic elements of a culture of safety when
18 looked at from a SUBSAFE perspective are to recognize a
19 responsibility from top to bottom in chains of command,
20 not only in the military, but also in the civilian
21 population that helps to design, maintain, construct,
22 test and modernize our ships.

23 I would tell you that in the SUBSAFE program, in
24 my experience, from top to bottom, workers feel a duty
25 and obligation, a burden, and we'll speak a little bit

1 more in a few minutes about how that is instilled in
2 people, in a sense the loss of Thresher was the
3 inspiring event. It also becomes a touchstone. It's a
4 real thing that happened. Real lives were lost. You
5 can speak with the real survivors of the families who
6 lost loved ones, and when you do that, as a worker new
7 to the program or one who has been doing it for 20, 30,
8 40, even 50 years, then my experience is that that
9 responsibility is heartfelt, and it is because each of
10 these individuals has been trained and educated in what
11 the consequences would be of failing in this regard, and
12 there are personal touches that can be made to reinstill
13 that sort of responsibility.

14 Accountability is a topic we've already covered
15 a little bit this morning, but it is essential in a
16 program where consequences are as important, as in this
17 program, that when requirements aren't adhered to, that
18 responsibility is also an accountable responsibility.
19 That is, one where there are consequences to one's
20 failure to act or for the wrong actions.

21 Integrity, a rigid adherence to a code of
22 behavior, is a presumption, but it's a presumption with
23 controls, along the lines of in any human endeavor, we
24 seek to put in place the right people, the ones who
25 uphold the highest sense of integrity and who will be

1 true to that responsibility and understand the
2 accountability that goes with it. But also to put in
3 place second checks, to put in place methods of
4 verification and validation, to look at things at
5 tactical and strategic levels so as to avoid the
6 downside consequence of having an incremental approach
7 of accepting small amounts of risk, one day add to a
8 tipping point that perhaps puts us in a bad place.

9 So, integrity is foundational, but integrity is
10 not taken on blind faith. Elements of that culture of
11 safety. If you were to decompose the program and say,
12 well, you know, how do you take the loss of Thresher and
13 the facts around it and generalize to a condition where
14 a program that will last for decades, and likely
15 centuries, can have enough of a foundation of building
16 blocks that it properly covers the whole landscape where
17 risk is dealt with. And remember, I'm not talking about
18 the risk that a ship might hit another ship or the risk
19 that a ship might back into something while trying to
20 moor. I'm not trying to discuss whether the submarine
21 will carry out its mission effectively.

22 This is a fairly narrow perspective, but it is
23 one about the loss of ship and the attendant loss of
24 life. So, in that, it comes down to something like
25 this: Do we understand how we design the ship so as to

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 not present undue risk or to have maximum reasonable
2 assurance that we will not have that flooding, and in
3 the event of flooding, that we will not compromise the
4 system's recoverability?

5 To do that, we start out with a set of
6 requirements, and the requirements are made as simple as
7 possible, and in describing those requirements, an
8 envelope of affected systems and components is
9 described. The work discipline that evolves from being
10 able to describe the scope of the responsibilities and
11 then the requirements that go with each of those
12 components and systems is brought under the topic of
13 work discipline, and being able to explain to the work
14 force, whether you're talking about the welder who's
15 putting something together in new construction, or the
16 same kind of a welder, perhaps his grandson, who 40
17 years later working on another ship of the class near
18 its end of life, is still putting the same integrity
19 into the same kind of welded joint, or if you're talking
20 about the people who in design of a ship have to take
21 into account factors of safety and so forth, all of the
22 moving parts of that requirements in the system of
23 systems has to be translatable, it has to be well
24 documented, and it has to be something where a sense of
25 discipline about adherence is recognized.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 In material control, the bullet under it,
2 correct material installed correctly, I think is fairly
3 self-explanatory, but boy, there's a lot tied up in
4 that. How do you make sure that what you're receiving
5 in shipyard is what you ordered? Do you take it based
6 on the vendor agreeing to have stipulated that, yes, he
7 sent you the right wall thickness, or do we measure that
8 wall thickness a second time upon receipt so that we
9 make sure that we know what we've got?

10 Do we do that after we've done something to it
11 mechanically so that if we bend, for example, a piece of
12 pipe, but we're expecting a certain strength, did that
13 strength change in the bend, and it did, but did it
14 change in a way that we understand and that we are okay
15 with.

16 So, material control is about receiving the
17 right material, having specified it properly, then
18 controlling it well so that we know exactly what's
19 getting installed in the system and that it's being
20 installed properly.

21 Documentation really is a bit of an underlying
22 catch for all of this, but it not only comes in the
23 sense of requirements and the design's integrity, but
24 also an important phrase that permeates this whole
25 system, "objective quality evidence." Objective in that

1 it can be measured, back to the point that it's hard to
2 manage something that can't be measured. Well, here
3 we're trying to measure things so that we can instill in
4 our system a level of quality assurance that is given by
5 evidentiary documentation. We don't just say, I want
6 everybody to stand up in the morning and pledge that
7 they'll weld well, that they'll wire things well, but in
8 the case of the most important components of this, if a
9 welded joint is critical to the safety of that ship,
10 that welded joint is going to have additional
11 assurances.

12 And you can go back today in a ship that was
13 designed and built 20 or 30 years ago and find the
14 signatures and records and hard copy of the individuals
15 who performed all of those critical component processes.
16 You can find how they attested to what they had done was
17 correct, and in the most critical of those, you can
18 follow them in a likewise scheme of objective evidence,
19 a trail of certification by individuals who did the
20 follow-on inspections, the nondestructive testing, the
21 imaging, whatever was used to validate that yes, what we
22 thought we were there to achieve and which we properly
23 trained and educated a worker to achieve was indeed
24 achieved because now we can perhaps in the case of an
25 x-ray look right through a weld and show that its

1 integrity was as fulsome as we expected.

2 So, that objective quality evidence is something
3 that is not only in the early days in design and
4 construction, but it'll be just as true on a ship with
5 25 years of life where that ship undergoing some
6 modernization needs to have additional work done inside
7 that scope or that envelope, the same process of
8 objective quality evidence is used, whether we're
9 maintaining, modernizing or doing new construction.

10 Compliance verification, I've kind of alluded to
11 some of that. Inspecting on top of the work that's
12 being done, you do the right work with the right
13 material, you do it right the first time, you attest to
14 it, you second check it where you need to, and then you
15 conduct inspection and process surveillances, whether
16 those are 100 percent or spot-checking. There's a lot
17 of decision space in which we work for that, but we can
18 get into questions there, if you like, but compliance
19 verification is intended to build a level of assurance
20 that not only we doing what we intended to do, but we're
21 achieving the results that we expected to achieve.

22 I'll speak more on another slide about a balance
23 of separation of authorities, but I think that's a key
24 part of how the Navy achieves within this framework a
25 sense of balance in getting to the right place, and the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 need for continual education and training, I think, pops
2 up in an Admiral Rickover quote that I have at the end,
3 it is human nature for people to reduce the retention of
4 knowledge to become more complacent in any endeavor I
5 think.

6 And, so, the need to reinforce and to raise the
7 level of training, and to take into account changes in
8 the way we do what we do, especially as technology gives
9 us opportunities to do things differently and better,
10 there is education and training that goes with that, so
11 whether it's to stay up-to-date or to reinforce the
12 basic tenets, that's a big part of this program.

13 In the area of compliance verification, just to
14 give an example of a way I think the net we weave that
15 goes beneath the wire we walk has sort of -- there's a
16 couple of different dimensions of webbing. In the top
17 case, before a ship goes to sea coming out of a major
18 overhaul or in the case of new construction, there is a
19 ship-specific set of audits that's done to go through
20 every element of how that ship was designed and built
21 and that we built the verified design that we met the
22 requirements, both for construction and all the material
23 pieces of it, and that the design itself had been
24 properly reviewed and met its requirements.

25 All of that is somewhat diametrically opposed to

1 another simultaneous set of audits that's going on, that
2 is that they're always going on. In any activity or
3 facility where we do this kind of work, then we go in on
4 a regular basis and perform functional audits to look at
5 the health of the system and to specifically pull
6 examples out of the record sets of that objective
7 quality evidence and look for compliance with the
8 program requirements at the highest level and all the
9 way down to the nuts and bolts.

10 And in doing that, and doing a sampling process
11 for that, we find that we can highlight in each of these
12 two cases what's right, what's not so right, where best
13 practices need to be reinforced, particularly if you go
14 from activity to activity, but also as we build ships,
15 if we build them well and successfully, do we take
16 things for granted and begin to atrophy some of the
17 compliance, or do we build upon the success of the last
18 one.

19 These certification audits and functional audits
20 together give us a sense of confidence that not only is
21 each individual hull ready to go, but also that the
22 people and facilities and processes who are making this
23 happen every day are complying properly with those
24 requirements. So, the second one is more of the health
25 of the program, and the top one is the readiness of that

1 individual ship.

2 On the subject of balance and separation of
3 authorities, here's how the system works. When I was a
4 program manager for Seawolf Submarines, and in other
5 roles, but as a program manager, I would present to a
6 certification authority, and generally that was my boss,
7 and I served in both of these roles, so I can kind of
8 speak -- in fact, I served in all of these roles one way
9 or another.

10 When I was a program manager, I would talk to
11 the one with whom the buck stopped, the certification
12 authority, these days that's the deputy commander at the
13 Naval Sea Systems Command for Undersea Warfare, and it's
14 Admiral Jabaley. So, today, a program manager, for
15 example, for Virginia-class submarines will walk in to
16 Admiral Jabaley, and it's not done in one moment, in one
17 day, but over a series of months, he will present to him
18 a full set of documentation and auditable results that
19 show that the ship he's getting ready for sea trials
20 should receive the proper certification without which it
21 will not sail, and in that certification, he can -- that
22 Admiral Jabaley, the guy in the gold box in the middle,
23 can rest assured and can examine that not only has the
24 platform program manager done what it took to get the
25 nuts and bolts put together, but he complied with the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 requirements of the Submarine Safety Program Manual, and
2 that it's agreed by an independent technical authority,
3 in that case the chief engineer for Naval Sea Systems
4 Command, and his team, as well as an independent safety
5 and quality assurance authority who doesn't report to
6 the program manager, does not report to the chief
7 engineer, and is in the fabric of all of this for the
8 purpose of examining whether or not compliance is
9 ongoing, that all three of those pillars are of a like
10 mind.

11 When they're not, then that surfaces issues, and
12 issues like that are the things that would prevent a
13 certification authority for saying, let's move ahead.
14 And having acted as that certification authority myself,
15 I can tell you that I was looking for the balance of the
16 program manager saying, I've got this date for sea
17 trials, and I've got a ship that says it's really ready,
18 I've got all of the other peripherals that go with it,
19 the records of having done all the construction, having
20 done all the testing, having done all the quality
21 assurance. And my only hang-up is that I've got one guy
22 over there working in NAVSEA's engineering house who
23 doesn't like the thickness of something.

24 We nailed that one down before we made a
25 decision that the ship is ready to go, and by having

1 independence in each of those voices, we had the ability
2 to hear any of those solo opinions, or two of them
3 saying, we're moving too fast. These things create a
4 constructive tension around one another. On the worst
5 days, they're barriers to moving ahead, but you have to
6 ask yourself -- that's why we put it in place, right?
7 We're trying to create a barrier whose job is to say,
8 let's not let the thing that happened to Thresher happen
9 again, and that particular thing that happened to
10 Thresher, which was probably a sil-brazed joint and a
11 piece of piping connected to the seawater systems, is
12 not very likely to happen because we've examined that to
13 death.

14 But so many other things are critical, and so
15 many small things, when accumulated, can present a
16 larger risk that it's this team, despite the program
17 manager's responsibility and cost and schedule -- the
18 technical authority's responsibility for getting it
19 technically right, the safety and QA authority to show
20 that it's all properly documented, despite the fact that
21 those can be intentioned.

22 In the end, they're working together so that
23 when the certifier says the ship is ready, then it
24 really is, and then under the operational control of the
25 fleet commander, they've got the ability to send it out.

1 Now, that same construct is fundamentally in
2 place for all major work, like overhauls, through the
3 life of the ship as well as a new construction, and
4 there is a version of this that goes on inside the fleet
5 day in and day out when commanding officers at sea make
6 decisions to break into these same boundaries and do
7 work, or when they're in port, just in the execution of
8 maintenance, whether it's corrective or preventative,
9 that same notion of integrity of process is put into
10 place, and there's a certification at the fleet level
11 that mirrors this.

12 So, challenges. Such a system sounds perfect,
13 right? Well, no system is, and the ability to generate
14 these human attributes of ignorance, not even
15 recognizing the problem, sometimes really does crop up.
16 We can find people who, without the right training,
17 without the right education, can certainly demonstrate
18 ignorance, and that can be a problem if you've only gone
19 one deep in a critical place.

20 Arrogance is a much more common problem, and it
21 isn't arrogance like the way you might use that word to
22 describe an individual that's pretty distasteful. I
23 mean, this is the kind of arrogance that the best people
24 can still have, that they're pretty sure they understand
25 what's happening, and without someone else giving them

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 the support needed to recognize or for themselves to
2 question their own assumptions, then this arrogance
3 presents all kinds of challenges.

4 I had some experiences, as was said in the
5 introduction, in the Deepwater Horizon investigations,
6 and in that, I think it's evident by the facts that
7 there were people making decisions on the rig who hadn't
8 been given the ability to know, so in some way were
9 ignorant of what was happening down in the earth's
10 crust, and they didn't recognize some of the risks that
11 were being taken.

12 They also used a presumption of knowledge to
13 rationalize some of the steps that they bought into.
14 They looked at test results that were evidently failing,
15 and they found a way to rationalize that those results
16 were positive. I think that was a collision of
17 ignorance and arrogance at that same point, and,
18 frankly, I think it was a case of the system setting the
19 team on the rig up for failure by not giving them
20 another voice. A less ignorant, a more knowing voice,
21 and one that was in the business of routinely
22 questioning its own intellectual superiority.

23 In fact, in the end then, much of that can lead
24 to complacency, but you know, even people who aren't
25 ignorant and aren't arrogant can still say, It's been 50

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 years since we lost one of these submarines, you know,
2 in the years before that, which was approximately 50
3 years, the Navy lost something like 16 submarines to
4 noncombat losses, and since then, just one, and it was
5 not a submarine safe, certified submarine. That was
6 Scorpion.

7 If we wanted to, we could sort of rest on our
8 laurels or haunches or something right now and say, I
9 guess that statistically it ain't going to happen again.
10 We'd somehow have it right. I don't think anyone in
11 that system looks at it that way, but the danger is that
12 we might, and that would be a sense of complacency.

13 Now, the real truth is that the same risks that
14 are presented in those 16 earlier incidents and the two
15 that happened in nuclear submarines all need to be
16 guarded against today, and so these challenges are ones
17 that leaders must remind themselves of.

18 I do not expect that the people at the deck
19 plate level every morning are getting up saying, let me
20 think about complacency, right? Now, I hope they do,
21 but I don't really think it's what they're thinking
22 about in the line at Starbucks or wherever.

23 I do think, though, that they think about it
24 frequently because it's instilled by leaders who get
25 down there on deck plates, who do that walking around,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 who check in on people who are new on the job, who ask
2 the people who should be mentors whether they're doing
3 that mentoring, and when is the last time they had a
4 workplace conversation about complacency.

5 So, Admiral Rickover, in his long-term view,
6 said, you've got to drive these ideas into practice with
7 courageous patience, and importantly, he said, all of
8 this can be overturned or subverted through apathy or a
9 lack of follow-up, so a continuous effort is required,
10 and he was famous for his diligence and his continuous
11 effort. That legacy has lasted far beyond his time. It
12 is a part of what goes on in the Submarine Safety
13 Program.

14 I think it's important to recognize that while
15 Admiral Rickover was personally involved in the hearings
16 that went on with the Atomic Energy Commission back in
17 the -- or I'm sorry, the Joint Committee on Atomic
18 Energy right after the loss of that ship, it is a
19 separate program, the Submarine Safety Program, from the
20 one that Admiral Rickover and his follow-on, Admiral
21 Richardson today, Admiral Donald a few years ago, have
22 instilled in Naval Reactors, but there are some similar
23 characteristics and traits, and this diligence and
24 discipline and the need to guard against complacency is,
25 I think, a common factor between the two.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 And that's probably about as far as I will go in
2 terms of trying to weigh into Naval Reactors territory,
3 but I think it's important when you're looking at this
4 from the perspective you all have, that these systems
5 are hard fought, hard won. It continues to be a
6 challenge every day for the people who work in this
7 environment to get it right, and every morning when they
8 wake up, the leaders in this community do have to remind
9 themselves of these challenges and this kind of a
10 long-term view.

11 In going back to Thresher and asking, how do we
12 personalize this for individuals, how do you take
13 somebody who has shown up at a place like Portsmouth
14 Naval Shipyard today working on submarines that were
15 designed and built before that individual was born, in
16 some cases, how do you get that person to understand
17 that the events of 51 years ago, and a history that goes
18 50 years before that, is relevant in today's world and
19 the work that individual does right now.

20 I think part of it is that we listen, pretty
21 regularly, at least annually, believe it or not, to the
22 audiotape, about two minutes long, of the sounds of the
23 Thresher hull imploding, and all those people dying.
24 It's a terrible thing to hear, and it would be abstract
25 if it wasn't being narrated by someone who is telling

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 you live what it is that you're about to hear, and then
2 listening to that, it raises the hair on the backs of
3 the necks of most people. You have to be damn near dead
4 to not get a little emotional about that.

5 And I think that what that does is it reinforces
6 on a regular basis for people that this is about real
7 folks, and it's about their own brothers and sisters,
8 fathers, mothers, and their own kids and grandchildren.
9 This is who they have to worry about.

10 If you have a tragic event like this and you
11 have an opportunity to do something about preventing its
12 recurrence, and you can tie people back intellectually
13 and emotionally to what did happen and the need to
14 prevent its recurrence, then I think you've got a strong
15 connection that has to be made and sustained.

16 So obviously there are many other famous events
17 like the ones mentioned earlier. Challenger and
18 Columbia both had people who came over from NASA, looked
19 in the Navy and looked in many other places and said,
20 how do programs that seem to be succeeding instill the
21 right traits in place in their people? How do leaders
22 embrace this need and keep it forefront in what they do?
23 How is it that the foundation and the construction of
24 the program, the way it's documented and the way it has
25 requirements that don't change frequently, how is all

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 that built and then attempted to try to bring those back
2 to using those same notions in other environments.

3 NASA, I'm not an expert on the NASA side of it,
4 but a predecessor of mine in the chief engineer job was
5 one of the ones who answered the question in the early
6 2000s to go over and meet with the Challenger group and
7 gave them some testimony on the SUBSAFE program, not
8 unlike what I'm talking about this morning, and that was
9 Paul Sullivan. And when he did that, it began this
10 dialogue that I think has grown into where Admiral
11 Norton is really a full-fledged member of their safety
12 board, that they open their eyes and minds to other
13 parties who have similar stakes and interests. I think
14 that's all healthy.

15 Professor Meshkati, who is here, and I were both
16 on this team that did the report on the far right. We
17 were not on the one that did the report to the President
18 in the middle, but looking at that Deepwater Horizon
19 thing, I think there's, even today, an ongoing dialogue
20 in the energy industry about how we don't let things
21 like that happen again.

22 It's a best practices discussion, but it's a
23 really different environment from the one in which the
24 Navy put together a list of requirements, built the
25 framework around which all that stuff would be executed,

1 and then requires it of our people, holds them
2 accountable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
3 in the military case when they don't comply, and
4 instills that same requirement in contracts, puts it in
5 place so that it isn't a negotiable point. It is like a
6 specification point.

7 In fact, it literally is in the statement of
8 work and the spec that the Submarine Safety Requirements
9 Manual will be invoked, and we can talk more about this
10 as you like. I would tell you that we get the same kind
11 of support out of people who are required by contract,
12 like the workers at the submarine construction yards,
13 and even at the subcontractor level today as we do from
14 the sailors who are working these things either because
15 they're already in the crew or they just came from and
16 are likely go back to the crews of these same ships.

17 People who sail in these ships recognize
18 firsthand how important it all is, but I think it's also
19 recognized by many people who never get the privilege to
20 sail in them but they have a responsibility to get it
21 right. So that's my experience.

22 The ability to translate that then into
23 something like an energy industry and be able to avoid
24 blowouts and the consequences in a rig, that's a more
25 tenuous discussion because not all the same controls

1 exist, as we have the luxury of imparting on the Navy
2 side.

3 And then you can't beat something at the end of
4 a show like a big picture of a Virginia-class submarine
5 like New Hampshire up there in Groton, Connecticut, so
6 that's my closing slide.

7 I think I've closed with a picture of some Navy
8 ship for every briefing I've done for 25 or 30 years.
9 Okay. That's all I have. I'm happy to answer any
10 questions you may have.

11 DR. WINOKUR: We do have a few. Thank you very
12 much for the presentation. Once again, it's very
13 insightful. I'm going to start the questioning, and I
14 want to ask you from a personal point of view when you
15 were the chief engineer for this program, what did you
16 do personally to convince yourself that you had the
17 culture of safety you needed and that these subs were
18 being built to the specifications they needed to be
19 built to? What did you personally do?

20 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yeah. So, as an
21 individual, in my personal role, I guess I'd say I had
22 three or four things that were really important. One is
23 that I made a regular practice of getting out to the
24 places where we were working on ships. I walked ships
25 every time I walked into a shipyard. I don't think I

1 ever have gone to a shipyard and just gone to a meeting.
2 That just is a huge mistake for any officer to do. It's
3 about the sailors. It's about the ship workers.

4 And, so, speaking with welders on deck plates,
5 speaking with people who are putting components in place
6 and visiting the places where our manufacturers do what
7 they do and test the devices that are going to end up on
8 our ships, those factory floor tours and those
9 walk-arounds on ships are very important.

10 An extension of that is that in my role as the
11 certification authority and as a program manager, I
12 would as often -- well, always as a program manager, I
13 would make the first dive on a submarine that was in new
14 construction. That's part of the deal is if you're
15 presenting this thing for certification, then you'll be
16 there with the captain and crew on the first dive, and
17 not alone. The Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion has
18 done that for as far as I know every ride ever made on a
19 submarine on its first dive, and I've personally been
20 out with several of them on several of those.

21 DR. WINOKUR: It's called incentives.

22 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: It's a pretty personal
23 incentive, and just to take the incentive to the right
24 place, the other couple of bunks on those ships are for
25 the presidents of the two construction yards. These

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 days those Virginia-class ships that are going to sea
2 are built -- each of those ships has been in part built
3 by Electric Boat and in part by Newport News
4 Shipbuilding, and so the chiefs of those two yards are
5 under way on those sea trials.

6 I think that makes it personal, and I think it
7 also makes it a great leadership example for the people
8 who every day are doing the work on those ships. They
9 want to know that there's commitment, and that's one way
10 to show it.

11 So, personal commitment and getting out there
12 with the people who are doing the work is a piece of it.
13 The other is a very diligent process of selecting the
14 right people for the right jobs. And, so, it was my
15 privilege a number of times to influence people's
16 careers by giving them the opportunity to get into this
17 kind of work, but also to have them understand that only
18 the best get that kind of assignment, and then to hold
19 them accountable for doing a good job while they were in
20 it.

21 And I guess another factor in all of this would
22 be to have the knowledge gained through experience and
23 education to be able to personally dive into the details
24 on some of these things and ask the hard question when
25 someone says, we accepted this, even though it wasn't

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 within some parameter of acceptable conditions, the
2 reason we accepted this outlier is as follows. If the
3 people who are making the decision to accept that are
4 led by folks who cannot understand the basis for
5 acceptance, then there's a breakdown in what I think is
6 a wholesome system.

7 So, I believe that just as being a
8 NATOPS-qualified aviator in a plane requires you to have
9 not only the experience and the skills, but the basic
10 knowledge, the same kind of idea holds true on the
11 submarine side. It holds true in any really critical
12 safety endeavor, and I think as you move up in the
13 leadership ranks, you've got to retain some ability to
14 get back down into that stuff.

15 As a diver, I dove up until my last couple of
16 weeks in the Navy. It just didn't ever seem to me that
17 I was allowed to get old enough to stop doing it, okay,
18 and the troops like it when they see you do it because
19 they know you're committed, but I'll tell you, it also
20 means I'm checking whether the regulator's in good
21 condition or not before I decide to take breaths
22 underwater with it.

23 So, I think that kind of personal commitment is
24 commonplace in the system. I think it's exactly the
25 kind of thing you find in the people in leadership

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 positions in aviation surface submarines, people taking
2 care of our warfighters, people taking care of our
3 weapons, and doing all these other things that most
4 Americans would consider high-risk, but finding a way to
5 do it with safety in mind for our people.

6 DR. WINOKUR: Were there metrics that you
7 tracked in your role as chief engineer, things that were
8 on your desk?

9 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yes, and some of those
10 also were on some other people's desks, and that's part
11 of the overlap of requirements here. A guy who's an
12 individual who might be the certification authority and
13 one of those other legs like the chief engineer, and
14 I've been in both of those jobs, so I know that we often
15 were looking at the same basic measures of
16 effectiveness, and they included things like in a
17 long-term view, what are the trends in these audits that
18 we do in facilities?

19 Are we seeing the major exceptions or the
20 recommendations that would be written by audit teams for
21 improvement? Are those things growing and how do we
22 characterize and categorize them? Are they presenting
23 current risks to ongoing programs or are these good
24 ideas that we should take from one activity and extend
25 to another.

1 We would have recommendations that we tracked as
2 individual numbered items that each unto themselves were
3 important, but they could have really different
4 meanings, one to another. And the accumulation of those
5 things was one kind of an indicator of whether or not we
6 were seeing progress in a good direction or in a not so
7 good direction. And that was true system-wide. It was
8 also true at an activity level and on a project basis.

