



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY

Department of Energy Activities Relating to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

Fiscal Year 2025

Report to Congress

May 2026

United States Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

Message from the Secretary

Following is the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy's (Department or DOE), including the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA or NA), Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 annual report to Congress addressing the activities related to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or Board) and status of Implementation Plans (IPs) in response to accepted Board recommendations, as required by section 316(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), codified at 42 United States Code (USC) §2286e(b) and section 315(g)(1) of the AEA, codified at 42 USC § 2286d(g)(1).

The Board provides analysis, advice, and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy (Secretary) regarding the safety of the Department's defense nuclear facilities (DNFs). DOE as regulator and owner, ensures to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the DOE workforce and the public from operations conducted at the Department's DNFs.


Pursuant to statutory requirements, this report is being provided to the following members of Congress:

- **The Honorable Susan Collins**
Chair, Senate Committee on Appropriations
- **The Honorable Patty Murray**
Vice Chair, Senate Committee on Appropriations
- **The Honorable Roger Wicker**
Chairman, Senate Committee on Armed Services
- **The Honorable Jack Reed**
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services
- **The Honorable Mike Lee**
Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
- **The Honorable Martin Heinrich**
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
- **The Honorable Tom Cole**
Chairman, House Committee on Appropriations
- **The Honorable Rosa DeLauro**
Ranking Member, House Committee on Appropriations
- **The Honorable Mike Rogers**
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
- **The Honorable Adam Smith**
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services

- **The Honorable Brett Guthrie**
Chairman, House Committee on Energy and Commerce
- **The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr.**
Ranking Member, House Committee on Energy and Commerce

If you have any questions regarding the information in this report, please contact Mr. Jared Hatch, Deputy Director for External Coordination for Appropriations, Office of Budget, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, at (202) 329-5503; or Mr. Scott Marks, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Senate Affairs or Mr. Michael Inguanta, Deputy Assistant Secretary for House Affairs, Office of Congressional and Intergovernmental Affairs, at (202) 586-5450.

Sincerely,



Chris Wright
Secretary of Energy

Executive Summary

This is DOE's, including the NNSA, annual report to Congress¹ regarding the Department's FY 2025 activities related to the DNFSB and status of IPs in response to accepted Board recommendations.²

It is the policy of DOE to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection and safety of workers, the public, and the environment during the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of its DNFs. This policy is implemented through the Department's nuclear and worker safety programs, which are comprised of a robust regulatory framework and multi-layered oversight by DOE line management and headquarters organizations. DNFSB, an independent executive branch agency established by Congress in 1988, provides analysis, advice, and recommendations to the Secretary regarding safety at DOE DNFs.

In addition to supporting Board visits to DOE sites, in FY 2025, DOE:

- Provided over 3,000 documents to DNFSB in response to 181 requests for information.
- Participated in 12 meetings or briefings with the Board.
- Completed responses to 13 Board reporting requirements.

Additional information regarding these and other interactions is detailed within the report. As of the end of FY 2025, the status of open DOE IPs developed in response to accepted Board recommendations is as follows:

- Recommendation 2019-1, *Uncontrolled Hazard Scenarios and 10 CFR 830 Implementation at the Pantex Plant*. A briefing on the results of the IP effectiveness review was conducted on December 10, 2024. This recommendation is closed, via Board letter dated January 30, 2025.
- Recommendation 2020-1, *Nuclear Safety Requirements*. The IP contains 17 milestones, 11 of which were completed prior to FY 2025. In December 2024 and May 2025, the Department notified DNFSB about a delay in three deliverables (5.2.3, 5.3.2, and 5.5.2).
- Recommendation 2023-1, *Onsite Transportation Safety*. IP issued on October 7, 2024, containing six deliverables. On August 22, 2025, the Department transmitted Deliverable 2.C, *Extent of Condition Summary Report*.

¹ In accordance with Section 316(b) of the AEA, codified at 42 USC § 2286e(b).

² In accordance with Section 315(g)(1) of the AEA, codified at 42 USC § 2286d(g)(1).



DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

FISCAL YEAR 2025

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I. Legislative Language

This report is being provided to Congress in accordance with section 316(b) of the AEA, codified at 42 USC § 2286e(b):

DOE REPORT. The Secretary of Energy shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, and Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, and Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate each year, at the same time that the President submits the budget to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of Title 31 [United States Code], a written report concerning the activities of the Department of Energy under this subchapter during the year preceding the year in which the report is submitted.

This report also addresses section 315(g)(1) of the AEA, codified at 42 USC § 286d(g)(1), which states:

Subject to paragraph (2), not later than one year after the date on which the Secretary of Energy transmits an implementation plan with respect to a recommendation (or part thereof) under subsection (f), the Secretary of Energy shall carry out and complete the implementation plan. If complete implementation of the plan takes more than 1 year, the Secretary of Energy shall submit a report to the Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, and Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, and Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate setting forth the reasons for the delay and when implementation will be completed.

