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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

Board Public Meeting and Hearing

Thursday, March 22, 2012

Session II

6:00 p.m.

Three Rivers Convention Center

7016 West Grandridge Boulevard

Kennewick, Washington

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DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD )  
BOARD PUBLIC MEETING AND HEARING )

Thursday,

PARTICIPANTS:

- MR. PETER S. WINOKUR, Chairman
- MS. JESSIE H. ROBERSON, Vice Chairman
- DR. JOHN E. MANSFIELD, Board Member
- MR. JOSEPH F. BADER, Board Member
- MR. TIMOTHY J. DWYER, Technical Director
- MR. RICHARD E. TONTODONATO, Deputy Technical Director
- MR. RICHARD A. AZZARO, General Counsel
- MR. RICK SCHAPIRA, Deputy General Counsel
- MR. BRIAN GROSNER, General Manager
- MR. STEVEN STOKES, Group Lead, Nuclear Facility Design & Infrastructure
- MR. WILLIAM LINZAU, DNFSB Hanford Site Representative
- MR. ROBERT QUIRK, DNFSB Hanford Site Representative

ALSO PRESENT:

- (6:30 Panel Discussion)
- MR. WILLIAM ECKROADE, DOE-HSS Principal Deputy Chief for Mission Support Operations
- MR. WILLIAM MILLER, Deputy Director, DOE-HSS Office of Safety and Emergency Management
- (7:15 Panel Discussion)
- MR. FRANK RUSSO, WTP Project Director
- Mr. RICHARD KACICH, WTP Assistant Project Director, Integration
- (8:00 Panel Discussion)
- MR. DAVID HUIZENGA, DOE Senior Advisor for Environmental Management
- MR. JAMES HUTTON, DOE-EM Chief Nuclear Safety Advisor

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ALSO PRESENT (Cont'd)  
  
MR. SCOTT SAMUELSON, DOE Manager of Office of River  
Protection  
  
MR. DALE KNUTSON, DOE Federal Project Director for  
WTP

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P R O C E E D I N G S

CHAIRMAN: Good evening. My name is Peter Winokur and I am the Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. I will preside over this public meeting and hearing.

I would like to introduce my colleagues on the Safety Board. To my immediate right is Ms. Jessie Roberson, the Board's Vice Chairman. To my immediate left is Dr. John Mansfield. Next to him is Mr. Joseph Bader. We four constitute the Board.

The Board's General Counsel, Mr. Richard Azzaro, is seated to my far left. The Board's Deputy Technical Director, Mr. Richard Tontodonato is seated to my far right.

Several members of the Board staff closely involved with oversight of the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities are also here.

Today's meeting and hearing was publicly noticed in the Federal Register on January 5 and March 8, 2012. The meeting and hearing are held open to the public per the provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act. In order to provide timely and accurate information concerning the Board's public and worker health and safety mission throughout the Department of Energy's defense nuclear complex, the Board is recording this

1 proceeding through a verbatim transcript, video  
2 recording, and live video streaming.

3 The transcript, associated documents, public  
4 notice, and video recording will be available for viewing  
5 in our public reading room in Washington, DC. In  
6 addition, an archived copy of the video recording will be  
7 available through our website for at least 60 days.

8 Per the Board's practice and as stated in the  
9 Federal Register notice, we will welcome comments from  
10 interested members of the public at the conclusion of  
11 testimony, at approximately 8:30 p.m. this evening.

12 A list of speakers who have contacted the Board  
13 is posted at the entrance to this room. We have  
14 generally listed the speakers in the order in which they  
15 contacted us or, if possible, when they wished to speak.  
16 I will call the speakers in this order and ask that  
17 speakers state their name and title at the beginning of  
18 their presentation.

19 There is also a table at the entrance to this  
20 room with a sign-up sheet for members of the public who  
21 wish to make a presentation, but did not have an  
22 opportunity to notify us ahead of time. They will follow  
23 those who have already registered with us in the order in  
24 which they have signed up.

25 To give everyone wishing to make a presentation

1 an equal opportunity, we ask speakers to limit their  
2 original presentations to five minutes. The Chair will  
3 then give consideration for additional comments should  
4 time permit.

5 Presentations should be limited to comments,  
6 technical information, or data concerning the subjects of  
7 this public meeting and hearing. The Board Members may  
8 question anyone making a presentation to the extent  
9 deemed appropriate.

10 The record of this proceeding will remain open  
11 until June 23, 2012. I would like to reiterate that the  
12 Board reserves its right to further schedule and regulate  
13 the course of this meeting and hearing to recess,  
14 reconvene, postpone, or adjourn this meeting and hearing,  
15 and to otherwise exercise its authority under the Atomic  
16 Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

17 The Board's statutory charter is to ensure the  
18 adequate protection of the public health and safety,  
19 including safety of the workers. In the case of the  
20 Waste Treatment Plant, however, this statutory charge is  
21 made more complex because we are not just concerned about  
22 whether this plant can operate safely, we are also  
23 concerned about whether the plant is fully capable of  
24 processing the large volume of toxic and radioactive  
25 wastes now stored in underground tanks at Hanford. The

1 oldest tanks, which were built with a 20-year design  
2 life, date back to World War II and will be almost 100  
3 years old by the end of the projected treatment mission.  
4 The Board has therefore inquired into many issues that  
5 involve a mixture of accident risk and the ability to  
6 reduce risks posed by continued storage in Hanford's tank  
7 farms due to potential performance limitations of the  
8 Waste Treatment Plant.

9           The Board recognizes that the Waste Treatment  
10 Plant serves a vital function in the cleanup of the  
11 Hanford Reservation, and that it is important to get the  
12 plant operational. However, the Board also recognizes  
13 that the Department's decision to pursue a design-build,  
14 fast-track approach for this project involves potentially  
15 greater risk than would a traditional design and  
16 construction approach. What concerns the Board are the  
17 Department's decisions to continue design and  
18 construction of the plant when there are many major  
19 unresolved technical issues that can impact not only  
20 safety-related controls needed to protect the public and  
21 workers, but also the reliability and capability of a  
22 plant that must operate safely for decades.

23           Once the plant is operating and processing  
24 radioactive waste, options for physical changes in  
25 process cells will be extremely limited, costly, and



1 likely to expose workers to hazardous situations. To the  
2 maximum extent possible, solutions to design and  
3 operational issues must be accommodated before  
4 commissioning. A learn-as-we-go operating philosophy is  
5 not prudent or safe for this facility.

6 The Board held a hearing at Hanford in October  
7 2010 to better understand the project's progress towards  
8 resolving technical issues dealing with mixing, hydrogen  
9 control, and safety basis development. The Board's  
10 evaluation of the technical issues was broadened in the  
11 summer of 2010 to include an investigation into the  
12 project's safety culture after the Board received a  
13 letter from Dr. Walter Tamosaitis, a former engineering  
14 manager for the project. In his letter, Dr. Tamosaitis  
15 alleged that he was removed from the project because he  
16 identified technical issues that in his view could affect  
17 safety. He further alleged that there was a flawed  
18 safety culture at the project.

19 The Board's investigation concluded that the  
20 Waste Treatment Plant project suffered from serious  
21 problems in safety culture and in the management of  
22 safety issues. As a result, the Board issued  
23 Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste  
24 Treatment and Immobilization Plant, on June 9, 2011,  
25 identifying the need for prompt, major improvement in the

1 safety culture of the project. From the Board's  
2 perspective, the "flawed" safety culture at the Waste  
3 Treatment Plant is an indicator that significant  
4 organizational weaknesses may be adversely impacting the  
5 project's ability to identify, address, and resolve  
6 critical technical issues which directly impact the  
7 ability of the plant to treat waste safely and  
8 efficiently. The Department of Energy accepted the  
9 Board's Recommendation and is executing a plan to fully  
10 characterize and address problems in safety culture at  
11 the Waste Treatment Plant.

12 The Board called this public hearing and meeting  
13 to receive testimony from the Department of Energy and  
14 its contractors concerning several issues that are  
15 central to the success of the Waste Treatment Plant  
16 project. During the session earlier today we received  
17 testimony on: (1) the significance of the timely  
18 integration of safety into the Waste Treatment Plant's  
19 design and (2) the relationship between the resolution of  
20 safety issues and the development of a sound nuclear  
21 safety strategy. In this evening's session, we will  
22 receive testimony concerning the Department of Energy's  
23 progress towards implementing the Board's Recommendation  
24 on fixing flaws in the project's safety culture, which is  
25 closely tied to the project's ability to resolve

1 technical issues like erosion/corrosion and pulse jet  
2 mixing discussed during this afternoon's session.

3           There are four fundamental things to remember  
4 about organizational culture that guide us. First,  
5 culture is a learned behavior, and it characterizes how  
6 the group will respond to both internal and external  
7 influences. On this project, internal tensions between  
8 the organizations responsible for completing the design  
9 and the organizations responsible for the nuclear safety  
10 basis are well documented and need prompt resolution.  
11 External influences must be viewed as value added and  
12 leveraged to improve the project's execution, which is a  
13 key to a learning organization. Second, the group's  
14 leaders are the designers, modelers, and teachers of the  
15 culture. It's what the leaders say and do that matters.  
16 It isn't enough to say safety is an overriding priority  
17 on a project. Such pronouncements quickly ring hollow if  
18 subsequent actions demonstrate otherwise. Third, one  
19 evaluates culture by looking at what a group actually  
20 does versus what the group claims to believe. Fourth,  
21 peer pressure within the group is what maintains the  
22 culture.

23           We will begin this session by receiving  
24 testimony concerning actions that the DOE is taking to  
25 understand the cultural issues at WTP and to implement

1 the steps necessary to improve the work environment. The  
2 Board will explore the findings and recommendations of  
3 DOE's Office of Health, Safety and Security's Independent  
4 Oversight Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture and  
5 Management of Nuclear Safety Concerns at the Hanford Site  
6 Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, which was  
7 issued in January of this year. It is vital that the  
8 Department ensures that all WTP workers know that their  
9 safety concerns are valued and that all safety issues are  
10 appropriately identified and will be dispositioned in a  
11 timely fashion.

12 We will then spend some time receiving testimony  
13 from senior project personnel concerning their plans for  
14 improving management and resolution of technical issues,  
15 as well as removing institutional barriers that inhibit  
16 the development of a strong safety culture. Resolving  
17 technical issues and incorporating the resolutions into  
18 the project plans will demonstrate the project's  
19 commitment to both the Department of Energy and its own  
20 workers that they will produce a plant fully capable of  
21 safely meeting its mission objectives.

22 Finally, as the Board tracks DOE's  
23 implementation of Recommendation 2011-1, the Board needs  
24 to understand DOE's assessment of the project's  
25 difficulties in obtaining resolution of safety and

1 technical issues, and the potential risks those  
2 difficulties impose on the ultimate and safe operation of  
3 the plant. As DOE continues to learn from its  
4 experiences with the Waste Treatment Plant project, the  
5 Board encourages DOE to feed those lessons back into its  
6 design and construction projects to avoid the types of  
7 problems encountered at the Waste Treatment Plant.

8 I note that the Board will be continuing this  
9 public meeting in Washington, DC, on May 22, 2012, to  
10 hear from senior Department officials. At that meeting,  
11 the Board will provide those officials with an  
12 opportunity to discuss their approach to addressing the  
13 broader policy and program issues associated with  
14 Recommendation 2011-1 and their efforts to evaluate the  
15 safety culture at the Waste Treatment Plant other design  
16 and construction projects, sites, and programs within  
17 DOE.

18 This concludes my opening remarks.

19 I will now turn to the Board members for their  
20 opening remarks.

21 VICE CHAIRMAN: No thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22 CHAIRMAN: Dr. Mansfield.

23 DR. MANSFIELD: Nothing at this time, sir.

24 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Bader.

25 MR. BADER: No comments at this time, Mr.

1 Chairman.

2 CHAIRMAN: This concludes the Board's opening  
3 remarks for this session. At this time I would like to  
4 invite Mr. David Huizenga, DOE's Senior Advisor for  
5 Environmental Management, to the witness table to provide  
6 a statement on behalf of the Department of Energy.

7 Welcome, Mr. Huizenga. I would ask you -- we'll  
8 take your full written testimony into the record. I  
9 would ask you to limit these comments to about 10  
10 minutes.

11 MR. HUIZENGA: So do we think we got the mics  
12 fixed, Mr. Chairman? Well --

13 CHAIRMAN: We were a little nervous before, to  
14 be frank.

15 MR. HUIZENGA: Well, good evening, Mr. Chairman,  
16 and distinguished members of the Defense Nuclear  
17 Facilities Safety Board. I appreciate the opportunity to  
18 be here today to represent the Department of Energy's  
19 Office of Environmental Management Program and discuss  
20 the important topic of safety culture. I'd like to offer  
21 a few thoughts to set the stage for tonight's session.

22 Nuclear safety has been an integral part of our  
23 vital and urgent mission from its inception. And our  
24 goal is to continuously improve our safety performance.  
25 Our overall approach to nuclear safety is further

1 articulated in DOE's nuclear safety policy. We are  
2 firmly committed to this policy and expect a similar  
3 commitment from all DOE employees, contractors and  
4 partners. DOE is committed to a strong and sustained  
5 safety culture where all employees are energetically  
6 pursuing the safe performance of work, encouraging and  
7 questioning work environment and making sure that  
8 executing the mission safely is not just a policy  
9 statement but a value shared by all. A positive safety  
10 culture is an integral aspect of an effective integrated  
11 safety management system.

12 DOE defines safety culture in the Department's  
13 integrated safety management system guide as safety  
14 culture is an organizations values and behaviors modeled  
15 by its leaders and internalized by its members which  
16 serve to make safe performance of work the overriding  
17 priority to protect the workers, public and the  
18 environment. These words are important. Behaviors  
19 modeled by its leaders, organizational safety culture is  
20 in large part as you said a product of the behaviors of  
21 management.

22 The organizational safety culture is the  
23 environment in which the integrated safety management  
24 system is implemented and work takes place. I want to  
25 make it clear that safe performance of work is the

1 overriding priority in the office of environmental  
2 management and it is a reflection of leadership starting  
3 with me. It's not a priority, it's not an overriding  
4 priority, but the overriding priority.

5 I take these concepts seriously. In this venue  
6 I am focused on three things: Instilling and holding  
7 managers accountable for leadership behaviors that foster  
8 a strong safety culture and driving these behaviors all  
9 the way down through the EM headquarters and field  
10 organizations. Ensuring line managers encourage a  
11 vigorous questioning attitude towards safety and  
12 fostering constructive dialogues and discussions on  
13 safety matters. Establishing a high level of trust in  
14 which individuals feel safe from reprisal when raising  
15 safety concerns. Differing points of view are solicited  
16 and encouraged, management provides relevant and timely  
17 information to the workforce and vigorous corrective  
18 action programs are effectively implemented.

19 I would note that the actions within the  
20 Department's implementation plan for Board recommendation  
21 plan 2011-1 develop and deliver training to senior  
22 contractor and DOE managers that will assist leaders in  
23 creating an open and collaborative work environment.

24 Turning specifically to recommendation 11-1, the  
25 Department's response team for the recommendation



1 reviewed a wide variety of materials and reference  
2 documents related to the safety culture topic, including  
3 those recommended by the Board in your letter to the  
4 secretary of June 30 of 2011. In doing so, the response  
5 team identified underlying causes it believes led to the  
6 findings and concerns stated in your recommendation.

7           The response teams review found that some  
8 technical staff at WTP hesitate to raise safety or  
9 technical concerns that might affect project schedule or  
10 costs believing their managers may not support them or  
11 find the resolution process too difficult or too lengthy.  
12 Some staff also believe the employee concerns program, or  
13 ECP, as we would refer to it, has been effective in  
14 management actions and implementing the ECP have reduced  
15 its value and credibility. These observations indicate  
16 weakness in the safety conscious work environment.

17           I'd like to discuss the underling causes we  
18 identified in our implementation plan. First,  
19 departmental expectations for implementation of the  
20 safety culture concept at nuclear facilities were not  
21 developed. In other words, there's a need to do a better  
22 job of converting high level policy expectations for a  
23 strong safety culture into detailed guidance for  
24 implementation of those expectations.

25           A strong safety culture is expected by the DOE's

1 nuclear safety policy and our worker safety rule and  
2 integrated safety management policy. There is a need for  
3 better implementation and dissemination of the safety  
4 culture concept. That employees not only have the right  
5 to raise concerns but also the responsibility to raise  
6 concerns and that they can do so without fear of  
7 retaliation is a message that DOE and its contractors  
8 must constantly reinforce.

9           Second, DOE and contractor management did not  
10 adequately mitigate the unintended impact on the safety  
11 conscious work environment that occurred as the WTP  
12 project shifted from the research and design phase to be  
13 more focused on construction and commissioning. We  
14 discussed this in the afternoon session that the WTP  
15 contract awarded in 2001 is a concurrent design build  
16 contract.

17           In a sense, the convergence of design completion  
18 and the project construction schedules is manageable but  
19 inherently creates additional complexity and tension  
20 between organizational elements assigned to resolve  
21 technical issues and those responsible for schedule and  
22 cost goals. This tension contributed to management  
23 behaviors detrimental to safety conscious work  
24 environment. Thus, the WTP contracting strategy had an  
25 unintended impact on WTP safety culture.

1           One of the highest ISMS guidance principles is  
2 balance priorities. The response team observed that the  
3 WTP contract incentives cost and schedule performance and  
4 project milestones was focused on this. The performance  
5 measures reported to headquarters and contract  
6 performance incentives focused there but do not do enough  
7 to reinforce the safety culture.

8           Third, DOE and contractor management require  
9 more knowledge and awareness of safety culture. Some  
10 managers need more knowledge and awareness of the overall  
11 topic. Managers must thoroughly understand the value and  
12 value elements such as the differing professional opinion  
13 process, the employee concerns program, the treatment of  
14 staff who raise issues and concerns. Federal and  
15 contractor managers have not generally been required to  
16 have specific training on management roles and  
17 responsibilities for safety culture attributes, behaviors  
18 and expectations. Moreover, the managers performance  
19 plans do not always include specific measures for meeting  
20 safety cultures expectations.

21           And fourth, technical issue resolution and  
22 communication of results at WTP are sometimes inefficient  
23 and ineffective. The response team found three areas in  
24 which WTP's resolution process needs improvement. First  
25 some personal perceived -- some personnel perceived

1 pressure from managers not to submit issues into the  
2 resolution process. Second, after the issues were  
3 submitted, the issue resolution process sometimes took  
4 too long to disposition. And third, after issues were  
5 resolved managers did not always effectively communicate  
6 the decisions and the basis to the technical staff.  
7 These underlying causes combined to negatively impact the  
8 safety culture at WTP.

9 I'd like to briefly turn to the recent HSS  
10 review of WTP safety culture, which I know we'll be  
11 speaking more about later on. EM and ORP have reviewed  
12 the HSS report and accept the report recommendations. We  
13 will take timely and appropriate action to address the  
14 findings and other deficiencies in the report that are  
15 directed at the federal workforce and will ensure that  
16 Bechtel develops and implements meaningful and responsive  
17 corrective actions as well.

18 To promote constructive dialogue and gain a  
19 better understanding of the issues, I recently joined  
20 Scott Samuelson and Federal Project Director Dale  
21 Knutson, Matt Moury and Jim Hutton of my staff to meet  
22 with some of the DOE and contractor individuals that have  
23 raised safety issues and voiced concerns. We were able  
24 to do this on a recent trip that I made out here a couple  
25 weeks ago.

1           I found these individuals to be highly motivated  
2           and to contribute to the success of the WTP projet. They  
3           presented detailed information regarding some of the  
4           issues we discussed earlier today such as erosion and  
5           corrosion and the ability of the pretreatment facility to  
6           safely process waste. They presented concepts they had  
7           developed that may help us to address these issues and  
8           may help ensure safe operation and the success of the  
9           WTP. I found this information compelling, believe it may  
10          have merit and have directed the ORP staff to review the  
11          concepts and develop an approach to maturing these ideas  
12          for further consideration.

13                 I believe these kinds of positive discussions  
14                 are central to nurturing a strong safety culture. Model  
15                 appropriate management behaviors to engender a strong  
16                 safety culture and also hold promise to help us resolve  
17                 the technical issues that we're dealing with at WTP. We  
18                 are now focused on developing and implementing corrective  
19                 actions in response to the issues and recommendations in  
20                 the HSS report. The DOE oversight will ensure that BNI  
21                 corrective action plan for the HSS report is fully  
22                 responsive, comprehensive and effectively implemented.  
23                 DOE will provide the Bechtel corrective action plan to  
24                 the Board following our DOE review.

25                 Second, consistent with an ISMS guiding

1 principle of clear roles and responsibilities, EM has  
2 revised the project execution plan for the WTP to be  
3 similar to other EM management acquisition plans -- major  
4 acquisition plans, excuse me, and to more clearly  
5 describe roles and responsibilities within the WTP  
6 project organization and supporting elements from the ORP  
7 and the Richland operations office.

8 Third, ORP has directed Bechtel to amend the  
9 nuclear safety quality culture plan to assure it responds  
10 to issues from the most recent HSS report and relevant  
11 issues from the external assessment that they conducted.  
12 The ORP will revise the Bechtel contract performance  
13 evaluation plan and project performance measures to  
14 achieve balance, priorities and include safety culture  
15 elements. ORP will review the Bechtel WTP contract and  
16 implement appropriate mechanisms to achieve balance,  
17 priorities and include safety culture elements.

18 And fourth, ORP will prepare an action plan  
19 formally documenting DOE's responses to the HSS report.  
20 The action plan will include federal actions to improve  
21 accountability for a strong WTP safety culture such as  
22 changes to management, employees performance plans. ORP  
23 will solicit involvement of federal employees and their  
24 union representatives in preparing the action plan.