9 So, in all of those areas, yeah, we would look
10 at measurements, even to the point of looking at things
11 like how many quality assurance findings are we getting
12 in a given production activity. Is there something not
13 coming out right because there's a problem in the
14 process, occasionally even ferreting out wrongdoing, but
15 that's pretty rare, but we would have from time to time
16 a recognition that someone we were counting on did have
17 an integrity problem, and it was picked up because the
18 system has enough mesh to it that we could eventually
19 filter out the problem, but when you find that, whether
20 it's a malfeasance or an innocent mistake, you've got to
21 get to the bottom of it. So, we did that through
22 indicators.

23 DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Sullivan?

24 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, and good morning,
25 Admiral, or Mr. Eccles, whichever you prefer.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Good to see you, sir.
2 It's always Tom to Mr. Sullivan.

3 MR. SULLIVAN: Maybe it's just Tom, okay. I
4 want to go back, I hate to take the picture of the
5 submarine sitting in Groton, Connecticut, off the
6 screen, but if we go back to slide 7, which was I think
7 your three-headed monster there.

8 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yeah.

9 MR. SULLIVAN: So I want to ask you, where is
10 cost control in that diagram? I seem to recall back the
11 submarine program having a Congressional -- the Seawolf
12 Program having a Congressionally mandated cost cap,
13 which had to add a degree of difficulty to what looks
14 like an otherwise simple diagram. Would you speak to
15 that?

16 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yes, happily. So, the
17 program manager is the one in that picture who has
18 responsibility for cost and schedule control, and really
19 is the leader of getting the job done when it comes to
20 all of this, and the others could be looked at as
21 controls.

22 The others are flying in support. You know, if
23 this was a formation, you would say that the one with --
24 on point or with lead is that one at the platform
25 program manager level, and he might well be the junior

1 one in the picture, but he's that individual for that
2 particular moment and project has the lead.

3 The Independent Technical Authority is really a
4 large organization with a lot of people, just as the
5 platform program manager's team is a fairly large
6 organization with diverse skill sets, but that program
7 manager is the accountable one, and when I was in that
8 role, besides the seriousness of getting under way with
9 the ship the first time, making the first dive and all
10 those things, saying let's be personally committed to
11 the right thing. I also had someone brief me on the way
12 into the job that it was I think two different felonies
13 if we somehow failed on that cost cap, and that got my
14 attention as well.

15 So, it's a constraint, for sure. How is it
16 managed? Well, honestly, through a bunch of judicious
17 decision-making, so that what we don't do is let any of
18 this get so out of balance that we're either shorting
19 ourselves and taking risks we shouldn't take, or
20 creating an opportunity for a risk-averse culture to run
21 so rampant that we literally tie the ship up and never
22 get under way.

23 We couldn't have it that way, so if you have to
24 come in under a cost cap but you've got to get under
25 way, then finding that way is one of them and is one of

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 the great challenges.

2 In my own case, with the SEAWOLF submarine,
3 Jimmy Carter, we actually found between the contractor,
4 in that case the prime was General Dynamics/Electric
5 Boat, and the Navy, that we had a common interest in
6 driving to that cost cap, and we worked a whole bunch of
7 day-to-day systems of controls, so that we would not pay
8 too much attention to the little stuff and pay a great
9 deal of attention to the things that mattered most.

10 And we found efficiencies the way we did that,
11 and we actually did control it and came in with like a
12 dollar and a half to spare at the very end. In fact, I
13 don't think I admitted we had that buck and a half, but
14 we slid into home on that one, and --

15 MR. SULLIVAN: You were a buck and a half away
16 from two felonies, is that what you're telling us?

17 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: It was something like
18 that, maybe a buck 350.

19 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Well, thank you for that.
20 I mean, it just seems to me, though, that there must
21 have been situations where there was a problem and then
22 there was a solution one and a solution two, and two was
23 more expensive than one.

24 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yes.

25 MR. SULLIVAN: But two would have given you a

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 better product and perhaps additional margin of safety.

2 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Right.

3 MR. SULLIVAN: How were those decisions made?

4 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yeah, great question. I
5 think those decisions are made every day, and I think
6 that there are many, many examples of those, and I think
7 in the end, that is the dialogue that these arrows might
8 represent where you get a conversation going that says,
9 I could do it the way I've always done it, but I know
10 what that's going to cost, and maybe there's a risk that
11 goes with that that is something like a reliability
12 challenge. And then there's a new way of doing it, and
13 that new way might cost me some more investment up
14 front, but it might give me the reliability that's been
15 eluding me for all this time.

16 And, so, finding a way to translate that into
17 terms that can be recognized as value and accepting
18 them, that's a tough one, but if it can be done in
19 dollars and cents and in the near term, then that makes
20 decision-making pretty easy. Is it worth doing as a
21 business case? And that, frankly, when those go the
22 right way, nothing is hard.

23 The hard ones are when you say something like,
24 my savings will come so far out in the future that it's
25 not inside anyone's incentive plan to get rewarded for

1 that, or when the way to translate that is, we'll be
2 more operationally effective by doing the more expensive
3 thing, then how do you make that trade?

4 And very often, the people in this diagram would
5 turn to the requirements officers in the Pentagon and
6 look for another value discussion, too, that would say,
7 I have a choice here, and I could do this and give
8 myself some margin on cost for the future, but if I do
9 the right thing, and this is my recommendation, then
10 we're going to be happier in the end because you will be
11 this much more capable. Maybe stealthier, maybe more
12 accurate with weapons fire.

13 And, so, whatever that proposition would be, we
14 would look to the people who set the requirement on the
15 operational side and who actually hold the purse strings
16 as well to say, I'm thinking about spending the treasury
17 like this, what do you think. And on the best days,
18 those conversations go really well.

19 I think the -- it may be a bit off topic, but
20 some of the improvements done to lower the cost of
21 Virginia-class submarines, and this is pretty much out
22 of my scope because it's largely after my time, but much
23 of that thinking and work required people to embrace
24 long-term benefits from near-term investments, and it's
25 paying off now. The first of those ships is at sea.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Things are working right, and as they continue to come
2 off the production line, they're going to be built at a
3 lower cost for the same capability, and they wouldn't
4 have been able to do that if someone didn't have the
5 courage to spend some serious money a few years ago.

6 In the end, the taxpayers will be better served.

7 MR. SULLIVAN: Okay. Thank you. I do want to
8 shift gears a little bit now, and I want to ask you
9 about the fire on the USS Miami, which I think occurred
10 in 2012.

11 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Okay. '12. June I think,
12 yes.

13 MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. So, just a little over two
14 years ago now.

15 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yes.

16 MR. SULLIVAN: And, so, for those who aren't
17 familiar, the USS Miami was undergoing overhaul up in
18 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. There was a fire that
19 ultimately was decided was deliberately set by a
20 disgruntled shipyard employee.

21 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yes.

22 MR. SULLIVAN: But the actual location of the
23 fire remained undetected long enough to allow the fire
24 to grow out of control, and actually threatened the
25 reactor compartment. It didn't actually go to the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 reactor compartment, but there was concern that it
2 might, it burned out of control for so long.

3 So, can you speak to the lessons that were
4 learned within the community -- the Navy's maintenance
5 community for what happened there and how safety was
6 subsequently improved?

7 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yes. I can speak to some
8 of that, and some of the evolution of thought that's
9 gone on on that subject is after my time, so, you know,
10 I probably have an impartial or an incomplete set of
11 comments on that.

12 One thing I would like to do is clarify that
13 from my perspective, and I think the way the Navy
14 spokesman put the word out at the time, the fire was
15 confined to the forward end of the ship, and yet it was
16 devastating for sure, and the consequences of it were
17 pretty terrible.

18 The reactor compartment and the propulsion plant
19 were isolated from the casualty, and remained manned
20 throughout, and was in a shutdown mode for a couple of
21 months preceding. So, to the best of my knowledge, and
22 it's not my territory either, but that was not a factor
23 in that fire. But, yes, it was a big, devastating fire,
24 and you have it right that it was a deliberate criminal
25 act of arson, and it was done by somebody whose arson

1 tendencies weren't detected until some time afterwards.

2 We were proceeding on the notion at the time as
3 investigators, doing both the safety investigation and
4 JAG manual investigations, and I was more on the side of
5 reviewing results from those things, that there was a
6 cause that was more of a technical cause in nature. We
7 were looking for accidental reasons for this, and the
8 damage was so sufficient or so complete that it was
9 really difficult to get to the bottom of that clue set
10 and pin anything down. And we pinned down a few ideas,
11 but, you know, saying, this is the one and we know it
12 conclusively, couldn't get there.

13 So, it's good that in the end a criminal
14 investigation determined what really was the cause, and
15 a confession came from that, and a guilty finding. Your
16 point that having been started deliberately but then
17 allowed to grow by lack of detection led to extreme
18 amount of damage, that's true. And, so, there's been
19 some work done inside the Navy and with people outside
20 who work on fire fighting and fire detection systems to
21 say, can we raise the game in how we detect things like
22 this?

23 And I'll tell you, the Navy's view has been not
24 to confine this to just a submarine discussion or a
25 Portsmouth discussion, but a broader one across our

1 industrial base, public, as Portsmouth is, and private,
2 and across all ship types, and even shore facilities.
3 And say, where do we run the risk? That whether
4 deliberate or accidental, a fire could go undetected and
5 then result in a significant amount of damage or risk to
6 people and all of that.

7 So, earlier detection, some of that by unmanned
8 systems, some question about whether the way watch
9 standards are deployed and how that process is run
10 operationally is another factor. Beyond that then, how
11 are responders organized, and are the people trained who
12 show up as professional firefighters and as crew members
13 on that ship and nearby ships, all focused in their
14 energies and their equipment and their tactics to be
15 able to combat this together, or is there a hand-off
16 process?

17 And that night, there was a process that was
18 followed, and it proved to yield a lot of lessons
19 learned. People were really spent by the heat
20 exhaustion that came from that fire. Additional crews
21 had to be called up. Firefighters came in from out of
22 town. Firefighters came from other communities.

23 Interestingly, some of the firefighters who came
24 as volunteers from outlying communities were people who
25 had worked their day shift at their day job as workers

1 in the shipyard, and actually some of those people were
2 particularly helpful in being able to show up as a
3 firefighter who might not have known anything about a
4 submarine, but in that case, some team members did.

5 So, learning that being able to take the people
6 who live just outside the gate and familiarize some of
7 them in the event they might have to be called is a part
8 of that decision or -- that education process. So,
9 those are kind of the main lanes that people are going
10 down.

11 Because the cause was deliberate, those
12 accidental ones were able to be ruled out, the ones that
13 were theories. On the other hand, each of those was a
14 thread worth examining, too. Could it be that by
15 employing certain kinds of equipment, we could have led
16 to a fire through an accident? And should we change
17 that equipment? So, there had been some component and
18 equipment changes done for tools that shipyard workers
19 use and ways that ships are equipped. How good is a
20 battle lantern versus a modern LED light at providing
21 light that cuts through dense smoke, or are any of those
22 any good, and how do we find a downed firefighter if one
23 of them is left behind? How do we make sure we don't
24 leave anybody behind, and we know when we've got someone
25 who has been brought unconscious?

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 There are tools that are used in civilian
2 firefighting that can be used aboard ships as well. So,
3 all those kinds of things, how do people communicate
4 with one another, which is a classic one. Every time we
5 bring people together in a network who weren't
6 deliberately networked before. So, in each of those
7 cases, good news is there are lessons learned,
8 documented. There are plans of actions and milestones
9 that are being used to implement those changes, and also
10 to a point that Admiral Norton made, there's a clear
11 separation between the Judge Advocate General's
12 investigation, the process that leads to accountability
13 from a misconduct perspective, and that -- and a
14 judicial one in the case of this one that got prosecuted
15 up in New Hampshire, but also then on a different tack,
16 is the question: What happened and how did it happen
17 and why did it happen and how do I look at that in terms
18 of a safety investigation, and give people the freedom
19 to speak without risk that that will cross paths over to
20 the JAG discussion so that we can get the lessons
21 learned that are as fact-based and objective as
22 possible out to the fleet as soon as possible through
23 the Naval Safety Center and their components. That, I
24 think, worked very well in this case.

25 MR. SULLIVAN: Yeah. Thank you.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 DR. WINOKUR: I want to ask you a question about
2 changing an existing culture, so let me start out by
3 saying we've acknowledged, and I think it's true that
4 the Navy's often asked to help out in terms of providing
5 its insights on safety and safety culture. And in your
6 particular case, when it came to the investigation of
7 Deepwater Horizon, the SUBSAFE program was pointed out
8 as a model of an organization that successfully operates
9 a high-risk program. But do you have any insights on
10 how you go about changing a safety culture that's an
11 existing safety culture that's very different than the
12 SUBSAFE program?

13 It seems like the Navy has had some benefit from
14 getting it right at the beginning. I mean, you have
15 Thresher, of course, but then you created a very -- it
16 sounds like a SUBSAFE program that was very well
17 conceived, and, you know, other programs and naval
18 reactors, but what if you're faced with making
19 suggestions to an organization that has a very
20 entrenched existing culture but from your perspective
21 isn't what you need in order to provide the kind of
22 safety to ensure the mission?

23 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Right. Well, so in the
24 SUBSAFE program, 50 plus years does sound like a pretty
25 good record, and I don't want to take anything away from

1 that, but in the 50 years preceding that, there were a
2 lot of really daring people in those earliest days about
3 100 years ago willing to lock themselves into a
4 windowless tube and take it under water, especially
5 given that in the century or two before that, there had
6 been very few successes from all of that, right?

7 So, submarining, right off the bat, starts
8 sounding in its earliest days like a very high-risk
9 venture, and it certainly didn't have the basic tenets
10 of the Submarine Safety Program, because there hadn't
11 even been enough experience to start drawing conclusions
12 like the ones drawn in the early '60s and into the '70s
13 and '80s for SUBSAFE, and I would say there's probably a
14 very similar story in aviation.

15 Most of us would probably not be the one to
16 first try to land on the deck of a pitching ship,
17 Admiral Norton excluded because he did do that, but the
18 first one who did that has got to be a little like the
19 first one who ate an oyster, right? There's a certain
20 trepidation.

21 So, if you ask yourself, how do people with an
22 engrained culture, or people who are taking something on
23 who have never taken it on, try to get to a place where
24 they can build such a system that has a likely
25 successful outcome over a long time. I think that you

1 have to decompose the problem into individual pieces
2 that you can then examine in really clear ways.

3 Like it is easy to explain to someone on their
4 first day on a job that we have a program that only has
5 two things it's trying to achieve: Prevent flooding in
6 submarines; and then make it so that if the submarine
7 does flood, you can recover that submarine to the
8 surface.

9 I can explain that, and have, to children, very
10 successfully. You can do it at the worker level. You
11 can tell your mom and dad about it. It's not
12 complicated. And then in similarly articulate ways, we
13 can take the pieces of that, break it down and say,
14 well, look, it depends on getting the right material
15 properly installed in the right place, and that sounds
16 easy. The systems that achieve that are very
17 complicated, but really, at their core, there's a simple
18 construct that we're trying to achieve, and we do it by
19 breaking the program and the process down into its
20 elements.

21 So, I think that, for example, in the energy
22 industry, if there had been a question asked the day
23 that the Deepwater Horizon had that problem, we're out
24 here -- there were executives on the platform giving a
25 safety award that day, as you may know just from reading

1 the papers, and it was a slips, trips and falls kind of
2 safety award, and that's important in an environment
3 where slips, trips and falls can be fatal, but it is not
4 the whole picture.

5 And a question I guess would be, is there a way
6 that team of executives, having finished giving those
7 awards, would have had the thought and conversation, so
8 what are we doing about systemic risk, and what are we
9 doing about the highly complex operation that's going on
10 down below the sea floor and managing all the energy
11 that we're tapping into, because they're essentially
12 taking a household plug and plugging it into a really
13 powerful source.

14 So, how well is that going to go, how well do
15 they understand the process, and do the people here on
16 the rig have everything it takes to make local
17 decisions, or are decisions being made at the
18 appropriate level by the appropriate people with the
19 appropriate tools and knowledge?

20 And I think if they had asked that question that
21 day, before everything went badly, they might have found
22 some things lacking, and I think it's been pretty well
23 documented what many of those are. You could take a
24 similar question without the big catastrophic event and
25 just ask the question similarly, if I went into this

1 factory where this downside effect is possible, and has
2 perhaps never occurred, what's being done today to frame
3 that proposition that we must avoid that catastrophic
4 event, or whatever the family of catastrophes is, how is
5 that being articulated, made plain to everybody at any
6 level that can influence the outcome, and how is it
7 being instilled as a basic part of what they do every
8 day?

9 I don't know that that's common. I don't think
10 it's typical. I think that you can find it in many
11 places. For some reason aviation safety is pretty darn
12 good in America right now, and generally around the
13 world. This is actually, despite some of what you've
14 read about in the papers, this is a safer year in
15 aviation safety, as I understand it, than the last ten.
16 So, there's something going on right there. How do we
17 take those kinds of things and extend them into places
18 where maybe that discussion isn't happening every day?

19 DR. WINOKUR: I'm just trying to get some
20 insight into how you manage a work force that could be
21 very resistive and just simply say, we always have done
22 it that way? I mean, that's the way we do things around
23 here. How do you get the light to go on that they need
24 to make changes?

25 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yeah, well, it is like

1 swimming upstream, I'm sure in many cases, but if you
2 can make that proposition that what you're trying to
3 achieve is something that is clear and it's simple and
4 it affects their individual lives, then I think that
5 individuals can relate to that.

6 Now, if they've never had the bad thing happen,
7 then certainly there's maybe some difficulty convincing
8 people that the risk is present. In my experiences, as
9 in most places where we deal with a lot of risk, there
10 are at least small pieces of that that have been
11 presented, and you might not have blown the whole end
12 off of a building, but you probably had people hurt.

13 So, how do you talk about those cases and make
14 them real for the people who are nearby but not directly
15 affected? And I think that's a communications
16 challenge, and I think it has a lot to do with how
17 leaders frame the thing they're trying to achieve. It
18 has to do with clear articulation and simple statements,
19 and I do think that the more we make that complicated,
20 the less we win the troops over, whether those troops
21 are in uniform or not.

22 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you.

23 Mr. Sullivan?

24 MR. SULLIVAN: So, what did the Navy do for its
25 contractors to make sure that they had the right

1 mindset? I mean, we could talk about contract law, but
2 that's pretty cumbersome. I know you mentioned earlier
3 General Dynamics. You can't really threaten to take the
4 business away from them because there's only so many
5 places you can go to build a submarine, so what did the
6 Navy do in order to make sure the contractors had the
7 right mindset?

8 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Right. I think that most
9 of the same things that were being done inside the Navy
10 from the beginning of this program, the SUBSAFE program,
11 to today has been done in a very similar way that is
12 sort of an emotional and intellectual attachment of the
13 program's goals, its objectives, and then the how of the
14 program.

15 That has been laid out for people who are on
16 private sector payroll just as for Navy civilians and
17 uniformed sailors from the operators who are really
18 facing the risk each day, to the people who are perhaps
19 sitting in a building doing the design for the next
20 thing.

21 And they might be the furthest removed, perhaps,
22 or from a subcontractor who's busy making a valve
23 somewhere in Pennsylvania, but may not ever get to see
24 that valve installed, and certainly is unlikely to sail
25 in the ship.

1 That connection is one that I think has been
2 made by a combination of the big precipitous event, the
3 calamity when it happened was real news, and it was
4 something that I think people found easy to embrace 50
5 years ago.

6 Then you'd carry it forward, and part of what's
7 been done is a messaging process in the training, and
8 this is just as true on the private sector side as
9 public sector, that for a long time, family members and
10 people who are like design leaders in the shipyards
11 where the decisions had been made, people who survived,
12 even a few people I've known who were supposed to have
13 been on the sailing list, but for one reason or another
14 did not make the trip, and would have been lost and then
15 weren't, these individuals, when they, you know,
16 realized the depth of the tragedy and the closeness of
17 their personal connection, they became very, very
18 forceful spokespeople for how important it is to never
19 let it happen again.

20 So, since many of those people would be a
21 hundred or more years old now, there has been a process
22 of building living histories from those folks, using
23 technology now to make it so that web-based training
24 that people receive on their first day and that they
25 receive annually thereafter, in some cases we do it a

1 little bit differently in the cycle, but you listen to
2 people who were there then. You listen to adults who
3 lost their dads. You listen to people who work in a
4 shipyard now but are the children of someone who was
5 lost in Thresher. And those kinds of people have a way
6 to express things that you just never really lose track
7 of.

8 And I think that we can make an impression in a
9 valve manufacturer in Pennsylvania just as easily as on
10 -- inside the USS name-the-sub by using those kinds of
11 connections.

12 And then the contract law piece of it, not to
13 get into any of that because you'll whip me on this one,
14 but what we really do is we just simply make it a
15 non-negotiable mandate that the system and the
16 authorities and accountability that go with it, that
17 that system transcends private and public sector.
18 Everybody has got to toe the line, and there is a
19 disciplinary consequence to not performing.

20 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you.

21 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Thank you.

22 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you.

23 Ms. Roberson?

24 MS. ROBERSON: Yes. Just one follow-up
25 question. I was going to ask you, the way I understood

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 your comments earlier about the effect on the contractor
2 work forces, you really don't see a difference, either
3 in mission commitment or in the culture of safety.

4 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Right.

5 MS. ROBERSON: So, on the National Academy of
6 Engineering effort for Macondo well blowout, what did
7 you see in that arena?

8 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: That's a great question.
9 I think the people who are out there on the platforms
10 are every day dedicated to doing the job right and
11 coming home to their families at the end of that period,
12 and, of course, they don't come home every day. They're
13 often out there for several weeks, and then home for a
14 time, and then back out, so they do this on crew/off
15 crew kind of thing.

16 Some of those crews seem very, very tight. And
17 I went out there to visit with crews on nearly identical
18 rigs, and spoke with them about that camaraderie and
19 about the sense of watching out for each other, and they
20 certainly are in a dangerous environment, whether
21 they're plugged into the energy source or not, because
22 they're also living out in seas that are sometimes
23 pretty unforgiving, and their job is to stay put, too.
24 They don't usually just outrun a storm. You know, the
25 storms kind of hit them.

1 So, the people are not unafraid of managing
2 these kinds of things, and they do watch out for each
3 other, but when you look at it at a more corporate
4 level, I saw differences between the major energy
5 companies and their commitment to investing to put the
6 right connections in place. In one company you might
7 find that the expectation was the people on the rig have
8 got it, and they'll call us with status and they'll let
9 us know if they're in trouble, but, you know, of course,
10 in the particular event that was the Macondo well
11 disaster for Deepwater Horizon, those calls weren't made
12 or recognized to be made until everything was going to
13 hell.

14 But if you would take it from a different
15 company's perspective, there are several others where
16 it's likely that the same conversations that were done
17 only locally on the rig would have been done across a
18 net connection to the beach, and on the beach would have
19 been a greater depth of knowledge base, and maybe a more
20 senior decision-making level that could feel a little
21 less encumbered by the pressure to get going, meet the
22 schedule, because that pressure was -- any company's
23 capable of exerting a lot of it, but if you never give
24 it any relief, then it really does build.

25 And, so, a relief process would be to take

1 decisions and kick them up the chain to someone who is
2 actually entitled to say, today I won't produce because
3 today there is something I don't understand about what's
4 going on down there on the sea floor, and or a mile or
5 two below it.

6 In my opinion, the people in the Macondo case,
7 at the Deepwater Horizon, didn't have that outlet, and
8 if they had had that kind of an outlet, if they -- or if
9 the investment had been made upfront to have a decision
10 process and the equipment that goes with it so that they
11 could take robust challenges and meet them with robust
12 knowledge and make an executive decision at a level far
13 above what's normally out on the rig, then I don't think
14 they would have gotten the same outcome.

15 MS. ROBERSON: Okay. Thank you. One last
16 question, Mr. Chairman.

17 DR. WINOKUR: Sure.

18 MS. ROBERSON: The Navy has a well understood
19 hierarchy of rank and seniority, strong culture of
20 discipline and obedience, a well-defined process for
21 succession planning, and well-developed leadership
22 training and educational programs, and we've talked a
23 lot about those today, and those are kind of embedded in
24 the culture.

25 And Admiral Norton has talked about it at the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 corporate level and his own experience, so I guess I
2 wanted you to just talk about sometimes we hear if you
3 don't follow these rules, you're out.

4 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Right.

5 MS. ROBERSON: And I think there's often a lot
6 of investment made, so I guess I want to ask you at the
7 operational level, what kinds of positive or negative
8 incentives did you use to change behavior?

9 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Well, I think the story
10 that was given in the aviation example of the sailor who
11 was willing to take the XO's airplane and say, I don't
12 think you're flying today, even though he might have
13 come out of boot camp the night before, or some time
14 like that, that was truly a sailor whose example was
15 excellent, and calling him out and rewarding him for it
16 was the right thing.

17 It's hard for me to put my finger on an exact
18 example of that, but I've seen dozens of cases where
19 whether sailors or shipyard workers, public or private,
20 there have been similar happenstances where it took guts
21 to say, this isn't right. And in so identifying it, a
22 person took individual risk, maybe risk that they were
23 afraid could actually result in termination or
24 reassignment or something like that. And in so doing,
25 when well led, they had been rewarded for making the

1 right call, usually by simple acts of recognition. The
2 Navy Achievement Medal or a certificate to an individual
3 or the ability to just say well done from a foreman to a
4 crew. That kind of positive incentive is all it takes.

5 We do not need to try to put money in place to
6 get people to do the right thing when it comes to
7 safety, in my opinion, and, frankly, I think there would
8 be too much downside risk to create some kind of
9 mercenary reward for doing the right thing. So,
10 sometimes right is just right, and an 'attaboy is all
11 that ought to be required.

12 On the other side of it, a failure to comply is
13 something that needs to be remedied, but, you know,
14 making a mistake can run a real gamut, from malpractice
15 to a person who's still learning, and I've certainly
16 made a few mistakes and been lucky enough to work for
17 people who said -- even one where I made a big mistake
18 with a ship and I put it in the wrong place in dry dock,
19 and there was some adverse consequences to that, and I
20 went up to explain myself, and my boss, a captain at the
21 time, decided that he had heard everything he needed to
22 hear, and he said, that's it, you're dismissed, and I
23 didn't really want to leave because I was pretty sure he
24 left out the part where I get fired from that position.