II. Introduction

This report contains information regarding FY 2025 activities between the DOE, including the NNSA, and the DNFSB, regarding safety-related initiatives and activities at DOE DNFs, and the status of open DOE IPs developed in response to DNFSB recommendations accepted by the Secretary.

Section 318 of AEA, codified at 42 USC § 2286g, defines a DNF as:

- (1) A production facility or utilization facility (as defined in 42 USC § 2014 [§ 11 of the AEA]) that is under the control or jurisdiction of the Secretary and that is operated for national security purposes, but the term does not include:
 - (a) Any facility or activity covered by Executive Order No. 12344, dated February 1, 1982, pertaining to the Naval nuclear propulsion program;
 - (b) Any facility or activity involved with the transportation of nuclear explosives or nuclear material;
 - (c) Any facility that does not conduct atomic energy defense activities; or
 - (d) Any facility owned by the United States Enrichment Corporation.

(2) A nuclear waste storage facility under the control or jurisdiction of the Secretary, but the term does not include a facility developed pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (42 USC 10101 et seq.) and licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

DOE Sites with Defense Nuclear Facilities

Site Name	Acronym or Abbreviation	Location	DOE Program Office Responsible for DNFs*
Hanford Site	Hanford	Washington	EM, SC
Idaho Cleanup Project	ICP	Idaho	EM
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	LLNL	California	NA
Los Alamos National Laboratory	LANL	New Mexico	NA, EM
Nevada National Security Site	NNSS	Nevada	NA, EM
Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management	OREM	Tennessee	EM
Pantex Plant	Pantex	Texas	NA
Sandia National Laboratories – New Mexico	SNL-NM	New Mexico	NA
Savannah River Site	SRS	South Carolina	NA, EM
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant	WIPP	New Mexico	EM
Y-12 National Security Complex	Y-12	Tennessee	NA

* EM = Office of Environmental Management; NA = National Nuclear Security Administration; SC = Office of Science

It is DOE policy to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection and safety of workers, the public, and the environment during the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of its DNFs. The Department protects its workers, the public, and the environment from hazards associated with its DNFs through rigorous and proactive nuclear and worker safety programs. These programs are comprised of a robust regulatory framework of Federal Regulations, DOE directives (i.e., Policies, Orders, Manuals, and Guides), Notices and technical standards, and multi-layered oversight by DOE line management, management and operating contractors, federally managed field and headquarters Program Offices, the DOE Office of Environment, Health, Safety, and Security (EHSS), Office of Enterprise Assessments, and Central Technical Authorities.

DNFSB, an independent executive branch agency established by Congress in 1988, provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary regarding the status and implementation of DOE safety programs designed to provide protection of workers and the public from operations conducted at DOE DNFs. The Board and the Department communicate and interact through a variety of mechanisms, including Board recommendations, reporting requirements, informational letters, public meetings, public hearings, briefings, discussions, and site visits.

DNFSB:

- Reviews and evaluates the content and implementation of DOE standards and directives relating to the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of DOE DNFs.
- Performs analyses of design and operational data from DOE DNFs.

- Performs investigations of safety-related practices, incidents, and accidents at DOE DNFs.
- Reviews the design and construction of new DOE DNFs.
- Makes recommendations regarding safety at DOE DNFs.

Within DOE, interactions with DNFSB are governed by DOE Order (O) 140.1A, *Interface with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board*, issued June 15, 2020, that emphasizes DOE line management accountability and establishes clear requirements and responsibilities for DOE Federal and contractor staff when communicating and/or interfacing with DNFSB. Additional information regarding Departmental interactions with DNFSB is available at: <https://ehss.energy.gov/deprep/>.

III. Departmental Activities Related to the DNFSB

This section provides information regarding notable activities between DOE and DNFSB and other information related to safety at DOE DNFs. This section also provides information regarding responses to Board requests for information, general topics of interest to DNFSB, meetings and briefings between the two agencies, and the status of reporting requirements.

A. Departmental Activities

Implementation of DOE-STD-3009-2014, *Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis*

On December 6, 2024, the Board transmitted a letter to Secretary Granholm with reporting requirements for a briefing and a report regarding implementation of DOE Standard (STD) 3009-2014, *Preparation of Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analysis*. Specifically, for DNFs with Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) written to DOE-STD-3009-94, *Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses*, DOE was requested to provide: (1) plans to transition facility DSAs to DOE-STD-3009-2014, (2) DOE’s rationale for facilities that will not transition to DOE-STD-3009-2014 within 5 years, and (3) DOE’s plans to ensure wide and timely implementation of new safe harbors that strengthen safety requirements.

In its response dated June 20, 2025, and briefing on September 22, 2025, the Department stated that there is no DOE-wide schedule or direction to update DSAs to DOE-STD-3009-2014. The decision to transition the DSA of a facility from one safe harbor methodology to another is made on a case-by-case basis and ultimately approved by the Safety Basis Approval Authority. DOE’s position is that the currently identified safe harbor methods for DSA preparation listed in Table 1 of 10 CFR Part 830, Subpart B, Appendix A, are acceptable and meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 830, Nuclear Safety Management.