25 The Department of Energy and Bechtel plans will

1 be discussed at the Board's public meeting scheduled for  
2 May 22nd, as you referred.

3 In summary, we understand the critical role that  
4 a robust safety culture plays in an effective integrated  
5 safety management system. We know we need to strengthen  
6 our safety culture and we're making progress by taking  
7 actions to identify where weaknesses exist and to  
8 implement necessary corrective actions. We recognize  
9 that changing culture will not occur overnight, it will  
10 require sustained effort by senior managers to develop or  
11 improve the mechanisms and processes necessary to  
12 facilitate a strong safety culture and to reinforce the  
13 behaviors we want our leaders and employees to  
14 demonstrate. The Department is committed to this effort.

15 I will have to say just in closing, Mr.  
16 Chairman, and others that I found the discussion this  
17 afternoon very encouraging in the sense that I think I  
18 heard a good dialogue amongst our own team and with the  
19 Board. And I appreciate the opportunity for that to have  
20 taken place. Thank you.

21 CHAIRMAN: We appreciate your comments very  
22 much, Mr. Huizenga. Thank you.

23 Before we hear from the Board staff, at this  
24 time I would like to enter into the hearing record the  
25 following reports, which the Board will be discussing the

1 evening. One, the DOE Office of Health Safety and  
2 Security Independent Review of Nuclear Safety Culture  
3 dated October 2010; two, the Pillsbury Assessment of the  
4 Safety Conscience Work Environment at the Hanford Waste  
5 Treatment Plant; three, the Independent Safety and  
6 Quality Culture Assessment Team Report on assessments and  
7 recommendations for improving the safety and quality  
8 culture at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization  
9 Plant dated November 30, 2011; and four, the DOE Office  
10 of Health Safety and Security Report on Independent  
11 Oversight Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture and  
12 Management of Nuclear Safety Concerns at the Waste  
13 Treatment and Immobilization Plant dated January 2012.

14 Now the Board would like to recognize Richard  
15 Tontodonato, who is the Deputy Technical Director for our  
16 staff. He is going to briefly review the status on DOE's  
17 implementation of Recommendation 2011-1, set the stage  
18 for the panel discussions to follow.

19 Mr. Tontodonato, please proceed with your statement.

20 MR. TONTODONATO: Thank you, Chairman Winokur. For  
21 the record, my name is Richard Tontodonato, and I'm  
22 Deputy Technical Director for the staff of the Defense  
23 Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. My purpose here is to  
24 set up tonight's discussions. I will summarize the  
25 actions that the Department of Energy has taken to date



1 in response to the Board's Recommendation 2011-1 on  
2 safety culture at the Hanford Waste Treatment and  
3 Immobilization Plant, and describe the Department's plan  
4 to fully implement the recommendation.

5 As the Chairman said, the Board issued  
6 Recommendation 2011-1 on June 9, 2011, identifying the  
7 need for prompt, major improvement in the safety culture  
8 of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant project.  
9 The Secretary of Energy accepted the Board's  
10 Recommendation. Furthermore, Secretary Chu signaled his  
11 recognition of the importance of the recommendation by  
12 designating the Deputy Secretary of Energy, Mr. Daniel  
13 Poneman, as the Responsible Manager. The Board has  
14 designated its Vice Chair, Ms. Jessie Roberson, as its  
15 lead for the recommendation, to work directly with the  
16 Deputy Secretary.

17 The Secretary of Energy initiated actions in  
18 response to Recommendation 2011-1 even before the  
19 Department finalized its formal implementation plan. One  
20 very significant action was accomplished on December 5,  
21 2011, when Secretary Chu and Deputy Secretary Poneman  
22 issued a memorandum to the heads of all Department of  
23 Energy elements. The memorandum described their  
24 expectations for nuclear safety in the Department,  
25 including roles and responsibilities, safety culture,

1 standards and directives, and Integrated Safety  
2 Management. The memorandum clearly stated their  
3 commitment, which I will quote directly here, "to a  
4 strong and sustained safety culture, where all employees  
5 - from workers with shovels in the ground to their  
6 managers all the way up to the Secretary and everyone in  
7 between - are energetically pursuing the safe performance  
8 of work, encouraging a questioning work environment, and  
9 making sure that executing the mission safely is not just  
10 a policy statement but a value shared by all."

11           Additionally, in parallel with developing its  
12 implementation plan for the recommendation, the  
13 Department began a major independent assessment of safety  
14 culture and the management of safety concerns at the  
15 Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant project. DOE's  
16 Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) performed  
17 this review, assisted by external independent experts in  
18 safety culture and a specialist in group dynamics and  
19 focus groups. The HSS team issued their report in  
20 January. It provides substantial insight into the  
21 project's safety culture, its management of safety  
22 issues, and the relationship between the two. The report  
23 gives an extensive list of conclusions and recommends  
24 numerous specific corrective actions. Both the Deputy  
25 Secretary of Energy and the Department's Acting Assistant

1 Secretary for Environmental Management have specifically  
2 accepted the findings and recommendations of the HSS  
3 report. The first panel of tonight's hearing session  
4 will focus on these findings and recommendations.

5 The Secretary of Energy provided his formal plan  
6 for implementing Recommendation 2011-1 to the Board on  
7 December 27, 2011. The plan includes actions to address  
8 the issues specific to the Waste Treatment and  
9 Immobilization Plant project, including a commitment to  
10 address the findings of the HSS assessment. The plan  
11 also includes important actions to review the project's  
12 contract, performance evaluation plan, and performance  
13 measures and implement appropriate mechanisms to achieve  
14 balanced priorities and include safety culture elements.

15 A validation and effectiveness review for all of  
16 these actions is to be completed by the DOE Office of  
17 Environmental Management by May of next year. The second  
18 and third panels of tonight's hearing session will focus  
19 on the actions being taken by the project contractor and  
20 by DOE in the areas of safety culture and the management  
21 of safety concerns for the project.

22 DOE's plan also includes actions to evaluate  
23 whether similar issues exist elsewhere in DOE defense  
24 nuclear complex. DOE-HSS will perform independent  
25 assessments of five other major design and construction

1 projects including the Uranium Processing Facility  
2 project at the Y-12 National Security Complex. Other  
3 sites, facilities, and DOE-Headquarters offices will use  
4 training and guidance developed under the implementation  
5 plan to perform assessments with oversight by DOE-HSS.  
6 DOE will use the results of the self-assessments to  
7 determine whether to conduct additional independent  
8 reviews.

9           Based on all these assessments, DOE will develop  
10 actions needed for the ongoing management of safety  
11 culture within the DOE defense nuclear facility complex.  
12 One action already included in the implementation plan is  
13 to develop and provide training on safety culture  
14 attributes and management behaviors for key senior  
15 leadership in DOE and its contractors, and to assign the  
16 line organizations to sponsor and conduct training for  
17 other employees. The final actions in DOE's  
18 implementation plan are the development and approval of  
19 site-specific tools to sustain a robust nuclear safety  
20 culture throughout the DOE defense nuclear complex.

21           The first and third panels of tonight's hearing  
22 session will provide an opportunity for the Board and DOE  
23 to discuss the actions that extend beyond the Waste  
24 Treatment and Immobilization Plant project. These topics  
25 will also be a focus of the final session of this hearing

1 to be held on May 22 at the Board's Washington, DC,  
2 office.

3 The Board evaluated DOE's implementation plan  
4 and concluded that it is an acceptable response to the  
5 Board's recommendation. The Board issued a letter to DOE  
6 accepting the implementation plan on March 2, 2012. The  
7 letter included a request and a caution, however. The  
8 Board requested that DOE update the implementation plan  
9 using the information gained from the HSS independent  
10 assessment, since much of that information had yet to be  
11 developed when DOE was formulating the plan. It should  
12 now be possible for DOE to include in the plan a more  
13 specific set of actions to be taken at the Waste  
14 Treatment and Immobilization Plant project.

15 The Board's letter also noted that the findings  
16 of the HSS assessment of the project underscored the need  
17 for independent viewpoints and specialized expertise in  
18 safety culture assessments. This is an important  
19 observation, because DOE's implementation plan relies on  
20 self-assessments to characterize the state of safety  
21 culture from facilities, activities, and on organizations  
22 other than DOE's major construction projects. The  
23 Board's letter cautioned DOE that a broader suite of  
24 independent reviews may be needed if self-assessments do  
25 not prove to be a reliable means of evaluating safety

1 culture.

2 That concludes my testimony. Thank you.

3 CHAIRMAN: Do the Board members have any  
4 questions for Mr. Tontodonato? Seeing none at this time  
5 I'd like to invite the first panel of witnesses from the  
6 Department of Energy's Office of Health, Safety and  
7 Security or HSS to take their seats as I introduce them  
8 for the topic of this panel HSS's assessment on safety  
9 culture at the waste treatment plant. Mr. William  
10 Eckroade, DOE Health Safety and Security Principal Deputy  
11 Chief for Mission Support Operations; and Mr. William  
12 Miller, Deputy Director, DOE Health, Safety and Security  
13 Office of Safety and Emergency Management.

14 The Board will either direct questions to the  
15 panelists or individual -- and to the panel or individual  
16 panelists who will answer them to the best of their  
17 ability. After that initial answer other panelists may  
18 seek recognition by the Chair to supplement the answer as  
19 necessary. If panelists would like to take a question  
20 for the record, the answer to that question will be  
21 entered into the record at the hearing at a later time.

22 Does anyone on the panel wish to submit written  
23 testimony at this time?

24 MR. ECKROADE: I'll submit testimony at the  
25 conclusion of my remarks.

1                   CHAIRMAN: Thank you. We'll certainly accept  
2 that for the record.

3                   I'd like to thank each of you for your testimonies.  
4 With that we'll continue with questions from the board  
5 members to this panel.

6                   Ms. Roberson will begin the questioning.

7                   VICE CHAIRMAN: I'm sorry, Mr. Eckroade, did you  
8 have something you wanted to say to begin with?

9                   MR. ECKROADE: We have prepared statements if  
10 you'd like hear those or we can move right into questions  
11 and answers. It's up to you.

12                   VICE CHAIRMAN: Move into questions.

13                   CHAIRMAN: Okay. Let's move into the questions.

14                   VICE CHAIRMAN: I think we'll probably give you  
15 an opportunity to make those comments along the way I  
16 hope.

17                   Mr. Eckroade, can you tell us who was your on  
18 HSS assessment, the assessment that concluded with a  
19 report in January of this year?

20                   MR. ECKROADE: Sure. As you know, we've done  
21 two assessments and HSS has a standard independent  
22 oversight program that's been longstanding with a good  
23 set of technical expertise. For this safety culture  
24 assessment that was completed in January we supplemented  
25 our normal technical experts with behavioral specialists

1 because we learned in the first review when you use  
2 engineers and scientists who are very good at asking  
3 questions, in individual interviews you don't learn  
4 everything there is to learn. People will tell you  
5 answers to questions but there's other tools and  
6 resources that we found during this review that really  
7 help. So we complimented our normal team with experts  
8 that then helped us use other tools and the methodologies  
9 that were endorsed and utilized by the Nuclear Regulatory  
10 Commission as well as the Commercial Nuclear Industry.  
11 And I think a couple critical things, and these may be  
12 other questions you want to get at, but, you know, these  
13 other tools really, you know, gave us great insights.  
14 And the analogy I have in our first review when you had,  
15 you know, individual interviews we learned people were  
16 comfortable telling us their strong feelings. We don't  
17 have a concern here or we have strong feelings. But we  
18 didn't learn about the middle ground, the uncertainties  
19 we didn't learn about through that mechanism. So the  
20 tools we put in place on the second review were much more  
21 informative.

22 VICE CHAIRMAN: So how did you get to that? How  
23 did you get at that? What kind of tools did you use or  
24 what kind of expertise did you bring that you didn't have  
25 before?



1                   MR. ECKROADE: Sure. Well, the behavioral  
2 specialists that we brought on board, you know, have  
3 decades of experience. Dr. Sonja Haber was the lead  
4 expert. And I will tell you, and hopefully it meets with  
5 the Board's satisfaction, that we are maintaining the  
6 same team that we have used for the WTP effort, you know,  
7 for about the next five projects as far as the extended  
8 condition review.

9                   So we're using the same tools. So the -- a  
10 couple key things with the focus groups. We've learned  
11 that in focus groups as you get peers that are  
12 comfortable with each other, there's no supervisor  
13 relationships, they're peers, there seems to be a  
14 facilitation of discussion in that forum. And so in the  
15 focus groups folks were much more open to describing  
16 their concerns, including things about their  
17 uncertainties. So that format was good. And then we  
18 used a couple of different survey mechanisms that Mr.  
19 Miller would probably be able to describe in much more  
20 detail. Behavior anchored rating scales was a key tool  
21 for us as well as a standard survey that was utilized by  
22 the commercial nuclear industry that gave us quantitative  
23 data perceptions of safety culture attributes by labor  
24 category across the project.

25                   VICE CHAIRMAN: So can you categorize for me

1 your major findings or tell me what your major findings  
2 were by category?

3 MR. ECKROADE: By labor category?

4 VICE CHAIRMAN: No. By your assessment, you  
5 know, as you did your assessment and you categorize your  
6 findings and conclusions, can you give me at that level  
7 is what I'm looking at, not the details.

8 MR. ECKROADE: Right. And I'll ask Mr. Miller  
9 to help me out this point. You know, I'll start with the  
10 issues of safety culture and a safety conscience work  
11 environment.

12 One of the key goals was really to get to the bottom  
13 of how people -- what are the perceptions of the  
14 employees broadly across the project both in the Office  
15 of River Protection as well as BNI and their  
16 subcontractors. And so managers, technical staff,  
17 clerical staff, craft workers, you know, we put them into  
18 focus groups and did a broad survey.

19 And with respect to, you know, the feedback from  
20 those workers we certainly learned that quite a few, you  
21 know, had either strong concerns about their ability to  
22 objectively and freely raise safety issues where they had  
23 concerns about whether they really -- the environment was  
24 right to challenge their management's decisions and so  
25 that gave us a lot better understanding of the scale of

1 the concerns across the employees of the project and the  
2 site office.

3 VICE CHAIRMAN: So safety culture is one. How  
4 about management of safety concerns specifically? Can  
5 you talk about that.

6 MR. ECKROADE: Since our first review, which had  
7 strong conclusions on management of safety issues, we  
8 found during this review that activities had gone on to  
9 try to get at some of those issues. There were some  
10 improvements to kind of look at the mechanisms and there  
11 are many mechanisms to raise safety issues within the  
12 project staff. And so there were some improvements to  
13 re-look at those methods. But ultimately we still found  
14 substantial implementation problems where issues weren't  
15 getting into the systems but once they got in they  
16 typically stayed in, but they weren't always analyzed  
17 fully for causes and communications with the individuals  
18 submitting the issues weren't always kind of closed so  
19 they understood what the issues were.

20 VICE CHAIRMAN: And what about management of  
21 nuclear safety design and safety basis organization?

22 MR. ECKROADE: Sure. One conclusion as I was  
23 working with Bill and his team on developing the report  
24 that really struck me was the clear conflict between the  
25 nuclear safety and environmental organization and the

1 design engineering groups. And this is such a  
2 fundamental issue. As we're dealing with complex  
3 technologies and very difficult issues and an environment  
4 with difficult project schedules and milestones, you  
5 know, not to have the teamwork, you know, working  
6 together to kind of optimize solutions that optimize for  
7 the mission, optimize for safety and budget, it was very  
8 difficult.

9           And so ultimately we found that the issues of  
10 safety basis where the Department's -- the contract  
11 requirements for the safety basis weren't aligned with  
12 the actual practices and the Department standards, which  
13 ultimately contributed to the conflict between the groups  
14 as they're trying to engineer the system to one set of  
15 standards that's in the contract, you know, it is  
16 different than reviewing the safety basis to the  
17 standards of the Department's regulations and directives.

18           VICE CHAIRMAN: So one last question, Mr.  
19 Chairman. So there have been a whole host of reviews,  
20 right? Your earlier review, many, reviews. Where does  
21 your latest review stack up? I mean, what interview is  
22 the overriding assessment and set of findings? Where's  
23 your latest review sit in the hierarchy?

24           MR. ECKROADE: Well, I think one of the things  
25 that we acknowledge in our report is there are a lot of

1 reviews and there are a lot of conclusions and some of  
2 them overlap and some of them don't. We're confident,  
3 based on the expertise we brought in to this team that --  
4 and the methodologies that we utilized in this review  
5 that are validated and tried and true in the commercial  
6 nuclear industry, that the information that we deliver to  
7 the secretary and to the manager of environmental  
8 management is very reliable information and will serve  
9 the Department well moving forward to solve these  
10 problems.

11 CHAIRMAN: Before we go to Dr. Mansfield, I want  
12 to follow up with a few questions. If I heard what you  
13 said, and tell me if this is true. You said that a  
14 person can be an expert in nuclear safety but that does  
15 not make them an expert in nuclear safety culture.

16 MR. ECKROADE: That is true.

17 CHAIRMAN: So I think that's an important thing  
18 for people to keep in mind. I mean, I have studied, a  
19 lot of people in this room have studied culture to some  
20 extent but there is a difference between an engineering  
21 perspective on this thing and somebody who really has a  
22 true understanding of culture and how -- how organization  
23 of culture works. Would you agree with that?

24 MR. ECKROADE: I certainly do. I'll leave it to  
25 my colleague here to -- that's got more experience here.

1                   CHAIRMAN: Mr. Miller.

2                   MR. MILLER: Yes. We clearly agree with that  
3 statement.

4                   CHAIRMAN: In Mr. Huizenga's testimony, which I  
5 appreciated very much, he used the word some, some. And  
6 we heard in the earlier HSS report this thing about  
7 isolated and some. What does the word some mean to you  
8 when you think about your assessment? How does the word  
9 -- how does that impact you in terms of what you're  
10 trying to understand when somebody says some of the  
11 people or a few of the people?

12                  MR. ECKROADE: Well, you know, in many contexts  
13 when you get the word some it doesn't give you a clear  
14 understanding of what the context is. And in this  
15 context of safety culture really the articulation of some  
16 is -- in quantification is a very important factor in  
17 understanding the importance of the issue. So I have to  
18 first say that.

19                  In our first review we used terms pockets of  
20 individuals had concerns because through the regular  
21 interview process, that's what people told us. They  
22 would tell us when they had strong concern.

23                  But what we learned through the different tools  
24 that we applied, the surveys that we had statistical  
25 data, you know, the -- Dr. Haber put this into different

1 categories that she showed in charts. And I was there  
2 when she briefed the Secretary of Energy and the Deputy  
3 Secretary of Energy. It was the first time I had seen  
4 those charts. So what you saw was by labor category, you  
5 know, reds were when they had a strong concern about a  
6 cultural attribute and green was when they had a very  
7 positive view of that attribute. And then the yellow in  
8 the middle was uncertainty about management's  
9 expectations for those attributes.

10 And so when you those charts the term some seems  
11 inadequate. The quantification of these attributes  
12 through these survey methods really provide a powerful  
13 tool for line managers to really understand their safety  
14 culture and give them accurate information about those  
15 groups that they need to take care of more and make more  
16 investment in time so they understand management's true  
17 intent.

18 CHAIRMAN: I'll have more questions later. But  
19 let me go on to Dr. Mansfield now.

20 DR. MANSFIELD: Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I  
21 appreciate your remarks. And I say also that your  
22 description of the four elements of safety, of safety  
23 culture in your opening statement is informative and  
24 describes very well what we have seen here.

25 On the number of or percentage of people that

1 seam to have a problem with the safety culture in the  
2 organization and are maybe hesitant to say it but  
3 eventually do and it shows up that five percent of the  
4 people think that things aren't going well, it is very  
5 easy for management to say, well, it is only five  
6 percent. But I'm going in the hospital for a rotator  
7 cuff next month, and well, five percent of the nurses  
8 think that the doctors are only in it for the money and  
9 five percent of the doctors think that the lab techs are  
10 incompetent, and five percent of the lab techs think that  
11 the nurses are lazy. Should I pick another hospital?  
12 Five percent is a big number. I mean, it is a whopping  
13 number. Any organization that has the -- tolerates five  
14 percent of total distrust of management in its  
15 organizational principles is in a lot of trouble. Thanks  
16 for letting me spout off here. Here's the question I  
17 have for you.

18 CHAIRMAN: Did I have a choice? (Laughter.)

19 DR. MANSFIELD: There are two features of your  
20 HSS report, to my mind, it is well thought out, it is  
21 organic, it holds together very, very well, it is  
22 understandable, it is not just a lot of social science  
23 talk, that's very valuable. It evaluates the  
24 interactions between groups that have built in conflicts  
25 and what that can do, what those interactions can do to



1 the feeling that the organization is working together to  
2 accomplish a safety goal.

3 In particular we talked about two elements of  
4 tension between the contractor, between the safety basis  
5 organization and engineering and within the Office of  
6 River Protection between the task -- the waste treatment  
7 plant manager and the rest of ORP. I think those were --  
8 we can perceive those are strong conflicts. Could you  
9 explain -- was it hard for you to find those out? Dig  
10 that out? Or was this something that stood out to you  
11 from the beginning?

12 MR. MILLER: First of all, for ORP, the office  
13 of ORP, we sponsored our own survey result and so that  
14 survey result gave us very quantitative data on that  
15 conflict. That was pretty apparent by those results.  
16 And also, we did have focus groups that also brought out  
17 that conflict.

18 DR. MANSFIELD: So it was apparent from the  
19 beginning because of the tools that you picked?

20 MR. MILLER: Right.

21 DR. MANSFIELD: That you were getting convincing  
22 answers right away, not just a lot of master's theses.

23 MR. MILLER: Correct.

24 DR. MANSFIELD: Nothing against master's theses.

25 MR. MILLER: Fundamentally that's the strength

1 of this NRC methodology for safety culture.