25 And I mentioned that to him. He says, why would

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 I fire you? And I said, I thought I just went through
2 that. And he says, yeah, but you're the only guy at
3 your pay grade who's actually made that mistake here,
4 and if I give this job to those other guys, anything
5 could happen. Are you going to make that mistake again?
6 I said, no, sir, not that mistake. You know, I
7 didn't -- I wasn't smart enough to realize I had some
8 other ones I was yet to make, but he had the trust and
9 confidence to go take somebody who has made a mistake
10 and might learn from it and put him back to work.

11 And we can do that, but we have to be able to
12 understand the difference between learning and trusting
13 versus finding somebody who needs to get a different
14 message, and sometimes that message is separation, but
15 other times the message is something much more like
16 something Admiral Norton talked about. When we've got
17 an individual who meant to do the right thing and that
18 the wrong thing resulted, then a re-education process
19 might just mean that your qualification to do that thing
20 you were just doing is suspended, and you need to earn
21 it back. And, in fact, you're going to have some
22 incentives to earn it back because you're going to do an
23 awful lot of push-ups between here and being ready to
24 get qualified again, but you need to go get re-educated,
25 you need to go through some training, an examination,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 and then come back, and we'll let you have the keys
2 again.

3 And I think that systems like that work really
4 well in the public and the private sector, and I have
5 now employed them in both sectors. And I did have
6 somebody say to me early in my new private sector career
7 where I became the boss of some stuff that this isn't --
8 he said, this isn't the Army, we don't follow orders
9 around here. And I said, well, I know it's not the
10 Army, but you're damn sure going to follow some orders.

11 And it turns out -- well, not everything is
12 given by decree. It is not so different in all our
13 different parts of life that when the most important
14 things are required, then that requirement has to be
15 followed, and when it's followed well and good things
16 happen, people should be rewarded, and when there's a
17 deviation, then we need to deal with the deviation and
18 figure out why and what we do about it and self improve.

19 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you.

20 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Thank you.

21 DR. WINOKUR: Just a couple of very brief
22 questions to end. I wanted to just ask you briefly
23 about complacency, and do you think there's a cyclic
24 component to where every 20 or 30 years you get a new
25 corps of officers and they become more distant from

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 events that you grew up with and you understood. Could
2 be wars, could be accidents, things of that nature, and
3 how you go about overcoming that and making sure you are
4 moving in the right direction?

5 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Right. I mean, if I think
6 about us as having been about the same age and coming in
7 the Navy in the same era, we probably have certain
8 shared traits, whether one was in submarines and one was
9 flying because we're just products of our time.

10 On the other hand, you know, our flow of
11 officers and enlisted into the Navy, just as in the
12 workplace, is somewhat continuous, and yeah, there are
13 ups and downs, you know, and yeah, we have these bimodal
14 distributions of age in some workplaces, but by and
15 large, what we're doing is continually working on the
16 process of educating, training, sustaining, and I think
17 that we can overcome any sense of cyclic forgetfulness
18 through that.

19 I do not have the sense that there is an
20 interval of 20 or 30 years over which we forget things.
21 I think that if we don't pay attention to things, it
22 takes much less than that to forget, and when we do pay
23 attention, I think we can achieve a nearly continuous
24 awareness, if we're doing it right, but that's a
25 leadership challenge. How do you do that when you're

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 retiring people who were there, and part of the answer
2 might be, let's get some of them to put that testimony
3 into a format where we can show it 100 years from now if
4 we have to.

5 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you.

6 Mr. Sullivan?

7 MR. SULLIVAN: I want to ask actually a question
8 for both of you, maybe you can take turns answering, but
9 the injection of new technology, Admiral Norton, you
10 talked earlier about night vision goggles and the effect
11 that that has, but the other day I was down at a --
12 visiting Pantex where the NNSA puts together and takes
13 apart nuclear weapons, and I was supposed to meet up
14 with my escort at a particular place to get taken
15 somewhere, and we had a miscommunication, and so we
16 weren't in the same place.

17 And because they had taken my cell phone away
18 from me, I was like at a loss, all of my ability to
19 reach out to this person was now gone. So, the point is
20 there's always a downside, right? Through my career,
21 navigation systems improved, that was great, but there
22 were old things that we had learned back when we had to
23 look at the stars that helped us make sure the
24 technology was working.

25 Can you speak to the I would call it, and this

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 is just my opinion, there's somewhat of a double-edged
2 sword, technology is always -- you always want it, but
3 there's always some downsides. Can you speak to that
4 and how the Navy deals with it? Maybe Admiral Eccles,
5 you want to go first?

6 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yeah, let me just take a
7 quick shot at that. I mean, certainly there are some
8 things where we need to be able to work in directions
9 that are very progressive, by keeping in mind these
10 downsides. There are other places where we should be
11 much more conservative and ask the question, why must I
12 change or when will this thing that seems promising
13 prove its utility, and we'll deal with what the downside
14 is successfully enough that we'll let it displace what
15 it used to do.

16 And, so, I think there are a lot of examples of
17 places where highly reliable components and highly
18 reliable system approaches have not been shifted until
19 the technology that was present had matured a lot
20 somewhere else and where risks are lowered, before we
21 adapted and adopted these things into higher risk
22 environments. And maybe also part of the math in this
23 is, so how big is the benefit?

24 So, for example, in submarines, there's a
25 fly-by-wire kind of technology being employed today, and

1 really for the last decade or so, but not much before
2 that, where instead of using hydraulics to move our
3 control surfaces that change the attitude of the
4 submarine under water. We always used hydraulics, and
5 then airplanes really sticks with wires and pulleys
6 would be the analogy, and now both have moved in a
7 direction toward sending telemeterized signals from
8 processors near the stick to processors and actuators
9 back at the control surface.

10 If you asked an old-time person, are you going
11 to let somebody send photons or electrons back and forth
12 to give the command, or are you just going to trust in
13 that wire or in that hydraulic pipe, most of the
14 traditionalists would say, you better not give up the
15 wire or the hydraulic system very fast, and most of them
16 would also say, I want to see a lot of redundancy built
17 into whatever that path is that sounds to me fragile.

18 So, we engineer more redundant systems, and now
19 F-18s and lots of other airplanes are flown with
20 fly-by-wire systems, and adopted it faster than the
21 submarines did, even though they go a heck of a lot
22 higher and faster and all of that, high-risk
23 environment, but the payoff for doing things lightweight
24 and highly responsive, the way that technology was, had
25 a more immediate transactional value to the aviation

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 side than doing that in a big submarine did.

2 But it turns out to be a good thing in
3 submarines, too, but we had to get to where we could
4 build the faith, build the confidence, and we built it
5 through observation of other places that were embracing
6 it and having to deal with some of these same risks.

7 So, I think sometimes we need to be a bit slow
8 about this. That said, I'm really glad I have the
9 iPhone I carry today and not the lousy BlackBerry I had
10 a year ago.

11 REAR ADMIRAL NORTON: The -- it's an interesting
12 comment. You talked about shooting the stars, celestial
13 navigation, even aboard with the GPS systems we have the
14 radar systems we have, the connectivity we have, it was
15 fun for me to watch my -- the ship's navigator and also
16 the quartermaster actually still go up and do celestial
17 navigation just to keep those skills up, so that's still
18 going on out there at least on the big decks, on the
19 aircraft carriers, et cetera.

20 For the young sailors, the young quartermasters
21 to reach their quals, they still rely on those things.
22 Fortunately for me, I never had to rely on that, I
23 always had my GPS and the radar systems, et cetera, and
24 we still shoot fixes when we get close to -- using
25 nav aids when we get close to shores, et cetera, but,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 yeah, out there in the deep kind of blue water ops,
2 relying on celestial navigation it's more of an art than
3 it is a science right now.

4 Yeah, we do rely on technology now, and I agree
5 with what Admiral Eccles says concerning the fly-by-wire
6 systems that we have, the night vision goggles, et
7 cetera. Ultimately we rely on some of the old
8 techniques. I can speak certainly from the cockpit,
9 even though we had night vision goggles, there were many
10 nights that to practice our instrument flying skills, we
11 would flip those up.

12 We would actually put hoods on so all we could
13 read was our instruments on the panel in front of us,
14 and so we would keep those skills. So, we still have
15 requirements to go back to what I would call the basics,
16 if we're going to fly in instrument flight conditions.
17 So, it's not in lieu of or we no longer do those type of
18 things. We use the technology to -- in the correct
19 environments, and mostly they're in the landing zones or
20 on the back ends of ships, et cetera, but there --
21 certainly have, in my opinion, have saved probably
22 untold lives and certainly equipment over the years
23 because of those technologies that are out there.

24 MR. SULLIVAN: Thanks to both of you.

25 DR. WINOKUR: One final question, Admiral

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Eccles. We're interested in DOE safety culture. It's
2 DOE safety culture or culture of safety, it's not the
3 Board's, but we're an oversight organization. Do you
4 have any ideas about how we can effectively assist the
5 Department of Energy in providing some benefit to their
6 desire to improve their safety culture over time?

7 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Yeah, that's an
8 interesting question whose answer I'm sure I don't
9 really have great -- a great way to give to you because
10 I've been a part of oversight organizations, but not as
11 distinctly separated as this construct is.

12 Instead, usually what I was looking at is
13 something like the people who are a part of a process in
14 operationalizing something, then take some level of
15 executive managers or leaders and make an oversight
16 entity out of that and have the operational folks report
17 on a periodic basis the status of things to that
18 oversight group.

19 That's much less of a live connection than the
20 one I might infer from your question, but if you accept
21 the idea that that's more of a periodic check-in and a
22 steering question, are we doing what we said we would
23 do, are we achieving the kinds of ends that we intended
24 to achieve, and if not, what are we doing about it.
25 That kind of an oversight board has very little

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 operational connection but can still hold value in that
2 kind of a way.

3 And that's what I would imagine you already have
4 as a relationship, but I don't have familiarity with the
5 DOE, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board relationship
6 to be able to comment on how strong or not that is.

7 DR. WINOKUR: All right. Thank you very much.

8 REAR ADMIRAL ECCLES: Thank you.

9 DR. WINOKUR: So, I want to thank you, Admiral
10 Eccles, and I want to thank both of our panelists,
11 Admiral Norton and Admiral Eccles, for your valuable
12 insights into the safety practices and tools that the
13 Navy is using to improve or sustain a robust culture of
14 safety, both in operations and in the design and
15 construction of nuclear submarines.

16 At this time, it is the Board's practice to
17 provide an opportunity for comments from interested
18 members of the public. We will offer a similar
19 opportunities at the end of this afternoon's session,
20 and it's my understanding is there are no members of the
21 public or our audience today who wish to comment, but I
22 do want to ask again, is there anybody in the audience?
23 Yes, please? Let's get a mic.

24 Thank you very much.

25 (Brief discussion off the record.)

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 DR. WINOKUR: I think we're just going to
2 entertain comments. I don't think you're going to
3 question the panelists, but if you have thoughts or
4 comments you'd like to share, please do that.

5 MR. SINHA: Hi, so my name is Ashish Sinha with
6 the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability. So, the
7 overall just thing, I think, that I was interested in
8 and to consider was in the wake of the Air Force's
9 recent challenge with cheating, Admiral Kirby had
10 mentioned about his concerns about systemic problems
11 with low morale within the nuclear mission, and so one
12 of the things that I have been wondering about is that,
13 is there a correlation between personnel's value of both
14 their mission and work on their willingness to support a
15 robust safety culture, and how do we guard against that
16 if there is that sort of correlation?

17 DR. WINOKUR: I want to thank you for that
18 comment, I appreciate it. That's something that
19 certainly we'll be thinking about as we go about these
20 investigations. Thank you.

21 MR. SINHA: Thank you.

22 DR. WINOKUR: Are there any other comments from
23 the members of the audience today?

24 (No response.)

25 DR. WINOKUR: All right, thank you very much,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 then. At this time, I will recess this meeting and
2 hearing for lunch. I will hold my closing remarks and
3 ask other Board members to hold their closing remarks
4 until the end of this afternoon's session.

5 Once again, I would like to thank our two
6 witnesses for supporting this session. The Navy has
7 clearly put significant amount of effort and resources
8 into understanding the concept of safety culture and
9 improving their operations based on that understanding.

10 We appreciate the insights into those efforts
11 that our two witnesses have provided today. I want to
12 thank members of the public, Congressional staffers,
13 elected officials, and other representatives of state
14 and local organizations who may have been present this
15 morning or observed our webcast. I invite all of you to
16 return for this afternoon's session, which promises to
17 be and interesting and inform -- which promises to be as
18 interesting and informative as this morning's session
19 has been.

20 This meeting and hearing is now in recess until
21 1:00 p.m. Thank you.

22 (Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., a lunch recess was
23 taken.)

24
25

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 AFTERNOON SESSION

2 (1:00 p.m.)

3 DR. WINOKUR: Good afternoon. My name is Peter
4 Winokur, and I'm the chairman of the Defense Nuclear
5 Facilities Safety Board. I'm presiding over this public
6 meeting and hearing. I would like to call this
7 afternoon's session to order.

8 I'd like to introduce my colleagues on the
9 Safety Board. To my immediate right is Ms. Jessie
10 Roberson, the Board's Vice Chairman. To my immediate
11 left is Mr. Sean Sullivan. We three constitute the
12 Board.

13 Mr. Batherson, representing the Board's Office
14 of the General Counsel, is seated to my far left. Mr.
15 Steven Stokes, the Board's Technical Director, is seated
16 to my far right. Several members of the Board's staff
17 closely involved with safety culture oversight at the
18 Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities are
19 also here.

20 Today's meeting and hearing were publicly
21 noticed in Federal Register on August 14th, 2014. The
22 meeting and hearing are held open to the public per the
23 provisions of the Government and the Sunshine Act.

24 In order to provide timely and accurate
25 information concerning the Board's public and worker

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 health and safety mission throughout the Department of
2 Energy's defense nuclear complex, the Board is recording
3 this proceeding through a verbatim transcript, video
4 recording and live video streaming.

5 The transcript, associated documents, public
6 notice and video recording will be available for viewing
7 in the public reading room here at headquarters in
8 Washington, D.C. In addition, an archive copy of the
9 video recording will be available through our website
10 for at least 60 days.

11 Per the Board's practice, and as stated in the
12 Federal Register notice, we will welcome comments from
13 interested members of the public at the conclusion of
14 testimony, which will be at approximately 4:00 p.m. A
15 list of those speakers who have contacted the Board is
16 posted at the entrance to this room. We have generally
17 listed the speakers in the order in which they have
18 contacted us, or if possible, when they wish to speak.

19 I will call the speakers in this order and ask
20 that speakers state their name and title at the
21 beginning of their presentation. There is also a table
22 at the entrance to this room with a sign-up sheet for
23 members of the public who wish to make a presentation
24 but did not have an opportunity to notify us ahead of
25 time. They will follow those who have already

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 registered with us in the order in which they have
2 signed up.

3 To give everyone wishing to make a presentation
4 an equal opportunity, we ask speakers to limit their
5 original presentations to five minutes. I will then
6 give consideration for additional comment, should time
7 permit.

8 Presentations should be limited to comments,
9 technical information and data concerning the subjects
10 of this public meeting and hearing. The Board members
11 may question anyone making a presentation to the extent
12 deemed appropriate. The record of this proceeding will
13 remain open until September 27th, 2014.

14 I would like to reiterate that the Board
15 reserves its right to further schedule and regulate the
16 course of this meeting and hearing to recess, reconvene,
17 postpone or adjourn this meeting and hearing and to
18 otherwise exercise its authority under the Atomic Energy
19 Act of 1954, as amended.

20 This public meeting and hearing is the second of
21 a series of hearings the Board will hold to -- convene
22 to address safety culture at Department of Energy
23 defense nuclear facilities and to address the Board's
24 Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste
25 Treatment and Immobilization Plant. Later hearings will

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 be announced by separate notices.

2 In this hearing, the Board is holding two
3 sessions. In this morning's session, the Board received
4 testimony from current and former Navy officers with a
5 focus on safety practices and tools that the Navy uses
6 to improve and sustain a robust culture of safety, both
7 in operations and in the design and construction of
8 nuclear submarines.

9 In this afternoon's session, the Board will hear
10 testimony from a panel composed of a member of the
11 United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
12 Board, and two experts in human and organizational
13 factors in management of high reliability organizations.

14 The panel will discuss the role of the
15 organizational leaders in establishing and sustaining a
16 robust culture of safety within organizations conducting
17 complex and hazardous operations.

18 In a follow-on session later this fall, we will
19 discuss with officials from the Department of Energy how
20 these approaches and lessons learned might be used to
21 guide their efforts in continuing to assess and improve
22 safety culture at the Department's Defense Nuclear
23 Facilities.

24 This concludes my opening remarks. I will now
25 turn to the Board members for their opening remarks.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Ms. Roberson?

2 MS. ROBERSON: I have no statement at this time,
3 Mr. Chairman.

4 DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Sullivan?

5 MR. SULLIVAN: No, Mr. Chairman.

6 DR. WINOKUR: This concludes the Board's opening
7 remarks. At this time I'd like to invite our three
8 panelists to the witness table for this session. I
9 notice you're already there. Each witness will be
10 provided 25 minutes to make a presentation that
11 addresses some of the initial lines of inquiry provided
12 by the Board in advance of this hearing. The Board will
13 then question each witness.

14 Our first witness is the Honorable Mark Griffon.
15 Mr. Griffon was appointed by President Obama in 2010 to
16 the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard
17 Investigation Board, also referred to as the Chemical
18 Safety Board.

19 Prior to that appointment, Mr. Griffon served as
20 a member of the Federal Advisory Board on Radiation and
21 Worker Health, which advises the Department of Health
22 and Human Services on occupational illnesses and
23 compensation policy. Mr. Griffon's career has included
24 work in academia, the public sector and the private
25 sector.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 The Chemical Safety Board is an independent
2 Federal agency with a mission of investigating
3 significant chemical incidents and hazards, and
4 effectively advocating the implementation of
5 recommendations to protect workers, the public and the
6 environment.

7 The Chemical Safety Board primarily conducts
8 root cause investigations of chemical accidents at
9 industrial facilities, but they also -- but they are
10 also authorized to conduct investigations of chemical
11 hazards, regardless of whether an accident has already
12 occurred. Some of the significant investigations
13 performed by the Chemical Safety Board during Mr.
14 Griffon's term include the Deepwater Horizon explosion
15 and fire, the Tesoro refinery fire and the West Texas
16 fertilizer plant explosion and fire. All of these
17 accidents resulted in significant loss of life and
18 property.

19 Given the mission of the Chemical Safety Board,
20 it could be said that Mr. Griffon sees organizations at
21 their worst rather than at their best. With that in
22 mind, Mr. Griffon will provide his perspective on the
23 role that organizational leaders play in either
24 contributing to the occurrence of accidents, or in
25 responding to them, and perhaps share some ideas on how

1 leaders can help prevent accidents.

2 Our second witness is Dr. Najmedin Meshkati from
3 the University of Southern California. Dr. Meshkati is
4 a professor of civil environmental engineering and a
5 professor of industrial and systems engineering. For
6 the past 25 years, he has been teaching and conducting
7 research on risk reduction and reliability enhancement
8 of complex technological systems, including commercial
9 nuclear power, aviation, and the petrochemical and
10 transportation industries.

11 Dr. Meshkati has inspected many petrochemical
12 plants and nuclear power plants around the world,
13 including the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. Dr.
14 Meshkati was the Technical Advisor for the National
15 Academy of Sciences Committee on Lessons Learned from
16 the Fukushima nuclear accident for improving safety of
17 U.S. nuclear plants.

18 Prior to that, he was a member of the National
19 Academy of Engineering, National Research Council
20 Committee on the Analysis of Causes of the Deepwater
21 Horizon explosion, fire and oil spill, to identifying
22 measures to prevent accidents in the future.

23 He also serves as a consultant to both the
24 National Transportation Safety Board and the Chemical
25 Safety Board. Dr. Meshkati obviously brings a wide

1 range of experience to this meeting, but two of his most
2 recent activities are of direct interest to this Board;
3 namely, evaluations of the Deepwater Horizon accident
4 and the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi
5 accident.

6 Dr. Meshkati will discuss his perspective on the
7 influence that organizational leaders can have on the
8 success or failure of the organization to respond to
9 situations that challenge or exceed the design basis of
10 the facility.

11 Our third witness is Dr. Kathleen Sutcliffe from
12 the Johns Hopkins University. Dr. Sutcliffe is an
13 organizational sociologist, and has recently joined the
14 faculty at the Johns Hopkins Carey Business School as a
15 Bloomberg Distinguished Professor. Prior to that, she
16 was on the faculty of the Ross School of Business at the
17 University of Michigan.

18 Dr. Sutcliffe's research has been devoted to
19 understanding the fundamental mechanisms of
20 organizational adaptation, reliability and resilience.
21 She has focused on how top executive team composition,
22 cognition and learning influence a firm's adaptability
23 and performance on processes associated with team and
24 organizational resilience and high reliability
25 organizing, and on the social and organizational

1 underpinnings of mishaps.

2 Her explicit goal is to gain an understanding of
3 how an organization's design contributes to its members'
4 ability to successfully manage unexpected events.

5 Dr. Sutcliffe has studied and provided
6 consultation to a wide range of organizations conducting
7 hazardous operations, including the U.S. Forest Service
8 wildfires, major oil companies, and healthcare
9 providers.

10 From Board Member Griffon to Dr. Meshkati, we
11 hope to learn how leaders influence the behavior of an
12 organization and its likelihood of success when the
13 organization is seriously challenged.

14 Dr. Sutcliffe will discuss with us her
15 perspective on how organizational leaders can learn from
16 such situations, and how they can work to improve
17 themselves and their organization in order to be better
18 prepared for future situations.

19 I am very pleased that these three distinct
20 experts have agreed to be here and share their
21 perspectives with us today. I look forward to their
22 presentations and discussions.

23 We will begin the presentations with Board
24 Member Griffon. Welcome.

25 MR. GRIFFON: Thank you. That's fine. Thank

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 you, Dr. Winokur, and members of the Board. Thank you
2 for inviting me here, and I have the distinguished
3 opportunity of being the first speaker after lunch,
4 which we always know is quite troublesome.

5 I also feel like I'm returning the favor here.
6 Ms. Jessie Roberson was nice enough to come to a
7 Chemical Safety Board hearing where she testified at our
8 hearing on process safety indicators, and she was very
9 helpful, and I appreciate that, and so I hope I can give
10 some insights into what the CSB's done in our
11 investigations and particularly focusing on safety
12 culture.

13 I think you are right, our perspective coming in
14 is more probably glass half full than -- or glass half
15 empty, I guess we tend to see organizations at their
16 worst, and we also have a bit of hindsight bias. We're
17 looking at what went wrong after the fact, not trying to
18 prevent going forward, although our recommendations are
19 focused in that regard.

20 So, I am going to do a quick intro to how we do
21 our work, and then try to get into a couple of the
22 investigations that have involved safety culture, and
23 the last several slides are going to focus on a lot of
24 sort of challenges questions that I have, and I'm hoping
25 that we'll engage the dialogue between you all and the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 whole panel, as I'm going to defer them on answers.

2 All right. First, my disclaimer. The only
3 thing I really want to -- you know, this is our lawyers
4 helping with this, but the important part for me as a
5 board member is that I'm going to say quite a bit of
6 information that's on the public record that's based on
7 Board votes, and that's our process, similar to yours,
8 is that our published reports are all voted on by the
9 Board.

10 I'm also going to add into this presentation
11 some of my own observations and views that aren't
12 necessarily Board opinions at this point, but I think
13 it'll will be helpful in creating a dialogue.

14 So, I don't know why this was laid out this way,
15 but I'll just put it all up there. The CSB, I mean,
16 we're a very small Federal agency. Most of you, I
17 think, in this room, anyway, know us. Most of the
18 audiences I go to don't know us, but we got funding in
19 around 1998. Right now we have two Board members, we're
20 supposed to have five. And we have about 45 staff, and
21 maybe about 15 to 17, I think, of those are
22 investigators.

23 We're modeled after the NTSB, but I often say
24 that we're jealous of the difference in budgets. We --
25 so, our intent is to look at root causes and make

1 recommendations toward prevention. Of course, we're not
2 regulatory or and we don't have enforcement authority.

3 I think at this point, I added in this slide
4 because I think it's important for people to understand
5 how we go about our investigations, at least the more
6 comprehensive investigations that we do, and this --
7 since I've been on the Board, we sort of modified our
8 protocol to include or to change this approach, and the
9 top bullet, I'll read this out because I think it's
10 important to understand. "Formal analysis to identify
11 underlying technical, unifactor management system,
12 organizational and regulatory causes of the incident."

13 So, the point being there is that we try to go
14 beyond the widget that broke, beyond the worker error
15 and ask, as someone earlier said, ask the whys, why did
16 all this happen.

17 And, of course, we're also -- as we do this,
18 we're looking at systems that were in place, but also
19 the deltas between what management thought was going on
20 versus what was actually going on.

21 And the other factor is why -- what conditions
22 were present and what decisions were made that led up to
23 the incident. So, we try to take that higher level look
24 for causes.

25 I want to put this presentation into a context

1 of process safety and personal safety. This is a theme
2 that has come up in several of our investigations, and,
3 in fact, the two that I'm going to talk about, Macondo
4 and Texas City, also have a component of this. And I
5 think it's important as we get on to safety culture,
6 too, so we're really dealing with two distinct
7 disciplines, and on the one side, we have the attributes
8 of one, prevention for process safety. We're looking at
9 mechanical integrity, hazard evaluation, management of
10 change, the risk -- while there might be fatality risks
11 in both personal accidents and the more process safety
12 accidents, the major accidents, the property damage, the
13 environmental damage, the multiple fatalities usually
14 occur on these sort of larger process safety incidents,
15 so another distinction.

16 Also the indicators, I think, is very important.
17 Personal safety, right now a lot of the indicators are
18 recordable injury rates, days away from work, and I'll
19 also note that these are some of the only indicators
20 that are required for reporting for a lot of the
21 companies that we cover. As you go into process safety,
22 you might be looking at other releases to the air or
23 more leading indicators to process events.

24 So, they're very different disciplines,
25 different focuses, not to say one is important and one

1 is not, but they're very different.

2 So, starting with BP Texas City, obviously I
3 think this is the incident that probably took -- put the
4 CSB on the map. A lot of people followed this incident,
5 and it involved a large hydrocarbon release, a vapor
6 cloud went through the site, and there in the foreground
7 is the trailer. Obviously the vapor cloud found an
8 ignition source, and these temporary trailers with
9 contractors in and around took the brunt of the
10 explosion, 15 deaths and many injuries, 180 injuries.

11 This resulted in actually two different reports.
12 The Chemical Safety Board did a report, but they also
13 asked for Secretary Baker led a panel, which we refer to
14 as the Baker report, to further look at organizational
15 issues, including safety culture.

16 So, some key organizational findings out of
17 this, I just picked some obviously, but the first one,
18 personnel checked off safety procedures as done when
19 incomplete, and I think the point I want to make here is
20 that, you know, obviously we don't want to stop the
21 investigation there, and it was clear that these
22 work-arounds had been occurring for quite some time.

23 The other thing -- the other way you think about
24 the systems, reward systems, reward and punishment
25 systems is that oftentimes workers are almost

1 encouraged, albeit subtly, to do these work-arounds, to
2 be more efficient to make the system work. It's only
3 when the procedure fails when there's retaliation or
4 punishment to the workers. So, there in this case they
5 were, they were working around these procedures for
6 quite some time, just never had an event, and this
7 obviously in this case they had one.

8 The absence of reporting of abnormal situations
9 for fear of blame, this is another finding of the
10 report. The message just wasn't getting up the chain.
11 No messages -- no emphasis on learning from mistakes to
12 prevent worse incidents. They certainly had prior
13 incidents. They even had internal audit reports that
14 were warning signs that they should pay more attention
15 to process safety, and yet these were not emphasized at
16 all. And the last part is the internal surveys.

17 So, the Baker panel went further with this, and
18 I'm just highlighting again some of their findings,
19 ineffective process safety leadership, lacking an open,
20 trusting relationship between management and the
21 workers, and the contractors I'll add in there. There
22 was a multiple dimension there.

23 A lack of unifying process safety culture, and
24 I'll come back to that unifying thing later. And,
25 again, personal safety emphasis versus process safety.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 They -- I think it was mentioned earlier from Macondo,
2 there was a ceremony going on to reward a great safety
3 record, the same thing that was happening pre-Texas
4 City. They were getting an award for their very low
5 lost time injury rates, and they were heavily relying on
6 lost time injury rates to sort of be a predictor of
7 major accidents, which is a fallacy.

8 And then there was a production versus safety
9 component, too. Cost-cutting pressures seriously
10 degraded the infrastructure. The maintenance budget I
11 think was cut by 25 percent preceding this, and a lot of
12 things that were waiting to be repaired were just put on
13 hold longer, and so certainly a component.

14 They did, as a part of the Baker panel report,
15 they did a safety culture survey, and some of the
16 focuses of this, the attributes they were looking at,
17 does the work force feel that they were empowered? Do
18 they report safety-related incidents, process safety
19 awareness, trust, information flow? Several of these
20 are attributes that a lot of you are probably familiar
21 with, but when you look at some of the survey items, and
22 I just took a few snapshots off -- I'm not so good with
23 my PowerPoint, but I took a few snapshots, and these are
24 percentages that disagree with the question, the stated
25 question. "I believe the culture exists at this

1 refinery that encourages raising process safety
2 concerns."

3 You see Texas City and Toledo, but I think the
4 importance is, I have three of these slides, they're all
5 similar. I think the -- there's a bunch of stuff to
6 look at and maybe ask more questions on, but one thing,
7 Texas City, of course, has sort of worse scores in some
8 regard, but I also point you to the differences between
9 management, engineering and the workers essentially, the
10 operators and maintenance people, and there's supposed
11 to be a last line which is contractors, but it was cut
12 off, but if you look to the report, you can find that.

13 The other thing that doesn't show up on this
14 simple overhead is that Carson and Cherry Point were
15 recent acquisitions by BP, so they might have had a
16 different culture because they -- a lot of the people
17 that were working there were under another operator
18 fairly recently, but there's a lot of more drill-down
19 that has to happen there to understand that.

20 Just another similar question: "Is management
21 more concerned with correcting hazards than assigning
22 blame or issuing discipline?" And, again, these are
23 even higher disagrees on this, so there was really a
24 focus or at least a perception by the operators and
25 maintenance folks that they were going to assign blame,

1 which makes them very unlikely to report, right?

2 And when process safety is involved, can I
3 challenge decisions made by the supervisors without fear
4 of a negative consequence? Again, similar numbers.

5 So, they have a fairly lengthy survey of this,
6 concluding in part that there were some problems with
7 Texas City's, and BP's to some extent overall safety
8 culture, or at least some challenges to improve.

9 And then fast forward to 2010, Deepwater
10 Horizon, so this is about five years after for BP
11 anyway. Of course, we don't want to forget that Trans
12 Ocean and Halliburton, and there were some other big
13 players involved in this incident. So, the incident has
14 been described, people are well aware of this incident.
15 We, the CSB, is still trying to complete -- did I say
16 that on the record, trying to complete? We're going to
17 complete our report on the -- on the investigation
18 fairly soon, and we've put out one -- two volumes out of
19 the three, I think, that are going to be the full
20 report, but at this point we're still looking at those
21 components of safety culture, organizational failures.

22 We've got a lot of information, but I'm
23 probably -- I'm going to focus on -- there's so many
24 other reports that are out there right now, that some of
25 the slides I'll share with you are from these other

1 reports, and I think we're going to -- we do agree with
2 most of these, anyway, that are up here.

3 The Presidential Commission Report Safety
4 Culture, again, must be accompanied by sweeping reforms
5 that accomplish no less than a fundamental
6 transformation of its safety culture. When I read this,
7 it also makes me think back to the Kemeny Report after
8 Three Mile Island, the Presidential Commission report,
9 where they also warned that the regulator and the
10 industry have to have sweeping reform. I don't know if
11 they used those same words, but essentially the same
12 idea of the way they do their business, and they didn't
13 use the words "safety culture" in that report, but, boy,
14 rereading it, it certainly sounded like safety culture.

15 The Commission's Chief Counsel Report went a
16 little further than the initial Presidential Commission
17 Report, and they added some findings on this that these
18 errors can lead back to management failures and
19 decisions, management errors. They didn't fully
20 appreciate all of the risks that Macondo presented, and
21 I think that was discussed a bit earlier, too, and they
22 didn't adequately supervise the worker and its
23 contractors.

24 This is this notion of deference to expertise.
25 They had the experts on shore. They weren't really

1 going to them. Part of it was the way they were
2 organized and dealing with decision-making. This is
3 related to the decision-making. They addressed one risk
4 while increasing the overall risk profile. Again, this
5 is from the Presidential Commission's findings. Failed
6 to take full advantage of the shore-based expertise, and
7 this is interesting to me, too, the overreliance on
8 individual preferences and experience.

9 So, they were really dealing with the guys on
10 the rig experiences on making these decisions and it
11 almost -- at least we have some indications or questions
12 about whether it led to sort of a group think atmosphere
13 going on where they all kind of just -- no one really
14 wanted to say no, and they just kind of proceeded that
15 way, and never had problems doing it this way, so...and
16 I think as was stated earlier in the morning panel, it
17 might have been a good time for just a pause, talk to
18 the onshore folks that didn't have those pressures and
19 get sort of that secondary expertise or opinion.

20 I had to put a slide in for Dr. Meshkati. The
21 National Academy of Engineering also did a report, and
22 just to read the one, the lack of a strong safety
23 culture resulting from deficient overall systems
24 approach is evident in the multiple flawed decisions
25 that led to the blowout, and they failed to appreciate a

1 plan for the safety challenges presented by the well.

2 So, again, not fully appreciating the risk.

3 I think the sense we also have is that there was
4 a real focus on the commercial risk, but sort of an
5 underestimation of the potential major accident hazard
6 risk so that they viewed, leading up to the incident,
7 the view was that well, if all else fails, we'll end up
8 having to redo the cement job or we might lose a few
9 days of production, which in offshore drilling is no
10 little thing. Obviously a lot of money is being lost,
11 but they weren't really thinking of the major accident,
12 at least in the sense that it played out.

13 And, so, with those two in mind, I want to come
14 back to this concept, the safety culture model, and this
15 is adopted from the IAEA model where you have the --it's
16 a circle diagram, and in the middle, of course, is a
17 definition of safety culture, a lot of times thought of
18 as the way we do things around here.

19 Outside of that is the values, which I list down
20 here, and then the artifacts or symptoms are on the
21 outer edge of that. And I just want to remention a few
22 of these, because I think they're important. You know,
23 the learning-driven concept, and the artifact is
24 encourage reporting. Encourage reporting would arguably
25 be a good thing, an improved safety culture.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 The thing I think you have to look at, though,
2 is does management want the reports. The workers are
3 smart enough to know if management really wants to hear
4 this or if they don't. They also have to understand
5 about retaliation, and so these are important things
6 when looking at this learning-driven. It's easy to say,
7 but implementing it is much harder.

8 The first one -- I skipped over the first one,
9 that it's a recognized value, across the organization
10 safety culture is a recognized value, and my comment is
11 unified safety culture. I think this is been expressed
12 before, that can you really expect to have a unified
13 safety culture, especially in big organizations? You
14 have contractors, you have unions, you have different
15 unions. You have, so so -- and on Deepwater Horizon,
16 many different organizations working together, perhaps
17 with different cultures. Can they -- can they unify
18 around some practices? That might be a different
19 question.

20 Resiliency, I always say, you know, this is a
21 challenge in the field that I'm working in in that it's
22 low probability/high consequence, so it's a common
23 pressure that they have to say, well, we haven't had
24 anything happen here for 20 years, why do I need more
25 money for this process safety group, you know? And, so,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 it's a real challenge to stay and stay resilient in that
2 kind of atmosphere. And let's see, I think that's
3 enough on that. We'll hit the other ones, I'm sure.

4 So, the next several slides I have various
5 titles for them, but they're all around the same notion,
6 cautions and challenges, challenges going forward, et
7 cetera.

8 The first one, this is a quote from Dr. Fleming,
9 I think it's St. Mary's University in Canada,
10 Regulator's Guide to Safety Culture and Leadership, and
11 he's been working with the International Regulators
12 Forum for Offshore Drilling and trying to put together a
13 sort of international guidance document for offshore
14 drilling on this issue, and one thing he says in this
15 paper is that the popularity of the concept has been
16 counterproductive, and there's a danger of it becoming
17 meaningless.

18 And I've done several talks on this because I
19 see the same concerns, I have the same concerns. I see
20 a lot of headlines, safety culture caused, and I think
21 if you stop there, my biggest concern is a lot of times
22 the fix -- the answer for some of the companies we work
23 with anyway, the answer is to say, you're right, that's
24 fine, we're going to train up those workers and make
25 sure they don't, you know, they get -- they get better

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 behavior, and that doesn't answer any of my questions on
2 the whys going up.

3 So, I think he is worried or he states this
4 correctly, I agree with that, that we could dilute the
5 concept. There's a real fear of that.

6 I think I sort of hit on this, the overemphasis
7 and this is on the sharp end, the front line worker, and
8 I think this is a -- sometimes I think it happens
9 because it's the easier thing to address, you know, that
10 it's easier to take these recommendations and say
11 clearly we can train workers to look at this better,
12 train their attitudes.

13 It also ends up, I think, focusing more on
14 personal safety because that's the easier things to
15 grasp, and I had a trip to the United Kingdom where the
16 Regulator there, and they have, a lot would argue, a
17 much more robust regulatory system than us, in the Gulf
18 of Mexico anyway, and the Regulator there was -- the
19 industry wasn't very happy with us either, but she had a
20 big PowerPoint slide with a person carrying a cup of
21 coffee with a lid off of it, and she said that we have
22 to start thinking farther than the coffee cup with the
23 lid on it.

24 And I guess this whole focus on holding
25 handrails when you're on the rigs, putting coffee lids

1 on. Not that it's not important, but she said that
2 there was no emphasis, at least on the shop floor, the
3 line workers, on how she was pushing for campaigning for
4 a better training program and how -- what the workers
5 were doing on a day-to-day basis related to the system,
6 the overall system, and major accident risk. So, that
7 was an emphasis of theirs.

8 And I think, you know, a lot would argue that
9 they're much further along than we are in the Gulf on
10 these issues, so...

11 Another issue is risk tolerance. When you think
12 about safety culture, it's a matter of sort of unified
13 values about safety and risk, and, again, I don't know
14 that you can unify those values. I also think there's a
15 question there of -- a larger question of who defines
16 what's tolerable, you know, or what's acceptable. Is it
17 the corporate level? Is it regulators? Is it society?
18 And how does that play out, and what other work, you
19 know, if -- if the work force has a much lower tolerance
20 for risk than management, it seems like it creates quite
21 a -- quite a tension there.

22 So, and, you know, the other thing you get into
23 there is this whole notion, and I think it was brought
24 up earlier, of stop work authority, and they have --
25 they have this -- and in, in most of these offshore

1 facilities have this, in talking to, again, Norway, the
2 UK, some of the higher level running organizations, they
3 say, yeah, we have stop work authority, but the reality
4 is if it's any critical path item, it's, it's -- you use
5 it at your own peril, you know, and most people are very
6 reluctant to use it at all, so it's not used for
7 critical path.

8 In fact, petroleum engineers at a conference I
9 was at were sort of challenging that and calling for
10 that saying that we have to do better at this. We have
11 to, you know, allow people to have that authority and
12 be comfortable with that authority.

13 The next slide, just, just looking at I think
14 most of the studies out there on safety culture right
15 now and also on how you implement change, I don't see
16 much considered on the question of power and authority,
17 and, you know, obviously in these organizations you have
18 different levels of power and authority from the line
19 worker to the health and safety.

20 In Deepwater you had the safety people not
21 reporting all the way up the chain. They were reporting
22 to operations management, whose main driver was
23 production. So, did they have the authority going up
24 the line?

25 Similarly with the worker, that, you know, if

1 you're going to -- I think it's interesting that the
2 Baker Panel Report called out for empowerment. Most of
3 the reports you see call for involvement or informing
4 the workers. This said worker empowerment, which I
5 think a lot of work force people would appreciate that
6 kind of language, but how do you do it? And I think you
7 have to acknowledge when you're trying to make safety
8 culture change, that these dynamics exist, otherwise --
9 and they could be reasons for everything to fail or
10 collapse when you're trying to make this change.

11 And, you know, it's not simply a moral
12 commitment to safe behavior. You know, I feel, and by
13 the way, if I didn't preface this slide, these are my
14 opinions now. We're not getting into Chemical Safety
15 Board opinions, but, you know, I feel that there's a
16 better opportunity to change actions rather than change
17 the way people think, so perhaps as an oversight group,
18 you might have more influence in in recommending certain
19 actions be done or recommending certain -- rather than
20 recommending that everyone think the same and you have a
21 unifying safety culture.

22 What safety culture shouldn't be? You can read
23 down these, but, you know, my second -- the second
24 bullet, I think, is the one I want to emphasize the
25 most. I don't think it should be concerned with

1 employee -- with only the behavior-based safety
2 programs, and this gets back to that addressing just the
3 personal safety side of it. It's the easy part to
4 address, make sure the workers have the -- the term I
5 heard in the UK was they had the safety reps and the
6 safety reps had more authority. Even within the
7 regulations, the safety reps have designated stronger
8 authority than the average worker on the rigs, and they
9 were a derogatory term they were using was they were the
10 PPE police.

11 So, if those reps are just watching for PPE and
12 not reporting other things or looking for other process
13 problems or maintenance problems, then that's an issue.

14 I'll go down to the impact of the regulatory
15 oversight. I think -- I think it is an important role
16 that -- and can have a lot of influence, especially in
17 terms of telling people or advising what can be done.
18 So, if they have a structure, for instance, if you're
19 just requiring reporting of lost time injury rates and
20 all the reporting metrics are related to personal
21 safety, it should be no surprise that the strongest
22 programs people have are in the personal safety arena.

23 I think this could be flipped, though, and more
24 requirements could be included to improve metrics on
25 process safety.

1 And there's this bit of an add-on, I see this as
2 safety culture is part of the organizational culture,
3 and I don't think it -- much like process safety or
4 safety in general, it shouldn't be outside of
5 everything. It shouldn't be an add-on to your
6 organizational functioning. I think the same is true of
7 the safety culture. It has to be thought of as part of
8 your organizational -- part of how you do -- how you do
9 what you do.

10 And this -- this, this speaks to how do you fix
11 the problems, and, you know, this is just a caution I
12 guess that the things that are measurable and malleable
13 in terms of your behaviors, and it's often the lowest
14 level actors with the least authority, as she says, in
15 the organizational hierarchy.

16 So, again, the fix can't be just at the fix the
17 worker, or blame the worker, fix the worker approach.

18 Finally, leadership in safety culture, just a
19 couple of final concluding points. Measuring safety,
20 the absence of failure, this is our business, right?
21 The absence of failure doesn't equal effective systems.
22 We see this all the time. They haven't had anything
23 wrong for 20 years and they have a -- they have the big
24 one.

25 They can't let the boundaries of safety slide.

1 I mean, I think this is this resilience issue, and if
2 management doesn't want to hear it, people stop talking.

3 And then there's the complacency thing, but the
4 management doesn't want to hear people stop talking, I
5 think the other challenge from leaders is that I've seen
6 this a lot where in a lot of organizations we've looked
7 at, that there seems to be high commitment from
8 leadership, but then somewhere in middle management,
9 there's mixed signals being sent. They're still being
10 -- they're still getting most of their performance
11 reviews based on production, so if that's the case, then
12 what are they going to tell the shop floor workers, and
13 what are they going to -- they're not going to want to
14 hear bad news.

15 So, even though the leaders at the top might be
16 saying safety first and all this stuff, somewhere in the
17 middle, in middle management, all their metrics, all
18 their performance measures are flipped, and we've
19 actually -- I've heard from several that are really
20 looking at that now since it's a topic in several large
21 refineries where they're looking at changing those
22 performance metrics for middle managers.

23 And you know what? I realized I should have
24 like a submarine at the end of my presentation instead
25 of an email address, but anyway, so that's all I have.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 I hope that was helpful, and be happy to answer
2 questions.

3 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you very much. I think it
4 was very helpful. You might try the explosion at the
5 end, that would probably get some attention, too.

6 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I've got to rework that.

7 DR. WINOKUR: So, we're talking about leadership
8 and safety culture, and I want to stay on that theme a
9 little bit, and I want to get a sense of what leaders
10 we're talking about here. So, let's talk about what
11 happened at the Texas City refinery and what happened in
12 the Gulf.

13 We're not really talking about the head of BP,
14 British Petroleum. I mean, he's in London. And we're
15 not really talking about the Secretary of Energy. He's
16 here in Forrestal, and he's running \$30 billion worth of
17 programs.

18 I mean, there must be some leader that you've
19 seen who can make a difference here and, you know, get
20 this connection to the workers and the attitudes and
21 behaviors and so on. Where do you think that leader is
22 in these plants or what's the sphere of influence that
23 we really need to be looking at for the right leader?

24 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I think, I mean, based on
25 my observations and the CSB's investigations, I think,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 you know, a lot of these organizations, the plant
2 manager is -- and I know it's a bit cliché, but we've
3 heard it earlier, you know, that they, they really have
4 to walk the walk, walk the talk, and the ones that are
5 effective, the ones that get out on the shop floor can
6 have the influence.

7 I think it's also important, a lot of what we've
8 seen is looking at the leadership, not just necessarily
9 a single leader, but the general manager along with the
10 folks that work at the leadership level, and how that
11 decision-making occurs and what information they get fed
12 up to them. So, they have to be, I think, interested in
13 hearing some of the bad news, not having it filtered out
14 at the lower level, not just saying, you know, well, our
15 injury rate levels look great, and I guess we're doing
16 great.

17 I've been shocked by, over the last four years
18 I've been at several conferences where I'm having a
19 really good discussion with one of the co-presenters
20 from a company, and they'll be saying a lot of the right
21 things in terms of process safety and, you know, how
22 we're thinking at the CSB, and they lead off their
23 presentation by saying how great fill-in-the-blank X
24 company is doing. You know, in the last five years, our
25 injury rate -- you know, they just start with three or

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 four slides on injury and illness rates, and like I
2 said, not that that's not important, but when you're at
3 a process safety conference talking about major accident
4 hazard, and they had no metrics on the other stuff.

5 So, so, I think that general manager and that
6 general manager's interest in process safety and
7 understanding the importance of sort of being resilient
8 in that regard, I think that's critical. And I think
9 they do set the tone, but I also think they have to pay
10 attention to not sending mixed signals. It's not just
11 sloganeering. It can't just be, you know, safety first
12 and a lot of posters around the facility. It's got to
13 filter to mid-management as well.

14 DR. WINOKUR: So, when we look at leaders and
15 things that they may improve or the weaknesses, and we
16 had this discussion a little bit this morning with Mr.
17 Sullivan, is it the fact that they don't understand the
18 hazards? They may not have the technical background
19 they need to appreciate what can happen, or is it that
20 they don't respect the hazards, more along the lines of
21 being complacent and saying, it never really happened
22 here before, we don't expect it to happen again?

23 Where is the pitfall in terms of what their --
24 because when it's all over with, they must be just
25 beside themselves that 10 or 15 people have died and --

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I mean, I think it's
2 probably a mix of don't fully appreciate the hazards,
3 and also when they're being told for several years that
4 everything is going well, all these metrics look good,
5 everything they're reporting is good, and at the same
6 time they're being asked for more money to do X, Y or Z,
7 it's an obvious question of why.

8 So, there might be a little bit of not
9 understanding the idea of this -- the field that we're
10 in. Again, the low probability/high consequence
11 incident, and not fully appreciating the risks that they
12 could face. I think that's part of it.

13 DR. WINOKUR: So, what does it take to get a
14 leader to acknowledge and understand the dangers of
15 these low probability/high consequence accidents?

16 MR. GRIFFON: Well, hopefully it's not the big
17 accident. Sometimes that's the case though, you know?
18 I've actually spoken to somebody that said they -- that
19 some of these managers that went through these big
20 incidents, anybody was reluctant to hire them for
21 similar positions, and the person I was talking to made
22 the reverse argument, they said, this would be the
23 perfect person to hire because they've gone through this
24 and they really respect it and appreciate it.

25 I met a person at a conference that was doing

1 exactly that. He went through -- he wasn't the general
2 manager at that time, but he went through the Phillips
3 incident, and he said it changed his life. It gave him
4 a whole new respect for it. But I guess it's just these
5 ideas of lessons learned.

6 I also think it's an understanding of
7 cross-sector. I've tried to do this for the last
8 several years with talks with the nuclear industry,
9 particularly because of my background, I've been engaged
10 in that, but the idea that these learnings -- just
11 because it was a refinery, doesn't mean that there can't
12 be learnings for managers in the nuclear sector. I
13 think the NRC really appreciated that, they invited me
14 my first year on the Board, and they said, we would love
15 for you to come and talk about Macondo, but we don't
16 want to hear anything about the blowout preventer, and
17 that, to me, spoke that they're really thinking about
18 how this could apply to what they're doing.

19 So, I think that's another thing, is that they
20 -- that you can't wait. The leaders shouldn't be
21 waiting for it to happen at their facility, but they
22 have to be exchanging this information. I think there's
23 a couple of model, I won't name companies, but there's a
24 couple of companies that are doing really good things in
25 this regard, they're doing training where they actually

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 link -- they actually talk about process safety elements
2 within their own organization, and then they link it to
3 a Piper Alpha accident or something like that, and it
4 tells the younger work force that, you know, you haven't
5 seen one of these, but if this isn't done right, this is
6 what could happen.

7 So, I think that part of it is critical. Don't
8 wait for it to happen at your facility, you know, share
9 those lessons learned or get those lessons learned from
10 others.

11 DR. WINOKUR: Alright. We can chat about that
12 more later. Mr. Sullivan?

13 MR. GRIFFON: Okay.

14 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, and thank you for
15 coming, Mr. Griffon, and I've already forgiven you for
16 not having a submarine picture.

17 MR. GRIFFON: I have to work on that, yeah.

18 MR. SULLIVAN: But you only get one free pass.
19 I want to -- you just -- I want to follow up on the
20 Chairman's question talking about the level of
21 leadership, and I think you identified sort of the plant
22 manager level. My background is in the Navy. It was a
23 big Navy. We've got fleet admirals, but sort of the
24 commanding officer of a vessel might be a comparable
25 level.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 The question goes to what is the experience and
2 the background of the person who got there, how did they
3 get there, and what I'm really looking for your insight
4 on, based on your experience, is if you notice any
5 difference or place any preference for what I would
6 think is a trade-off between you have an individual who
7 maybe comes to a plant and starts at the lower level, 20
8 years later that person is now the plant manager, so
9 they know that plant. They know its ins and outs.

10 On the other hand, if they learned something
11 that is a bad way to do business, bad habits, if you
12 will, those bad habits may stay. The Navy sort of
13 benefits by having -- you have many submarines, and from
14 a technical standpoint they're all very similar, if not
15 actually identical, and so you can move from one to the
16 other as you grow, get higher in authority.

17 By the time you get up to that plant manager
18 level, you are the technical expert on that submarine,
19 but on the other hand, you didn't stay in one place and
20 you get to see different ones.

21 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah.

22 MR. SULLIVAN: So, is there -- would you say,
23 generally, do you have any thoughts about whether or not
24 it's better to see movement prior to you getting to that
25 level or have somebody who really understands that plant

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 and has been there for a very long time, be at that
2 plant manager level?