2 DR. MANSFIELD: You mentioned -- I won't quote  
3 very much. This is a quote from your report. "Although  
4 most of the symptoms are evident within the ENS and  
5 engineering departments, most of the contributing factors  
6 are not there but they're from actions or inactions at  
7 higher levels, both ORP and DOE, WTP and BNI." Could you  
8 describe how you discovered that it was actions or  
9 interactions inattention or attention by the higher  
10 levels that had that formed behavior?

11 MR. MILLER: Yes. One of the major issues of  
12 the conflict between the environment and nuclear safety  
13 organization and engineering design is this conflict with  
14 the standard 3009 implementation. And when we spent time  
15 looking into that and when that occurred, it actually  
16 went back several years. So that's what that statement  
17 is based on is that there was many opportunities over the  
18 years to resolve that issue by senior management and  
19 those opportunities were not successful.

20 DR. MANSFIELD: And has that conflict on  
21 Standard 3009 been resolved or is it just put -- hiding  
22 in the bushes until sometime in the future?

23 MR. MILLER: At the conclusion of our review it  
24 was -- it still existed.

25 DR. MANSFIELD: Is it your opinion the progress

1 was going slowly or has there been a breakthrough both in  
2 the contractor and DOE that they have to solve this  
3 problem?

4 MR. MILLER: Yes. There's -- you know,  
5 actually, our report goes through some of the actions  
6 that they have taken and plan to take. And one of them  
7 is that they need to have a contract revision to actually  
8 implement some of these changes. And they have  
9 identified an integrated strategy to address this  
10 problem.

11 DR. MANSFIELD: Yes. I would say then in  
12 judging from our afternoon session a light bulb has gone  
13 off and people are -- people get it, to a certain extent.  
14 Would you agree with that?

15 MR. MILLER: Yes. Very much.

16 DR. MANSFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 CHAIRMAN: Let me follow up with a couple good  
18 questions. We did have a lot of discussion today about  
19 this tension between the nuclear safety organization and  
20 design organization on this project. And my  
21 understanding is that this tension sometimes exists, it  
22 may have been unusually high, I think it was unusually  
23 high on this project. And we have discussed it. But  
24 you're also talking about a tension here between the  
25 project and the site office. From your experience is

1 that something that you typically see in the Department?

2 MR. MILLER: I'm at a little bit of a  
3 disadvantage because our extended condition review would  
4 kind of give us that extra perspective on the project.  
5 I'm sure that in terms of management of a project that's  
6 unusual.

7 CHAIRMAN: Because the project director does  
8 support -- does report to the site manager.

9 MR. MILLER: Yes. I think the conflict was this  
10 alternate path where he could report directly to the  
11 secretary. And that has initiated some of this conflict  
12 between the two groups.

13 CHAIRMAN: So you think those roles or  
14 responsibilities helped create some of that tension?

15 MR. MILLER: Yes.

16 CHAIRMAN: And that is not typical of a DOE  
17 project; is that true?

18 MR. MILLER: That is correct.

19 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Bader.

20 MR. BADER: Before I get to the question that I  
21 had planned to ask, I wanted to comment and get some  
22 clarification.

23 We're using words "conflict" and "tension." The  
24 words used most this afternoon was tension. I view  
25 tension as something you frequently deal with on a

1 project and if it is, quote, unquote, "healthy tension"  
2 that helps get the job done. Your report and you have  
3 used the word conflict. That to me is an unhealthy  
4 situation. Do you agree with that interpretation.

5 MR. MILLER: Yes, I do. I think the tension  
6 perceived by those involved has gotten to the point where  
7 they do have fear of reporting issues. And so at that  
8 point it is significant.

9 MR. BADER: And whereas a healthy tension is  
10 something that really could facilitate the progress of  
11 the project, this is destructive; is that correct?

12 MR. MILLER: Correct.

13 MR. BADER: Thank you. The earlier session  
14 today focused on several technical issues that could have  
15 significant impact on the project's likelihood of success  
16 and could also require significant time and resources to  
17 address. However, these issues have not been resolved,  
18 as we just discussed, even though they have been known to  
19 exist for a decade or close to a decade. This would  
20 appear to me to be another case of an organization  
21 struggling with competing goals of project completion  
22 versus safety in design. Mr. Miller, did your team  
23 assess the formal goals established by the project's  
24 contract and the methods that DOE is using to incentivize  
25 those goals?

1           MR. MILLER: We did spend sometime looking at  
2 that area but not a lot. We were mainly focused in just  
3 finding out what the true safety culture was using the  
4 NRC methodology.

5           MR. BADER: Would you believe that the  
6 incentivization drives behavior on the part of the  
7 contractor?

8           MR. MILLER: Yes, I would agree with that.

9           MR. ECKROADE: That's why they do it. That's  
10 the whole point, you want an outcome so you incentivize  
11 that outcome.

12          MR. BADER: From your look at the contract, how  
13 much do you -- do you remember roughly how much  
14 incentivization there was for safety?

15          MR. MILLER: No, I don't. I don't have that.

16          MR. BADER: Does the number one percent or less  
17 sound about right? (Laughter.)

18          MR. MILLER: I know it is low but I wouldn't be  
19 able to quote you on actual percentage.

20          MR. ECKROADE: I think it is important to  
21 acknowledge that the implementation plan for the Board  
22 recommendation does, you know, recognize the need to go  
23 back and re-look at the incentive plans and to fix that  
24 issue.

25          MR. BADER: Do I take that as a belief on your

1 part that it is important to do that?

2 MR. ECKROADE: It is.

3 MR. MILLER: Yes.

4 MR. BADER: And that it would be helpful?

5 MR. ECKROADE: Absolutely helpful. And that's  
6 something that I think the extended condition review,  
7 looking at those contracts and seeing, you know, if  
8 that's -- has a correlation with the results from the  
9 surveys and focus groups data, which will be an  
10 interesting exercise. But ultimately we already know  
11 that that's an important area to re-look at as far as  
12 DOE's management practices.

13 MR. BADER: Okay. Thank you.

14 MR. MILLER: I just wanted to mention that there  
15 is a recommendation that related to that in our report.  
16 Although we didn't spend an inordinate amount of time in  
17 that area of reviewing, we do recommendation about  
18 looking at the incentive part of the contract.

19 MR. BADER: Thank you.

20 CHAIRMAN: I have a question too, but I want to  
21 first turn to Ms. Roberson.

22 VICE CHAIRMAN: I have a question. And actually  
23 think it's to both either/or, it matters not. We talk a  
24 lot of about safety culture and it tends to sound like  
25 something very soft, yet earlier today we talked about

1 misalignment between project design and safety strategy.  
2 So we see it as the way it demonstrates itself is  
3 something very hard and very important. I hear a lot of  
4 the terms being used like perception or poor  
5 communication. And I guess in my mind if I perceive  
6 something there's a reason I perceive it. What did your  
7 behavioral specialist advise? In your assessment, did  
8 you consider whether perception was the problem here or  
9 was perception an indicator of something more?

10 MR. MILLER: Well, I mean, this whole safety  
11 culture review is gathering perceptions, that's the key.  
12 What the NRC methodology does is give you a very  
13 systematic measurement to do this via 17 organizational  
14 behaviors. So but you are ultimately trying to get  
15 workers, staff, perceptions of safety, because again,  
16 perceptions become reality. You will use those  
17 perceptions in how you perform your job.

18 VICE CHAIRMAN: Is that the case? Is that what  
19 you guys saw? That whether their perceptions were real  
20 they're impacting what's getting done.

21 MR. MILLER: Yes. So our report is based on  
22 perceptions and we say that a lot in our report, these of  
23 the perceptions we observed.

24 CHAIRMAN: Just about every assessment and we  
25 entered a few of them into the record before we



1 introduced Mr. Tontodonato, talks about the fact that the  
2 project does have a problem resolving technical issues.  
3 And many of these issues have been around for 10 years.  
4 And the Board strongly believes that that's an indication  
5 of a flawed or problematic safety culture. That there's  
6 a very strong link between the safety culture and the  
7 inability to resolve technical issues. Do you agree with  
8 that statement?

9 MR. MILLER: I think there's two parts of it.  
10 We actually spent some time looking at their technical  
11 issues. And currently they're doing a good job of  
12 tracking the issues. And then making sure those come to  
13 conclusion. So I'd rather take the timing out of it. It  
14 is more important that they have the issues identified  
15 and then they take the appropriate time to correct that.  
16 I don't know if that answers your question.

17 CHAIRMAN: So you don't think the fact that  
18 issues drag on for very long periods of time, that might  
19 not be a measure in some way that workers are having a  
20 very difficult time raising technical issues to  
21 management's attention?

22 MR. ECKROADE: Let me actually add, if you don't  
23 mind.

24 CHAIRMAN: Please.

25 MR. ECKROADE: It is a real connection in our

1 report. We do, as Bill mentioned, the goal is to get  
2 perceptions to surveys and focus groups. And we have  
3 really good data on perceptions. But what's driving  
4 those perceptions. And I think our report does a very  
5 good job at digging into some of those things like the  
6 safety issues. And there are examples in our previous  
7 report and this report where processes were not  
8 supporting the users of those systems. And if normal  
9 human beings, if a system's not supporting you, you're  
10 wondering why. Do they not care about my problem? Is it  
11 a low priority. Do they not believe me? Are they going  
12 to do something now to me to retaliate against me for  
13 raising this issue they don't want to seem to deal with.  
14 So yeah, the safety issues is a really big linkage to  
15 safety culture perceptions. We believe that to be to  
16 true.

17 MR. MILLER: I just wanted to comment that I  
18 think the importance is to keep open communication on the  
19 status of the issue throughout the process so that  
20 whoever raised the issue knows the current status and can  
21 understand where it is. It's not necessarily a rush to  
22 get it closed, but to keep the open communication.

23 CHAIRMAN: Well, I said in my opening remarks  
24 based on my understanding of safety culture, it is  
25 important what the leaders say and do. And so when you

1 get into a situation where somebody actually raises a  
2 technical issue but management doesn't respond to it,  
3 that's almost the worst situation. To actually have been  
4 able to feel they could at least raise the issue and then  
5 nothing was done about it and that leads to I think in  
6 the end people not wanting to raise issues in the future  
7 because they just know management's not going to do  
8 anything. So management in that case might be doing a  
9 pretty good talk but there's not very much walk to back  
10 it up. Is that something you'd accept?

11 MR. MILLER: No, I wouldn't.

12 MR. ECKROADE: We wouldn't accept it for the  
13 systems that we look at, but we would accept it as a  
14 conclusion.

15 CHAIRMAN: Okay. All right. Let me get to my  
16 question. That was -- so where should the primary focus  
17 of the corrective actions take place? So now we have a  
18 situation where we have a problem with a safety culture  
19 that you've identified. Do you think these corrective  
20 actions can take place effectively at the contractor  
21 level or do they warrant significant action on the part  
22 of the Department or the Department's leaders?

23 MR. ECKROADE: Well, I think we have heard from  
24 Mr. Huizenga today about the Department's strategies for  
25 moving forward in developing corrective actions, having

1 those reviewed really through the site office and the EM  
2 program office and their commitment to delivering those  
3 to you for your review. Clearly, the entire chain of  
4 command, line managers, are ultimately responsible for  
5 resolving significant safety issues. And for the kind of  
6 issues we're dealing with here, because they have such  
7 significant outcomes, you know, it would be our  
8 expectation that all levels of the line organizations  
9 take their responsibilities seriously for having these  
10 issues resolved.

11 CHAIRMAN: So it would be important for the site  
12 office to have responsibilities as well as headquarters  
13 to have corrective actions at all levels of the  
14 Department, would that be true?

15 MR. ECKROADE: That's true.

16 CHAIRMAN: Okay. One of the other things you  
17 said in your report is that you needed to gather  
18 additional information about the role of headquarters,  
19 line management organizations and safety culture in terms  
20 of being able to address issues at the waste treatment  
21 plant.

22 What do you have in mind in terms of what you're  
23 expecting from the role of headquarters the do in this  
24 process? What does that look like? What role are they  
25 going to play in this process of correcting safety

1 culture problems in this project?

2 MR. MILLER: Well, what you're referring to,  
3 your statement is we're actually going to go and do some  
4 interviewing with the headquarter staff to understand  
5 their safety culture. And so headquarters does play a  
6 role as part of the line management for the project and,  
7 therefore, that's why we want to also review them. So  
8 they're important to safety culture at the project.

9 CHAIRMAN: Do you have any sense if you look at  
10 headquarters versus the site versus the contractor where  
11 the biggest bang for the buck is going to be? What's the  
12 thing that's really going to start to move things in the  
13 right direction? I mean, the Board, for example, has  
14 said that the secretary needs to assert his influence at  
15 the highest levels at the Department of Energy for this  
16 thing to begin to move in the right direction. Do you  
17 think that's a fair statement?

18 MR. MILLER: No. I think the highest level  
19 management needs to push improvements in this area. And  
20 so I would agree with that.

21 CHAIRMAN: I'll have some later, but let me move  
22 on to you, Dr. Mansfield.

23 DR. MANSFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. These  
24 questions are for you, Mr. Eckroade. In your opinion,  
25 might this be a lesson that the Department should learn

1     that it is -- the dealing organization managing a  
2     contract like this should have someone who keeps track of  
3     all of the project issues, the evaluation reports that  
4     have been raised up, and all of the differing  
5     professional opinions, those methods -- mechanisms by  
6     which people raised issues that rose to the imperium and  
7     were never seen again, should somebody track those so  
8     that DOE knows when -- at least when they're being  
9     disposed of so that you don't -- you don't have this  
10    festering situation where people are demoralized by their  
11    PIER's ignored or their DPO's never ruled on.

12           MR. ECKROADE: I appreciate the question. You  
13    know, in a generic question across the Department, which  
14    has a lot of very low-risk industrial type operations and  
15    we have some of the most hazardous operations known to  
16    mankind, so we have the whole range of things. So when  
17    you're dealing in a low hazard environment, the need for  
18    a federal manager to engage on issues may be less  
19    pressing. When you're dealing with higher hazard  
20    operations I think there's ultimately a need for federal  
21    line managers to be informed about what the issues that  
22    are coming up from the workforce, particularly in an  
23    organization that has challenges and is known to have  
24    challenges to me it makes only sense that a deliberate  
25    strategy is put together to monitor the health of that

1 issues management process so that they can determine  
2 whether there's issues that are indeed festering.

3 DR. MANSFIELD: You think such an arrangement  
4 might have helped in the last few years in the Waste  
5 Treatment Plant?

6 MR. ECKROADE: It certainly could not have hurt.

7 DR. MANSFIELD: Do you think there's been a  
8 change now in what the Department's going to expect of  
9 contractors in this situation?

10 MR. ECKROADE: I think there's a lot of learning  
11 that's going. I mean, as an oversight organization have  
12 learned about the approaches to address safety culture.  
13 I think the Department is going to grow in its  
14 capabilities and its focus, as you've heard Mr. Huizenga  
15 speak to. So yes, there's going to be a lot of growth in  
16 our attention to these kind of issues.

17 DR. MANSFIELD: I'm not sure where you would put  
18 this in your incentive program. There is a big chunk of  
19 incentives in this contract and as was mentioned less  
20 than one percent was for environment, safety and health.  
21 Is this something you would incentivize in a contract  
22 somehow?

23 MR. ECKROADE: You know, when I first came to  
24 the Department of Energy in 1989 it was under the Watkins  
25 administration, and one of the things he did to kind of

1 get on top of, you know, kind of the uncertain  
2 environment and safety and health conditions is he  
3 demanded 51 percent of the award fees be environment,  
4 safety and health. And that got everybody's attention.  
5 And ultimately I think it was unnecessary to specify that  
6 uniform across the organization but he sent a message  
7 that this is important. And it led the Department and  
8 Energy on a path to focus its energies on safety,  
9 environment and health issues. And ultimately, we're  
10 better for it.

11 DR. MANSFIELD: And you're coming up to some  
12 large projects like the uranium processing facility.  
13 Will this be an opportunity to structure a contract to  
14 instruct the DOE site management to take advantage of  
15 what you've learned here?

16 MR. ECKROADE: One of the things that is true  
17 and I was at a meeting with the EFCOG board of directors  
18 last week and they are very interested in learning from  
19 our safety culture assessments and want for us to come  
20 and brief their members, you know, as we do each one of  
21 these. And there's not much time between these  
22 assessments so I didn't commit to that. But they would  
23 like to get briefings periodically.

24 So there is an interest in the contractors and  
25 there's an interest in the federal managers of these



1 projects. And I am certain that the kinds of  
2 communication that will continue during the whole extent  
3 of the condition review and I believe afterwards will be  
4 very healthy to share these lessons learned. I can't  
5 predict any specific outcome of Y-12 on how they manage  
6 the projects but I am certain they're paying attention to  
7 what's being learned at WTP.

8 DR. MANSFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Bader.

10 MR. BADER: This is just a small question. My  
11 understanding is that yesterday Mr. Podonsky in his  
12 testimony before Congress was asked a question about the  
13 various safety culture studies that had been performed.  
14 And one of the questions he got on that was which one or  
15 ones should the good Congressman who was asking the  
16 question really focus on. And Mr. Podonsky said that  
17 his 2012 study was the definitive study. I assume you  
18 would agree with that.

19 MR. ECKROADE: I was with Mr. Podonsky, we had  
20 many discussions in advance of that hearing and we  
21 absolutely do agree that our report has a tremendous  
22 amount of information that will be of extreme value to  
23 the Department of Energy.

24 MR. BADER: Thank you.

25 CHAIRMAN: So in summary here, and we do

1 appreciate your testimony, give me your best assessment,  
2 big picture assessment of when you looked at the safety  
3 culture at this project what you found it to be. Just in  
4 very generic terms.

5 MR. MILLER: There's three statements that kind  
6 of summarize it if you'll permit me.

7 CHAIRMAN: Please.

8 MR. MILLER: Overall there's a reluctance to  
9 raise safety concerns at ORP and BNI. And within some  
10 groups at BNI there's a fear of retaliation. The  
11 approach to safety and safety culture, it is highly  
12 proceduralized across WTP and not yet internalized at all  
13 levels of the organization. WT managers do not have a  
14 full appreciation for the current culture or the level of  
15 effort needed to foster a healthy safety culture. I  
16 think those are our overriding conclusions.

17 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. When will you perform  
18 your next assessment of the project to get another  
19 snapshot in time of how it's is proceeding on improving  
20 the safety culture?

21 MR. ECKROADE: We're committed to doing a  
22 followup in 2013. We haven't selected the month but we  
23 want to make sure that enough progress has been reported  
24 to justify the return visit schedule.

25 CHAIRMAN: Any other thing you want to share

1 with the Board? Any other burning insight that you have?  
2 Our time is very brief but is there anything additional  
3 you'd like to say?

4 MR. ECKROADE: No, I will just tell you that we  
5 as an organization, the Department of Energy, you know,  
6 aspire to be a learning organization. The focus on  
7 safety culture over the last few years in the end I  
8 predict will be a great learning opportunity that will  
9 help the Department immensely as we move forward to these  
10 complex projects. So we're focused on it from the Office  
11 of Health, Safety and Security. We have many roles. We  
12 do our oversight role and that's been the subject of  
13 today's discussions. But ultimately as a tool for the  
14 secretary and a tool for the line organizations, you  
15 know, we take the responsibility seriously to help line  
16 organizations be successful in meeting their mission and  
17 their safety goals and you have our commitment that we'll  
18 stay focused on this issue.

19 CHAIRMAN: And Ms. Roberson does have one more  
20 question.

21 VICE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Miller just succinctly cited  
22 your three overriding concerns. I want to make sure  
23 those are as clearly communicated in the statement you're  
24 going to provide for the record. I'm going to ask him to  
25 provide that for the record.

1           MR. ECKROADE: Mr. Miller will provide that for  
2 the record. It is also in our report.

3           VICE CHAIRMAN: Okay. Thank you.

4           CHAIRMAN: I want to thank you both very much.  
5 Appreciate it very much. And I think we'll thank you for  
6 your testimony and we'll move on to the next panel.

7           At this time I'd like to invite the second panel  
8 of witnesses from the Department of Energy's contractor  
9 at the waste treatment plant Bechtel National  
10 Incorporated, or BNI, to take their seats for the topic  
11 of this panel session, BNI's assessment on safety  
12 culture. Like to introduce Mr. Frank Russo, the WTP  
13 project director, and Mr. Richard Kacich, WTP Assistant  
14 Project Director, Integration. The Board will either  
15 direct questions to the panel or other panelists who will  
16 answer them to the best of their ability. After that  
17 initial answer other panelists make seek recognition by  
18 the Chair to supplement the answer as necessary. If  
19 panelist would like to take a question for the record the  
20 answer will be entered into the record of this hearing at  
21 a later time. Does anybody on the panel wish to enter a  
22 statement into the record?

23           MR. RUSSO: No. Thank you.

24           CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much for your  
25 testimonies. We'll continue with questioning. And the

1 first question will be Mr. Bader.

2 MR. BADER: The Deputy Secretary of Energy, Dan  
3 Poneman, and the Department's Acting Assistant Secretary  
4 for Environmental Management, Dave Huizenga, both  
5 accepted in writing the findings and recommendations of  
6 the 2012 report by HSS on safety culture and management  
7 of nuclear safety concerns at the waste treatment plant.  
8 Mr. Russo, do you accept the findings and recommendations  
9 of the report?

10 MR. RUSSO: Yes, I do.

11 MR. BADER: Do you believe that any of the  
12 findings of the HSS assessment reveal the important  
13 factors behind the project's difficulty in resolving  
14 safety and technical issues?