3 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I don't know if I have a
4 lot of experience to offer on that question, but I mean,
5 I would say we see a variety of leaders at the different
6 plants that have been, you know, as you describe, the
7 ones that worked there for 30 years, worked their way
8 up, and they're in charge, and there's certain benefits
9 to that.

10 We've also seen some that come from the outside
11 but not even with the technical background. They're
12 more run there to get the plant in financial shape.
13 And, so, I guess for me, I don't -- you know, I think I
14 could see places where either leader could be effective,
15 but they also need to probably have a good leadership
16 team.

17 So, the person that's more financially oriented
18 has to understand what they don't know and has to ask
19 questions and have a team of experts around them that
20 could be working with the lower managers and process
21 people, and I just don't have experience with what you
22 said, shifting from one, it makes a lot of sense in the
23 Navy system.

24 What does happen in like refineries, and I'm not
25 sure this is necessarily a positive, is that they have

1 constant either selling refineries, so they have
2 different company takeovers, and upper management will
3 change and come in with a bunch of their own new
4 initiatives. And, you know, it may be better, it may be
5 worse, but it's new. It definitely creates a flux
6 situation for all the site because they're used to doing
7 things a certain way.

8 So, we see a lot of that. I'm not -- I'm sure
9 there is some migration of people that had a lot of
10 experience at one plant and moved to manage another, and
11 might be some benefits to that, but the effect we've
12 seen on that -- the other issue we have as far as sort
13 of safety and sort of continuity in it, is this the
14 challenges of the middle managers.

15 Middle managers in the refineries, and I think
16 it's true offshore as well, a lot of them are looking
17 for the fast track to corporate. And, so, just, again,
18 it gets back to ways their performance are measured, and
19 a lot of times they're very reluctant to take on sort of
20 long-term safety challenges because it's going to make
21 their bottom line look worse and their performance not
22 look as good, so they want to look as good as they can
23 for the three or four years they're in that position and
24 then move up the ladder.

25 And, you know, again, that's a challenge to sort

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 of having the organization's process safety continually
2 improve.

3 MR. SULLIVAN: So, I would like to --

4 MR. GRIFFON: I'm not sure I got to your
5 question because I just don't have much experience on
6 that one part of it.

7 MR. SULLIVAN: That's okay. I don't remember my
8 question anymore. I want to follow up on, you talked
9 about the flux that happens in refineries when companies
10 get bought out. We actually see something similar when
11 we're doing our oversight work with the Department of
12 Energy, that they compete contracts for contractors, but
13 the nature of the beast is they can change contractors,
14 but there's only so much talented work force in the
15 vicinity of the plant.

16 They happen to be the same people, so the middle
17 -- the middle to the lower, they're all end up being the
18 same human beings, and we just change out the corporate
19 structure.

20 MR. GRIFFON: Right.

21 MR. SULLIVAN: So, we see that happen in the
22 area that -- that we are interested in, and I'm just
23 wondering if you -- I know you mentioned it. I'm not
24 sure you gave any thoughts as to whether that was a good
25 thing, a bad thing, or a mixed bag.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 MR. GRIFFON: I see it -- it's a -- it's a
2 challenge I'd say. You know, I'm not saying whether
3 it's good or bad, but it's a challenge. I know talking
4 to some of the folks at Texas City, that plant got sold,
5 and they actually told me, this is four years -- I mean,
6 this is three years into my term, so it's several years
7 after the 2005 incident, and they said they actually
8 felt like they were making headway, but then the new
9 team that came in had all new initiatives, and they're
10 dropping this initiative that they thought was very --
11 so, you know, it creates this flux and you have to at
12 least manage that and understand that, you know, and if
13 you're going to have -- I mean, that's the challenge of
14 a unifying safety culture, too. If you -- there's got
15 to be a meeting of the minds at some point that this new
16 management team coming in -- maybe they have great ideas
17 and the work force that's been there for years should be
18 open to this change, but you have to manage that change.

19 That's all I'm saying. So, it can be -- I think
20 we've seen mixed bags, but it's something that certainly
21 has to be paid attention to.

22 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you.

23 MR. GRIFFON: Thanks.

24 DR. WINOKUR: Ms. Roberson?

25 MS. ROBERSON: So, I guess first I make a

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 comment and then I'll find out if you agree or disagree,
2 and then I have a couple of questions.

3 One is, I mean, as you know, I definitely think
4 the focus on process safety, first personal safety is an
5 important one, and the -- I call it the personal safety,
6 the safety bubble, and therefore if there's any
7 turbulence inside or outside, you can burst the bubble
8 pretty easy, but why is it so hard for leaders -- so,
9 this morning we talked about the Navy, their SUBSAFE
10 system I consider to be a process safety investment.
11 Why -- you guys do investigations. Do you see the
12 leadership in different companies taking hold of that
13 lesson learned from accidents?

14 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. And I think to different
15 degrees I guess I would say, but yes, there is
16 definitely more attention now to sort of process safety
17 and process safety metrics, and how to get their arms
18 around it. Some of it is pretty challenging.

19 I mean, I've heard anecdotally people that they
20 start measuring a certain metric and they collect all
21 this reams and reams of data, and they realize that it
22 probably wasn't the right metric to begin with. So, you
23 know, there's a lot of trial and error with these
24 metrics. What's the appropriate metric to be looking
25 for when you haven't had the major accident that you

1 might be trying to prevent for years.

2 So, it's harder to see the leading indicator,
3 whether it's the right leading indicator, but there's
4 certainly more attention being paid to it. I guess the
5 shocking thing for me is that there's still so much out
6 there that you see people presenting and saying that
7 injury rates are low and therefore we're doing
8 wonderful, you know. So, there seems to be some sort of
9 disconnect still.

10 I know that prior to Deepwater, I think it was
11 in 2009, there was an argument made by the industry
12 group that there wasn't a need for a safety and
13 environmental management system regulation offshore in
14 the Gulf, and part of their argument was that they have
15 a slide in their presentation showing the low injury
16 rates compared to other industries, and their offshore
17 is way down here and then petroleum and general sector,
18 you know. And, so, on that graph, it was obviously a
19 convincing argument to some, but I think, yeah, it's
20 definitely being paid attention to more, but there's
21 still, I think, some, some disconnect.

22 MS. ROBERSON: So, let me ask you, in the --
23 what you can share in the investigations that the Board
24 has conducted or the ones that you've evaluated when you
25 weren't on the Board, have there been any where there

1 was an obvious disconnect between the quality of
2 leadership and things going wrong down below?

3 MR. GRIFFON: I would say, their -- their --
4 that we've seen problems with the organizational issues,
5 you know, including the inattention to -- that safety
6 didn't report directly up the chain, that sort of thing.
7 I don't know that we looked at individuals themselves,
8 you know, individual leaders and their qualities, but
9 there was obviously the structure of the organization,
10 the focus of the organization seemed to suggest -- had a
11 flawed model to start with.

12 MS. ROBERSON: So, are there other things that
13 you conclude would be important traits? I mean, the
14 structure is definitely one you just cited. Do you have
15 to pay attention to the other key traits that you think
16 would be important for a leader to pay attention to?

17 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Well, I guess just, you
18 know, this notion of really understanding what's going
19 on, you know, below them in a sense, you know, and then
20 being on the shop floor, being willing to hear bad news.
21 And when I say that, it's like, well, who is not going
22 to be willing, but I mean, there has to be some sort of
23 openness that the workers really say, yeah, this is
24 okay, we can report this up.

25 You know, there's also challenges to making that

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 happen. I mean, it doesn't get lost on me the fact that
2 we talk about this trusting relationship to report bad
3 news up the chain or whatever, and yet some of the
4 systems that we say are the best is like in aviation,
5 they have an anonymous reporting model. Well, if they
6 had an open, trusting work environment, why do you
7 require an anonymous reporting model?

8 And I know there's reasons, but, I mean, it's
9 just -- so, I think -- but the leaders have to be open
10 to hearing that bad news and not just want to put on the
11 blinders, so to speak.

12 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you.

13 MR. GRIFFON: Sure.

14 DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Sullivan?

15 MR. SULLIVAN: I want to follow up on the
16 structure, specifically with respect to internal
17 oversight as opposed to external oversight by a
18 regulator, but whatever internal oversight models have
19 been used by different companies, if you can share any
20 either best practices or worst practices that you've
21 seen?

22 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I mean, there is definitely
23 the internal oversight models. I think I've seen --
24 we've seen the gamut of it. Again, it goes back to the
25 internal, the corporate auditor being sort of accepted,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 and that they're, just a -- not viewed as, oh, here
2 comes some bad news from corporate, but rather, they
3 give us some great insights, and we have to address
4 these. This is good. We're getting a fresh set of eyes
5 to look at our issues, and I think you can quickly see
6 the difference.

7 I mean, there's some that -- so, I think that
8 model is important, that the management from the top
9 down has to say, this is corporate coming in, but we
10 want to look at this as a learning opportunity, not as,
11 you know, clean everything up and cover everything up
12 and don't give them everything, don't give them access,
13 that sort of thing.

14 So, I've seen both sort of models, and I think
15 obviously the one that's in my opinion more effective is
16 that one where they're using it as a learning
17 opportunity. And then in some of the systems we've
18 looked at, you also have the sort of third-party
19 verifiers, and that's been a bit of a mixed bag, too,
20 because there can be a strong impression that they're
21 basically paid by the company to tell them what they
22 want to hear.

23 And I've heard from the third party verifiers
24 some of the frustration they have is they're doing a
25 sort of random audit, and they'll find something wrong

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 like one flange is bad. Well, they only looked at ten
2 out of a thousand, and they found two that were bad, and
3 the company says, oh, that's okay, we're going to fix
4 these right away, and don't write that up, you know.

5 So, that's not the way to work with your
6 auditor. That's not the right model. It's not going to
7 help you in the long run, so.

8 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you.

9 MR. GRIFFON: Thanks.

10 DR. WINOKUR: We've been talking about process
11 safety and personal safety for a long time, and when I
12 first came on the Board, and that was eight years ago,
13 all we pretty much saw at sites was slips, trips and
14 falls. I mean, the site managers immediately want to
15 tell us about their DART and TRC records, right, and
16 we've worked with the Department quite a bit on that,
17 and I think they've made a lot of progress. I think
18 they have a better set of metrics and they certainly
19 have a pretty good occurrence reporting system, so in
20 that sense DOE, I think, is doing better.

21 But I want to understand why you think this
22 imbalance continues to exist between -- or there isn't a
23 clear enough understanding of the need for process
24 safety at these facilities.

25 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. I mean, I think -- I can't

1 speak to DOE so much, but in the OSHA arena and in the
2 private sector chemical companies that we're dealing
3 with, I think some of it comes back to a sort of
4 compliance mindset. So, I'm not in any way blaming
5 OSHA, but the regulations are focused on reporting those
6 things, and therefore if the company also has this sort
7 of compliance mindset, then they're going to have their
8 safety -- they expect their safety group to comply with
9 OSHA, and that's the extent of it, and they don't want
10 to, you know -- now, OSHA also has process safety
11 management, but they don't have the reporting
12 requirements and things like that in there. So, I think
13 that's part of it.

14 I think, you know, the other factor, which I've
15 already mentioned, the other factor is that they just
16 don't see these things very often, and especially for
17 smaller companies to make a bigger investment on
18 something that they haven't heard of or seen in 30
19 years, it's difficult, you know. So, there's a
20 challenge there to just not just say, well, we've been
21 out -- I think we're still working on this
22 investigation, but we went to a place that had
23 unbelievable, by our investigator's accounts anyway,
24 housekeeping was immaculate. The general manager, I
25 think it was like a family kind of owned place, you

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 know. The general manager knew everybody there, knew
2 everything, you know, would probably get great scores on
3 safety culture, and that part of the safety record was
4 great, and I think they just never -- the hazard, the
5 explosion that occurred, they just never anticipated the
6 hazard at all.

7 They weren't covered under process safety
8 management, so they weren't even required to look at it.
9 And, you know, so, some of it, I think, is back to the
10 focus, the emphasis for the last 20, 25 years on
11 reporting anyway, and on everything the Government is
12 looking at is those injury illness records, less
13 interest on the process, and I think one role the
14 regulator could play, and we've actually made this
15 recommendation to OSHA, to add in process safety
16 indicators.

17 MR. SULLIVAN: And you've made that point that
18 there could be a regulatory component. One of the
19 things that I've personally spoken at some DOE workshops
20 about is the cost of safety and the cost of accidents,
21 and it's pretty sobering.

22 MR. GRIFFON: Right. Yeah.

23 MR. SULLIVAN: And you may not be aware, but DOE
24 recently had some accidents down at the Waste Isolation
25 Pilot Plant, which may be offline for two or three

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 years, and the cost, in the end, is hundreds of millions
2 of dollars to fix the problems down there. And
3 typically, I mean, I don't know, what is the cost of the
4 -- to BP of the Macondo or Texas City refinery? What
5 are those costs roughly? Are they in the billions?

6 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I don't know -- I don't know
7 even know the numbers there, but they're huge, yeah,
8 yeah. But I don't know that they -- that those large
9 oil companies can't absorb those even, so...this is my
10 opinion, of course. But they're enormous, yes, and the
11 other thing they also consider is obviously the effect
12 on the corporate image and everything else, and the
13 communities they're working in. So, yeah, it's a big
14 toll.

15 DR. WINOKUR: One of the things I've heard why
16 slips, trips and falls are a good measure as opposed to
17 process safety is that they say slips, trips and falls
18 are leading indicators, and if you can't take care of
19 the little things like somebody tripping on a step, then
20 that's eventually going to lead to bigger and bigger
21 problems.

22 So, it's just there's a value on it, and once
23 again, I'm not minimizing slips, trips and falls, and I
24 would not minimize them on an oil rig, where I do think
25 if you tripped or fell, you could have a serious

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 problem.

2 But still, I think there is some of that
3 mindset. Do you think that that's true?

4 MR. GRIFFON: I think it's a false premise. I
5 don't think these are leading indicators of the
6 process accidents.

7 DR. WINOKUR: I don't think so in that sense
8 either.

9 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah. Right. I mean, I think --
10 look at oil rigs. You know, they -- right after I went
11 out on my first rig offshore, they shared with me a
12 presentation on all the helicopter accidents that occur,
13 and it was my first helicopter ride to a rig, you know?
14 So, I don't -- I don't minimize the personal safety side
15 of things for sure, and the falls from height on the
16 rigs are another major problem.

17 Especially in the North Sea, I mean, these
18 things are all over the place and very, very dangerous,
19 but I think that's been a premise that's been put
20 forward for years, that if we have these rates low
21 enough, therefore we're protected from a major accident,
22 and I think it's been pretty well -- literature has
23 pretty well gotten rid of that notion, that the two are
24 disconnected, and you have to look at other indicators.
25 You have to look at other metrics to sort of have a

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 sense of the health of your system.

2 DR. WINOKUR: What was the basic point, one more
3 time, my last question now, about what you were trying
4 to say associated with power relationships?

5 MR. GRIFFON: I think to look at safety culture
6 at the sites and not to consider power relationships
7 is -- it's not appropriate. I mean, you have to weigh
8 in the different power relationships and authorities
9 that people at all different levels have within the
10 organization. Otherwise it could end up being -- it
11 could end up blowing the whole thing up, the change
12 you're trying to promote if you don't consider how the
13 unions are working with management or contractors.

14 There's a lot of -- on refineries especially,
15 there's opinion, we hear it quite frequently, is that
16 workers say, well, you know, especially during
17 shutdowns, they hire a lot of contract workers, and the
18 union workers are usually pretty angry about that. But
19 it's not only connected to wages, they say, it's also a
20 health and safety component because you're bringing in
21 these groups of people that might be the low bidder or
22 whatever.

23 So, you have these -- whoever is right or wrong
24 on these issues, you have these relationships, the
25 contractors, the unions, the management, and you have to

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 consider that when you're trying to consider how do I
2 unify the culture around safety.

3 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you.

4 Ms. Roberson?

5 MS. ROBERSON: I don't have any additional
6 questions.

7 DR. WINOKUR: Well, I'll just end with one
8 question and then we'll move on, and that was that last
9 question, and I don't know if it was mine or yours, but
10 I asked it before, it may not even be a good question,
11 but what recommendations can you make to an organization
12 trying to provide oversight, you know, a better way for
13 us to perform the oversight role that could help DOE
14 improve its culture? And once again, it's DOE's
15 culture, not our culture, but where can independent
16 oversight provide some benefit?

17 MR. GRIFFON: Yeah, I mean, I think you can play
18 a role, at least in -- well, I mean, I think there's a
19 program right now that's sort of come up through DOE out
20 of the incident. It's a -- I knew I'd forget the name
21 of it.

22 DR. WINOKUR: Safety-Conscious Work Environment?

23 MR. GRIFFON: Safety-Conscious Work Environment,
24 yeah, and I guess I would -- one role is I think it's
25 appropriate for your Board to be looking at, is that the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 right tool or the right fix for the problem? And I will
2 say I talked to some safety reps at the conference I was
3 at with you, Dr. Winokur, in Las Vegas, that are now
4 questioning whether that points more toward personal
5 safety fixes than toward the more systemic problems.

6 And, so, I think that's maybe one area where you
7 can weigh in with guidance or with additional
8 recommendations, you know, clarifying recommendations,
9 whatever.

10 DR. WINOKUR: All right. Thank you very much
11 for that presentation and answering our questions, and
12 we will now move to Dr. Meshkati, or Professor, I
13 believe.

14 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: Thank you very much,
15 Chairman Winokur. My name is Naj Meshkati, I'm a
16 professor at University of Southern California. And to
17 the Ms. Roberson and Mr. Sullivan, it's really an honor
18 for me to be here.

19 There are much more qualified people than me
20 that can make this presentation. One of them is
21 watching us over the Internet, that's my mentor, Mr.
22 Earl Carnes. I want to be on the record that I
23 acknowledge him, but whatever I do good, I learn from
24 him; whatever I did bad is all my own fault.

25 DR. WINOKUR: I'm so happy to hear you have a

1 mentor still.

2 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: In fact, I would like to
3 start with another -- first of all, I would like to
4 point out that this is basically my personal reflection
5 of last 25 or last 30 years being in this business. As
6 you mentioned in my bio, I have visited many nuclear
7 plants, Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, Fukushima in 2012,
8 and many nuclear plants, and I have been on several
9 committees, and I've had the privilege of being on two
10 national panels on that, but what I'm presenting to you
11 is very much my personal reflection and the story that I
12 learned from my mentors and from my own research.

13 I would like to start again by another mentor of
14 mine that he has a book, which I'm going to show it to
15 you, and that is Professor Jim Reason, that I noticed he
16 was promoted to be Admiral Jim Reason in the previous
17 panel, but Jim Reason is so dear and God to me at least,
18 but he has a recent book, and that is this one. It's
19 his latest book called "A Life in Error", and again,
20 being a university professor, I would like to assign a
21 reading to all of you colleagues here. This is a
22 must-read. It's a very smart book. And, it's called "A
23 Life in Error." This is really a compilation of Jim
24 Reason's research in last 30 years that you know about
25 human error, you know about organizational accidents,

1 you know about human contribution, but this is really
2 the finale, so far. I know that he is working on
3 another book.

4 But look what he has said about safety culture
5 in this, and I'm quoting that from his page 81, and I
6 put this title because I think -- I put that in this
7 title in the context that I'm familiar with, root cause
8 accident, common mode failure, and because of what Jim
9 says, Professor Reason says, I think culture is a very
10 important issue.

11 This is exact quote from page 31 of his book.
12 "Because of their diversity and redundancy, the defense
13 in-depth will be widely distributed throughout the
14 system." We know multiple layers of defenses that we
15 have in nuclear plant, the last layer of defense is the
16 containment dome, and then we have other layer of
17 defenses going down. But this layer of defense for all
18 sort of technological systems, to the extent that I
19 know, they are basically, they exist in different
20 places.

21 Then he says, "as such, they're only
22 collectively vulnerable to something that's equally
23 widely spread, the most likely candidate is safety
24 culture."

25 And the last line I think that is the key: "It

1 can affect all elements and systems for good or bad."

2 For example, if you look at, we could have -- I
3 always refer to the accident that I started my career by
4 investigating that or writing about that Bhopal Chemical
5 accident on December 3, 1984, and that accident, we
6 could have stopped the release of the material, that was
7 cyanide. After the water got into tank 610 and the
8 reaction started, we have had several layer of defenses,
9 like water curtain, and then the scrubber, and then from
10 the scrubber the water curtain and flare tower, but all
11 these three were broken. They all fell off because of
12 bad safety culture. Of course, there are many examples
13 like that.

14 I think Jim Reason genius has put such an
15 important issue in such a succinct of three, four
16 paragraphs over there. And I call that this is my
17 premise, this is what I have seen in my professional
18 career, I want to come back to that.

19 For now, I would like to concentrate on
20 Fukushima because I knew the Honorable Mark Griffon
21 would be here, he would be talking about BP, Deepwater
22 Horizon, and Rear Admiral Tom Eccles was here that I had
23 the honor of serving with him and others on the BP
24 Deepwater Horizon, that's why I want to concentrate on
25 Fukushima, and if there is some question on that, I can

1 come back to the BP Deepwater Horizon.

2 Let's look at Fukushima. That's the one that I
3 spent the last three years of my life on that. But this
4 is a very rudimentary map of Japan. You see Tokyo over
5 here. You see Fukushima Daiichi over here. You see
6 Fukushima Daini over there. I would like to come back
7 to it later.

8 As you see, Fukushima Daini is closer to Tokyo
9 than Fukushima Daiichi, and I will come back to it.
10 This is just to give you some relatively -- relative
11 location. I want to come back to this map because there
12 is another nuclear plant that I would like you to pay
13 attention to.

14 The Fukushima accident happened on March 11,
15 2011, and there have been several investigations of the
16 Fukushima accident, excellent investigations by the
17 International Atomic Energy Agency, by the Parliament of
18 Japan, which is called National Diet, and then by other
19 agencies which I will come back to it.

20 But if you look at the -- really the root cause
21 of the two Fukushima accidents, this is what happened
22 exactly. One, we had -- of course, we had the
23 earthquake; 45 minutes later the tsunami came. The
24 earthquake basically caused loss of offsite power. That
25 happens a lot. We are prepared for that. In U.S.

1 nuclear plants, everybody, loss of offsite power.
2 That's why we have something which is called emergency
3 diesel generators.

4 And because of the loss of offsite power, of
5 course the reactor, they shut down automatically, in the
6 case of Fukushima, both plants, Daiichi and Daini,
7 emergency diesel generators are kicked in.

8 However, I have to say for the record that
9 emergency diesel generators are very temperamental
10 machines, and as we know about this accident -- this
11 earthquake that was near Washington, D.C. a few years
12 ago, one or two of the emergency diesel generators at
13 the nuclear plant, they didn't kick on.

14 But in this case, the diesel generators kicked
15 off, and everything was good. However, 45 minutes
16 later, tsunami came, and that tsunami basically
17 inundated emergency diesel generator or their
18 switchboard or their cooling pump. In some cases,
19 basically emergency diesel generator, they became
20 inoperative because they themselves got inundated or
21 their cooling pumps they got inundated. They couldn't
22 send the cooling water around the diesel generators,
23 they had to overheat and shut down or some of them their
24 switching systems and they cut off.

25 The combination of one and two, meaning the loss

1 of offsite power inundation after emergency diesel
2 generator due to tsunami caused something which is
3 called a station blackout, and a station blackout was
4 exactly the thing that it's one of the most severe
5 accident that could happen, and there is this history,
6 you know that very well.

7 However, the difference between Daiichi and
8 Daini was in the case of Daini, when that great line
9 that fell off, one 420-kilovolt pylon was still on.
10 However, that was sitting outside the fences of Daini.
11 Everything inside the connection of that to the plant
12 got lost.

13 That's one of the biggest or luckiest things
14 that the Daini people had, which Daiichi didn't, as far
15 as I remember. I can double check that for the record.
16 But I would like you to keep that in the back of your
17 mind when I come back to it.

18 National Academy of Sciences, at the request for
19 U.S. Congress, they put together a committee, it was
20 called Fukushima Lessons Learned Committee for Improving
21 U.S. Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Security. This
22 committee consists of like 20 members. I was a member,
23 and a technical advisor on this committee. The
24 committee released this report on June 24, 2014, just a
25 few months ago.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 As this committee visited Fukushima, Daiichi,
2 Daini and other plants and studied a lot of issues over
3 there, however, I have to have this disclaimer that I
4 learned from Honorable Mark, that I am speaking as
5 myself here, not as a former member of the committee or
6 maybe I'm not reflecting the points of view of
7 committee. That's why I put that personal opinion under
8 that because I quote the committee, but I may give a
9 little spin to that that some committee members may not
10 necessarily agree with that, but anywhere that I have
11 excerpts from the committee, I quoted.

12 These are my personal observations. Was
13 Fukushima a natural disaster or what we call that
14 natural disaster or earthquake triggered a anthropogenic
15 man-made accident? From the day one of that, or after a
16 few weeks, this issue was discussed in media by many
17 people. What was Fukushima? And basically this report
18 came on the first anniversary of that.

19 As you see, the title asks "Why Fukushima was
20 Preventable." The former commissioner of -- and this
21 statement is very interesting, let's say. It was
22 preventable if it had we had appropriate enforcement.

23 The former Commissioner of U.S. NRC, my dear
24 colleague from MIT, Professor George Apostolakis, gave a
25 talk at a meeting. I think he gave a talk at that first

1 anniversary. As you see, his statement is very
2 politically correct, about the issue of preventability
3 and being able foresee. But again, because he was a
4 Commissioner on that, he had to be politically correct.

5 But basically the debate on preventability of
6 Fukushima came to attention of people, and that's what I
7 would like to concentrate on that and relate that to
8 safety culture and leadership here.

9 National Diet of Japan, which is the name for
10 the Parliament, they came with their report. It was
11 released on July 2012, I guess, and the Chairman of this
12 group was Dr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa. I met him when we went
13 to Japan, and I met him again when he was in Los Angeles
14 on a private trip two months ago. And, so, I learned a
15 lot from this gentleman.

16 He wrote an introduction for this National Diet
17 report. It's the most comprehensive study that I saw.
18 That introduction is one page. Within that one page,
19 four times he uses the term "mindset," in one page,
20 "mindset." And then these are some excerpts from that,
21 Dr. Kurokawa's introduction to that Diet report. I say
22 that Daiichi cannot be regarded as a natural disaster.
23 It was profoundly a man-made disaster that could have
24 and should have been foreseen and prevented.

25 Then he said that it was a man-made accident in

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Japan. These are some very strong statements
2 considering that it is in the National Parliament of
3 Japan. It requires a lot of guts to put that in a very
4 polite society like Japan. That's why I salute Kurokawa
5 for this.

6 And then these are two other excerpts from that
7 that he says that we -- in Japan, we failed to learn
8 from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. In fact, he was
9 talking about Kemeny report, Rogovin report that you
10 mentioned to it, and also Chernobyl report by IAEA, and
11 others. Then, of course, he talks again the issue of
12 the mindset over there.

13 This is very interesting. If you look at the
14 National Diet report, the way that I studied that myself
15 with my students, it's very revealing. It's really a
16 seminal report.

17 And now I want to take you to another issue
18 which is related to that. You have heard about
19 Fukushima Daiichi and Fukushima Daini. I have asked
20 this question all over. I have asked it from many
21 audiences in different conferences and that, have you
22 heard about Onagawa nuclear plant? The typical answer
23 is -- some people say yes, the majority of the audiences
24 that I have asked that question, they say no.

25 In fact, we had a conference about the economic

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 effect of the great Tohoku accident in USC in June.
2 There were a lot of people from Japan that I asked that
3 question from them, and only a few of them have heard
4 of, I don't know why.

5 Well, maybe the reason is this: Look at this
6 map, please. This is very, very interesting, and it's
7 going to be revealing for you. This was Daiichi. This
8 was Daini. You have seen that over here, and this is
9 Onagawa. But you haven't heard or many people, they
10 haven't heard about that. And I will tell you later
11 that this plant, as you see over here, was 60 kilometers
12 closer to the epicenter. Tsunami height was one meter
13 higher, but we haven't heard about that.

14 This is very interesting, and Fukushima in a NAS
15 committee report that has done a good job, beautiful
16 report, but it doesn't do justice to this question in my
17 judgment, and I think there should be like a sequel or a
18 complement to that report, about specifically about
19 Onagawa.

20 And by the way, I wrote an editorial which was
21 published in the Japan Times, the day before yesterday,
22 I have a copy of it, which is I'm going to submit that
23 to you as part of the record, specifically about
24 Onagawa. There is also another article that my students
25 wrote about that.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 This is, again, another map of Japan that shows
2 you the location of Onagawa. It's more detail over
3 there. Here is epicenter, and this is interesting that
4 this map was sent to us by this gentleman from Japan
5 after my student article appeared in Japan Times. This
6 is my former Japanese student, extremely bright student
7 by the name of Airi Ryu. I encouraged her to work on
8 this term paper for my class last fall. The title of
9 her term paper was "Nuclear Safety Culture in TEPCO and
10 Tohoku Electric Power Company, the Root Cause of
11 Different Fates of Fukushima Daiichi Plant versus
12 Onagawa."

13 And this is her receiving the Discovery Medal at
14 the last May commencement. She now works for Bloomberg
15 in Tokyo. Brilliant, brilliant student. She accessed a
16 lot of Japanese documents that our National Academy
17 report and others didn't have resources to study that.
18 That's why I think her paper, which is posted on our
19 website, and that is one of the seminal reports about
20 Onagawa. Undergraduate USC. I should plug my
21 university here.

22 A short copy of her paper got published in the
23 prestigious Bulletin of Atomic Scientists last March on
24 the anniversary of Fukushima, the title of that
25 "Onagawa: The Japanese Nuclear Power Plant That Didn't

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Melt," and then a longer version of that, as you see
2 over here, got published in Japan Times.

3 And this article generated a lot of response to
4 us, those photos and that that I showed to you. People
5 sent it from Japan to us. And this is something that
6 I'm going to now concentrate, why you haven't heard
7 about Onagawa.

8 Let's give you some information, this
9 information, by the way, is by my student, I didn't know
10 how to do it. It's great. Daiichi and Onagawa, let's
11 look at that. The nuclear power plant. They are both
12 -- Daiichi had six reactors, BW, boiling water reactor.
13 Onagawa had three reactors, boiling water reactor.

14 Their commission engaged with construction is
15 always the same. Their regulatory oversight is always
16 the same. Ministry of Economy, International Trade and
17 Industry, and then this Nuclear Safety Agency or
18 something, Nuclear Industrial Safety Agency.

19 In that case, you see that these two plants,
20 they are the same age, the same vintage, the same
21 regulatory oversight. See that basically I tried to go
22 selection by elimination. It puts the regulatory
23 oversight common to these.

24 If we can attribute that to the regulatory
25 problem, they have the same oversight, but let's look at

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 this. Onagawa was 60 kilometers closer, and tsunami was
2 higher at Onagawa, almost one meter higher than
3 Fukushima. In that case it was -- it should have been
4 more vulnerable. And then when you look at IAEA report,
5 this is a direct quote from IAEA, which Airi has quoted
6 in her paper. It was the closest nuclear power station
7 to the epicenter, and the strongest shaking that any
8 nuclear power plant has experienced in history, and it
9 was shut down and was remarkably undamaged. Remarkably
10 undamaged. This is the report of IAEA.

11 We got this photo, again, by this gentleman
12 Woody Epstein from Japan. This is the city of Onagawa
13 before the earthquake and tsunami. This is that
14 location after that. It was devastating, as you see
15 over there. But I think this is the key to
16 understanding Onagawa's success. If you look at that
17 every year, 1970, 1987, 2002, they basically had some
18 estimate for the tsunami value, and they constantly
19 learned and they increased the height of the wall. They
20 learned from Indian Ocean tsunami, they improved their
21 defenses. They learned from Chile tsunami, they
22 improved their defenses. They constantly learned, and
23 remember that Onagawa, please remember, that belongs to
24 a different utility called Tohoku, whereas Daiichi and
25 Daini that they belong to TEPCO. I want to come back to

1 that.

2 This, again, was sent to us by Mr. Woody Epstein
3 in Japan after that article got published in Japan
4 Times. That basically says that the man who created
5 Onagawa, he insisted for a much higher layer of
6 defenses, and he is able to raise that in 1968, and
7 finally they raised that to 15, but there's all this
8 detail is in my student's paper.

9 This is a very -- let me give you, this one is
10 even better. It's very interesting. When the
11 earthquake happened, people were evacuating. They were
12 escaping from Daiichi and Daini, but Onagawa was the
13 only plant that had the power -- that's why the evacuees
14 that they lost power to their home, they came, they took
15 refuge in the gymnasium, in the gym of the Onagawa.

16 It's really a very ironic fate that people
17 escaping from nuclear plant, because of the accident
18 over here, it was becoming a refuge for the people,
19 because they had power and water. That's a very
20 interesting photo that we gathered some 300 people at
21 that -- that stayed in this for several weeks. Here, I
22 think this one, also, is a better photo of that, that
23 they had 300-plus people, local residents, that lived in
24 the gymnasium of Onagawa for several weeks because they
25 had water, power and food. That's another comparison of

1 Onagawa and Daiichi that we put together for you.

2 The owner of the Onagawa is Tohoku. The owner
3 of Daiichi is TEPCO, and this is the tsunami risk
4 characterization. Basically this is what one of my
5 colleagues, Professor Costas Synolakis, who is one of
6 the world experts in tsunamis, he is my next-door
7 colleague at USC, he said that in an interview to New
8 York Times, what TEPCO people did with respect to the
9 risk analysis of the tsunami "was a cascade of the
10 stupid errors that led to the disaster."

11 This is the way they did the estimation of the
12 tsunami, based on Costas Synolakis, who is a world
13 renowned expert of tsunamis. He runs our tsunami
14 research center.

15 And in the case of Onagawa, they were proactive.
16 They initial construction was ten meter elevation, and
17 they were underestimating tsunami level, and they
18 constantly increased that to 14.7 meter.

19 This is a very good comparison from the National
20 Diet report about the way that TEPCO and Tohoku they
21 addressed tsunami risk. I would like you to look at
22 this quote from the National Diet report, which is very
23 interesting. Basically when it came to risk of tsunami,
24 "TEPCO resorted to delaying tactic such as presenting
25 alternative scientific studies and lobbying." Basically

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 they fought for improving their safety. They
2 resorted -- this is the direct quote from Dr. Kurokawa's
3 report.

4 Now, let me, and then, of course, in the case of
5 Onagawa, they learned from Chile tsunami and they
6 constantly and continuously improved their counter
7 mission.

8 Let me say something about Daini, also. Daini
9 was a plant. This is my article the day before
10 yesterday in Japan Times, it is mostly about Daini. In
11 fact, I start by talking about the Navy Admiral in that
12 article. That's Admiral Togo, but not submarine.
13 That's a talk about Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and what
14 Togo did over there.

15 This is, again, that thing, and remember, Daini
16 is 20 kilometers closer to Tokyo. And Daini had four
17 nuclear reactors operating at the time of earthquake and
18 tsunami, and they had also station blackout, but then
19 they had that 420-kilovolt pylon study outside the
20 plant.

21 The superintendent of Daini, a Mr. Masuda, and
22 200 workers, we met him, he gave a presentation to us.
23 They worked heroically in order to save their plant, and
24 a committee report acknowledged that, but I still,
25 that's an epic story that needs to be told. That's what

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 I tried to highlight that in my Japan Times article.

2 Basically this is what our committee said, which
3 is music to my ear because many people say that human
4 operators are the weakest link in the chain. I say no.
5 They are the first layer of defense and last layer of
6 defense when something goes wrong in a technological
7 system. I have seen that in aviation industry. I have
8 seen that in nuclear power industry. I have seen that
9 in petrochemical refining and other high hazard
10 industry.

11 These are some quotes from our National Academy
12 report, but there are some -- there is one quote that I
13 would like you to pay attention to, that's last line,
14 that talks about Daiichi, but it applies even more to
15 Daini. The way that they saved the plant. They were
16 able to bring the four operating reactors to the cold
17 shutdown, by laying out nine kilometers of cable that
18 typically takes 20 days to do, they did it in almost 24
19 hours.

20 By flexibly using emergency operating procedure,
21 by improvising decision-making. There was a good
22 article in Harvard Business Review, also, by Chuck
23 Casto, who was a resident representative of NRC during
24 this accident over there and a Harvard Business School
25 professor that shed some more light on that.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 And what Masuda and Daini and his personnel they
2 did, they did impromptu but prudent decision-making and
3 improvisation. That is what I mentioned flexibly
4 applied, it is what he told me, emergency operating
5 procedures. Temporary cable line, this is a direct
6 quote from him, by the way, which it typically takes 20
7 personnel and a month to put.

8 We met Mr. Naohiro Masuda in his office over
9 there. By the way, Mr. Masuda and his 200 people, I
10 asked him, how long did it take you to find out your
11 family were alive and survived? He learned about that
12 after almost 24 to 36 hours, but they stayed over there
13 and they worked, and this is his cot in his office, that
14 he slept on this cot and lived in this office for almost
15 three, four weeks.

16 This is the man that I called him in my article,
17 he should be considered as a national hero of Japan in
18 21st Century, the same that Admiral Togo was considered
19 as a national hero of Japan in 20th Century.

20 Now, I want to come to the finale of my talk,
21 and this is the man that I admire and there's a photo of
22 him on the wall of my office. This is my submarine
23 photo with no submarine in it.

24 This slide is given to me by one of my nuclear
25 Navy friends, Mr. Bill Blunt that works now -- he was at

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Diabolo County and now he's at Amgen. If you see that
2 this is basically the report on performance of Nuclear
3 Navy. This is what Nuclear Navy for the right reason is
4 proud of. This is what they have done successfully,
5 thanks to this gentleman. But Admiral Rickover said
6 this statement, and I would like for the record to read
7 this statement because when I was watching Mr. Tony
8 Hayward, BP, CEO of Halliburton, CEO of Transocean,
9 sitting before the Congress in a table like that
10 testifying, and they were doing this pointing fingers to
11 each other for the blowout, that reminded me of the
12 truth of Rickover's statement, and I would like to read
13 it to you.

14 By the way, this one is on the wall of my
15 office. Next to his statement by Valery Legasov, who
16 investigated Chernobyl, who was a member of National
17 Academy of Science of Soviet Union, and then he
18 committed suicide on the second anniversary of
19 Chernobyl.

20 He made a statement that we didn't learn lesson
21 in Soviet Union from Three Mile Island and from Bhopal,
22 and this statement is sitting side by side. That's a
23 statement you might want.

24 Responsibility, I would like to -- I have less
25 than one minute or two minutes. I would like to use

1 this finale to finish it, because this, to me, captures
2 everything that I do or I said in a much more beautiful
3 way. "Responsibility is a unique concept. It can only
4 reside in inherent single individual. You may share it
5 with others, but your portion is not diminished. You
6 may delegate it, but it is still with you. You may
7 disclaim it, but you cannot divest yourself of it. Even
8 if you do not recognize it or admit its presence, you
9 cannot escape it.

10 "If responsibility is right for yours, no
11 evasion or ignorance or passing the blame can pass the
12 burden to somebody else. Unless you can point your
13 fingers at the man responsible when something goes
14 wrong, then you never had anyone really responsible."

15 And the most interesting thing, I want to finish
16 with this note, is when I learned when he said that. I
17 had this quote on my wall. Last week before coming
18 here, I said this to my Navy -- Nuclear Navy friends. I
19 said, please check the quote if it's good, the Ts are
20 crossed, no errors are in there. Two of my Navy
21 friends, Richard McPherson and Tom Herring, they said,
22 no, the quote is good, but the source of that or the
23 reference for that is even much more amazing and much
24 more related to this meeting.

25 Admiral Rickover said this quote in a public

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 hearing and testimony before a Congress panel in
2 Congress, when that he was asked about the SL1 nuclear
3 reactor in January 3rd, 1961. They were asking him if
4 that accident could happen at civilian reactor, and he
5 made this statement without preparation or something.
6 That's the reference for this statement.

7 I have another one that I want to finish with
8 that, but I would like to come back to it because I want
9 to finish my talk with the submarine photo. This is a
10 statement that I learned from my colleague, Bill Hoyle
11 from U.S. Chemical Safety Board. It's a title of a
12 paper that was presented in Australia. Of course, this
13 is a paraphrase of the late Peter Drucker's philosophy,
14 Culture Eats Strategy for Breakfast, but this, I think,
15 captures some of the discussion that we have over here,
16 particularly about Onagawa versus Daiichi, and really I
17 think culture eats systems for breakfast, if we don't
18 take that into account.

19 Again, as I said, I want to finish my talk with
20 a photo of submarine here. Thank you.

21 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you very much. Thanks for
22 an excellent presentation. I'm going to start by asking
23 you a couple of questions. That last one, I'm not going
24 to ask you to switch to that slide because you want to
25 stay on this one. Does culture eat leaders for

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 breakfast?

2 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: I'm sorry, could you please
3 repeat that question?

4 DR. WINOKUR: Does culture eat leaders for
5 breakfast?

6 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: Wow. That's a very
7 profound question. I would say yes, definitely if
8 leaders are green and brown, but no if leaders are
9 seasoned and experienced.

10 DR. WINOKUR: Okay.

11 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: I think that's a very
12 profound question. By the way, I have seen that myself
13 in some organizations that I have dealt with as a
14 consultant, as an instructor and that a new leader came
15 and tried to change the safety culture, or for that
16 matter organizational culture and safety culture, and
17 that leader was eaten alive, literally, by the culture.

18 DR. WINOKUR: Yeah, that's what I'm trying to
19 get to and understand better, and that is that I
20 understand how these incredible leaders create culture,
21 how Admiral Rickover created a culture, how Steve Jobs
22 created a culture at Apple, how Fred Smith created
23 FedEx, but I'm just wondering what it takes to come in
24 and change an existing culture, and, of course, the DOE
25 culture, and DOE labs have done phenomenal stuff, but

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 DOE's culture has been established for, you know, since
2 50, 60 years, and it has many, many accomplishments, and
3 many and wonderful things it's done, and it accomplished
4 many of those things because it had a certain kind of
5 culture, and now we may be asking leaders to come in and
6 change that culture to be a slightly different culture,
7 maybe to be less risk-adverse, and it seems to me like a
8 major challenge for leaders to be able to do that.

9 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: It is absolutely, Mr.
10 Chairman, a big challenge. I can tell you one example
11 from my own experience with a major water utility in
12 Southern California, a new leader came, tried to change
13 the culture. In this particular case, I had them, with
14 some of the studies and some of the work over there, the
15 strategy that we chose, as you know, water utility are
16 very deep -- they have deeply entrenched culture. Very
17 much -- utility industries are very deeply entrenched.
18 Water utilities even more.

19 The approach that we took was basically a
20 top-down, bottom-up approach. You need to start from
21 the top, the leader needs to lead, but at the same time
22 you need to work with the rank-and-file from the bottom.
23 This is the discussion that I think Mr. Sullivan asked
24 Admiral Eccles and that about the commander and the
25 troops, if they -- don't agree or disagree.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 I think it's a very difficult, delicate thing,
2 but it cannot be unilaterally done and instilled from
3 the top if you don't at the same time simultaneously try
4 to build it up from the bottom up. That's why I
5 consider that. It's a simultaneous approach from
6 bottom-up and top-down approach for culture change.

7 DR. WINOKUR: You talked to us about the
8 different Japanese leaders of these different power
9 plants, some we know, maybe two of them were fairly
10 successful. They didn't do as well at Daiichi as they
11 did at the other plants. Is there something different
12 about the Japanese concept of safety culture than it
13 would be with the U.S. concept of safety culture? I
14 mean, could we view them in a similar way?

15 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: That's another excellent
16 question. I have been struggling with the issue of
17 cultural context of nuclear safety culture for the last
18 15, 20 years. In fact, I have a book chapter published
19 in 1997, its title is Cultural Context of Nuclear Safety
20 Culture, because when IAEA came with INSAG 1 and then
21 INSAG 4 after Chernobyl about safety culture, they don't
22 talk about national culture, but then the Fukushima
23 issue raised that, and then for your information, and
24 for the record, International Atomic Energy Agency
25 hosted a meeting last April, it was called Cultural

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Factors and Its Impact of Safety Culture, and I had the
2 privilege to be invited and gave a talk over there.

3 This is a very important issue, Mr. Chairman,
4 and more than nuclear industry, as you may know,
5 aviation industry has been struggling with that for the
6 last, I would say since 1977 Tenerife accident, when two
7 747, KLM and Pan American, they had a runway incursion
8 in March '77 on Tenerife. And then another aviation
9 accident which was Avianca Flight 052, Korean airline in
10 Guam, and the last one Asiana 214 in San Francisco.

11 The issue of role of cultural factors in safety
12 culture still is a very hot topic. I have written about
13 that. We published the stuff on that. I want to make
14 this story short, I think there is something out there.
15 For example, in safety culture, we talk about one of the
16 biggest element of safety culture that both U.S. NRC,
17 and INPO, they raised that, it's called questioning
18 attitude.

19 Questioning attitude is one of the pillars of
20 safety culture. IAEA has it as one of the three
21 pillars. There are certain cultures, national cultures
22 that questioning attitude cannot be nurtured or it will
23 be stifled, and using Hofstede's model, power distance,
24 the higher the power distance in the society, it impacts
25 and it stifles the questioning attitude.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 One of the contributing factors for the accident
2 of Avianca Flight 052 was the lack of questioning
3 attitude in the cockpit, according to the late Bob
4 Helmreich of this Latin culture, the Colombian culture
5 of cockpit.

6 Back to excellent question, I would say that
7 Japan society collectivism, politeness and the power
8 distance could have played an important role over time.

9 DR. WINOKUR: Yeah, and I'll end my question
10 with just a statement, the way that somebody explained
11 it to me, or what I read said that in the United States,
12 the squeaky wheel gets the grease. In Japan the saying
13 is the nail that sticks up gets hit by the hammer.

14 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: Excellent.

15 DR. WINOKUR: So, it will have a little bit of
16 an impact on that questioning attitude. Alright, let me
17 move to Ms. Roberson.

18 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
19 wanted to do kind of a cross-section of the leadership
20 for the Fukushima event and the three nuclear power
21 plants. So, you have quite a bit of admiration for the
22 superintendent at Daini. And I'm assuming you also had
23 the opportunity through the review and evaluation to
24 understand the superintendent at the other two plants.

25 So, what was the difference in leadership? For

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 instance, if you had swapped the superintendents at
2 Daiichi and Daini, do you think the results would have
3 been different at Daiichi?

4 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: That's -- wow. I think the
5 superintendent of Daiichi, I think it was Mr. Yoshida,
6 also, there -- there is a very good analysis of his
7 decision-making, which was again very, very heroic, done
8 by Mr. David Lochbaum from the Union of Concerned
9 Scientists, in his latest book on that.

10 I think David -- in my judgment, again, this is
11 my reading, based on my reading, I think Daini and Mr.
12 Masuda had the luck of that 420-kilovolt pylon standing
13 over there, but he used his ingenuity and improvisation
14 to the maximum. That's my judgment.

15 Daiichi, they didn't have that element of luck
16 as well as I remember, and -- but they still worked very
17 hard. They still worked very hard. Again, this is my,
18 Naj Meshkati's humble opinion. I think in that
19 particular case, it wouldn't make any difference.

20 MS. ROBERSON: It wouldn't have made a
21 difference.

22 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: Again, this is my
23 speculation, of course. Had Masuda was in Daiichi, I
24 think because of that 400 -- that 420-kilovolt live
25 offsite power, that made a big difference. But what

1 made the big difference, which I tried to explain in my
2 focus in my Japan Times commentary, Ms. Roberson, is
3 really at the end of the day, it was not automation, it
4 was not PRA, it was not expert system that saved the day
5 at Daini. It was the human operators, that they
6 improvised and they literally rewired the plant.

7 I tell my USC students, just to imagine under
8 what condition that they did that. The water in some
9 cases was still up to here (indicating) and there were a
10 lot of debris, wire and hazardous material lying over
11 there. I told my students that it's not like you take a
12 piece of wire to run from my office on campus to the
13 cafeteria. They did it in a most dire, difficult
14 condition.

15 Coming up with that solution, that's another
16 thing which was remarkable, but at least they had this
17 pylon standing there, and then they used that and they
18 rewired it. But that's a very profound question.
19 That's deserving of dissertation by itself.

20 MS. ROBERSON: One other question. One of the
21 things that seems to come up in investigations of
22 organizational accidents like Colombia, Fukushima,
23 Deepwater Horizon, is an organization's failure to
24 manage changing conditions. While a lot of people are
25 tempted to view this as a process failure, the recurring

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 nature of the weakness suggests it's a fundamental
2 weakness in leadership. Is the ability to effectively
3 recognize and manage change, changing conditions an
4 essential element of effective leadership?

5 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: In my judgment, exactly. I
6 mean, if you remember that slide about what Tohoku
7 executives, what did they learn from past tsunami? How
8 did they incorporate that risk analysis done? And
9 improving their defenses, in order to protect their
10 plant better. Again, that plant was 60 kilometers
11 closer to the epicenter, tsunami was one meter higher.

12 I think it was exactly, because their original
13 wall of defense against tsunami wasn't that high. They
14 constantly managed that change, and they improved from
15 that, rather than miss reinterpreting the science and
16 resorting to lobbying. They managed it beautifully.

17 That's what I think, that's a good example that
18 your statement is very, very pointed.

19 MS. ROBERSON: Okay. Thank you.

20 DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Sullivan?

21 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you, Doctor, and thank you
22 for coming today. I really appreciate it. How is your
23 football team at USC going to do this year?

24 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: Can I take a fifth on that,
25 sir?

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 MR. SULLIVAN: Yes, you can. There's got to be
2 a game like on Saturday, and you're here.

3 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: That's another good answer
4 there, implicit answer.

5 MR. SULLIVAN: I want to ask a question that I
6 think is kind of related to what Ms. Roberson just asked
7 you, when she was talking about swapping the leaders,
8 and you called her question very profound, so I will
9 just try to copy it and change it a little bit.

10 But if you could, if we had a time machine and
11 you were the consultant and you go back ten years and
12 show up at TEPCO and talk to the leaders, other than
13 convincing them that you had a crystal ball that said
14 there would be a 13-meter high wall of water, what do
15 you -- what do you tell them? How do you -- how do you
16 go into that scenario again? So, this would be roughly
17 middle of the last decade at TEPCO. You have the
18 mindset that you -- that ultimately we know existed,
19 what do you tell them? How do you try to change it?

20 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: I tried that, sir. In
21 fact, when the Tokaimura Nuclear Processing Plant
22 accident happened in September 1999, I had an article in
23 Los Angeles Times looking at the root causes of that,
24 September 1999, got reprinted in Japan Times. And at
25 that time, then on the anniversary of that, I had

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 another article in Japan Times. Its title was Japan
2 Needs to Commence Nuclear Safety Reform.

3 And in 19 -- around 2001 or 2002, four
4 executives of TEPCO, they resigned in disgrace because
5 of falsification of data. And I had another article in
6 2007, after Kashiwazaki earthquake, they also, again,
7 they came dirty-handed.

8 The problem is this: Again, I'm on the record
9 that I've said that at least what was the problem at
10 Tokaimura, what lesson could be learned, what Japan
11 should do.

12 Sometimes I think that I carry Cassandra's curse
13 and nobody believes that, which is obvious, but a man
14 looking like me nobody believes, but -- but going back
15 to, again, your profound question, Japan is a developed
16 country. It's a first-rate country. However, when it
17 comes to the regulatory system industry, the
18 relationship between regulator and industry, I think, is
19 a perfect textbook example for regulatory capture.
20 Perfect and textbook example. And lack of independent
21 oversight regulator, something else that they have it,
22 they call it "Amakudari," unholy alliance, between the
23 METI industry and some other groups over there. That is
24 what we see the result over there.