15 MR. RUSSO: A more complex answer but yes, I  
16 believe so.

17 MR. BADER: Do you accept Mr. Podonsky's  
18 statement that his report is the definitive report?

19 MR. RUSSO: What I wrote to my team when his  
20 report came out was that this report had special  
21 importance to us because the HSS understands the complex,  
22 they understand the culture of the complex, they  
23 understand the lessons learned from a lifetime of being  
24 involved in the conflicts. So in my mind it is the  
25 definitive report because it is the one that best

1 understands the context of the issues we're dealing with.

2 MR. BADER: Can you give a -- I assume you've  
3 read the report.

4 MR. RUSSO: Yes.

5 MR. BADER: Can you give a specific example from  
6 the HSS report that you have found particularly helpful?

7 MR. RUSSO: Again, I think the part of the  
8 report that we have to understand and focus on is in  
9 preparing our response how do we ensure that we don't  
10 have unintended consequences. And Sonja Haber was very  
11 helpful in this question about people feeling  
12 uncomfortable raising issues and how do you deal with  
13 that.

14 The Pillsbury report had a similar finding so  
15 I'd like to use that for an illustrative purpose. If you  
16 look at their outlier on their survey the outlier  
17 question was it takes too long to get issues resolved on  
18 this project. It was a full point lower than the next  
19 lowest score. And it stood out and in the analysis it  
20 stood out. And I really wanted to get a sense of  
21 granularity on what that meant. So we did ask the focus  
22 groups without any influence by supervision, just note  
23 takers, what did it mean to you? What do you mean when  
24 you answer that question it takes too long to get issues  
25 resolved? And we got two very actually, three distinct

1 answers. From the craft it was a fundamentally basic  
2 answer of I want a tool and it takes too long to get it.  
3 There's just too much bureaucracy to get from Point A to  
4 Point B to get my tool.

5 But from the technical folks it was a very  
6 enlightening, for me a very enlightening answer because  
7 one group said I have to really persevere to be heard.  
8 Another group said I spend my entire day answering  
9 questions that I thought were answered before.

10 Now, if we don't address both groups in terms of  
11 making it more comfortable for both of them to understand  
12 the nature of their jobs, the unintended consequence for  
13 one or the other would be they're going to feel left out  
14 of the answer and feel that they weren't heard.

15 So, then, I think the most telling thing that  
16 came out of the HSS report was that we have to be  
17 extremely sensitive to what our folks are telling us.  
18 And before we just step off and say we're going to do  
19 this, this and the other anything, it is not a check the  
20 box process. We've got to make sure we really understand  
21 the steps we can take as a management team and as a  
22 complete organization so that we answer everyone's  
23 concerns: The people asking the questions, who think it  
24 takes too much effort to get it out there, and the folks  
25 who are answering the questions who feel it takes too

1 much effort because they have to answer that same  
2 question multiple ways and different times.

3 MR. BADER: Is there any particular area in  
4 the HSS report that you felt you didn't accept or  
5 couldn't accept or had a problem with?

6 MR. RUSSO: No. There's nothing in the HSS  
7 report that I had a problem with. However, I have spent  
8 a lot of time both with that report and the others as  
9 well as the feedback I get from the members of the team.  
10 And I think there's a couple of things again from the  
11 point of making sure we get this right that point out I  
12 think are the major hurdles for making sure we get this  
13 right.

14 We're following a set of processes fundamentally  
15 that exist either in the nuclear industry through NEI  
16 [Nuclear Energy Institute] and INPO or for the most part,  
17 in operating facilities. There have been major  
18 construction jobs, but I would say that WTP is quite  
19 unique for a variety of reasons.

20 So whereas a lot of those organizations are very  
21 stable, our nuclear plant has about a thousand people,  
22 we're very fluid, so we have already had 11,000 people  
23 work on this project and that's to fill the current 2,800  
24 positions roughly.

25 So the techniques that work for a very stable



1 workforce have to be analyzed against what would it take  
2 not just in the technique, I think the techniques are  
3 fine, but in the frequency of application and the  
4 frequency of checking because your workforce is, for very  
5 valid reasons, you know, in a state of turnover. As the  
6 civil folks are finished, they go to their next project.  
7 As the mechanical folks are finished, they go to their  
8 next project. As the units that we have, you heard  
9 earlier, as LBL [Low Activity Waste Facility, Balance of  
10 Facilities, Analytical Laboratory] finishes, those folks  
11 will move on and operation folks will come on. Start up  
12 forks. So what works today has to be reinforced tomorrow  
13 and the next day and the next day and the next day. And  
14 we have to continually keep focused on that the people  
15 we're talking to, both the worker and the supervisor, are  
16 different people and that critical mass is always  
17 evolving.

18 MR. BADER: Did you consider the conflict  
19 between the engineering organization and the  
20 environmental and nuclear safety organization that's  
21 described in the HSS report to be a problem that needed  
22 to be addressed?

23 MR. RUSSO: And yes, for a variety of reasons.  
24 And I think that the primary reason -- and again, I'll  
25 regress for a second, but I want to provide you with as

1 much context as I can. Back in 2001 a decision was made  
2 to do the design of this project in the Tri-Cities. A  
3 typical design build firm would have it in a production  
4 office somewhere other than the community it is being  
5 built. But the decision was well thought out and I felt  
6 an appropriate decision because to the question of Will  
7 you be here? Well, maybe the brand won't be here but the  
8 people will be here. This is their community. They live  
9 here their whole lives. They're passionate about it.

10 Now that passion creates an extremely  
11 interesting dynamic, especially on a project that's  
12 already been 11 years in design and will be many more  
13 years in design. People become, on all sides of the  
14 question, they become very married to their beliefs. And  
15 it relates to the point I made earlier about it is too  
16 hard for me to ask a question if the person you're asking  
17 is very married are they really actively listening. On  
18 the other side, if you're answering the question and you  
19 think you've really got it right are you really willing  
20 to provide the right feedback.

21 So an unintended consequence of doing it in a  
22 place where everyone feels true passion about their work  
23 is the potential for not empowering them to understand,  
24 all of them, that it is okay in a 21st Century nuclear  
25 facility, any 21st Century nuclear facility, and I worked

1 in the 20th Century ones and it's very different, part of  
2 your job is constantly having a questioning attitude.  
3 And if you're answering the question, part of your job,  
4 not a distraction from your job, not something that takes  
5 you away from your work, part of your job is answering  
6 their questions.

7 MR. BADER: Mr. Russo, how do you plan to deal  
8 with this situation going forward?

9 MR. RUSSO: We have already taken some steps,  
10 and again, I want to make sure we get them correct  
11 because I don't want an unintended consequence. First  
12 and foremost is we've brought in Ward Sproat. Ward's  
13 reporting directly to me, he's got experience at Yucca  
14 Mountain in terms of taking the licensing of that  
15 facility and combining it with the production work that  
16 was required to produce the license. We have had a  
17 meeting with our senior management team that Ward  
18 facilitated with the understanding, and this was about 25  
19 of my senior leaders, not just the direct reports but the  
20 next level below my direct reports, because there's a  
21 need that whatever plans we come up with, the senior  
22 leadership teams owns them. You've heard that several  
23 times tonight from others and we absolutely should share  
24 that. If we don't own them, if we can't walk the talk,  
25 then words are very cheap. So we have to get alignment

1 on what is a plan that everyone can own and carry  
2 forward.

3 We are then going to use a process where you  
4 turn change agents into champions so that you empower  
5 them to both make the change and then you recognize them  
6 when they accomplish it. And we have put it into our  
7 measurement plans, our performance measurement plans,  
8 both from a contract point of view and an individual  
9 point of view that ensuring that our culture is  
10 constantly questioning and answering questions is part of  
11 how we assess your value to the project and how we assess  
12 our performance to the government.

13 MR. BADER: Do you feel you've had any successes  
14 yet?

15 MR. RUSSO: I think we've had successes from a  
16 culture point of view yes, I believe we have had some  
17 successes. But I believe that unless you ingrain them  
18 they're short lived. We got last year 1,350 PIERS, so  
19 people wrote PIERS [Project Issues Evaluation Report].  
20 And from the people having to answer to those PIERS it  
21 creates, you know, a tremendous work load. We got to  
22 make them comfortable that that's their job, it's not a  
23 distraction from their job, as I said before.

24 I think the amount of information that's going  
25 into PIERS is much stronger than it was when I first came

1 to the job. I saw PIERs that were 20 pages and I  
2 couldn't quite get to the issue. They're much more crisp  
3 and distinct.

4 We have a PIRB [Performance Improvement Review  
5 Board], which is our PIER review group and that group  
6 seeks to find more than is in the PIER. So, for example,  
7 I saw one a couple of months ago where we had non-manual  
8 in craft violating rad barriers when we were doing  
9 non-destructive examination at night. And it was written  
10 up as a singular issue. But I had also seen other PIERs  
11 when they were violating do not pass through the red  
12 barriers. And basically in some cases ignoring signs  
13 like put on your hearing protection. So I didn't see it  
14 a single Level B PIER that required specific action, I  
15 saw it as something that was systemic and needed to be  
16 reviewed at a systemic level. What's the cultural issue  
17 that is allowing folks to feel comfortable ignoring  
18 posted warnings.

19 MR. BADER: Did you feel you've had any failures  
20 recently?

21 MR. RUSSO: I think whenever folks feel  
22 uncomfortable for whatever reason, and we have heard a  
23 lot of about perception, trusting the tools that are  
24 available within the project and feel the need to go  
25 outside of those tools, we fail.

1 MR. BADER: All right. Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN: I'm going to turn it over to Ms.  
3 Roberson but I have one or two brief questions. Well,  
4 first a statement. I want you to know that we understand  
5 you have a very committed and capable and dedicated  
6 workforce, that's not what this discussion is about. Do  
7 you think the HSS report that came out in 2012 changed  
8 your perceptions of the safety culture on the project?

9 MR. RUSSO: I believe that report was additional  
10 validation of the first report, our own analysis and my  
11 growing understanding of what makes this project unique.  
12 When I came on the project everyone said this is -- I  
13 have been doing this for 45 years. They said this is the  
14 most unique thing you're ever going to go on in your  
15 life. And you don't understand until you've lived it for  
16 a period of time. And again, the complexity of the  
17 technical issues. The fact that if we really are open to  
18 an issue it's going to take longer because there are  
19 things you glean out of the data that weren't gleaned  
20 five years earlier, three years earlier, two years  
21 earlier. And you can either just turn a blind eye to  
22 them or you've got to take them on. Well, that creates  
23 its own set of cultural issues and it creates its own set  
24 of pressures.

25 So yeah, I believe the HSS report and

1 particularly the way Sonja Haber described the process  
2 and the use of the focus group and the freedom it  
3 presented them, I thought that was very informative and  
4 very useful in terms of how I looked at dealing with  
5 these issues.

6 CHAIRMAN: Let me just share an insight that I  
7 hope is helpful to you. We get to see your  
8 communications to your workforce because the minute you  
9 send it out of course it's in the press and everywhere.  
10 They see it in a microsecond, you know, we see it in a  
11 millisecond.

12 MR. RUSSO: I noticed that.

13 CHAIRMAN: And in my opinion you're a leader,  
14 one of the key leaders on this project. And I don't  
15 think from what I read in your communications it really  
16 conveys the message to the workforce that we need to work  
17 on this safety culture and improve it and that we have  
18 problems with this safety culture and we need to improve  
19 it. When I read your messages -- and this is my  
20 opinion -- it says we're really very good and robust in  
21 this safety culture but we can always get better. And  
22 it's a very different perspective. So I'd like you to  
23 just at least consider the message you send to your  
24 workforce, which I have already acknowledged is an  
25 outstanding and committed workforce, and just see if that

1 really conveys the right message to them. You are the  
2 leader and what you tell them is really going to matter.

3 MR. RUSSO: I appreciate that input. Thank you.

4 CHAIRMAN: And I'll turn it over to Ms.  
5 Roberson.

6 VICE CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Mr. Russo, in the  
7 first session we had earlier today we discussed two  
8 technical issues, two significant technical issues facing  
9 the project. In one form or another these issues were --  
10 surfaced early in the project and they remain unresolved  
11 today. They might have wore a different colored dress in  
12 2002 to 2004 and a different color after that, but  
13 essentially they haven't been resolved to the point that  
14 the project can move on. And these are just two in a  
15 larger collection of significant technical issues. You  
16 are the man in charge, what is your assessment as to why,  
17 you know, the reasons you're facing these issues at this  
18 point in time?

19 MR. RUSSO: I would say first and foremost we  
20 talked earlier about design build, and I want to lay a  
21 framework for this answer. I have done design build and  
22 I have done design bid build. And they both carry their  
23 own set of opportunities or ambitions. If you do design  
24 bid build right you have to procure the material or you  
25 have to buy the vendor data. And by the time you get to



1 the builds sometimes those vendors are gone or they've  
2 changed their designs, so there's iterations there.

3 So one or the other in my mind would have a  
4 difference but not a significant one. But what has a  
5 significant difference is R & D design build. And I  
6 think everyone would acknowledge that, certainly in my  
7 company.

8 And I believe with hindsight in the Department  
9 of Energy. The idea was at the time that the waste is  
10 sitting there, the tanks will be 100 years old and the  
11 research and development will just confirm, you know,  
12 beliefs that came out of Sellafield or some of the other  
13 locations. The reality is it wasn't. When you have  
14 research and development design build, the research and  
15 development needs to be done by 20 percent complete  
16 design. There's thousands and thousands of documents  
17 that support that answer. So it isn't. And it isn't for  
18 I think good reasons. I agree with Bill Miller when he  
19 said if you looked at a particle as being what controls  
20 the erosion and then says -- someone says well, no, maybe  
21 it's an agglomeration of particles coming out of that PJM  
22 [Pulse Jet Mixer] and it changes then the calculation you  
23 can either turn a blind eye to it or you can say I've got  
24 to go and look at this again. And I think that is the  
25 underpinning. I fully agree with what you said, culture

1 is getting the technical issues resolved and the  
2 technical issues resolved is culture.

3 But I believe it is important and you said it  
4 and I thank you for that, Dr. Winokur, the folks on this  
5 project are working as good as any team I have ever seen  
6 to get them resolved. And some of them get very  
7 frustrated when a new question comes up because they  
8 don't -- they just want to get it done. It's a human,  
9 you know, sense.

10 And again, our job, my job to take the full  
11 accountability is to make them comfortable that they --  
12 if there's something there that has to be answered, to  
13 answer it. If it is already answered and we're just not  
14 capable of articulating it in the best way, and we have  
15 quite a bit of that, when we're looking at the safety  
16 basis and the design, one of the things that is  
17 absolutely clear to me because I have gone through an  
18 operational readiness review, is when the mat team comes  
19 in I'm going to have to be able to point to a valve and  
20 say, even though I bought it in 2001 I can tell you the  
21 pedigree, I can tell you the material, I can tell you how  
22 it's been maintained. And it is not coming out of my  
23 mouth. It's coming out of an evidence file. And I think  
24 one of the areas where because we have a number of PIERS,  
25 because we have a number of technical issues, we probably

1 haven't put enough focus is development of those evidence  
2 files. So now when we look back at something that was  
3 solved and you look at what well, what's the evidence  
4 file that says it is solved? It's not a trust me  
5 conversation, it can't be because you won't get through  
6 an operational readiness review. We have to do some work  
7 there. So some of this is just reconstituting the  
8 record. When you can't reconstitute the record, then we  
9 have to go back and it is a very valuable lesson learned.

10 VICE CHAIRMAN: So we heard from Mr. Knutson and  
11 Mr. Samuelson about their concern. Do you think some of  
12 these open technical issues can present a risk to plant  
13 commissioning and the ultimate safe operation of the  
14 plant?

15 MR. RUSSO: I don't think we can ever get to a  
16 point where we would ever get to a DSA [Documented Safety  
17 Analysis] if we don't have alignment and agreement on the  
18 resolution of those issues, what that looks like and how  
19 it then reflects in the PDSA so that when we go to DSA  
20 that's all melded together.

21 There was a conversation on incentives. Our  
22 fundamental incentive is to get that waste treated. And,  
23 you know, the way I review the contract, that's our  
24 incentive. Even if the contractor didn't see it that  
25 way, I have got 700 engineers and safety basis folks who

1 do. And they would quickly trump me.

2 VICE CHAIRMAN: Do you think you've got your  
3 arms around the significant technical issues? Do you  
4 think you have your arms around the risk that you have to  
5 deal with or do you think that risk is going to grow?

6 MR. RUSSO: On mixing, and the reason I  
7 commissioned that trade study, I -- we feel as, you know,  
8 the company whose been working on it for a long time that  
9 the vessels will mix. But we also know that saying it  
10 and demonstrating it are two very different things. I  
11 believe when we do the large scale testing there will  
12 still be some questions.

13 Gary Brunson mentioned one, and that the  
14 chandelier. The geometry of each of those vessels, even  
15 if we do a 14-footer, is different. The number of PJMs  
16 in each vessel, different. Not everyone but the ones  
17 that have the different diameters have a different number  
18 of PJMs. The orientation of the nozzles, different.

19 So will the testing be conclusive enough to say,  
20 you know, it is so overwhelming that we don't have to do  
21 a test for each vessel or will it be, you know, we  
22 demonstrated this one works but do we have to demonstrate  
23 another one works. That's why Bill Gay mentioned we're  
24 making provision to have a pad to where we could actually  
25 put a 28-footer if the 14-footer isn't overwhelming.

1 We've been looking for an overwhelming answer for a lot  
2 of years now and they were always right on the edge.

3 VICE CHAIRMAN: I'm going to let somebody else  
4 ask you questions. Thank you.

5 MR. RUSSO: You know, he's here too.

6 CHAIRMAN: I know that. And Dr. Mansfield  
7 didn't ask him a question. We're going to ask you a  
8 couple question. Dr. Mansfield.

9 DR. MANSFIELD: Okay. I was going to ask this  
10 of Mr. Russo but I'll ask it of Mr. Kacich. In our  
11 morning session today we were discussing the disconnects,  
12 so-called misalignments between the preliminary document  
13 safety analysis and progress and plant design. And I  
14 asked Mr. Knutson whether there was -- whether this  
15 disconnect existed and was -- did the safety culture of  
16 your organization have some cause -- did it cause this in  
17 some way? Was the impeded communication, et cetera,  
18 that's implied by the safety culture issues that we  
19 talked about earlier, did that have something to do with  
20 getting into misalignment and is it when you fix that do  
21 you -- can you see progress towards fixing the  
22 misalignment?

23 MR. KACICH: I would start with going back to  
24 the Chairman's opening remarks when he talked about two  
25 sides of the same coin. I think the improvement

1 opportunities extend both to efficiencies in how  
2 processes work and clarity and decision making  
3 responsibility and authorities. And at the same time  
4 advancements in the safety culture starting with, as has  
5 been mentioned before, the values and behaviors that are  
6 modeled by the leaders and internalized by the workforce.  
7 So either in our preference both of those improvement  
8 areas would serve to diminish the challenge or accelerate  
9 the pace with which we're going to realize the progress  
10 that we all want to.

11 DR. MANSFIELD: Everybody agrees that this kind  
12 of disconnect and misalignment is a risk to completion of  
13 the project.

14 MR. RUSSO: We have to have a DSA before we ever  
15 can ever declare readiness for anything. Cold  
16 commissioning much less hot commissioning.

17 DR. MANSFIELD: Mr. Kacich, is it easy to keep  
18 track of this? Is the gap between the design and the  
19 safety analysis so immediately apparent that you can't  
20 miss it or do you have to dig in a bit? Do you have to  
21 ask a lot of questions? How do you tell how bad it's  
22 getting?

23 MR. KACICH: Well, I think the investment of  
24 time that some very accomplished people spent in  
25 performance of the root cause analysis that was alluded

1 to earlier today and the depth of that report and the  
2 number of recommendations that are being made there speak  
3 to the complexity of that challenge. I think they've  
4 done a us a big service by outlining the fundamentals of  
5 what's going to be required to get it right. And it will  
6 equally important for the leadership responsible to  
7 demonstrate accountable behaviors in the course of  
8 discharging the improvement actions associated with that.

9 DR. MANSFIELD: Specifically with the gaps  
10 between the safety analysis and design, can they get too  
11 far apart? Is there a risk that if you don't catch this  
12 at the right time that you're really in trouble?

13 MR. RUSSO: They were diverging and they are now  
14 at a point where we think we have hit the apex and we're  
15 trying to bring it back into alignment. We did maintain  
16 the SRD, the Safety Requirements Document. And there is  
17 a road map to get there. And we talked earlier about  
18 putting together a team of safety basis folks and  
19 engineering folks to really go out and both find where  
20 those misalignments actually would have an effect on how  
21 the safety basis folks do their work where the design  
22 folks continue to do their work. And we got -- we got  
23 not just limit it to the list of 99, that list is going  
24 to be a living document. It will grow and shrink as we  
25 go through system by system. You heard earlier that in

1 LBL we have now set the template for doing that. High  
2 level is going to be that much more complex, Category 2  
3 facility, a lot more safety systems. And then by the  
4 time we get to the point where the process definition  
5 stuff is validated, we should have a good model to get to  
6 the real hard one, which is pretreat.

7 DR. MANSFIELD: Mr. Kacich, this is my last  
8 question. Is this situation something you don't want to  
9 ever see again? Or is this something that you will  
10 expect in complicated projects forever?