25 If they would have listened to me 10, 15 years

1 ago, I say that TEPCO should have gone to a major
2 massive culture change. Again, I did some work with
3 another utility in Japan, which is called KEPCO, Kansai
4 Electric Power Company. They have a reactor in the city
5 of Tsuruga called Mihama. Mihama had a major steam
6 generator rupture accident in around 1992 or so, but
7 they massively learned from that. They created, Mr.
8 Sullivan, they created Institute for Nuclear Safety
9 System. That's why I went there in 1999 and then 2009
10 to that institute because it was created by KEPCO to
11 learn lessons from Mihama accident. They put that steam
12 generators in the -- in a glass to -- they made a museum
13 of that accident.

14 It was, by the way, part of my original slide
15 that my dear colleague, Dr. Douglas Minnema (inaudible),
16 cut it out from this presentation, because it's too
17 long.

18 But that was what KEPCO did, learning lessons,
19 managing to change. However, TEPCO was misinterpreting
20 or -- I mean reinterpreting science and resorting to
21 lobbying. My advice with them is at least look what
22 your neighbor, KEPCO, did, become better KEPCO people,
23 rather than falsifying record, lying to the public, and
24 then resigning in disgrace. I still have a photo of the
25 fourth TEPCO executive bowing to public and they

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 resigned in disgrace because of falsification of data.

2 MR. SULLIVAN: So, just to follow-up, let me
3 more or less give you the same question with respect to
4 the BP incident, and whether it was BP and/or
5 Halliburton, just imagine it was, again, 2008 or so.
6 So, it's before the actual accident, and you have an
7 opportunity with your crystal ball to talk to the
8 leaders of those companies. So now there's no element
9 of Japanese culture here, whatever that might be.

10 Do you tell them anything different in terms of
11 how you just answered the question with respect to --
12 with respect to TEPCO?

13 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: In the case of BP, I admit
14 I have a little bias because at a very important
15 meeting, I was with the State Department for a year and
16 a half. I was at a meeting in Athens at the Track II
17 Diplomacy Conference, and I met a very high-level
18 British person. That individual, it was almost a month
19 and a half ago, a month and a half after the BP
20 Deepwater Horizon, around June 2010 or so.

21 That individual told me a story about the motto
22 of Lord Browne, who used to be the CEO/president of BP
23 before Mr. Tony Hayward. His motto was a line from
24 Oscar Wilde that I have memorized. He said this is what
25 he instilled in his executive. The motto and the line

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 goes like this "consistency is the last refuge of
2 unimaginative. Consistency is the last refuge of
3 unimaginative."

4 This is what his motto. This was his marching
5 order. This is the way that he ran his company. Mr.
6 Sullivan, imagine a CEO of a nuclear power aircraft
7 carrier, he goes on the loud speaker and say every day,
8 consistency is the last refuge of unimaginative. What
9 will be the operation on the flight deck?

10 Imagine if a refinery manager, which in the case
11 of Texas City, unfortunately, they listened, because
12 their bonus system is also attached to that. It's a
13 struggle for survival. If I was -- or had the power to
14 advise, I would say, please remove Mr. Lord Browne from
15 that position because this motto is doomed to failure.

16 It was under his watch that the Alaska failure
17 happened. It was under his watch that Texas City
18 happened in 2005. It was under his watch that the root
19 causes festered that led to the BP Deepwater Horizon.
20 That's the role of bad leadership. That's the role of
21 infested leadership, in my judgment.

22 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you very much.

23 DR. WINOKUR: I want to ask you a question about
24 learning organizations, because it's always been my
25 sense that culture plays a very important role in

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 whether an organization can learn, because if the
2 workers are always saying, we don't do things that way,
3 and this is what we're comfortable with, and this is the
4 way we've always done things and so on and so forth, it
5 can be very challenging for a leader to come in and
6 change the organization and make it learn new things.

7 Do you have any sense of that process, of what
8 leaders might do to be more effective at coming into an
9 organization that has a very established culture in
10 helping them learn?

11 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: I have one personal
12 observation about that, and that's why I was involved
13 with this organization, and I'm very proud to name this
14 individual. You remember Metrolink had a major crash
15 with Union Pacific in September 2008, near Los Angeles?

16 DR. WINOKUR: I do.

17 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: You remember that?

18 DR. WINOKUR: There's a story, but I'm not
19 telling it to you. I do.

20 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: Tell me off the record or
21 after the meeting. That accident happened in September
22 2008. Twenty-five people died. I got there at the site
23 of the accident like three hours later. I slipped
24 through the barriers. I wanted to see that so I took
25 some photos. And it was a horrific, horrific accident.

1 And Metrolink has had similar mishaps and accidents
2 before that, but unfortunately, that organization didn't
3 care about that.

4 A year later or a few months later they changed
5 their CEO, and they brought in Mr. John Fenton. John
6 Fenton became the CEO of Metrolink. In a matter of two
7 years, John really converted that organizational
8 culture. Every single employee from I told you about,
9 top-down, bottom-up, with senior manager, and Metrolink
10 is really an umbrella organization. They have multiple
11 contractors. Their signal is maintained by one of the
12 train operators and other ones.

13 John Fenton was very successful in doing that
14 with the assistance of Jim Schultz, that was his advisor
15 and he was a former Air Force pilot, and these guys,
16 they really did that culture change. To the point that
17 the Honorable Robert Sumwalt from NTSB, he led a session
18 on the safety culture for them, and I had the honor of
19 sitting in the audience. This is what John Fenton was
20 able to do in two or three years over there, and it was
21 successful.

22 DR. WINOKUR: Do you think that one of the
23 things that helped there was the crash? In other words,
24 if we look at NASA, they lost the Challenger, lost
25 Columbia. Typically after an accident that serious, the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 workforce is more open to change, and if you get the
2 right leader in there at the time, do you think that
3 that's what helps make a big change?

4 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: I think it will make the
5 big change, but the question is not when the culture
6 change, which people are more amenable to that, but
7 sustaining that change.

8 I vividly remember the late astronaut Sally
9 Ride. She sat in both investigation of Challenger '86
10 and Columbia, and in the Columbia one, she said, I
11 vividly remember her words, that I'm hearing the echoes
12 of Challenger here. See, that is the problem. They go
13 through this culture change, but then sustaining that
14 culture change is, again, a leadership issue.

15 And that's, I think, a very important factor,
16 not reverting back to the old habits.

17 CHAIRMAN WINOKUR: Thank you very much.

18 Ms. Roberson?

19 MS. ROBERSON: I have one -- one question, and I
20 want to talk to you about worker commitment. I think
21 it's certainly been my experience everywhere I've been,
22 and the DOE complex is no exception, it is very clear
23 that the workers have a strong commitment to the mission
24 of whatever the requirements are or production
25 requirements are for where they work, but often they are

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 much less committed to the senior leaders or middle
2 management. And I don't know if you've seen that, but I
3 would say, I've seen that.

4 Is this strong commitment by the workers to the
5 mission, can that become an enabler for poor leadership?
6 For instance, if leaders don't really understand the
7 culture underneath, can the strong commitment to the
8 mission overcompensate for leadership and actually make
9 it more ineffective rather than more effective?

10 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: I have seen that in some
11 cases that I dealt with or I studied that that workers
12 commitment really could compensate for the bad
13 technology, bad workstation design, bad procedure or
14 sometimes bad supervision and leadership. I think
15 committed workers, they go above and beyond, they
16 stretch themselves too thin in order to keep system up
17 and running.

18 I was doing several projects, a research project
19 in Mexico with several chemical plants, and I've seen
20 particularly that the term should be called sacrifice.
21 That the sacrifice of some of the workers they do in
22 order to keep the operation going in spite of all the
23 problems that they have.

24 I think this is, again, what lends credence to
25 what I've said before, that really workers are the first

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 and the last layer of defense, because many times this
2 first layer of defense is the technological one, they
3 don't work, and workers, it's by their flesh and blood
4 that they become the first layer of defense.

5 MS. ROBERSON: Well, one last question on that
6 path. In the first session today, our two admirals kind
7 of laid out a very clear picture of what activities are
8 undertaken to try to understand the climate, they call
9 it command climate. We see a lot of surveys that are
10 done in the industry. Do you think surveys actually
11 provide a good picture of the climate or culture in an
12 organization?

13 PROFESSOR MESHKATI: Depends on the survey and
14 who does the survey. Again, this is my humble opinion.
15 I have seen some safety culture surveys done on San
16 Onofre Nuclear Plant that I would give them a C-, on a
17 good day, as a professor. However, I've seen some
18 surveys of safety culture, some of them I think done for
19 your organization, or DOE, by Dr. Sonja Haber, on
20 Pantex, on the one in Washington, escaped the name,
21 Hanford. These are very, very credible surveys. Dr.
22 Sonja Haber does this work for International Atomic
23 Energy Agency. Her work is very high quality and solid.
24 But there are some fly-by-night organizations that they
25 tell or they claim that they can measure safety culture

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 to two digits after decimal points, and if they do that,
2 then I have a bridge also in New York to sell you.

3 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you, Dr. Meshkati.

4 DR. WINOKUR: Yes, I want to thank you very
5 much, Dr. Meshkati, for your presentation, excellent.
6 We've enjoyed the questions, as you can tell, and now
7 we're going to move on to Professor and Dr. Sutcliffe.
8 Welcome.

9 DR. SUTCLIFFE: Mr. Chairman, Ms. Roberson and
10 Mr. Sullivan, thank you very much for the opportunity.
11 I'm honored as well to be here, and as Professor
12 Meshkati talked about his personal reflections, I am
13 going to say that I guess I'm going to give you my
14 professional reflections after having studied safety
15 culture and worked with organizations over the last 20,
16 25 years. And I accept full responsibility for not
17 having any quote from Admiral Rickover, and I just want
18 to say I apologize for that. I think I might have a
19 little Naval picture somewhere, but anyway.

20 DR. WINOKUR: I'm not making that mistake in the
21 future.

22 DR. SUTCLIFFE: So, now the question that you've
23 asked me to discuss relates to leadership and safety
24 culture, and specifically what's the role of the leader
25 in establishing and sustaining culture, and I think

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 today what actually what my presentation is going to do
2 after having sat here for the whole day in a very
3 interesting set of sessions is to bring some coherence
4 to our understanding of what it takes, because I think
5 the scientific knowledge that we've been gaining over
6 the last 30 years about safety culture has really been
7 accumulating.

8 I think it's a very important and interesting
9 time in understanding -- in in this kind of work, and so
10 I think hopefully I'll bring some coherence to what
11 we've been talking about today.

12 So, I want to do two things. One is I want to
13 first talk about my research and knowledge of safety
14 culture and particularly what leaders, how they can
15 enable and strengthen safety culture. And I've got
16 several models I want to present there. And then I want
17 to, second, spend a little bit of time talking about the
18 role of leadership in enabling organizational
19 adaptability, because I think that's a real critical
20 issue here because we know that organizational disasters
21 are often the result of pursuing a particular course of
22 action in the face of evidence suggesting that we should
23 change course.

24 And, so, I want to talk about research I've done
25 in wildland firefighting, suggesting how leaders can

1 play a role and what we should do. And actually, I
2 think this is really timely because I particularly want
3 to talk about leadership and the role that leaders play
4 in sense making. And Professor Meshkati talked about a
5 recent article in Harvard Business Review about the
6 Daini plant in Japan, and one of my colleagues, Ranjay
7 Gulati and Professor Meshkati's colleague, Charles
8 Casto, just published a paper where sense making was
9 really critical to the success of Daini, and so I want
10 to talk a little bit about that.

11 But I want to start by highlighting what we know
12 about organizational culture and why it's important, and
13 that is that in part, culture enables this similarity of
14 approach, outlook and priorities that enable people to
15 achieve collective sustained responses in complex
16 organizations. And I know that's a lot of words, but
17 really, you know, we talk a lot about culture, and my
18 fear is that we talk about it like it's a thing, and
19 it's more like a cloud that you put your kind of -- you
20 can put your hand in it. But you can kind of see it,
21 but when you put your hand there, you can't really feel
22 it.

23 So, there are so many definitions of safety
24 culture. I like this one in particular by Stian
25 Antonsen, and it's pretty similar to what we've been

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 talking about today, that culture really is these frames
2 of reference for meaning and action. They encompass the
3 skills, beliefs and basic assumptions, norms and customs
4 and language that members of a group develop over time.

5 So, in a way, culture is a way of seeing and
6 acting, and it's simultaneously a way of not seeing and
7 not acting, so culture can be a source of blindspots,
8 and we talk about that all the time.

9 Of course, the idea of culture is simple, that
10 we just have to be clear about the values and norms and
11 beliefs and the kinds of things that we want to see
12 people do, and we know that that's in complex
13 organizations, complex technologically, complex
14 sociologically, that's really, really hard to do.

15 And this morning I think the two admirals really
16 gave a good sense of how building, shaping a culture
17 really comes about, and if you think about it, this
18 particular model, and I'm -- I'm always much better when
19 I can get up there, but I will try to do it from here.
20 I mean, essentially, if you think about the story that
21 Admiral Norton, I think, told this morning about the new
22 seaman who was helping him take the plane off and they
23 saw a little bit of oil, and they said, you know, cut it
24 off, you've got to stop, you're not flying today. And
25 then the next night, the person was rewarded at a

1 gathering or whatever.

2 I think that is reflected in this particular
3 model. The idea is that we know, and this is a model
4 that adapted from Charles O'Reilly, who is a professor
5 at Berkeley, and I think about this as safety culture,
6 you can think about it as culture in general. The idea
7 that leaders have to know what they want, they have to
8 communicate what they want, and they have to do it
9 consistently. It has to be salient. People have to
10 understand it. They have to perceive this is how we
11 want our leaders want us to act, et cetera.

12 When people are rewarded for those things,
13 they're likely to redo them. So, that is one way that
14 we know leaders shape culture. It is by walking the
15 talk. You know, it is by knowing what you want, saying
16 what you want, making sure that you're rewarding when
17 people act in the ways that you want them to act.

18 At the same time, what we know from the
19 literature over the last 20 years that has been
20 accumulating, particularly in the area of safety
21 culture, we know that there are other ways that leaders
22 enable culture. This particular model was developed by
23 one of my former doctoral students Tim Vogus, who is a
24 professor at Vanderbilt University, my colleague Karl
25 Weick, at the University of Michigan, and I.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 What we did to create this model is we reviewed
2 almost the entire literature on safety culture across
3 industries, and we used a particular form of scholarship
4 called a scholarship of integration. What we wanted to
5 know from the literature was what do we know from that
6 literature? So, this is an analytical model. It is
7 derived from empirical evidence. What we know about the
8 commonalities, the elements, the factors that are
9 associated with strong safety cultures. And what we
10 learned from that analysis is that -- and I think
11 actually what I was really happy to hear this morning in
12 the presentations by the two admirals is they were
13 really talking about how organizations and how leaders
14 build the safety infrastructure.

15 I think a lot of Admiral Eccles, the idea of the
16 SUBSAFE program, was really oriented to this creating a
17 safety infrastructure, and what I mean by that is, you
18 know, creating a safety management system, an operating
19 management system that is composed of, you know,
20 standard operating procedures, training requirements.
21 And it's very, very complicated when you look at
22 organizations, they create this -- this system, the
23 requirements for how are we going to audit, how are we
24 going to monitor, what are we going to reward people
25 for, what are the leadership and supervision

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 requirements? All of that goes there.

2 That is a huge way that people, that culture
3 gets shaped and reshaped over time. And that, also, is
4 part of, you know, those actions, how much we're putting
5 into training, how much -- you know how are we
6 developing our training programs over time, you know,
7 what are we doing with respect to audits and all those
8 kinds of things. Those are visible to people, and that
9 shows leaders' visible commitment to safety.

10 The other thing that we know is that leaders in
11 the organization really want to develop safety
12 information systems, you know, informations for
13 collecting and disseminating safety information, and,
14 you know, that's reporting requirements, statistics, all
15 of the kinds of things that -- that people talked about
16 today.

17 We also know that a big part of the way that
18 leaders enable safety is by empowering people to speak
19 up and act in ways that promote safety. And then
20 there's this issue that we've talked about a couple of
21 times today, and that is, that -- is there a safety
22 climate that has developed? And that means that leaders
23 have to go about and really assess, are people getting
24 it? And that's -- that's a big part of the way that
25 leaders go about enabling.

1 Of course, in our model, you know, as we wanted
2 to show here is that it doesn't stop there. It's that,
3 of course, you have to understand and you have to make
4 sure that people are acting in the ways that you want
5 them to do, that they are following standard operating
6 procedures and policies, that they're disclosing
7 concerns, that they're learning, that they're mindful of
8 risks. That all goes in our enact section here.

9 And then, finally, we know that strong safety
10 cultures are shaped by learning, and that, you know,
11 learning -- we talk about learning loosely here, but the
12 way that organizations learn is not just about what
13 people carry around in their heads, learning gets
14 institutionalized. The lessons get institutionalized in
15 reshaping policies and procedures, in reshaping the ways
16 that we go about doing things and reshaping the way that
17 we want to go about the work.

18 So, that's what this model is, and I think it
19 represents, I-- I -- actually quite well, what I heard
20 today, particularly the admirals talking about it and
21 Mr. Griffon as well.

22 So, what would you see in organizations? Well,
23 you would see that leaders are directing attention to
24 safety. They're doing safety rounds. You would see
25 that they're paying attention to whether people are

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 speaking up, acting in ways that improve safety, that
2 they're actively seeking out bad news. Why is that?
3 Because we know bad news doesn't necessarily travel up,
4 and we also know that you know about people wanting to
5 speak up about things that are going wrong.

6 So, you have to be very active. We're
7 highlighting threats to safety, that people are
8 mobilizing resources to resolve those threats, that
9 people are getting feedback about how things are going
10 and they're revising their practices and what they're
11 learning.

12 So, on that note, I'll take a drink here. Where
13 am I on time?

14 DR. WINOKUR: You're good.

15 DR. SUTCLIFFE: I'm good? Okay.

16 So, let me turn now to the related issue of how
17 leaders enable adaptability, because, as I mentioned
18 earlier, we know that organizational disasters are
19 oftentimes the result of pursuing a course of action
20 when we should change direction, and when evidence shows
21 that we should do something different, and we know that
22 leaders play a role in that.

23 And as I said earlier, in part they play a role
24 because they help people in safety-critical contexts
25 make sense of what we're facing. And I think that's a

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 real critical leader role, and if you look at the
2 Harvard Business Review article on Daini, you will see
3 that this, you know, taking the 400 whatever -- the
4 tower, you know, creating this power grid, et cetera, it
5 wasn't just like, oh, let's do that. It was a
6 combination of having to make sense of a lot of
7 different kinds of changing conditions that then led to
8 those particular outcomes, but the leader was really
9 critical here.

10 And, so, I am going to talk about some studies
11 that I've done with Michelle Barton, who is -- was one
12 of my former doctoral students who is a professor at
13 Boston University, and we know that, you know, you may
14 say, well, does this relate to us in the nuclear
15 business? You know, it is an organizational context
16 that is very dynamic and very complex and where there
17 are lots of different entities that have to come
18 together. We also know that there are cues and
19 indicators of potential problems that exist and that are
20 known, and we know that there are clear performance
21 outcomes. You know your fire can blow up or you can
22 contain it.

23 And in particular, what I want to talk about is
24 62 fire incidents that we examined. These incidents
25 varied in their dimensions with respect to size and

1 outcomes, so the outcomes were sometimes horrific.
2 People died, and, you know, people had to deploy their
3 fire shelters and all these kinds of things, and in some
4 of the other incidents, there were very, very good
5 outcomes.

6 Now, why am I talking about this? In part
7 because when we looked at these incidents, and there
8 were, they were almost equally split between the
9 incidents that were successful where the fire was
10 contained and where things really blew up, so almost the
11 same numbers of each. What we noticed is in the good
12 incidents that in almost every, in every single one of
13 those incidents, there was a change in the course of
14 action. That we didn't just go down this particular
15 road and, you know, with blinders on.

16 And in the incidents that went bad, what we
17 found is that in almost every single one of those
18 incidents, people didn't change course. The leaders
19 didn't change course. And, so, we wanted to know what
20 was going on there. And, so, we wanted to know if there
21 were patterns that we could discern. And, so, you know,
22 just to lead up to that, you know, if you think about
23 it, and we have seen this today and Professor Meshkati
24 talked about this, that in interactively complex and
25 tightly coupled systems, small mishaps can concatenate,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 and they can build up. We heard that this morning, too.

2 And, so, we know that safety requires this
3 vigilance. You know, and that part of what safety
4 culture is all about is creating a vigilance so people
5 can see the small things and they can act with safety in
6 mind, they can bring up these cues, and that, you know,
7 we can constantly adapt and redirect what we're doing if
8 necessary.

9 And, of course, that there is a very big
10 literature and that was developed by Jim Reason and
11 myself and Karl Weick about failing to recognize cues,
12 and that there are weak signals. These weak signals,
13 you want people to pick up on them, and that disasters
14 occur in part because of these accumulation of unnoticed
15 events.

16 So, the implication is -- is that if we notice
17 these things, we redirect our actions that we will be
18 safe. But there is also a different, I guess, model or
19 a different idea, another possible explanation, and --
20 and that may be is that people fail to redirect their
21 action, not because they miss cues, signaling the fact
22 that they should change their course, but because
23 they're so embedded in the situation, they're so
24 embedded in what they're doing right now, that they
25 really fail to kind of step back and rethink what's

1 going on.

2 And, so, we talk about that as dysfunctional
3 momentum, in that they don't really make new sense of
4 what they're facing. And, so, what we need sometimes is
5 to think, perhaps, that we need some kind of
6 interruption, and actually I know if I went through my
7 notes again I would find that somebody today actually
8 talked about this, and perhaps it was one of the
9 admirals. The idea that sometimes you've got to kind of
10 step back, and you've got to think about, what are we
11 facing now? Because we don't oftentimes update in real
12 time, and, so leaders can play a very big role in that.

13 So, it may be the fact that lack of
14 interruptions threaten safety, and that we get into a
15 momentum. If you think about it, momentum is, you know,
16 it's this idea that we're -- it's a flow of
17 uninterrupted action, and so you kind of have to stop
18 the action. It's not necessarily like inertia where you
19 have to kind of start action. And, so, overcoming
20 momentum requires the slowing or stopping, and
21 dysfunctional momentum implies a continuing with a
22 failing action.

23 So, what motivates and enables individuals and
24 groups to redirect their action, what prevents it and
25 what are the implications for leadership?

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 So, let me just talk about what we found. We
2 found, as we expected, that most instances where ongoing
3 action was changed and where there were positive
4 outcomes that it resulted from some re-evaluation of the
5 situation, and in most instances where action continued
6 unchanged, it involved little, if any, re-evaluation.
7 But we also saw, you know, well, we saw this, you know,
8 these people re-evaluated the action, the test fire was
9 satisfactory, we applied a few igniters, it was going
10 bad. I told her I was seeing, you know, we need to shut
11 it down and we did.

12 These people, we took a test fire. It burned
13 actively, we were kind of anticipating that, but, you
14 know, there were five or six more fires that kind of got
15 lit, and in the end, people got a lot of smoke
16 inhalation and throwing up and headaches, and it was a
17 real mess. They didn't change their actions.

18 What we found, though, is that noticing cues
19 wasn't sufficient. So, if, you know, we talk a lot
20 about weak signals, noticing cues, not letting these
21 things accumulate. But we found that noticing cues was
22 not sufficient to introduce this re-evaluation of the
23 situation. There were many examples and where
24 individuals recalled, in fact, noticing cues that
25 conditions were dangerous or indicators suggested that

1 potential problems, but the approach to the fire
2 remained unchanged.

3 Now, these people, we knew it was a bad place to
4 light the fire. It was a steep slope, et cetera. We
5 knew it was going to be a loser, and, in fact, it was.
6 So, again, noticing the cues. But there were two social
7 processes that we found that led to the re-evaluation.
8 Not surprisingly.

9 One was voicing concerns, and voicing concerns
10 transmits this critical information. But it's not just
11 the voicing, because a lot of times people already knew
12 the information. It was -- it's actually -- I should
13 say it is just the voicing, that the voicing in a way
14 creates something that people have to react to. It's a
15 shared artifact. And, so, the cue may be ephemeral and
16 uncertain, but it creates this interruption, and it
17 creates this idea that it has to be acknowledged or
18 denied and it has to be responded to.

19 So, and this is an example I told my boss we're
20 experiencing. I didn't feel safe. I guess just by
21 hearing one person saying that, you know, most people
22 didn't feel safe in that example, that it was enough to
23 make him realize that, yeah, this is a safety concern.
24 It was, in a way, it was like he was waiting for
25 somebody to say something.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 So, what enables this voice? And we've heard
2 today a lot that, you know, a lot of times people don't
3 speak up because they're fearful, but oddly enough,
4 that's not necessarily what we found, and we were
5 really, really surprised by that. We found that in a
6 lot of cases, people didn't speak up because they
7 assumed that other people knew more than they did. And,
8 so, this perceived expertise also influences voice.

9 And, so, in this case, for example, you know,
10 I'm not used to questioning him. Nobody is because --
11 am I running over time?

12 CHAIRMAN WINOKUR: No, you're fine.

13 MS. SUTCLIFFE: He's made consistently good
14 decisions in gnarly situations for 30 years, and, you
15 know, I didn't feel comfortable about it, but I had the
16 least experience of anyone there. So, it was like,
17 well, it doesn't look right, but what do I know.

18 And, so, we found that that, you know, perceived
19 expertise was one reason, but we also found that when
20 people were skeptical of somebody's expertise,
21 regardless of whether it was a lower-level person or
22 their boss, that they were more likely to speak up and
23 voice their concerns, so skepticism was really
24 important. And, so, that was the one issue, this issue
25 of voicing concerns, one social process.