11 MR. KACICH: In answering that I would like to  
12 go back to the Yucca Mountain project that Mr. Russo  
13 alluded to earlier. I worked in the capacity of the  
14 manager of licensing and nuclear safety there for three  
15 years, that was my first Department of Energy job. And I  
16 think the parallel that's most compelling for the  
17 discussion we're having here concerns, and I'll summarize  
18 it briefly, is we had one group of accomplished people  
19 who were responsible for the preparation of the text of  
20 the license application of 8,600 pages. We had a group  
21 of accomplished people who were responsible for the  
22 performance of the preclosure safety analysis. Lots of  
23 Ph.D.'s and a unique endeavor with respect to risk  
24 informed performance based. We had a group of people who  
25 were very accomplished to perform the engineering



1 functions for the design of the repository. And we had a  
2 group of even more Ph.D.'s in connection with the post  
3 closure safety analyses. And we had the Navy nuclear  
4 propulsion program preparing its confidential portion of  
5 the application all needing to consolidate into a  
6 document that had to conform to the regulation and its  
7 interpretive guidance.

8 So I don't mind telling you that the outset of  
9 my arrival there was very similar in the sense that there  
10 was divergence and each party knew that they were right.  
11 We had to improve both our processes and we had to  
12 improve the ability with which they work together because  
13 one person isn't successful unless the entire team is  
14 successful.

15 I will share with you that when it came to  
16 yardsticks like cycle times we went from weeks and months  
17 to days and hours with respect to the improvements that  
18 were realized over that three-year period. We need to do  
19 that here.

20 DR. MANSFIELD: Thank you.

21 CHAIRMAN: Do you have a question on that topic?

22 MR. BADER: Yes. You mention, Mr. Russo, that  
23 you have a road map that you're using to identify the gap  
24 and narrow the gap. Is that a document that you could  
25 submit for the record?

1           MR. RUSSO: We have the 99 that came with 5731,  
2 and that's going to be a living document.

3           MR. BADER: Yeah, but I mean, you said -- my  
4 understanding of what you said was that you had a road  
5 map for the process. Is that a correct understanding?

6           MR. RUSSO: We're developing a road map for the  
7 process. Yeah.

8           MR. BADER: Okay. Could you --

9           MR. RUSSO: Yes, we will.

10          MR. BADER: Thank you.

11          CHAIRMAN: I'll try Mr. Kacich for 10 points.

12 (Laughter.)

13           The HSS assessment also identified safety  
14 culture issues associated with current construction  
15 activities. And we found this somewhat unexpected  
16 because previous reviews had not identified these. Some  
17 of the things in the HSS report were that, for example, a  
18 significant number of crafts personnel indicated that  
19 schedule pressures and other factors have resulted in  
20 instances where safety rules, procedures and practices  
21 were not followed. And then there was another finding  
22 that the perception that the rating system is arbitrary  
23 and unfairly implemented in a way that inhibits or  
24 penalizes the raising of safety and quality issues is a  
25 particularly important factor in many crafts workers'

1 views of safety culture and so on and so forth. There  
2 were a lot of findings about the construction workers  
3 that we found kind of surprising. So my question is:  
4 Were you previously aware of these kind of concerns in  
5 the construction crafts?

6 MR. KACICH: Well, the nature of my  
7 responsibilities keeps me a little more distant from  
8 that.

9 CHAIRMAN: Okay. So Mr. Russo would be  
10 appropriate person. Okay.

11 MR. RUSSO: I wasn't surprised but it was very  
12 troubling. And the reason it was troubling is because of  
13 the uncertainty within this type of project. And to go  
14 further, we had when I came on the job our relationship  
15 with the craft had improved immeasurably from a year or  
16 two before. They were working very hard. We had a  
17 construction manager named Dave Leeth, he formed a craft  
18 safety review team, craft safety reps. It was a grass  
19 roots movement with the craft. We got VPP [Voluntary  
20 Protection Program] star, VPP superior star. This year  
21 we got a NIOSH [National Institute for Occupational  
22 Safety and Health] award for hearing, which I wish they  
23 put into place when I was a young man, I wouldn't be  
24 wearing these hearing aids. But the reality is that we  
25 get into an unwritten contract with our craft workers.

1 And it's unwritten from the point of view of if they  
2 come, do a good job, don't violate process, they  
3 basically can project out how many years they'll be on  
4 that project.

5 And on this something this big, this is a stable  
6 job for craft. And when we had to -- and we were very  
7 careful about this, we were going from a 740 funding  
8 profile to an 840 funding profile, and that meant a ramp  
9 up of craft. But when we were starting to hear from  
10 Congress that that's not going to happen, we actually  
11 throttled back the ramp up. But when the information  
12 came in on that plan for 740 and '12 but plan for 690 and  
13 '13, those are not step function changes, projects ramp  
14 up and they ramp down. So what that meant is we had to  
15 start laying off craft. And the layoff of the craft came  
16 at the time that the HSS folks were interviewing the  
17 craft.

18 The rating and ranking system that was in the  
19 report is one that the union actually wanted, the union  
20 leadership wanted and negotiated into the labor agreement  
21 as what they felt was an appropriate way to have an input  
22 with Bechtel supervision on if you are laying off people  
23 there's a manner in which you would choose other than I  
24 don't like that guy, I do like that guy. So yes, it was  
25 surprising but not totally surprising because of the fact

1 that we had to release people. But again, it was a  
2 wakeup call that we have to be courageous in our  
3 leadership with not just the craft but all our workers.

4 There was a discussion about do we, you know,  
5 tell them more layoffs were coming or not. And there was  
6 a school of thought that said not. And I, you know, I  
7 decided that they need to be fully informed. And it does  
8 again create a sense at the site right now, if you notice  
9 are just normal routine industrial safety statistics, we  
10 were on a very good path, and now we have had a spate of  
11 reportable injuries. People get distracted when they're  
12 worried about am I going to be able to pay for that car?  
13 Am I going to be able to send my daughter to college? Am  
14 I going to be able to do the things I want to do? So it  
15 is troubling, yes.

16 CHAIRMAN: I want to focus on that aspect of the  
17 rating system. I think what the craft workers were  
18 saying, and there was a lot in the report on it, was that  
19 schedule pressures and other factors resulted in  
20 instances where safety rules, procedures and practices  
21 were not followed. They were being pressured to do  
22 things unsafely. I mean, that's what the HSS report  
23 said. That's what I really want to focus on. Was that  
24 conclusion a surprise to you?

25 MR. RUSSO: Not totally. And the reason I say

1       that is we have craft supervisors that are both  
2       non-manual, meaning they work for the company, and the  
3       foreman and general foreman. And they come from other  
4       jobs. And they want to be successful. And they measure  
5       success in terms of if I have got a piece of work I want  
6       to get done today, I want to get it done today.

7               We try to what we call the parade of trades, we  
8       try to make it so that the work areas are available so  
9       that they can. But if they run into some kind of a  
10      complexity, be it someone else working in the area, they  
11      would have a tendency to want to work through it.  
12      The way we're addressing that is the SCWE [Safety  
13      Conscious Work Environment] training that we did for a  
14      group of our folks earlier actually last year, we're now  
15      providing that SSCWE training across the entire site.

16             CHAIRMAN: Help me out here. I'm just trying to  
17      -- I mean, there are a fair number of near misses on the  
18      construction site, right?

19             MR. RUSSO: Yeah.

20             CHAIRMAN: Things do fall 50 feet and miss  
21      workers by a few feet. It is an environment where the  
22      workers really have to be quite careful and follow  
23      procedures. They can't be moving cranes outside of zones  
24      and things of that nature.

25             MR. RUSSO: Exactly right.

1                   CHAIRMAN: How do you think you're going to  
2 address that concern? What do you think are the most  
3 important things to do in terms of the actual  
4 construction crafts?

5                   MR. RUSSO: I think starting with, and this is a  
6 conversation we had with David Huizenga and with people  
7 on Capitol Hill, what we need more than anything else is  
8 within the context of budgeting annually, which again is  
9 a unique thing to a government project that you don't  
10 typically see in commercial work, we would rather have a  
11 predictable number that there's alignment on than one  
12 that may not be fully supported by whoever is in Congress  
13 in a given year. If we can plan under that basis then we  
14 can provide that predictability to our craft worker in  
15 terms of their longevity, and their mind gets on to your  
16 point, keeping the crane where it's supposed to be,  
17 keeping the spud wrench in the bag. That kind of stuff.  
18 So predictable funding, whatever level is supportable,  
19 for a craft worker is the underpinning of getting to a  
20 culture where everyone feels comfortable.

21                   CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I'm going to turn to Mr.  
22 Bader in a second. But first Ms. Roberson has a  
23 question.

24                   VICE CHAIRMAN: My question -- I'm still  
25 thinking about that question and the response. But my

1 question I think I'll ask it to you, Mr. Kacich. If  
2 you're not the right one, you guys seem to tag off pretty  
3 well. Another area that the HSS report recommended some  
4 improvement occurring was in your employee concerns and  
5 your differing professional opinions programs. What do  
6 you plan to do in those areas.

7 MR. KACICH: The differing professional opinion  
8 procedure is something that the HSS team gave us some  
9 very helpful suggestions about how we could improve it.  
10 And we're pretty far down the road, actually, on getting  
11 to the stage where we're prepared to issue a revision to  
12 it reflecting the enhancements that are recommended as  
13 well as some other input that we've received.

14 A predecessor to that of course would be to make  
15 sure that the senior team is aligned with it because the  
16 procedure is only as good as the team is able to  
17 appreciate the instances where its application will be  
18 valued. So again, the HSS team did us a good service  
19 there.

20 VICE CHAIRMAN: My recollection is procedurally  
21 you guys have great processes, its the implementation,  
22 how you carry out. And I assume that's what you're going  
23 to focus on.

24 MR. KACICH: Well, yes. I would add that for  
25 the two applications of that process in 2011 that



1 occurred, I think they were reasonably successful from  
2 the standpoint of the user in that we went to great  
3 lengths to thank and appreciate the value to the  
4 individual raising the issue, making every effort to  
5 treat that person with dignity and respect at every  
6 stage. We engaged very accomplished external parties in  
7 both instances. And notwithstanding the procedural  
8 imperfections that were identified, the application for  
9 those two instances I think was respectable.

10           Again, the broader application is are we using  
11 it at the right -- for the right occasions and with the  
12 right encouragement. And I think that's probably the  
13 values and behaviors dimension of the application that we  
14 needed to do more work on.

15           VICE CHAIRMAN: I think there was one more -- do  
16 the people who would rightfully use it believe that will  
17 result in the attention its intended to get?

18           MR. KACICH: Indeed. And every -- one of the  
19 best demonstrations of that is that for those instances  
20 where it is used and to the extent there's cognizance of  
21 it on the project that the user would say that in fact  
22 they were quite satisfied with it. And I believe in  
23 these two cases that is true.

24           MR. RUSSO: One of the learnings from that, Ms.  
25 Roberson, is it really did take too long to get either a

1 feedback to an employee or something triggered into DPO  
2 [Differing Professional Opinion]. And it did take a lot  
3 of effort and will to do so. So in modifying our work  
4 processes, one of the things we're putting into place is  
5 a measurement in metrics when someone brings something up  
6 how quickly do they get a response. And if it's not  
7 something that they're comfortable with, I mean, again,  
8 we're not going to get everyone 100 percent aligned on  
9 everything, but what we want them to feel is fully heard  
10 and understood. So if it is not satisfactory, a much  
11 quicker mechanism to introduce the option of DPO, much  
12 quicker.

13 VICE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

14 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Bader.

15 MR. BADER: Mr. Kacich, could you describe the  
16 role you're going to play versus the role that Mr. Sproat  
17 is going play in improving the safety culture at WTP and  
18 then how you plan to accomplish that.

19 MR. KACICH: Right now Mr. Sproat is serving in  
20 the capacity of management advisor. And as Mr. Russo  
21 alluded to earlier, he has led and facilitated a number  
22 of sessions and will continue to do so for the leadership  
23 team to get its fingerprints deeply immersed on the  
24 improvement plan we're going to effect. Frank has asked  
25 me to succeed Mr. Coyle in the capacity of the NSQC

1 manager. So in the capacity of someone whose in the line  
2 in the organization. And I'm going to very much welcome  
3 Mr. Sproat's contributions to this cause for as long as  
4 he's on the project. And I think fundamentally it  
5 reverts back to an observation that Mr. Miller made when  
6 he was up here that perhaps we as a senior team  
7 underappreciate the challenge that this represents. And  
8 to the extent that we can utilize our past experiences to  
9 provide evidence of that, we will do so.

10 MR. BADER: Have you decided what metrics you  
11 will use in order to measure your success?

12 MR. KACICH: We have not decided that, no. But  
13 we will be developing them as part of the overall  
14 improvement plan that we need to deliver to the  
15 Department of Energy next month. And we -- that's not to  
16 say that we don't have some metrics that I'm sure we'll  
17 be able to either continue or with some adaptation. But  
18 part of the plan is to develop those in a way that  
19 further informs our pace of progress.

20 MR. BADER: But you're basically going to use  
21 the tools similar or the same as what Mr. Miller used,  
22 correct?

23 MR. KACICH: I'm not quite prepared to prejudge  
24 exactly what metrics we'll have. But they will be a part  
25 of our plan.

1                   MR. RUSSO: One of the things we know we're  
2 going to measure is as I mentioned to Ms. Roberson, is  
3 timeliness to get feedback to an employee who raises a  
4 concern. We are definitely going to measure that. And  
5 if we can't come to alignment or acceptance of that  
6 feedback then a quicker DPO process. We're also going to  
7 measure the number of times when someone brings something  
8 up and the answer is always no, it's fine and then later  
9 on it becomes, wow, they were right. We should have  
10 listened to them. That's very important to me to walk  
11 the talk.

12                   MR. BADER: I'm not making myself clear, I don't  
13 think. I'm addressing the broad suite of tools that Mr.  
14 Miller used in his assessments. Are you going to try to  
15 mimic that? I believe that was the recommendation of the  
16 HSS report in doing your broad assessments.

17                   MR. RUSSO: Yes. So I believe I'm getting the  
18 question correct. We will, we have and will continue to  
19 do pulse surveys. I have asked Glenn Podonsky at the  
20 last meeting I had with him, although the next actual  
21 review will be somewhere in 2013, I would welcome an  
22 effectiveness review somewhere before that as we're  
23 setting off into the direction we think is the right  
24 answer. Just to get the Department's and HSS in  
25 particular's feedback on what you're doing even though

1 preliminary looks like it is hitting the issues that we  
2 thought created the perceptions that he talked about.  
3 Another thing we're doing aside from the pulse surveys is  
4 Admiral Coyle, whose told us he's retiring, we've asked  
5 him to stay with us part time because we want the  
6 continuity of his experience but we've also talked to his  
7 new employer about making him available from the  
8 contractor or the -- whatever perspective. For the --  
9 when the extent of condition reviews are being done what  
10 are the lessons learned that we could bring to those  
11 facilities. And just as importantly, what are the best  
12 practices that they could bring back to us. And we think  
13 that combined with our pulse surveys, our focus groups,  
14 will help us make sure we're not leaving anyone behind,  
15 to my earlier point there's a diverse number of things  
16 that make people uncomfortable.

17 MR. BADER: The last thing that I wanted to ask  
18 is there's been quite a bit of discussion of the  
19 importance of management leading by example and that  
20 employees, what they really watch is what's being done,  
21 not what's being said. Is this, in talking about the  
22 things you're going to measure or asking about what  
23 you're going to use as metrics, do you believe you'll use  
24 that as one of your metrics?

25 MR. RUSSO: Not just the metric but sort of a

1 measure of leadership. So an example is that at a point  
2 in a particular activity that was very, quote, schedule  
3 sensitive to a lot of the world, I had a team of people  
4 that were working seven days a week, and the guy in  
5 charge said well, we're going to work this weekend. And  
6 I said, no, you're not, everyone needs to go home and  
7 take the weekend off. And they actually resisted that  
8 notion to the point that I actually had to get sort of  
9 tough with them in terms of you need to take some time  
10 off. I was very surprised at how well that rippled  
11 through the entire project in terms of to your point  
12 there was an example of walking the talk.

13           It takes empowerment for people in the  
14 supervisory level to feel comfortable to do that. And  
15 again, part of what I'd like to both incorporate into our  
16 culture but also make sure it is a measure of your  
17 leadership as an individual on this team is not just your  
18 empowerment to do it but your willingness to use it. I  
19 have worked in the craft and I know that you reach a  
20 point where you work so many hours, you're not just safe  
21 anymore, you're not productive anymore. So there's no  
22 utility from a purely business point of view to having  
23 people working seven days a week. And we just have to  
24 make people comfortable with that. And I think we've not  
25 done a good enough job of that and we got to do much

1 better. And that's going to be one of my focus areas.

2 CHAIRMAN: I would like to thank you, Mr. Russo  
3 and Mr. Kacich for your testimony. I appreciate it very  
4 much. We have one more panel tonight I'm going to  
5 introduce. I want to make an announcement that we will  
6 begin the public comment no later than 8:45 but it will  
7 slip by a few minutes tonight.

8 I want to introduce our third and final panel  
9 for tonight on the topic of safety culture. They are Mr.  
10 David Huizenga, DOE's Senior Advisor for Environmental  
11 Management; Mr. James Hutton, DOE Environmental  
12 Management Chief Nuclear Advisor; Mr. Scott Samuelson,  
13 DOE Manager of the Office of River Protection; and Mr.  
14 Dale Knutson, DOE Federal Project Director. Does anybody  
15 on the panel wish to submit testimony at this time?  
16 Seeing none I want to thank you for your testimonies  
17 today and we will continue with the first question from  
18 Mr. Bader.

19 MR. BADER: Almost there. Mr. Knutson, do you  
20 believe that any of the findings of the HSS review led by  
21 Mr. Miller revealed important factors behind the  
22 project's difficulty in resolving safety and technical  
23 issues?

24 MR. KNUTSON: Yes, I do.

25 MR. BADER: We discussed two technical issues

1 earlier that were facing the project that had been  
2 unresolved for a long time. The Board understands that  
3 those are only two of a larger collection of significant  
4 unresolved technical issues. What is your assessment of  
5 the reason these issues haven't been resolved for so  
6 long?

7 MR. KNUTSON: I believe it is two-fold. One is  
8 the fact that for such a long time we have been a process  
9 driven organization. As I mentioned earlier this  
10 afternoon, we have gotten locked into the idea of  
11 identifying technical issues and then layering and  
12 layering and layering and layering and layering technical  
13 issues on top of technical issues, and never really  
14 stepping back to understand the integrated system effect  
15 and understanding the outcome associated with it.

16 Second thing is -- so that's item one. Item two  
17 is that we're structured in integrated project teams that  
18 flow from the federal project team into each of the major  
19 facilities. And every single member of the federal staff  
20 is assigned at some point to one of those integrated  
21 project teams. And what we have discovered, as we  
22 continue to pull the string on the HSS report, is how we  
23 establish expectations within those IPT's for the  
24 participation of its members. And how that participation  
25 results in increased communication, results in an



1 extensive understanding of what the daily business is  
2 that's going on. I believe both of those are  
3 contributory to HSS findings.

4 MR. BADER: You're touching on something that  
5 Mr. Brunson touched on earlier today, and that was the  
6 necessity of, as I understood his comments, looking  
7 beyond the specific issues and looking at the broader  
8 project and the need to establish what is the level of  
9 conservatism and margin in the systems and components all  
10 together. Is this part of what you're referring to?

11 MR. KNUTSON: That's one element of it. And  
12 quite literally, I'd like to talk to the specifics of  
13 margin, for instance. The Board in its seismic analysis  
14 went through a very extensive process to understand that  
15 the margin associated with the structural capacity of  
16 these facilities was sufficient. So we -- in that  
17 particular case we were able to demonstrate exhaustively  
18 that margin existed and that it was robust. It is our  
19 detriment that we have not been able to carry that  
20 forward across every system that's available in the Waste  
21 Treatment Plant. So our inability to actually discuss  
22 that on a daily basis or with a routine mechanism leads  
23 to part of the concern. It may be a concern that is  
24 based exclusively on perception. But our inability to  
25 describe it at a system level is a failure.

1           MR. BADER: Let me go back to the subject of the  
2 what's been called the conflict between the contractors  
3 engineering organization and its environmental and  
4 nuclear safety organization. And similar divisiveness  
5 within DOE organizations at the site. Do you believe  
6 those are problems that need to be addressed by DOE?

7           MR. KNUTSON: I do indeed.

8           MR. BADER: How would you address those  
9 problems?

10          MR. KNUTSON: As I mentioned, every element or  
11 every federal position is assigned to an integrated  
12 project team, that includes people that support nuclear  
13 safety, quality, environment permitting and so forth.  
14 And we really haven't done a good job at being able to  
15 establish those effective linkages within the IPT's to be  
16 able to communicate and to communicate well. And I  
17 think that's one of the very first steps that needs to be  
18 -- needs to occur as we move this forward.

19          MR. BADER: If -- we talked a moment ago about  
20 the metrics that might be put in place to measure this at  
21 the Bechtel level. Is this something that you will  
22 involve yourself in or pay attention to and manage too?

23          MR. KNUTSON: It is indeed. And it is one of  
24 the areas that we have put some time into already.  
25 Things such as metrics on the timeliness ABAR

1 evaluations and things associated with our ability to  
2 provide appropriate technical justifications and the  
3 bases of those technical justifications as we enter into  
4 these conversations on nuclear safety.

5 But it goes beyond nuclear safety. It's not a  
6 limited set. It goes into the issues of one of the  
7 expectations that this project has had to shoulder is  
8 rebuilding the NQA-1 infrastructure of the vast majority  
9 of the manufacturing capability of this country, and how  
10 have we learned from that and built that into the  
11 processes that will carry forward into the future. We  
12 need to be able to extend the communication that we have  
13 within our IPT's to be able to articulate things like  
14 that across every subject matter expertise that we have  
15 in place.

16 MR. BADER: If I take that to the highest level,  
17 do you believe that this is a situation where DOE and  
18 yourself as project manager may need to be a more  
19 demanding customer?

20 MR. KNUTSON: We do indeed need to be a very  
21 demanding customer, not just of our contractors but of  
22 ourselves.

23 MR. BADER: Thank you.

24 CHAIRMAN: Ms. Roberson.

25 VICE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Knutson, do you believe that

1 unresolved technical issues not uniquely limited to  
2 pretreatment but in general, you talked about all the  
3 other facilities in the plant, but do you think these  
4 unresolved safety issues like the two we explored earlier  
5 run a risk of impacting plant commissioning?

6 MR. KNUTSON: Yes, they do.

7 VICE CHAIRMAN: And ultimate operation.

8 How are you managing the accumulated risk of the  
9 unresolved issues?

10 MR. KNUTSON: There are a number of ways that we  
11 do it. Number one is this question of maturity, system  
12 maturity. The assessments that are done within nuclear  
13 safety associated with the DSA process, the PDSA  
14 evolution in LBL, for instance, gives me assurance that  
15 that group of facilities is at a level of maturity  
16 necessary to continue on. And that the level of risk  
17 associated with that is manageable. As you proceed to  
18 the other extreme to our least mature systems in the  
19 pretreatment facility, you can do the same assessments,  
20 just as Ms. Busche described earlier today, and  
21 understand that at that level of risk and the ability to  
22 move forward routinely, if you will, towards an  
23 expectation for unfettered construction carries an excess  
24 level of risk. And is something that does have to be  
25 managed more closely.

1                   VICE CHAIRMAN: Are you confident that your  
2 contractor or contractors have a good handle on the risk  
3 and the number of technical issues, significant technical  
4 issues that have to be addressed, whether its LAW, PT,  
5 the LAB, are you confident that your contractor has a  
6 handle on all of those?

7                   MR. KNUTSON: I'm confident on those areas where  
8 we have the greatest maturity, we have the greatest  
9 understanding of exactly what you just talked about.  
10 For those areas that are the least mature, we have the  
11 least understanding of what that level of maturity  
12 represents.

13                   I think it's also important for people to  
14 recognize that there's almost 36,000 people that have  
15 worked on this project at some manner, shape or form  
16 across this country. And that the vendor data we that  
17 rely on that comes into our designs is also a contributor  
18 to our ability to understand technical issues and to  
19 resolve technical issues.

20                   That outreach process and that ability to  
21 communicate not only our expectations to these vendors'  
22 as well as the vendors response back to us is a critical  
23 element of understanding the maturity of any given  
24 design. Pretreat is at the lowest level of maturity with  
25 respect to that. LBL is at the higher end.

1                   VICE CHAIRMAN: How do you determine at what  
2 point an unresolved technical issue impedes progress on  
3 design or construction?

4                   MR. KNUTSON: First and foremost is if it's not  
5 in alignment with the authorization basis by definition  
6 the stop work order is already -- the stop work system is  
7 already in place. The MSOW kicks in before anything else  
8 takes place. That's a first indicator. That's a great  
9 very realistic indicator.

10                  To go beyond that, the issues associated with  
11 how many iterations does it take to complete any given  
12 specification or iterative process associated with  
13 talking to a vendor. That's another indicator. The  
14 ramps associated with instrumentation and control systems  
15 that have to be delivered in time to support the realtime  
16 maintenance of LAW facilities or LAB facilities or the  
17 basic facility infrastructures, those are indicators of  
18 when are we at a point where our communication processes  
19 and our inability to stay latched up with our vendors  
20 could impede construction in a way that's unacceptable.

21                  VICE CHAIRMAN: What's your sense of how well  
22 the systems are working to reveal those indicators for  
23 timely decision making?

24                  MR. KNUTSON: I believe today they're working  
25 reasonably well. I believe that until we had established

1 an integrative project team that was focused on the  
2 shared systems, the shared systems actually happened to  
3 be the largest financial commitment of the individual  
4 project. It's some \$4 billion worth of work and it  
5 includes all of those activities that interact with the  
6 commercial industry outside this project. Until that was  
7 able to communicate very effectively within an individual  
8 project team and then lash the shared services to each of  
9 the facilities specific to integrated project teams we  
10 were at risk of not being able to be confident. I  
11 believe today we are much more confident than we were two  
12 years ago.

13 CHAIRMAN: All right. Dr. Mansfield.

14 DR. MANSFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 You're going to get tired of this question because we've  
16 discussed what I'm going to talk about earlier today and  
17 that's the misalignment, the disconnect between the  
18 preliminary documented safety analysis and the design for  
19 WTP. The Chairman asked you about it, Mr. Knutson, this  
20 morning and I asked Mr. Russo about it sometime later.

21 Inasmuch the substance of that problem is the  
22 interaction of the engineers and the BNS safety basis  
23 organization, do you think the safety culture played a  
24 role in prolonging that disconnect?

25 MR. KNUTSON: I honestly believe that it is too

1 simple an answer to simply say yes. The affects of  
2 safety culture, Frank and I have had many very in depth  
3 conversations about this particular topic and we both  
4 grew up in construction environments from the time we  
5 were very young people. Clean sites, people that are  
6 working hard, looking out for each other, sites that have  
7 low accident rates, even in the most technically complex  
8 arenas where engineers and nuclear safety are pulling  
9 together have technical challenges that take a long time  
10 to resolve. And it can become a convenience to allow a  
11 safety conscience work environment or a nuclear safety  
12 and quality culture finding to become a crutch. That's  
13 not okay.

14 Safety conscience work environments and nuclear  
15 safety and quality culture are foundations that must  
16 exist to do the job to start with. You can't be a crutch  
17 that's used for why performance is or is not existent.  
18 And that's one of the biggest issues that I have  
19 personally struggled with in the evaluation of the  
20 multiple reports and findings that have been issued is,  
21 again, we're in the process phase. We're dealing with  
22 the evolution or the measurement of unique processes and  
23 we keep or we continue to allow process to overdrive the  
24 fundamentals of people working with people. And I think  
25 that's the place we gain the most benefit from these



1 evaluations.

2 DR. MANSFIELD: I wasn't very clear on what I  
3 asked. Let me ask it a different way. How long -- a  
4 good part of your job is oversight of the contract. Your  
5 oversight has been looking at the facility specific  
6 preliminary documented safety analysis process for a long  
7 time. How long has your -- have your oversight  
8 activities indicated there was something wrong with the  
9 maintenance of the document safety analysis?

10 MR. KNUTSON: Since approximately February of  
11 2011. And in other words, the first five months of  
12 coming on board the project.

13 DR. MANSFIELD: And has that been on the top of  
14 your chart of priorities?

15 MR. KNUTSON: That has been the number one issue  
16 that I have been pursuing with Frank and his team since  
17 then up to and including Bechtel.

18 DR. MANSFIELD: And tell me if it takes -- what  
19 kind of effort does it take to do that and simultaneous  
20 watch the progression of design? A good part of your  
21 workday just to figure that out?

22 MR. KNUTSON: What I find is that it requires  
23 constant re-attention. And that in order to continue to  
24 make the, you know, Frank said it best, ramping up,  
25 ramping down, turning this \$2 million a day project does

1 require constant attention to the rudder. And I believe  
2 that that rudder has now turned and I believe that it has  
3 taken a year's worth my of personal effort to make -- to  
4 try to help make that turn. And in partnership with  
5 Frank we have done a great job in actually getting it  
6 there. Keeping it there as Frank used the term  
7 institutionalizing that change in direction, is the part  
8 that will occupy the balance of our futures.

9 DR. MANSFIELD: So just so you know, our focus  
10 is going to be watching how fast that gap closes.

11 MR. KNUTSON: That's a great metric. And that's  
12 one that we're interested in as well.

13 DR. MANSFIELD: Thank you.

14 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Hutton, can you summarize the  
15 major actions and objectives of the secretary's  
16 implementation plan for Recommendation 2011-1?

17 MR. HUTTON: Major objectives and --

18 CHAIRMAN: Well, specifically, what needs to  
19 change in how the contractor manages safety and technical  
20 issues would be something.

21 MR. HUTTON: Well, we found that the issues  
22 resolution process, as we've said here today a few  
23 different times, was just simply taking too long. And we  
24 believe that management behavior in responding to safety  
25 issues and safety concerns is an element of that. And an

1 important element of setting the safety culture. So I  
2 think when the project -- as you heard Mr. Huizenga say  
3 earlier, it will be important for those management  
4 behaviors to encourage a positive safety culture and  
5 we'll have to be very diligent at that to be successful.

6 CHAIRMAN: And what about the local DOE office?  
7 What kinds of suggestions would you have in terms of what  
8 your looking for in the implementation of that?

9 MR. HUTTON: We spoke about that earlier today  
10 also when Mr. Miller and Mr. Eckroade were up here. And  
11 what the HSS said in the report and I think it's, you  
12 know, I have no reason to doubt it, I think it's a good  
13 report and I think it's very valid. They said there's a  
14 strong indication of an unwillingness and uncertainty  
15 among ORP staff about the ability to openly challenge  
16 management decisions. And they said that most ORP staff  
17 members also strongly believe that constructive criticism  
18 is not encouraged. In my view, those things are  
19 important in order to get to the bottom of issues  
20 quickly, get them surfaced and get them resolved.

21 CHAIRMAN: Mr. Samuelson, do you feel you're  
22 making progress on resolving those concerns?

23 MR. SAMUELSON: I believe we are. We have  
24 certainly opened a much more active dialogue inside the  
25 office on those issues where employees are encouraged

1 regularly, both in writing and verbally, to participate  
2 and to share their concerns. We have established on our  
3 internet site mechanism for people to go ahead and submit  
4 things easily, put them up where they are seen by anybody  
5 in the office that wants to see them. And we're  
6 committed to providing responses to those as quickly as  
7 we can. We're not there yet but my objective is to get  
8 them answered within a week after somebody puts them up.  
9 And again, we're telling people if we put something up  
10 there that's a response to a concern you raised and it  
11 doesn't make any sense to you, you've got to tell us that  
12 too so that we can figure out why the heck we're not  
13 communicating clearly.

14 CHAIRMAN: I think if I remember, the concern on  
15 your staff's part wasn't the fear of raising safety so  
16 much as that it wouldn't really -- nothing would happen.  
17 Management wouldn't respond to it.

18 MR. SAMUELSON: I believe that the piece of that  
19 that I'm confident I understand is that we have not done  
20 a satisfactory job of closing the communications loop.  
21 That when people did raise issues, it wasn't that they  
22 weren't heard or that they were lost or something, but  
23 rather that they got caught up in the 101 other things  
24 that people were worried about that day and we never  
25 communicated back to people what it was we were doing

1 with what they had told us. And if you don't do that  
2 people just go, why am I bothering? And so we're very  
3 committed to doing that.

4 Like I said, that website is a first mechanism  
5 that we're using. But at the same time, our internal  
6 systems for capturing concerns and corrective actions,  
7 the systems themselves, depending on who you talk to but  
8 I would say there's a general consensus that they're not  
9 particularly user friendly or transparent. And we are --  
10 we have a group of people now that are looking very hard  
11 at what is it that we need to put in place to handle that  
12 aspect of it, to have a zero threshold transparent system  
13 in place and how are we going to get that established.  
14 And hopefully in a little later on this year we're going  
15 to get an answer to that -- that comes from the people  
16 that have to use that system and helps us get past this  
17 instead of just Band-Aiding old systems.

18 CHAIRMAN: In the final analysis it's your  
19 organization that will license the facility; is that  
20 correct?

21 MR. SAMUELSON: Yes, sir.

22 CHAIRMAN: So you really have a critical role  
23 and then Mr. Knutson will do a lot of heavy lifting here  
24 to get that safety basis in place, but you've got to say  
25 it's okay.

1 MR. SAMUELSON: That's correct.

2 CHAIRMAN: And the project's ready to go  
3 operational and go forward; is that true?

4 MR. SAMUELSON: That is absolutely true.

5 CHAIRMAN: So your folks need to be very  
6 intelligent customers and very demanding customers and  
7 very willing to raise concerns about issues.

8 MR. SAMUELSON: Absolutely.

9 CHAIRMAN: Let me go to you, Mr. Bader.

10 MR. BADER: No more loud noises.

11 MR. HUIZENGA: Yes, it's late.

12 MR. BADER: Mr. Huizenga, one of the early  
13 actions under the secretary's implementation plan was to  
14 issue a new project execution plan for the WTP project.  
15 Can you discuss the importance of that plan and what  
16 concerns it will address relative to Recommendation  
17 2011-1?

18 MR. HUIZENGA: Yes. I think as was pointed out  
19 in the HSS report and by others, there was some confusion  
20 about roles and responsibilities. One of the important  
21 things we did by issuing the project execution plan was  
22 to clarify that. And, you know, we had Mr. Samuelson and  
23 Mr. Knutson and myself and others had an opportunity to  
24 sit down with the Secretary of Energy in his office and  
25 discuss clearly how we wanted to operate and that's

1 what's reflected in the PEP now. We've got a normal  
2 reporting relationship consistent with what we do at the  
3 other EM sites with our major construction projects and  
4 we're quite comfortable with that and that's how we're  
5 moving forward.

6 MR. BADER: So you would consider that concern  
7 addressed?

8 MR. HUIZENGA: Yes, I would.

9 MR. BADER: Is that correct?

10 MR. HUIZENGA: At the highest levels.

11 MR. BADER: Let me move to a slightly different  
12 topic. DOE often uses a generic phrase Risk Acceptance  
13 Official to identify the individual who was assigned the  
14 authority to accept various risks on behalf of DOE. In  
15 the case of the WTP project who's that individual?

16 MR. HUIZENGA: I might ask Mr. Hutton to answer  
17 that question because I'm not quite sure I understand the  
18 question. If you want me to answer it you could try to  
19 help me.

20 MR. BADER: We'll go to our former assistant  
21 specific secretary, to be more specific.

22 MR. HUTTON: One thing we could say, as Mr.  
23 Samuelson just mentioned, he's the individual, in  
24 response to your question, he's the individual who takes  
25 the document safety analysis and essentially states that

1 the facility is safe to be operated in accordance with  
2 the FDSA. That's a delegated authority that's been  
3 delegated by Mr. Huizenga to him and of course as we  
4 know, delegation of authority doesn't relieve Dave of the  
5 accountability for the decisions that are made with  
6 regard to that. If that goes to the question.

7 MR. BADER: That's a piece of it. But to me  
8 there is a broader -- that's the safety license piece.  
9 But there's a broader issue here in that there is more to  
10 it than the safety license. There are various elements  
11 at risk; DOE essentially becomes the ultimate risk  
12 holder, if you want to say that. And what I was trying  
13 to ascertain was who is -- what level of person who by  
14 title is the person who is able to say I accept the risk,  
15 we move forward.

16 MR. SAMUELSON: Relative to operation of the  
17 facility?

18 MR. BADER: It could be --

19 MR. HUTTON: What kind of risk are you thinking?

20 MR. BADER: Welding, vessels and placing  
21 vessels.

22 MR. KNUTSON: I think it is critically important  
23 that the risk management profile that's defined and  
24 maintained within the mandatory requirements of the DOE  
25 order for 413 project delivery, those belong to me. The



1 issues associated with operational risk or Site  
2 regulatory risk or issues associated with permit and  
3 external conditions are Scott's. The biggest difference  
4 that we have got at the Office of River Protection right  
5 now is that we have a full-time Site office manager and  
6 that has been a great benefit to being able to resolve  
7 some of these roles and responsibility questions.

8 MR. BADER: Thank you.

9 CHAIRMAN: All right. We have two questions  
10 remaining. (Laughter.) Ms. Roberson, you asked one of  
11 the them.

12 VICE CHAIRMAN: Actually, Chairman, I have two  
13 short questions.

14 CHAIRMAN: We have three questions remaining.  
15 (Laughter.)

16 VICE CHAIRMAN: My first question's actually to  
17 you, Mr. Knutson. You said something a couple of times  
18 and I want to make sure we have the benefit of clarity  
19 and understanding what you intend to say. It's kind of  
20 relative to the issue of why some of these technical  
21 issues keep re-emerging or don't die and haven't been  
22 resolved. And you used the term -- this is my paraphrase  
23 so you correct me -- that one of the contributing factors  
24 has been things are sliced or diced and parsed and we  
25 haven't looked at them at a system level. Can you

1 briefly take one of the technical issues we've been  
2 talking about and illustrate for us what you mean by  
3 that?

4 MR. KNUTSON: Let's take erosion and corrosion  
5 as a very, very good example. We have 28 different  
6 reports. Each of them focusing on one or more aspects of  
7 a very discrete technical element associated with erosion  
8 and corrosion. And in none of those reports have we  
9 stepped back and looked at this evolution of particle  
10 size distribution expectation, have we stepped back and  
11 looked back at the overall integrated system question  
12 about to what extent does this particular type of issue  
13 extend beyond the very narrowly defined technical  
14 content. I believe that's where our greatest benefit  
15 lies as we move forward. And it is actually a result,  
16 and pardon me for using the term, but it is the result of  
17 the pivot message. The idea that we actually do have to  
18 be planning to operate these systems. And in the process  
19 of pivoting towards that kind of thinking, take ourselves  
20 from this component design, uniquely discrete technical  
21 element description to the more integrated systems that  
22 it takes to actually run as an operating facility.

23 VICE CHAIRMAN: Okay. And, Mr. Hutton, my  
24 second question. The implementation plan for  
25 Recommendation 2011-1 identifies actions to revise the

1 performance measures and performance evaluation plan for  
2 the WTP contract. And later it talks about the contract  
3 itself. Can you -- I'm not asking you to negotiate. I'm  
4 just saying can you describe generally for us what  
5 changes are envisioned and how that will contribute to  
6 resolving the issues raised in the recommendation itself?

7 MR. HUTTON: Well, his goes to something that  
8 came up earlier in terms of, you know, how the award fee  
9 is identified. Obviously the contract sets the  
10 priorities for the contractor and tries to attempt to  
11 incentivize the behavior that we want to see. And so  
12 when you look at -- when I look at the way award fee is  
13 distributed, it's easy for me to come to the conclusion  
14 that we need more emphasis in the area of safety and  
15 nuclear safety. So, you know, I would expect that would  
16 be the kind of thing we would want to do. As well as,  
17 you know, sometimes it is -- sometimes it's not so much  
18 what's in the contract but maybe what's not in it. You  
19 know, sometimes it's important to be explicit about  
20 things that, for instance, a strong safety culture is  
21 required to be able to satisfactorily implement the ISMS  
22 and to have a satisfactory ISMS system. And so the, you  
23 know, we have clauses in the contract which say you have  
24 to have a satisfactory ISMS or we'll hold the award fees  
25 at stake. Sometimes it's important to be explicit about

1 that that includes safety culture. So I guess that's the  
2 kind of things I would envision. But that's just my  
3 opinion off the top of my head.

4 VICE CHAIRMAN: Okay. Thank you.

5 CHAIRMAN: So the final question is yours, Mr.  
6 Huizenga, because you are the senior DOE official here.  
7 And I need your help on this. I understand that you were  
8 testifying with Mr. Podonsky in Washington, DC, before  
9 you came out here. And as you know, there has been an  
10 allegation made that there was an investigation by the  
11 Office of Nuclear Safety Enforcement, an HSS  
12 investigation taking place and that one of your  
13 contractors sought to prevent a senior official on the  
14 project from participating in that oversight investigation  
15 by the HSS organization. That's an allegation that was  
16 made.

17 Can you give me, and I know it was raised to Mr.  
18 Bolton in Mr. Podonsky's organization, can you shed some  
19 light and some status on that allegation, whether it has  
20 merit or not.

21 MR. HUIZENGA: Yes, I'll attempt to address  
22 that, Mr. Chairman. It's a sensitive issue obviously  
23 associated with personnel issues. But the fact of the  
24 matter is I had contact with the URS people to make clear  
25 to them that we will not abide by a situation where

1 they're actually trying to undermine the HSS review.  
2 That being said, I think there's a good chance that there  
3 was some miscommunication in this area. And that it  
4 wasn't necessarily their intention as to undermine it,  
5 but that being said, we have a clear understanding that  
6 that is not something that we would tolerate. And we  
7 have an agreement from URS that that's not something that  
8 they would seek to do.

9 CHAIRMAN: Well, my concern is that it is a  
10 safety culture issue. Another perception on the part of  
11 everybody on the workforce here that -- and I believe  
12 that we are making progress -- maybe we're not making  
13 much progress in terms of the safety culture issue at  
14 this project.

15 MR. HUIZENGA: I would agree that this is the  
16 exactly the kind of thing that we don't need because I,  
17 like you, actually believe we're making progress. And  
18 every time we have one of these things happen, whether  
19 it's through just sheer incompetence or miscommunication  
20 or confusion, it contributes to this perception that  
21 things aren't right. And nobody really wants that. So  
22 if there's actually a substantive real problem we're  
23 going to correct it. If there's a misperception we have  
24 to try to address it because it contributes to just  
25 digging us deeper into our hole here. And that's not in

1 anybody's interest.

2 CHAIRMAN: Well, if it has substance what is  
3 the Department going to do to impress upon its  
4 contractors that this type of behavior is not tolerated?

5 MR. HUIZENGA: I have been in consultation with  
6 Scott Samuelson already and we will provide direct  
7 communication to the contractor as I have done verbally,  
8 but we can do more than that to make sure that we  
9 clarify. There shouldn't be any confusion in this area  
10 anyway. But to the extent that we need to reemphasize  
11 it, we can -- Frank and I talked about this earlier  
12 today, there's no confusion about really what needs to be  
13 done. And what will not be tolerated. Let me be clear  
14 about that. What actually happened was unfortunate. We  
15 need to see to it that it doesn't happen again.