1 The other social process that we found was a
2 process of seeking disparate perspectives. Karl Weick
3 and I have talked about this as requisite variety, the
4 idea that you've got to seek discontinuities in order to
5 create opportunities for re-evaluation, and that we
6 found that leaders who deliberately sought disparate
7 perspectives were more likely to interrupt and
8 re-evaluate their ongoing actions. And as this person
9 said, you know, I wanted to get input from other people,
10 too, to see if there were different views, to see if
11 anybody had a different idea, because, you know, they
12 have a wealth of experience, and I want to use it all.

13 And what we found that led to that seeking of
14 disparate perspectives was really something that we've
15 talked about as an attitude of wisdom, and I think this
16 is really important to think about with respect to
17 leadership, that we found that the leaders who had a
18 sense of humility, that they didn't assume that they
19 knew it all, that they were more likely to ask for help
20 from other people.

21 And, you know, we've talked about, Karl and I,
22 and particularly Karl has written about this attitude of
23 wisdom, that, you know -- you want to be confident but
24 not overcautious. It's this balance between confidence
25 and overcautiousness, that it's this attitude of wisdom,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 having seen things a lot. And, you know, as this person
2 said, as old as I am and as experienced as I am in
3 relationship to these large fires, you know, I know I
4 don't know it all, and so the next fire I go on to, I'm
5 not going to go in there full guns blazing.

6 So, what we found really is that there was
7 likely to be a redirection of ongoing action and a
8 re-evaluation of the situation if people voiced the
9 concerns and if they sought disparate perspectives, and
10 we found that this skepticism of expertise and this
11 attitude of wisdom led to those.

12 And you can think about it as this opportunity
13 for sense making and this opportunity to create an
14 interruption. But I want to do -- I do want to say two
15 other things, and this goes I guess -- relates to what
16 Mr. Griffon was trying to talk about today, and that is
17 that we did find that there were two factors that kind
18 of interrupted this from happening, and one factor was
19 political pressure, that people were less likely to
20 re-evaluate the situation if there was strong political
21 and power issues going on, and also when people had
22 individual interests, and that they had a little bit of
23 wishful thinking, that they really wanted this fire to
24 go well, you know, they really want it to go well, so
25 they kind of put blinders on, and they were unlikely to

1 redirect their actions.

2 So, what do I take away from this? I think
3 safety culture is really critical, and it's critical
4 because it does sensitize us to what we want to pay
5 attention to, but also we know that disasters occur not
6 only because of cultural blindspots, because people miss
7 cues, but also because they get on a course of action,
8 and leaders are important because they help people make
9 sense, and they create interruptions and moments to
10 reflect and to re-assess on the unfolding story to
11 determine now what, what are we going to do, and also to
12 re-orient what they have been doing.

13 So, I will end there and look forward to your
14 questions. Thank you.

15 DR. WINOKUR: First of all, I want to thank you
16 very much for the presentation, and I see you've been
17 taking careful notes and you've integrated a lot of
18 these thoughts for us, so we'll try to take advantage of
19 that, and certainly a lot of what you said resonates
20 with me.

21 I don't know your model well yet, but I can
22 assure you my staff will force us to learn it, and we
23 will become more adept at it.

24 Let me ask you a question I asked before to see
25 if you can give me some insights. We talked before

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 about the fact that at different levels of an
2 organization, you had the leaders, you had the mid-level
3 managers, you had the workers. There were different
4 perceptions of the culture and how things were going
5 looking at the situation.

6 What do you think are the causes for that and
7 what are the causes to start with?

8 DR. SUTCLIFFE: Well, yeah, I think that's a
9 really good question because I have observed that myself
10 in some studies that I've done, that there are these
11 differences, and I actually think that the question --
12 the answer to your question has come out a couple of
13 times today.

14 Well, if we think about this work that I just
15 presented, I think one cause of that may be the lack of
16 humility, perhaps, but I think this morning, that one of
17 the admirals talked about the fact that, you know,
18 leaders have a strategic -- they have strategic
19 priorities and strategic goals. And, so, they have a
20 different orientation, and a different perspective on
21 the organization, so that may lead to some
22 overconfidence or confidence that we can achieve what we
23 can do.

24 And also, their, you know, people on the front
25 lines are seeing more problems day-to-day and the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 interruptions and the kinds of things that it takes to
2 get their work done, so they may be a little less
3 optimistic.

4 I also want to highlight that what we know from
5 sociological studies is that there is something called
6 positive asymmetry in organizations, meaning that
7 sociologists have demonstrated that it is very, very
8 difficult to imagine worst case scenarios, and perhaps
9 leaders are more subject to that. I don't -- I don't
10 know about that, but I also think that it may signal
11 that news is not getting to leaders, and it also may
12 signal that they're not paying enough attention to the
13 front line, or they're not really down in the weeds.

14 So, you know, those -- there may be actual
15 differences, and -- and those differences may be a
16 consequence that the leader doesn't really know stuff,
17 and that the news isn't getting to him or her. And, so,
18 I think there -- I mean, I would talk about that as the
19 reasons.

20 DR. WINOKUR: So, what I take from that, to some
21 extent, is that one of the values of surveys, especially
22 from the leader's point of view, is that if you see the
23 stratification, and if it's strong, and we've seen data
24 at our previous hearing from NASA about that that
25 stratification, things typically look a little bit

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 better at the top than at the bottom. It's a signal to
2 you, a strong signal to you that you may not know the
3 rest of the story, you may not be getting all the news
4 and all the information you need, and it's probably a
5 very natural process that that happens, right?

6 DR. SUTCLIFFE: I don't know about a natural
7 process, but I think it's -- I think just from what I've
8 seen, it seems to be the pattern that we see in
9 organizations, and I would say that, yeah, that it's a
10 signal that people need to know more, and I would be --
11 I mean, I would then be wondering about other things. I
12 mean, I would want to dive in, definitely.

13 DR. WINOKUR: All right, thank you.
14 Mr. Sullivan?

15 MR. SULLIVAN: So, thank you for being here
16 today, Doctor, and thank you for waiting very patiently
17 all day to have your turn at bat.

18 You know, we time constrained you I think to 25
19 minutes, so I think out of necessity, you went through
20 it rather quickly, but when you go through it quickly,
21 it almost seems kind of simple. It's like, here's a few
22 graphs, and here's a few traits.

23 DR. SUTCLIFFE: Right.

24 MR. SULLIVAN: I'm thinking it can't possibly be
25 that simple because there's many examples that we've

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 heard about today, where we're very smart, very talented
2 people, they've failed at this. So, if I gave you a
3 week, could you be sitting here talking about this for a
4 week? Is it -- it it complex?

5 DR. SUTCLIFFE: I could be talking about it
6 probably for months. It is extraordinarily complex,
7 and, of course, I mean all -- most models simplify
8 things, just as we did in the enable, enact and
9 elaborate model. You know, it's an analytical model to
10 give -- and I would like to explain it just a little bit
11 more in the sense that the model was derived from
12 looking at the published literature on safety culture,
13 and the findings that we have found, not we, but, you
14 know, the collective "we" of collective scholarship, and
15 the elements that were common to strong safety cultures.

16 So, you know, if you were going to go and take a
17 look at an organization's safety culture or if you were
18 establishing a new organization, what are the kinds of
19 things that you would want to think about, and that
20 gives you kind of a sense.

21 So, we created it for that reason, but the other
22 reason is to show that it is a process, that shaping
23 culture is a process. It is shaped and reshaped over
24 time. I mean, you could think about it as being
25 reshaped every moment. You know, every time you're

1 enacting a new action or taking an action, you're
2 getting new information, and people are incorporating
3 it, so it's extraordinary.

4 I believe in complex technological systems,
5 sociological systems. It's extraordinarily difficult,
6 and it takes -- it's very, very, very, very hard work.

7 MR. SULLIVAN: So, on your one graph that you
8 did have with traits that leaders should be showing, I
9 think I saw the word "consistent" there twice, which we
10 heard earlier about consistency.

11 DR. SUTCLIFFE: Oh, right, yeah.

12 MR. SULLIVAN: But, my experience, consistency
13 can be very hard just because rules are finite,
14 scenarios can be infinite, and so inevitably, you have a
15 rule that says this. Something comes along where the
16 rule doesn't make any sense. Alright. We don't have --
17 you want to talk about complex socioeconomic situations,
18 we can just talk about raising my own children, and I
19 ran into this all the time where now you're faced with
20 you enforce the rule for consistency purposes or do you
21 open up that Pandora's box of, okay, now we're going to
22 start having exceptions to the rule.

23 So, what do you tell leaders or prospective
24 leaders about that?

25 DR. SUTCLIFFE: I think you raise a really

1 important and I think one of the real challenges of
2 leadership, and I guess the way I would think about it
3 is -- and I think that people are pretty careful when
4 they think about culture and building culture, or
5 shaping culture, about that you want a few key values
6 that you really want that are invulnerable. But, yeah,
7 we need to have some -- I mean, there has to be the
8 capability for resilience, and I think Mr. Griffon
9 talked about resilience today, and I think Professor
10 Meshkati would talk about that, too.

11 I mean, we saw that in the -- in the, you know,
12 Daini and Daiichi. So, you've got -- I mean, I think
13 you have to think carefully about which things are
14 invulnerable that, you know, can't be penetrated, that
15 this is how they have to be, but also people have to
16 know that you have to be flexible. I mean, doing the
17 same thing in changing conditions, following a procedure
18 just blindly is not -- is in my view stupid. And, so, I
19 think -- I think that it's a balancing act, and I don't
20 know -- I mean, I had my own problems when I was
21 associate dean trying to balance certain things.

22 So, I think it's a challenge, and I don't know
23 that I have a good answer, other than to say that we
24 have to think carefully about what are the things that
25 we really want. If you really want people to speak up,

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 and they speak up, and then they are punished for it,
2 then that's a huge signal. You know, I mean, if that's
3 not really of that key value, then we shouldn't be
4 touting that as a value.

5 So, I think we've got to be careful in the kinds
6 of things that we say we want, and we probably don't
7 always do a good job with that.

8 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you. Well, if it makes you
9 feel any better, my children always got the best of me.

10 DR. SUTCLIFFE: Okay.

11 MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you.

12 DR. SUTCLIFFE: No, I don't think there's any
13 good answers for that. I mean, think that's a key
14 leadership challenge, right, and what leaders get called
15 on the carpet for is saying, you know, you want this,
16 and then tomorrow you're doing that.

17 DR. WINOKUR: Ms. Roberson?

18 MS. ROBERSON: Well, actually, thank you so much
19 for your presentation. I enjoyed it, and you actually
20 -- I had a series of questions, but you actually
21 answered most of them during your presentation.

22 But, I mean, you're talking to a room full of
23 engineers and scientists, so I've got to ask a little
24 bit deeper. These 60-plus events that were analyzed for
25 the study, I understand the categorization, but were

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 there any similarities or dissimilarities across the
2 line? I mean, was it like regional? Was there, you
3 know, any difference or were there no differences in the
4 data set in the more successful, less successful?
5 Anything you can think of? Yeah.

6 DR. SUTCLIFFE: I mean, we controlled for number
7 of factors.

8 MS. ROBERSON: Maybe that's what I mean.

9 DR. SUTCLIFFE: Yeah, we controlled for some
10 factors, and I honestly haven't looked at the paper for
11 on particularly what we controlled for, but we
12 controlled for several things, to the extent that we
13 could, given this particular thing.

14 I mean, we have also done another study, a more
15 quantitative study that's going to be published in the
16 Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. And in
17 that paper, we also take a look at sense making. And
18 the importance of that paper, I think, is that, first of
19 all, we have 600 observations, so it's a much larger
20 sample, but what we found there is that leadership sense
21 making was critical, and that the way that it was
22 critical is that particularly if people on the line were
23 trying to hold on to discrepancies, so if people on the
24 line were socialized to say, we've got to ask each other
25 questions and, you know, we want to hang onto the

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 details, and that if leaders were really -- if they were
2 engaging in behaviors suggesting that, you know, we've
3 got to somehow think about what does this mean and let's
4 come together and interpret what's happening here. So,
5 bringing those things together, it was a huge predictor
6 of performance, the outcomes of these fires.

7 So, that's why I think that leadership modeling
8 these behaviors that -- of inquiry, you know, I think
9 one of the questions that you all asked today, and I
10 can't remember, it might have been Mr. Sullivan. Well,
11 I think several times you've asked about technical
12 competence versus, you know, other competencies, and, I
13 mean, when I think about what a leaders need or how
14 would we make decisions on what leaders we want, I would
15 be thinking about we want leaders who are really going
16 to be inquiring about things, who are learning oriented,
17 who want to know about stuff, who have good relational
18 skills, and as well as deep technical skills, because I
19 think that's important, too, but it's really this
20 inquiring and making that salient that we want to figure
21 this out.

22 I mean, I think that the challenge for safety
23 critical industries, and we were talking about this at
24 lunch, is that, you know, risks, and one of the admirals
25 actually said this today, and I know I have it in my

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 notes somewhere, but -- is that safety -- is that risks
2 aren't always objective, and you have to make sense of
3 things as you're going along, and that that's a process
4 of really interpretation and talking and negotiation and
5 stuff like that, and I think we need more skills like
6 that.

7 MS. ROBERSON: So, where do people get those
8 skills?

9 DR. SUTCLIFFE: Business schools. No, I'm
10 teasing.

11 MS. ROBERSON: No, you're not.

12 DR. SUTCLIFFE: No, you know, I am, because
13 there's this recent book called "Quiet." I don't know
14 if any of you have read it, but about how we're creating
15 a culture of extroverts and that introverts can be very
16 good leaders, but they're not being listened to. But,
17 no, you know, I'd have to think about that, Ms.
18 Roberson, because I haven't really studied it, and so
19 I'm a little reluctant to say anything.

20 MS. ROBERSON: Thank you.

21 DR. SUTCLIFFE: You're welcome.

22 DR. WINOKUR: So, here's some of the things that
23 I'm trying to understand a little bit better today, and
24 I hope you take them home as research projects.

25 DR. SUTCLIFFE: Okay.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 DR. WINOKUR: But I'm not saying we're funding
2 it, but I hope so, and maybe they've been answered and
3 maybe you've heard the answers here today so you can
4 help me.

5 I'm trying to understand things about leaders in
6 the sense that some people may believe that if you have
7 an effective leader in one organization and you
8 transplant that leader to a different organization, that
9 they're still going to be effective, and yet I read a
10 lot of things in the Wall Street Journal or the press
11 that say, you know, this person was at Xerox and they
12 were super, and then they were hired by Ford Motor
13 Company, and they fell apart.

14 What do you think was going on there? Was it a
15 culture they could not deal with? I mean, they're
16 obviously great leaders. They led big corporations and
17 companies with hundreds of thousands of people
18 sometimes, and yet they were not successful.

19 DR. SUTCLIFFE: Right. You know, that's a
20 really great question, and actually there's a lot of
21 research that's developing on that right now, not
22 necessarily directly related to leaders but related to
23 taking stars, for example, star financial analysts and
24 taking them from one organization and putting them in
25 another where they fail. And so I think there's a role

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 to the context that really -- and maybe this goes back
2 to what Professor Meshkati was talking about, you know,
3 that you've got this bottom-up, top-down kinds of thing
4 going on and that there is -- the context matters.

5 So I don't believe that you can just take a
6 leader, and, you know, any leader, and transplant them,
7 and that they will be successful because there's a lot
8 of reasons, there's a lot of contextual reasons, a lot
9 of infrastructure things, a lot of what they learned in
10 that particular organization that makes them successful,
11 and, you know, sometimes people can be adaptable, but
12 sometimes I would say that leaders kind of take a
13 mindset that they have from one organization, take it to
14 the other, and that is a totally different culture that
15 they're entering.

16 You know, at the same time, I think you raise a
17 really important point because, you know, in order to be
18 credible, leaders have to kind of look like the people
19 that they're joining, but at the same time, they want
20 you to know -- generally organizations hire new leaders
21 because they want them to do different things, and so
22 you've also got to do different things, but, you there,
23 there has to be some kind of balance there, if you're
24 kind of -- if I'm making sense.

25 DR. WINOKUR: You are. I mean, so the skills

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 have to kind of be aligned to the organization. You
2 need to be the right person for the organization at that
3 time, and I think what you're saying is there's no
4 universal leader. There's no super-universal leader out
5 there who can just do anything, who could head a naval
6 reactors program and then necessarily turn around and
7 run the Department of Energy or turn around and run
8 Apple Computer. I mean, it's not likely to happen,
9 right?

10 DR. SUTCLIFFE: Yes, I agree with you, and I
11 also think about equifinality, that there are many ways
12 to the same end, so I think that's important to think
13 about, too.

14 If I can add on one thing to your question
15 though, and that is that that isn't to say that
16 outsiders aren't useful to organizations because I think
17 organizations can use outsiders in very valuable ways.
18 I mean, other people bring new insight to organizations,
19 new ways of doing things.

20 In fact, Jim March, who is a brilliant
21 organization theorist from Stanford University, you
22 know, he talks about the value of slow learners in
23 organizations, meaning when new people come into an
24 organization and they don't adapt to the culture right
25 away, that that's a good thing, and that because --

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 because what it does is it leads organizations to
2 question some of their assumptions and some of what
3 they've been doing. So it's a way to introduce new ways
4 of doing things.

5 DR. WINOKUR: So the other thing I've been
6 struggling with today is to try to understand whether or
7 not the culture of safety of one organization can be
8 transplanted to another. And that's why the Navy is so
9 valuable to us because they are so capable at what they
10 do, I think they are, and they have built a very good
11 culture of safety, maybe even, you know, really
12 outstanding in the submarine forces. And, you know,
13 could that culture be transplanted to a very different
14 diverse organization, which is how I view the Department
15 of Energy, or maybe some other organization that's also
16 complex? How do you do that? Can it be done? So, can
17 it be done?

18 DR. SUTCLIFFE: If you took all of those same
19 people and all the things they were doing and
20 everything, maybe, but, no, I don't think so. I mean,
21 my own view of culture is that organizations are
22 cultures, and so I don't think you can transplant them.
23 If you're thinking about transplanting, though, or if
24 you're thinking about benchmarking or best practices or
25 thinking about taking of adapting or adopting another

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 organization's safety management system or, you know,
2 practices, you might be able to do that. But the way
3 that I understand culture, it is the organization. The
4 organization is a culture.

5 I mean, you know, and it's an interesting way of
6 thinking about it. People talk about organizations
7 having cultures or organizations are cultures, and I
8 think that they're both -- that, you know, through
9 the -- I mean, if you think about what I talked about
10 with respect to enabling, through the routines, the
11 daily routines and practices, through the training
12 systems, through the kinds of education people have,
13 through the daily experiences that they have, that is
14 how culture is shaped and built and that means that then
15 we are a culture. And there are multiple -- I mean, I
16 think today we heard multiple times that no organization
17 has one single integrated culture.

18 I mean, there are oftentimes -- there may be
19 some values and norms and ideas and beliefs that are
20 similar across the whole organization, but they're
21 definitely subcultures within any organization.

22 DR. WINOKUR: I mean, the way I think about it
23 in an analogy is that we're a democracy in America, but
24 transplanting democracy to the Middle East is not the
25 same thing. Democracy does not -- is never going to

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 look the same in the Middle East as it does in America.
2 There's no way to transplant our system, per se, into
3 their culture.

4 DR. SUTCLIFFE: No, because they have a culture.

5 DR. WINOKUR: That's right.

6 DR. SUTCLIFFE: I mean, they are a culture
7 already, yes. So you can't transfer it. Yeah, I just
8 don't think about it that way.

9 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you. Appreciate it.

10 DR. SUTCLIFFE: You're welcome.

11 DR. WINOKUR: Ms. Roberson?

12 MS. ROBERSON: I don't think I have any
13 questions.

14 DR. WINOKUR: You don't? Mr. Sullivan?

15 MR. SULLIVAN: So I would just like to ask our
16 standard question, whether you have any suggestions for
17 us other than I heard we need to read the book "Quiet"?
18 Do you have any other suggestions?

19 DR. SUTCLIFFE: Oh, I can give you lots, no.
20 Yeah, you have asked the question before about, you
21 know, how if we have suggestions -- and I don't want
22 to -- I guess I would go back to Admiral Eccles'
23 comments this morning and I think Mr. Mark talked about
24 this, too, is that I'm not quite sure about your
25 relationship with the DNFSB. Oh, no, you are the DNFSB

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 -- with the DOE. But two things, I do have two
2 thoughts, though, you can see I have many thoughts.

3 One is that just by doing this I think it's a
4 signal, and it is a signal that safety is important, and
5 so I think that's important, just by itself.

6 I think the second thing is that I would be
7 thinking about -- you know, you talked today about
8 metrics and ways to assess safety culture, and if I
9 could say anything, I would say that we need a myriad of
10 ways to assess culture, that it's not just a safety
11 survey. Surveys are important to assess the safety
12 climate. I mean, surveys are a good -- you know, a good
13 indicator of the surface culture, but I think you've got
14 to think about other things.

15 And, so, I guess I would be thinking about how
16 you can give the DOE more tools to not only assess but
17 to evaluate because what do they do with the data then?
18 So, you know, are there ways that you can help them
19 figure out, Well, you know, what does this all mean, and
20 then also, you know, what are they going to do about it
21 because sometimes we do these assessments but then we
22 don't go further. And I think change -- and I know, Ms.
23 Roberson, you brought change up a couple times, you
24 know, change, and I've taught change to executive MBA
25 students for the last 20 years at Michigan before I

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 joined Hopkins, and it's darn hard.

2 And I've studied change, and, you know, it
3 takes -- it can take a long time, especially in open
4 systems. In closed systems where you have more control
5 over things, and I think Admiral Eccles made this point
6 this morning -- that in closed systems it might be more
7 easy to make change, but in open systems that are more
8 complex, it's really hard. And I'll end on that note.

9 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you.

10 DR. SUTCLIFFE: You're welcome.

11 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you. I want to thank you,
12 Dr. Sutcliffe. I want to thank all three panelists, Mr.
13 Griffon, Dr. Meshkati, Dr. Sutcliffe for your valuable
14 insights into the role of the leaders in organizations
15 conducting hazardous operations.

16 At this time, it's the Board's practice as
17 stated in the Federal Register notice to welcome
18 comments from interested members of the public. Once
19 again, I understand there are no -- nobody has signed up
20 to make a public comment. I want to turn to the
21 audience now and ask if anybody would like to make a
22 comment.

23 All right, seeing none, I'm going to turn to the
24 Board Members for their closing comments, and then I
25 will end with my comments, so let's begin with Ms.

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 Roberson.

2 MS. ROBERSON: I just want to thank you three
3 for participating. I actually really learned a lot. I
4 enjoyed it greatly, and I'm sure it's going to
5 contribute to our evaluation of any actions we take, so
6 thank you very much.

7 DR. WINOKUR: Mr. Sullivan?

8 MR. SULLIVAN: I just want to thank you all
9 again, and I have two books to read. Mark, you need to
10 pony one up.

11 DR. WINOKUR: Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. Before I
12 comment on this meeting, I'd like to thank our witnesses
13 and their organizations for supporting this meeting, and
14 I want to thank all the members of the public who
15 participated in this meeting. I want to thank any
16 Congressional staffers, whether they're here or
17 listening online, elected officials and other
18 representatives of state and local organizations that
19 were able to find the time to join us today. An active
20 community with engaged leaders is a vital part of any
21 successful program of this nature.

22 The expert witnesses that appeared before us
23 today illustrate the wide recognition that an
24 organization's culture is the key to its ability to
25 conduct hazardous operations safely and reliably. Our

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 first session demonstrated that the Navy clearly has put
2 a significant amount of effort and resources into
3 creating a culture of safety and using that culture to
4 improve its operations.

5 Our second session demonstrated that the quality
6 of an organization's culture has a dominant influence on
7 its ability to successfully conduct hazardous operations
8 and that the organization's leaders have an essential
9 role in establishing and sustaining that culture.

10 Culture is real and culture is really important.
11 And I want to emphasize this, we have also learned that
12 establishing and maintaining a robust culture of safety
13 is not easy. It requires dedication and commitment from
14 all members of the organization, in particular from its
15 senior leaders. Creating a robust culture of safety
16 must not be viewed as another item on a checklist. It
17 is a long, slow journey that never ends, and there are
18 many side roads that can easily mislead the unaware.

19 Finally, culture is unique to an organization.
20 A culture cannot be transplanted from one organization
21 to another. The Navy's culture is not the same as the
22 National Aeronautic and Space Administration's or the
23 Department of Energy's culture. The organizations and
24 missions are very different, and consequently the
25 cultures that develop to satisfy those missions are also

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 very different.

2 Hopefully one can identify those attributes of a
3 culture that makes it safer and embed those attributes
4 into other cultures. Those basic attributes may apply
5 across all organizations, but the devil is in the
6 details, and those details may vary widely.

7 Our goal for the first two meetings in this
8 series has been to learn about how different
9 organizations create, sustain and implement the robust
10 culture of safety.

11 Our goal for the next meeting in this series is
12 to discuss with the Department of Energy how this
13 understanding may be applied to its organization and
14 activities as we continue in our joint journey to
15 improve and sustain the safety of the Department of
16 Energy's Defense Nuclear Facilities.

17 I look forward to those discussions, and I hope
18 that all of you will join us then. Once again, I want
19 to thank everyone for their participation at this
20 hearing.

21 The record of this proceeding will remain open
22 until September 27, 2014. I would like to reiterate
23 that the Board reserves its right to further schedule
24 and regulate the course of this public meeting and
25 hearing to recess, reconvene, postpone or adjourn this

Safety Culture Public Meeting & Hearing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

8/27/2014

1 public meeting or hearing and to otherwise exercise its
2 authority under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as
3 amended.

4 This concludes the public meeting and hearing of
5 the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. We're now
6 adjourned. Thank you all for attending.

7 (Whereupon, at 5:08 p.m., the hearing was
8 concluded.)

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Linda D. Metcalf, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were recorded by me and reduced to typewriting under my supervision; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were transcribed; and further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

LINDA D. METCALF

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPTIONIST

I, Debra Maheux, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceedings were transcribed by me via audiotape/CD/WAV file and reduced to typewriting under my supervision; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which these proceedings were transcribed; and further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Debra Maheux