16 CHAIRMAN: You can imagine, you can sense my  
17 frustration because I think I have seen positive signs on  
18 the project, I have seen a more empowered site office, we  
19 have had good discussions here today, which makes me  
20 think that a lot of these have been identified, which is  
21 obviously the first step to beginning to resolve them and  
22 move forward in a very positive direction. And this to  
23 me was, you know, this is something that's being  
24 discussed on Capitol Hill.

25 MR. HUIZENGA: Yeah, I was there. (Laughter.)

1                   CHAIRMAN: You were there. So, I mean,  
2 obviously it's going to have a lot of visibility. A lot  
3 of people read the papers, a lot of people read other  
4 things. This is going to be in their consciousness. And  
5 I don't think as you already said that it's the kind of  
6 thing we need when we're trying to move in a direction of  
7 establishing a very strong safety culture on this  
8 project.

9                   MR. HUIZENGA: It is definitely unfortunate and  
10 we will address it.

11                  CHAIRMAN: And I just want to say I felt I had  
12 to raise it. I felt I would be remiss not to have an  
13 honest, straightforward conversation with you and this  
14 group without raising this issue. There are too many  
15 people in this room here who work on this project and  
16 understand the intricacies of what's going on to not pay  
17 attention to an issue like this.

18                  MR. HUIZENGA: No, I appreciate it. It's  
19 relevant, it's current.

20                  If you would indulge me, Mr. Chairman, just for  
21 a moment since I did poorly, I only answered one of my  
22 two questions today. I would like to try to answer some  
23 of the ones you asked other people when I was sitting in  
24 the audience taking notes. Just give me a minute.

25                  CHAIRMAN: I'm going to give you two, because

1 it's 8:45.

2 MR. HUIZENGA: So relative to some, we decided  
3 it wasn't worth debating what percentage it really was.  
4 We have percentages, but we don't really think that  
5 matters because the some we've decided was enough to take  
6 seriously this issue and we're going to address it. So  
7 that's how we're thinking of some, if you wanted a  
8 definition of it.

9 And the tension, the conflict, that was  
10 discussed. I witnessed that when I came out here on my  
11 last trip firsthand, hadn't seen it before. It is there.  
12 We had a very open, blunt discussion with Mr. Russo and  
13 he's aware of it and I'm convinced he's addressing that  
14 issue. It's going to perhaps take a little time but it's  
15 not something anybody's hiding from and we're going to  
16 work on that.

17 The 3009 implementation, that's now a contract  
18 responsibility. It is in the contract. We're going to  
19 deal with that. Incentivizing the contractor, you know,  
20 on the one percent issue it might not get to 51 percent  
21 like Watkins was driving. But we're going to do a lot  
22 better than one percent, I'll tell you that.

23 MR. KNUTSON: I will also add that there were  
24 those of us that were actually on the receiving end of  
25 the implementation of a 51 percent safety function



1 driver. And those of us that were at Rocky Flats in the  
2 days of those fee structures understand exactly what it  
3 meant to implement those types of measures at our bench  
4 levels. So that I think there's a very important message  
5 there that needs to be actively managed.

6 MR. HUIZENGA: Relative to issues dragging on  
7 too long. Scott and I had a discussion, a useful, very  
8 useful discussion earlier today of this tracking system  
9 that they're putting in place. Indeed sometimes they got  
10 lost and now we're finding them. And we're going to do a  
11 much better job of communicating with people when they  
12 raise issues and get back to them in a timely fashion.  
13 Sometimes we actually agreed with people and we didn't  
14 bother to get back and tell them. How silly is that?  
15 That's just, you know, not useful.

16 But in closing, if have don't mind, I would say  
17 I am actually, despite the issues that we discussed  
18 today, I'm optimistic. I'm not naive enough to think  
19 that it's going to be easy. But I'm hopeful. Each time  
20 I have come to Hanford I have seen areas of improvement.  
21 You might ask how I measure that. I measure that in part  
22 now because people are talking very openly about the  
23 issues and I think that's the first, you know, step  
24 toward actually accepting you have a problem and figuring  
25 out how to address them. As Frank said, has a dedicated

1 contractor staff. We have a dedicated federal team as  
2 well. These people have been working on these issues for  
3 a long long time. It's in nobody's interest to build a  
4 plant that won't operate safely. And we will not do  
5 that.

6 The issues that we were discussing here openly  
7 today will be tracked and measured through our 2010-2 or  
8 2011-1 responses. You've given us an opportunity to  
9 clearly track them through our interactions with you.

10 So together with our partnership with you, the  
11 contractor, the local stakeholders, we intend to be  
12 successful and bring home an operating WTP. We owe  
13 nothing less to the people and the citizens of the state  
14 of Washington and Oregon to do that.

15 CHAIRMAN: I thank you very much and we wish you  
16 and the project well. Believe me. Thank you, Mr.  
17 Huizenga, Mr. Hutton, Mr. Samuelson and Mr. Knutson.  
18 And with that we're going to turn to the public comment  
19 period.

20 It is the Board's practice and as stated in the  
21 Federal Register notice to welcome comments from  
22 interested members of the public. A list of those  
23 speakers who have contacted the Board is posted at the  
24 entrance to this room. We have generally listed the  
25 speakers in the order in which they wish to speak. I

1 will call the speakers in this order and ask the speakers  
2 to state their name and title at the beginning of their  
3 presentation. There is also a table at the entrance to  
4 the room with a signup sheet for members of the public  
5 who wish to make a presentation but did not have an  
6 opportunity to notify us ahead of time. They will follow  
7 those who have already registered with us in the order in  
8 which they have signed up. To get everyone wishing to  
9 speak or to make a presentation an equal opportunity, we  
10 ask that speakers limit their original presentations to  
11 five minutes. The Chair will then give consideration for  
12 additional comments should time permit. Presentations  
13 should be limited to comments, technical information or  
14 data concerning the subject of this public meeting and  
15 hearing. The Board members may question anyone making a  
16 presentation to the extent deemed appropriate.

17 And with that we're going to begin. The first  
18 member of the public to speak will be Beth Giansiracusa.  
19 Welcome back, Beth.

20 MS. GIANSIRACUSA: Thank you very much. What a  
21 wonderful forum tonight. Thank you for bringing out so  
22 much information. I was at the Open House last week that  
23 I guess it would be Bechtel or WTP and the DOE gave, and  
24 I got a little concerned in listening to some of this  
25 tonight when the DOE was up there because when I spoke

1 with one of the DOE engineers, nuclear engineers, and I  
2 went around with him and he had has gadgets and he was  
3 all excited and I was talking to him and I said, well,  
4 how do you guys deal with the whistleblowers? What do  
5 you guys do? And he said that mainly the whistleblowers  
6 were all going into the PIER groups, and those PIER  
7 groups reviewed what they had and they took it to the  
8 management and then he pulled out some little device in  
9 his hand, he says, well, sometimes people just want to  
10 change this little thing over here and then they take it  
11 to their manager and then their manager goes, well,  
12 that's not really what we want to look at. And then he  
13 says, I'm the one that goes, no, we don't need to look at  
14 that. And he said, most of the time what they are,  
15 they're looking for attention.

16 Now, I thought about that because I'm kind like  
17 with Occupy and there's a lot of people learning how to  
18 communicate now and they're uneducated or just learning  
19 different things. I'm expecting that the people that are  
20 on this Board in these things that are working with  
21 nuclear energy are a lot more educated. And that if one  
22 of the educated people needed attention that they got it.  
23 And so that's kind of what I wanted to say tonight. That  
24 when I had the DOE telling me that and then here you are  
25 saying strong safety culture and the DOE is not

1 presenting that to just your average person that's coming  
2 to an open house. I'm concerned. So that's what I have  
3 to say. Thank you.

4 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Tom Carpenter.

5 MR. CARPENTER: Good evening. My name is Tom  
6 Carpenter. I'm Executive Director of an organization  
7 called Hanford Challenge. And I have worked with workers  
8 at the Hanford site in and on the waste treatment plant  
9 and currently work with Walt and Donna and other workers  
10 out there. So I have a long perspective on some of these  
11 subjects being talked about tonight. And one of the  
12 phrases I have heard throughout the Hanford history is  
13 that the DOE does not tolerate retaliation or reprisals.  
14 And I have yet to see evidence of that. So that's one of  
15 the -- one of the catch phrases that you hear a lot.  
16 What does it actually mean that they don't tolerate it  
17 when it happens in front of you?

18 So here tonight we're looking at some people in  
19 the audience here like Dr. Tamosaitis and like Donna  
20 Busche and other names have come up that are living  
21 examples of people that have suffered retaliation and  
22 reprisal because they raised concerns. And that's speaks  
23 more to the culture and to the workers out there than  
24 almost anything else. That's who comes to mind when I  
25 hear that there, you know, there's a bumper sticker out

1       there saying we don't tolerate reprisal. And it has to  
2       be real. If you're going to deal with safety culture you  
3       got to deal with the actual examples of reprisal that  
4       happen.

5               So I have been posing the question now that the  
6       DOE and the contractors have gotten some religion to  
7       this, partly in thanks to you, partly in thanks to the  
8       media attention, and some people well meaning people  
9       within the Department, I'll say. But where, you know,  
10      what's going to happen when the lights go off or when  
11      people go away. So that's -- there's been a long, long  
12      history of promises in the area of safety culture change.  
13      I've got hanging on the wall in my office a 1988 news  
14      article from a gentleman name Mike Lawrence, his name is  
15      well known here in the Tri-Cities, and he said we don't  
16      tolerate reprisals against workers who raise safety  
17      concerns. And that was in reference to a gentleman named  
18      Ed Bricker that was raising concerns at the time. And  
19      then out along came Hazel O'Leary in 1994 and had a  
20      program of zero tolerance for reprisal against whistle-  
21      blowers. That program came and went. There was a  
22      Congressional hearing in the year 2000, saying Hey, where  
23      are the reforms? They're not sticking. Oh, don't you  
24      worry, Congressman, we definitely are committed to a  
25      program that's going to make sure that it sticks. And so

1       forth and so on, and here we are today.

2                   The problem is that the Department of Energy  
3       does not hold contractors accountable when there is  
4       reprisal. They don't investigate it. They don't deal  
5       with it. It's like it never happened. You don't hear  
6       about it tonight. No one here talked about what happened  
7       to Dr. Tamosaitis. They've never investigated it at the  
8       Department of Energy. Their answer has always been,  
9       well, we'll let the Department of Labor look at it.  
10      Well, the Department of Labor never investigated and  
11      never will investigate it. So it's just going to be, you  
12      know, a living example out there for all workers to see.  
13      And that's what concerns me, is that as opposed to the  
14      nuclear regulatory commission decided to deal with this  
15      issue 15 years ago it said if there's reprisal or an  
16      allegation of reprisal, we will look at it and we will  
17      deal with the perception of it and bite down on it if  
18      there has been reprisal and make sure that the licensee  
19      understands very clearly through a license suspension or  
20      through other accountability that they can't behave in  
21      that manner. And it's worked. So they have got a  
22      program there that works. Why cannot the Department of  
23      Energy take on the same kind of responsibility and the  
24      same kind of accountability? We need that kind of  
25      approach here.

1                   CHAIRMAN:  Could you summarize your comments in  
2   the next minute or two?

3                   MR. CARPENTER:  Thank you.  I sure will.

4                   So we need that kind of approach here at Hanford  
5   and throughout the Department of Energy.  The HSS report  
6   talked about 70 percent of the those surveyed, 70  
7   percent, seven out of 10 said they were not comfortable  
8   in challenging a management decision.  And 50 percent  
9   were uncomfortable in raising a safety issue.  These are  
10  the kind of numbers that would result in a license  
11  suspension at a commercial nuclear facility.  They would  
12  stop work.  They would investigate why.  And they would  
13  say you cannot restart until you fix that.  I don't see  
14  that kind of action here.  I see the same architects of  
15  the reprisal testifying up here tonight.  What's happened  
16  to them?  Nothing.  There hasn't been any change as far  
17  as a meaningful way that you need to have if you really  
18  are serious about changing the culture.

19                  So what's going to be done to re-empower,  
20  rehabilitate, and reinstate those who have been  
21  sacrificed for raising valid safety concern?  And why is  
22  the Department of Energy paying the legal bills for the  
23  contractors in these cases?  We want to see some  
24  meaningful process changes that stick.  Thank you very  
25  much for considering my comments.



1                   CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Allen Fridlund.

2                   MR. FRIDLUND: Hi, I'm Allen Fridlund. I'm a  
3 retired senior health physics technician. I worked for  
4 WRPS and retired last October 1. The reason I retired is  
5 because I felt that I was going to be fired for bringing  
6 up safety concerns. And this was going on throughout the  
7 whole arena that I worked in. I got out because I could  
8 get my benefits and everything even when I wanted another  
9 couple, three years of work. It only made sense to leave  
10 instead of take a chance from getting fired by bringing  
11 up concerns.

12                   I contacted everybody within my company, WRPS,  
13 right up the ladder. No results on anything I brought  
14 up. I've actually talked a couple times with Rick  
15 Shapiro of your group who sent me to Andrew T., who I  
16 thought had a confidential letter from me but it is on  
17 your website right now and that got me a call from Mr.  
18 Podonsky a week later, who was going to look up and  
19 follow these concerns because he thought they were quite  
20 valid. He really didn't do anything either.  
21 And so what I'm really finding out that I've talked to a  
22 lot of great listeners. But I'm really having trouble  
23 finding doers. And when you talk about the safety  
24 culture that you have a problem with now, one of the  
25 words I never heard was trust. And if you get trust

1 you've got a lot going for you. But you have to earn it.  
2 The trouble with trust is that you can lose it in an  
3 instance.

4 So when you see all these violations going out,  
5 you know, lock and tag two, three times a week, probably  
6 one of the most important safety programs within there.  
7 And you put that in the PER system, I think they  
8 wordsmith this so you don't have to put them all in there  
9 anymore. But it would spit out like a jackpot at a slot  
10 machine how times has happened.

11 Any contractor prior to WRPS if we had two in a  
12 month they'd shut it down. They would make all of those  
13 lock and tag packages go over the vice president's desk.  
14 And he had to sign off to be able to do it. They don't  
15 do that anymore. They'd just go on. And we're working  
16 on like 440, you know, steam, just the waste itself and  
17 the routes for these waste transfers, there's valves  
18 closed and all these other things.

19 So I guess what I'm trying to convey to all of  
20 you right now is when you look at this safety culture  
21 you've got to have trust. And as one of the people that  
22 -- just like the gentleman over here, I was put in a no  
23 end work area for the last -- well, ever since WRPS got  
24 there, basically. But where I didn't do anything. And  
25 they just pushed me aside so I couldn't see anything

1 either. And that -- when you have that going on and you  
2 tell DOE representatives and they say we can't do  
3 anything. Then you go, well, why am I saying anything?  
4 And I've just a high school diploma, not a master's.  
5 Thank you for your time.

6 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. David Bruce.

7 MR. BRUCE: My name is David Bruce, I have been  
8 a nuclear chemical process engineer here at Hanford for  
9 46 years. The last six of that on the WTP project. I'm  
10 still employed there in the process engineering group.  
11 And I think I'll just whip through what I've written so I  
12 don't miss anything.

13 I want to first to establish my credibility to  
14 talk about the nuclear safety and quality culture. And  
15 that started when I came here in 1965 to work for General  
16 Electric at B plant. I came with a fresh bachelor's  
17 degree in chemical engineering and of course I was leery  
18 of the nuclear industry. But my mentors were all of  
19 those people that had separated the first plutonium out  
20 of the production reactors in the '40s and '50s. And  
21 they were the same people that started up the large  
22 reprocessing plants, the radax plant and Purex plant in  
23 the '50s and '60s. So I got a good grounding in  
24 practical application of nuclear quality and safety. I  
25 worked there 24 years. I was processing engineer and

1 manufacturing engineer. I was through many plant  
2 startups, worked in the B plant startup for waste  
3 fractionation, design startup, construction of the waste  
4 encapsulation storage facility.

5 In 1980 I went to the Purex plant to get it  
6 restarted. And we restarted it in 1983. And I was  
7 there. I was the principle engineer, principle process  
8 engineer in the Purex plant. When I retired there in  
9 1989, the plant shut down in '89 and looked like they  
10 weren't going to do anything. I took early retirement  
11 from the Purex plant in '89. I was retired three days  
12 because I don't idle well. And I took a job providing  
13 technical expertise to the Department of Energy, DOERL.  
14 And I worked that job 17 years. I was in the 10-3 plant,  
15 clean out, shut down, the first facility representative  
16 for DOE at the Purex plant. And then I spent the last 10  
17 years or so up at the plutonium finishing plant.

18 And so during that time, that 17 years, the DOE  
19 nuclear quality -- safety and quality culture matured.  
20 And it grew up with all the bells and whistles that it  
21 has as we know it right now. So it's with that back-  
22 ground that I took a job with the WTP project. And I was  
23 absolutely appalled at the total lack of the functioning  
24 nuclear safety and quality culture. It just doesn't  
25 exist.

1                   In 2006 when I started there, shortly I  
2                   discovered a major problem with the vacuum evaporators  
3                   where the process solution could be sucked up into the R3  
4                   C3 areas during shutdown. And I thought well, they're  
5                   going to be real proud of me for finding this. So I, I  
6                   went to visions of bonuses and so forth. And anyway, I  
7                   talked to another engineer, he'd been there eight years  
8                   and I explained the technical part of it and he said, you  
9                   better shut up or they'll fire you. And that was his  
10                  first words. And I thought wow, that's not too good.  
11                  And the management neither in the process engineering  
12                  group or in the design group, none of them ever helped  
13                  out to try to get that resolved. I'm going write a PIER  
14                  to finally get the last part of it -- they did change  
15                  some of the material. So it's an uphill battle trying to  
16                  push anything through. I better check my notes here.

17                  CHAIRMAN: I'm sorry. But I have to ask you to  
18                  in the next couple of minutes finish up, if you might.

19                  MR. FRIDLUND: Okay. There have been many  
20                  outside reviews. EFRT and then DOE conducted technical  
21                  ready assessment and those drove us to look at our  
22                  designs much closer. And they added great value to the  
23                  plant. And my main message tonight is that the nuclear  
24                  quality safety and quality culture when I arrived there  
25                  was nonexistent. And I have documentation. I worked on

1 another problem on the steam recycle problem, the nuclear  
2 quality -- safety and quality culture did not exist in  
3 2002. Right on this particular single technical item  
4 right up to 2009 it still didn't exist.

5 So I've -- what I'm telling you is you can fix  
6 the nuclear safety and quality culture today and it will  
7 have no bearing on those designs that were done over the  
8 last ten years.

9 So my message is if this plant is going to ever  
10 start up there has to be an independent technical  
11 intervention on those designs. It has to be independent  
12 because the project is bias to the designs they put out  
13 and they're fine with the status quo. It has to be  
14 technical because there are undoubtedly many, many  
15 technical flaws in those designs that have not been  
16 discovered. And it has to be an intervention because the  
17 project is in denial and they are not able to make the  
18 correction.

19 Now, I knew I wouldn't get through this so I  
20 have got about 300 copies of this. I set over in the  
21 corner, so anybody that wants one I'll hand it out.

22 CHAIRMAN: Would you submit it to the record,  
23 please?

24 MR. FRIDLUND: Sure.

25 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Bert Niederer.

1                   MR. NIEDERER: My name's Bert Niederer. I'm  
2 health physics technician. I've worked out at Hanford  
3 for about 27 years. What I want to address today was  
4 lock and tags. And we seem to have a rash of incidents  
5 of lock and tag violation. Here I have basically 20 lock  
6 and tag violations within the last year. Most of these  
7 have to deal with electricity, which could be fatal if  
8 anything was to go, you know, drastically wrong. And I  
9 think I could give you the PER numbers if you want them.  
10 I have -- if you get on your search engines you would be  
11 able to find all this information. It is right there and  
12 would be able for you.

13                   And then I think from a worker's perception on  
14 this I kind of wanted to leave you with this. And I will  
15 go down through there. And these are not perceptions,  
16 these are things that actually happened while I was at  
17 work. Okay? Radcon supervisors tell junior technicians  
18 to falsify documents; instrument techs told to work  
19 inside a lock and tag boundary without hanging an  
20 authorized worker's lock; electricians issued stop work  
21 and field work supervisor continue work by applying a  
22 lock and tag to the situation on his own; HP Management,  
23 which would be the health physics management, was  
24 notified of a problem of what they call a crawler, which  
25 does the ultrasonic testing on the tanks, was told about

1 a problem with this crawler, the problem was ignored, the  
2 crawler dropped to the bottom of the tank;  
3 disintegrations of lines of communication due to  
4 isolation of teams led to failure of work stops. People  
5 don't know that there's a work stop or a stop work in  
6 place so they continue to work without that knowledge.  
7 DOE safety concerns have been turned over to WRPS to be  
8 investigated and found to be invalid. Chilling effect is  
9 solidly entrenched and safety concerns are not being  
10 reported for fear of termination/retaliating. Workers  
11 won't report injuries on the job for fear of being  
12 considered unfit for duty and not allowed to return to  
13 work. Thank you.

14 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Richard Fleming.

15 MR. FLEMING: My name is Richard Fleming. 35  
16 years an electrician. Worked all over the country.  
17 Worked for Bechtel a bunch of times. And Bechtel is  
18 Bechtel. They're going to make money no matter what they  
19 do. I'm representing myself today, but I'm also  
20 representing the hundreds of people that are former  
21 employees and current employees out there mainly at the  
22 WTP that are afraid to speak out because what these  
23 people have said about retaliation, intimidation,  
24 threats, you name it, economic hardship, is true. And it  
25 is still going on today. And Bechtel has a real good way



1 of bleeding money out of the government, especially a  
2 design build. It's great because they can just keep  
3 building, design, build, design, tear down, design,  
4 build, design, tear down, design. It will go on. It is  
5 an endless money flow.

6 But the safety culture out there, I tried my  
7 best when I went into that project because I was asked to  
8 by a lot of the members of my local because they know I'm  
9 a big fan of safety. And I've seen men die on jobs. And  
10 you -- I'm hoping I'm wrong on this but I've been right  
11 every time I've said it. People will die on this job for  
12 the reasons that these people have said tonight. They  
13 won't even report injuries sometimes just because  
14 they're afraid they'll get laid off. And you need to get  
15 absolute power over DOE so that you can tell them that  
16 you will be the ultimate decider on what gets built and  
17 how the safety culture runs. I urge Congress to give you  
18 that power. Thank you.

19 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. John David.

20 MR. DAVID: My name's John David. I've been  
21 associated with this project from its inception. I'm a  
22 craft safety rep. I've been a tradesman for 33 years.  
23 I would like to thank all of you for coming into this  
24 town tonight to listen to us. But I'd absolutely like to  
25 thank Walt and Donna and Mr. Bruce for standing up for

1 what they've said. Richard and I worked with him as a  
2 craftsman. And for having the guts to say what they've  
3 said because they're absolutely right, those that speak  
4 up most typically disappear.

5 I'm fortunate enough to be a craft safety rep on  
6 this project and that's why I have been able to survive.  
7 The culture is supposed to be positive. And management  
8 speaks out of both sides of their mouth continually from  
9 the top to the bottom. Workers are extremely reluctant  
10 bring up things because of, as Mr. Huizenga said, fear of  
11 reprisal. Top management makes great statements, you  
12 alluded to it to Mr. Russo. They work to really not do  
13 anything. Workers ask questions and they never get  
14 answers. Management gets notifications to stop doing the  
15 work and they don't tell their workers. I see this every  
16 day.

17 Everything in that HSS assessment is absolutely  
18 110 percent true. Mr. Russo talked about answering  
19 questions and presenting a questioning attitude. We are  
20 in a layoff process and in the facility I work in our top  
21 management person stood up there and said I would invite  
22 you all to ask us questions. And every single question  
23 he was asked he had the same answer. I don't know. Now  
24 I'm talking about 10 times, eight times, I don't know. I  
25 swear they send these people to school to never answer

1 anything.

2           Because of constant concerns on this project in  
3 the interest of positivity, the past ORP director,  
4 Shirley Olinger, and Central Washington Building Trades  
5 president, Dave Smith, urged Bechtel to start the craft  
6 safety rep program. We work with the safety committees,  
7 safety assurance, management and most importantly the  
8 craft to solve issues.

9           The workers on this project asked for something  
10 pretty simple. You tell us all the time, bring it up,  
11 and we'll help you. They come up with solutions to  
12 problems. You've heard of something called the PIER  
13 system. That's great for dialogue with computers, craft  
14 workers don't have computers. The PIER system is useless  
15 to the craft. We don't have computers in our tool boxes.

16           I'd like to thank Mr. Bill Miller, Mr. Russo and  
17 his team tried to do everything to rip apart the craft  
18 safety rep program last year. Mr. Miller called me up on  
19 8:40 Eastern time on a Friday night. He was the first  
20 and only guy to call and return my call and he helped me  
21 move forward. And he got Mr. Huizenga involved and Mr.  
22 Huizenga convinced Mr. Russo that he needed to rethink  
23 his process in relationship to tearing apart the craft  
24 safety rep program. Mr. Russo decided when he, myself  
25 and my steward got a chance to talk with him that he was

1 totally going to change his mind and he was going to help  
2 the others that were helping him trying to rip the craft  
3 safety rep program apart and he'd become totally  
4 supportive.

5 We'd also like to thank Mr. Carpenter. It just  
6 so happened Mr. Russo wanted to talk to me after he saw  
7 me talking to Mr. Carpenter in a restaurant in town.

8 I'd like to thank Mr. Scott Samuelson, he also  
9 helped.

10 There's a discussion about safety incentives for  
11 this project and the importance of how that helps people  
12 be motivated. I think Mr. Bader there talked about that  
13 that's approximately one percent or less, right, sir? We  
14 just cut our safety incentive funding in half because of  
15 we have funding issues. We don't recommend anybody goes  
16 to employee concerns because that's your quickest route  
17 out. That is the most useless program you will ever come  
18 across on our site. I know that firsthand because we  
19 went to talk to Shirley Olinger because we couldn't get  
20 any word from our management and our management listened  
21 to our conversation. I don't know if you know about  
22 this, they heard us on one of our cell phones, and the  
23 employee concerns department was brought in to help  
24 protect us. And I don't know where they got these  
25 buffoons, but it was impossible to imagine. It was the

1 most -- it was like watching Barney Fife. This guy told  
2 us he was their topnotch man. They sent him the script  
3 apparently of what they listened to when we talked to  
4 Shirley. That was on a Sunday. He talked to us on a  
5 Wednesday. He told us he felt sick because he just  
6 realized a couple short hours before he met with us that  
7 day right after lunch that that wasn't actually the  
8 script of our conversation and they couldn't find it.

9 CHAIRMAN: Could you summarize in the next  
10 couple of minutes?

11 MR. DAVID: Yes, sir. I welcome that. And I  
12 want to finish here in some positivity. One of the many  
13 reasons that the safety culture at the VIT plant is what  
14 it is, sir, is because this is 100 percent union  
15 represented craft. And we spend locally and nationally  
16 hundreds of thousands of dollars to train people in  
17 safety before they ever hit this job. That's what we  
18 live with. That's what we breathe with because if we  
19 can't work we don't get paid. We're hourly employees.  
20 We're hired by the hour. We don't have sick pay. We  
21 don't have vacations. That's how we -- our body is our  
22 tool so that's why our safety is so important and that's  
23 why we stress it.

24 And I would also like to say to you that it is  
25 rather interesting to me that we have one -- evidence of

1 one of the best safety records in the entire DOE complex  
2 on this Hanford site in relationship to the maintenance  
3 and operations. And there is not one word at all ever  
4 mentioned about utilizing the workforce that is already  
5 on this site to maintain and operate this plant when it's  
6 built. And I will tell you the conversation is 100  
7 percent in the reverse. And to ignore not utilizing  
8 their services would be a huge mistake in what history  
9 has shown us.

10 I thank you all for your time in coming here and  
11 listening to all of us. And it is my honor as a craft  
12 safety rep to be associated with my fellow workers.  
13 Thank you.

14 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Heidi Lambert, please.  
15 Welcome back.

16 MR. LAMBERT: I've never done this before. This  
17 is my second time today. My name is Heidi Lambert and  
18 I'm from Richland, Washington. I'm here with Occupy  
19 Tri-Cities. Please bear with me. I'm very nervous.  
20 From being from around here I'm trying not to question  
21 authority so it is difficult for me.

22 So today we heard that there's no WAC and no  
23 grasp of really what all chemicals are in all the tanks.  
24 We heard this evening about the culture having  
25 destructive tensions and conflict. We heard a lot about

1 what is flawed. But -- and what they were going to do  
2 different. And it sounds the same as what I heard 10  
3 years ago. So I want to know why will this be different?  
4 And I want to know why is it taking so long? And why is  
5 it taking \$2 million a day to tell us that the progress  
6 really isn't being made? And I want know is this really  
7 enough? Is there enough being done to clean up the most  
8 contaminated site in America? And thank you very much  
9 for listening to our concerns.

10 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Jenny McIntyre Dickey.

11 I don't see her so we'll move on.

12 Walter Tamosaitis.

13 DR. TAMOSAITIS: Good evening. My name is Walt  
14 Tamosaitis and I'm representing myself. Again, I want to  
15 thank the Board for your efforts in the past couple of  
16 years to oversee the WTP and what's going on here because  
17 again without your efforts nobody would be watching. So  
18 I personally thank you to help us assure that we get a  
19 safe plant that will operate efficiently.

20 The most recent HSS report in my opinion was  
21 very well done. The people who did that report, starting  
22 with Glenn Podonsky, really deserve a round of applause  
23 because in a culture, in that DOE culture they're really  
24 taking a chance to sign their name to a report like that.  
25 So within DOE I personally look at them as being really

1 stand up leaders who are willing to see something done  
2 right.

3 I do take one issue with their report. In their  
4 summary page they say safety culture change is different  
5 from correcting and resolving technical issues. I would  
6 offer that how technical problems are addressed, how  
7 they're corrected, whether they're pushed aside, is  
8 indeed a reflection of the safety culture. So to say  
9 that resolution of the technical issues is not part of  
10 it, I would question that.

11 Relative to the other surveys which have been  
12 referenced tonight, all the other surveys, from my  
13 review, touched on the issues. Even the most recent, the  
14 one that had the NRC people on it, the I-squad or  
15 IS-squad or ISCSAT, survey talked about the conflict  
16 within the organization and in particular with Bechtel  
17 Engineering. For whatever reason those other surveys  
18 either didn't know what they held in their hands or they  
19 pulled the punch when they issued the summary because  
20 obviously they didn't hit the nail on the head.

21 And again, I compliment the HSS for their report  
22 because they went the whole way and did drive the nail  
23 home.

24 What's more important is not the words and not  
25 what is said and not what memos are sent out to the



1 employees but what actions will be taken. People are  
2 going to move, time is going to march on. If substantive  
3 actions are not taken, the environment will revert to  
4 where it was and many people have commented on that  
5 tonight. An evolutionary approach is what will not  
6 work.

7 In this culture for where we are after a decade  
8 of construction, design construction and the problems  
9 that are faced, we need something which is more  
10 revolutionary. If the DOE implementation plan is any  
11 indication of whether it will provide change I think we  
12 have our answer and the answer is no. I mean, first DOE  
13 responded last June to the Defense Board rep prior to the  
14 public comments being submitted. If that wasn't bad  
15 enough, this past December they issued their  
16 implementation plan knowing the HSS report's coming out.  
17 You would have thought they would have waited, but the  
18 arrogance to address it without having information in  
19 hand to me is just a blatant indication of their interest  
20 to address the issues.

21 All companies are in business to make money and  
22 all customers are interested in schedule. The problem  
23 develops when the focus is on profits and not the  
24 product. When I think back over my 43 years, wherever we  
25 had a great operating system, a great culture, a good

1 team, people focused on the product first and not profits  
2 first. Bechtel's focus, as other people have commented,  
3 is on profits first.

4 With that said, and I've mentioned the word  
5 revolutionary, what changes could be made? I think major  
6 changes are needed to correct both the technical issues  
7 and the culture. We've talked about contract changes.  
8 Leadership changes are needed. Design oversight must be  
9 independent from Bechtel. DOE needs oversight. Even the  
10 most recent example which Dr. Winokur brought up in his  
11 last question indicates that DOE errors on the side of  
12 slapping the hand rather than taking a stronger  
13 enforcement action. You say well, okay, what could we do  
14 to show some action. There were 28 EFRT issues. We've  
15 talked about many of them today being open. Why doesn't  
16 DOE demand that any of those issues that were declared  
17 closed that have open work be reopened. And then any  
18 money that's been given to Bechtel and URS be given back.  
19 And then we'd have a good open accounting of what the  
20 open issues are at least relative to those 28.

21 CHAIRMAN: Could you summarize your comments in  
22 the next moment or two, please.

23 DR. TAMOSAITIS: Yes, sir. I'm just finishing.  
24 Without the proactive change, without doing something  
25 that demonstrates definite change, the culture is going

1 to stay where it's at. So I again applaud the Board for  
2 their actions and I'll thank you in advance for the  
3 efforts you'll do to see that things are improved in the  
4 WTP because we need it. Thank you very much.

5 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Pat Pento.

6 MR. PENTO: Hello, my name is Pat Pento. And I  
7 have worked for 10 years on the WTP project. These views  
8 I'm expressing, however, are completely and solely mine.  
9 As far as the authorization basis is concerned, with  
10 respect to safety a large portion of it is based on a  
11 Pacific Northwest National Lab Study concerning gas  
12 retention in the solids. Now, this study tells you that  
13 gas is retained in the solids but it takes almost six  
14 months for the gas to come up to the surface and result  
15 in a hydrogen explosion. So also this gas retention  
16 study was based on the double shell tanks and based on a  
17 composition of waste that can never exist at the WTP.  
18 Because the study clearly points out that this gas  
19 retention can occur only in tanks which have very high  
20 soil cake content.

21 So when you form an authorization basis based on  
22 the study, you're essentially forbidding the WTP to let  
23 the waste settle. And you have this constant -- you have  
24 this criteria that the waste has to be constantly stirred  
25 and kept well mixed. And what I would like to do is

1 request you to reconsider that decision because that  
2 decision is making this project cost 10 times what it  
3 should cost. And there is no logical technical reason to  
4 apply the same criteria that was used in the PNNL study  
5 to the WTP. It's forcing the WTP to use a process called  
6 ultra- filtration, which is a totally inappropriate  
7 process for concentrating the solids in the waste. And  
8 it's a real struggle. It will make the pretreatment  
9 facility operate 10 times longer than what it should  
10 operate. If you just use a gravity clarifier or a  
11 centrifuge to concentrate the solids you'll be that far  
12 ahead.

13           And I've worked in the nuclear reprocessing in  
14 the DOE nuclear field for the last over four years. In  
15 fact, I started here at Hanford in 1973. And I worked  
16 until 1980 when conditions were becoming so bad that you  
17 could hardly get anything done. And then I went to work  
18 in the oil business and then I lost my job in the oil  
19 company when the price of oil went from \$36 a barrel to  
20 \$12 a barrel. And then I find a job with the Idaho  
21 National Lab and I worked there for 16 years. And even  
22 -- and things were 10 times worse at Idaho National Lab  
23 than when I left here. And just to give you an example  
24 of how, you know, I'm not talking about safety and the  
25 lock and tag and the electrical safety, but I'm just

1 talking about going overboard on safety and making this  
2 -- making -- forcing the project to use ultrafiltration.  
3 It's a totally inappropriate process.

4 Just to give you an example on this overemphasis  
5 on safety that's occurring. When I left the Idaho  
6 National Lab in 2001 to come and work on this project --  
7 I'm sorry, I started at Idaho National Lab in 1984.

8 CHAIRMAN: Could you summarize your comments?  
9 Thank you.

10 MR. PENTO: Yes. I will summarize. And we had  
11 three dissolvers running, we were producing product,  
12 sending it to Oak Ridge. You know, the mission of the  
13 Idaho National Lab is to take the Navy nuclear fuels.  
14 And we had 1,100 people at the chem plant. And when I  
15 left in 2001 to come here nothing was running. And there  
16 were 4,500 people at the chem plant. And that's all  
17 because of ISMS and all these overemphasis on safety  
18 that's occurring.

19 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Let me check again for  
20 Jenny McIntyre Dickey. Are there any other comments from  
21 the public?

22 MR. WOOD: I want to thank you again. I was  
23 here this afternoon and also presented. My comments from  
24 this afternoon really do apply. There seems to be whole  
25 lot of acronyms involved with owning different pieces of

1 this and nobody's responsible.

2 CHAIRMAN: Could you identify yourself?

3 MR. WOOD: My name is Richard Wood and I live in  
4 Portland and support Portland Occupy and a number of  
5 other community groups. And basically we're looking for  
6 open government and open information. There's a lot a  
7 secrecy -- this nuclear stuff is not a secret anymore.  
8 Its safety is.

9 So anyway, what I wanted to speak to a little  
10 bit. I left industry about a year ago because of a whole  
11 lot of injustices I see in pay and compensation, in  
12 benefits and health and salary. One of the things I've  
13 consistently heard here and because I was among you at  
14 one time in my career, I've worked in a lot of heavy  
15 industry, and one of the constant threads I get is, when  
16 I come in and do a safety assessment or a risk  
17 assessment, the first thing I'm thinking about is my  
18 family at home. When I come into work everything there  
19 is secondary to my family at home. So my risk assessment  
20 at work is something like this. If I lose my job I have  
21 no health insurance. If I lose my job I lose my  
22 livelihood. If I lose my job I lose my house. There's  
23 my first level of health risk assessment. So now when I  
24 come in amongst my peers I've got to worry about this and  
25 this is nuclear stuff so the health concerns are global

1 when you're involved in this. But that job, a short term  
2 contract, worrying about speaking out here and going back  
3 to the union hall tomorrow and not getting work or being  
4 put in a basement job is very real across 35 years of  
5 this industry. I'm almost amazed that safety culture  
6 would have to be discussed because you're supposed to be  
7 a mature industry. I don't understand this. I see a  
8 program office. I use a PIER to be the program office.  
9 And I know you have a staff you should be doubling that  
10 because who is running this show? I don't -- you folks  
11 are. And thank you very much for doing that. I  
12 appreciate the great questions. But this is out of -- it  
13 looks like somebody sold somebody a long time ago a bill  
14 of goods and they've just milked the profit machine out  
15 of this. Half of this isn't new. This gentleman  
16 referred to the mixing. DWPF vitrification was done in  
17 Savannah River 10 years before here. So we're being  
18 resold a bill of goods somewhere, folks, and it needs to  
19 be talked about. I thank you all for the time.

20 CHAIRMAN: Thank you. Any other members of the  
21 public that would like to speak at this time? Seeing  
22 none, with that I'm going to turn to the Board members  
23 for their closing statements and then I'll end with my  
24 comments. Ms. Roberson.

25 VICE CHAIRMAN: I defer to you, Mr. Chairman.

1           CHAIRMAN: Dr. Mansfield.

2           DR. MANSFIELD: I have no statement.

3           CHAIRMAN: Mr. Bader.

4           MR. BADER: No comments.

5           CHAIRMAN: Thank you. I'll now provide some  
6 closing remarks. First, on behalf of the entire Board  
7 I'd like to recognize the dedication of the workers at  
8 Hanford who are working to get the Waste Treatment Plant  
9 built and clean up the site. Our discussions with the  
10 Department of Energy on safety culture and resolution of  
11 safety issues are aimed at making sure that the workers  
12 at Hanford have the tools and management support that  
13 they need in order to accomplish this vitally important  
14 work safely and efficiently.

15           Second, I want to acknowledge the hospitality of  
16 the Hanford site and local community. I'd also like to  
17 thank our witnesses and all the members of the public who  
18 participated in this meeting and hearing. I want to  
19 particularly thank the Congressional staff and its  
20 elected officials and other representatives of the state  
21 and local organizations that participated here today. An  
22 active community with engaged leaders is a vital part of  
23 any successful program of this nature.

24           This is the second time in 18 months that the  
25 Board has chosen to hold a hearing at Hanford because of



1 the essential role the Waste Treatment Plan will play in  
2 processing the large volume of toxic and radioactive  
3 waste now stored in underground tanks at Hanford. The  
4 project needs to resolve its longstanding technical  
5 issues, some of which have been known and reported on for  
6 more than decade. Left unresolved these technical issues  
7 will impact the safety, for the reliability, and  
8 capability of the plant to treat waste.

9           The Board is convinced that these issues have  
10 persisted in large part due to a poor safety culture.  
11 Unfortunately this resulted in an unproductive cycle  
12 where a difficulty in dealing with persistent technical  
13 issues in turn contributed to a worsening safety culture.  
14 To the maximum extent possible, solutions to the design  
15 and operational issues of the Waste Treatment Plant must  
16 be accommodated before commissioning. A learn as we go  
17 philosophy is not prudent or safe for this facility. To  
18 support safe and reliable operation of the plant, the  
19 Board will continue its focus -- to focus its oversight  
20 activities on the safety related aspects of the design to  
21 ensure the plant's design is consistent with the  
22 Department's requirements and implementing standards,  
23 especially the DOE nuclear safety management rule 10CFR,  
24 that's Code of Federal Regulations, part 830, its  
25 associated standard for preparing documented safety

1 analyses, DOE Standard 3009, and DOE's order on facility  
2 safety, Order 420.1B.

3           The Board wants to take a moment to reiterate  
4 several recent and positive actions taken by the  
5 Department. The Secretary and the Deputy's memorandum of  
6 December 5th, 2011, set a clear and unambiguous vision  
7 for nuclear safety and safety culture at DOE's defense  
8 nuclear facilities. Also, in December the Secretary  
9 provided his plan for implementing Board Recommendation  
10 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and  
11 Immobilization Plant. And the Department is now taking  
12 steps to improve safety culture throughout the complex.

13           And lastly, as we discussed in detail at this  
14 hearing, the Department's Office of Health, Safety and  
15 Security issued a noteworthy report in January 2012 on  
16 its independent oversight assessment of nuclear safety  
17 culture and management of nuclear safety concerns at the  
18 waste treatment and immobilization plant. Mr. Podonsky's  
19 team provided significant insights and the pathway to  
20 improve safety culture throughout the DOE complex.

21           Once again I thank everyone for their  
22 participation at this hearing. The record of this  
23 proceeding will remain open until June 23rd, 2012. I  
24 would like to reiterate that the Board reserves its right  
25 to further schedule and regulate the course of this

1 public meeting and hearing to reassess, reconvene,  
2 postpone or adjourn this public meeting and hearing and  
3 to otherwise exercise its authority under the Atomic  
4 Energy Act of 1954 as amended.

5           This concludes this portion of the public  
6 meeting and hearing of the Defense Nuclear Facilities  
7 Safety Board. We are now in recess. We will reconvene  
8 in Washington, DC, at the Board's headquarters on May  
9 22nd, 2012, to hear from senior department officials to  
10 discuss their approach to addressing the broader policy  
11 and programmatic issues associated with Recommendation  
12 2011-1 and their effort to evaluate the safety culture at  
13 the Waste Treatment Plant and other design projects,  
14 sites and programs at DOE.

15           Thank you all for attending.

16 (Hearing recessed at 9:40 p.m.)

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