Nuclear Criticality Safety Programs

Consistent with the Board’s letter dated January 6, 2022, DOE transmits an Annual Metrics Report on Nuclear Criticality Safety Programs. The report includes: (1) a summary of the health of the criticality safety programs, (2) number and a short description of criticality safety infractions per site-specific criteria, (3) number and a short description of identified non-compliances with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety, (4) total number of criticality safety issues, and (5) contractor and federal criticality safety staffing levels. The FY 2024 annual report was

issued in March 2025 and briefing to the Board was held in May 2025. No unsatisfactory performance ratings were reported.

Facility Maintenance – Aging Infrastructure Management

In FY 2025, DOE and DNFSB initiated discussions to plan a workshop focusing on aging infrastructure management requirements and practices at DOE and other agencies. Both DOE and DNFSB are approaching this workshop as an opportunity for continuous improvement, versus the need to address specific safety concerns at DOE. Both DOE and DNFSB also recognize that while the aging infrastructure management topic was a part of Board Recommendation 2020-1, the Department has completed and transmitted to the Board all IP deliverables associated with this topic in FY 2024. Thus, the workshop planning effort is not associated with Recommendation 2020-1. At the end of FY 2025, planning for this continuous improvement workshop is on hold while DOE considers the priorities, costs, and benefits of a workshop.

Revision of DOE O 425.1D, Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities

On December 5, 2023, the Board sent a letter to the Secretary with a reporting requirement for a briefing and written response regarding the revision of DOE O 425.1D, *Verification Of Readiness To Startup Or Restart Nuclear Facilities*, that allows up to an 18-month facility shutdown without restart readiness reviews and allows parallel contractor and DOE readiness reviews. DOE provided the briefing on June 13, 2024, and worked with the Board to address its concerns. The final order, DOE O 425.1E, was issued on September 25, 2024. The Department transmitted a written response to the Board on November 26, 2024.

B. Site-Specific Activities

Hanford Site

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant

In early FY 2025, the Cold Commissioning Management Assessment was completed successfully with actions verified and authorization to commence cold commissioning in November 2024. Cold commissioning was initiated successfully. The Low Activity Waste (LAW) Facility melter was operated with the chemical hazards (nitrogen oxide, ammonia) and successfully completed both the Contractor and DOE operational readiness reviews. Environmental Performance Demonstration Testing for Melter 1 was completed late FY 2025 and the Washington Department of Ecology authorized DOE to introduce radiological feed material and process the first 3 million gallons of LAW. On October 3, 2024, the Board issued a letter for information only on the maintenance program for the LAW Facility, which included observations regarding the timeline for accomplishing preventive maintenance activities and work planning processes.

On August 12, 2025, the Board issued a letter regarding the configuration management and conduct of operations programs for the LAW Facility, which noted improvements are needed in: (1) processes for managing and controlling facility configuration deviations; (2) technical procedure quality; and (3) shift turnover. The review on the conduct of operations program was conducted in FY 2024 and DNFSB provided preliminary observations in early FY 2025 that were evaluated and addressed appropriately. The review on the configuration

management program was conducted in FY 2024 and DNFSB provided preliminary observations in late FY 2024 that were evaluated and addressed appropriately.

On September 22, 2025, preliminary DNFSB observations regarding LAW Facility Emergency Preparedness implementation were provided. In each case, the observations were evaluated against existing corrective actions and adjustments made where appropriate.

Central Waste Complex

In FY 2025, issues regarding an ongoing update to the DSA and Technical Safety Requirement (TSR), identified in a November 16, 2021, Board letter, continued to be addressed. The letter documented the results of the DNFSB November 2020 safety basis review of the Central Waste Complex and identified several weaknesses and areas for improvement in the DSA and TSR documents.

The Central Waste Complex safety basis documents are part of the Solid Waste Operations Complex (SWOC) safety basis. As part of the DSA and TSRs update, the T Plant Complex is receiving a stand-alone safety basis document set. The contractor is 35% complete with developing the revised safety basis documentation, on track to complete the revisions by the end of FY 2026. The Waste Receiving and Processing Facility (WRAP) and 2706T/TA have had Final Hazard Categorizations performed, downgrading the facilities to Below Hazard Category 3. The Master DSA for SWOC is undergoing updates to remove the WRAP and 2706T/TA facilities from the SWOC safety basis documentation.

242-A Evaporator Facility

On September 22, 2025, DOE briefed the Board regarding concerns and status related to (1) a fire-related vulnerability of safety-significant solenoid valves located in the condenser room, and (2) the adequacy of programmatic administrative controls for seismic shutdown, as required in a June 27, 2023, Board letter. The briefing also addressed questions the Board raised in the June 12, 2025, Board letter, regarding the reliability of the seismic dump system and DOE's approach for providing guidance for design of safety significant instrumentation and controls systems for an existing facility when the design is not a major modification.

Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP)

In FY 2025, DOE continued to interact with DNFSB regarding the following activities at the site:

Integrated Waste Treatment Unit

From October 2024 through January 2025, the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit was actively treating sodium bearing waste from the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center Tank Farm Facility. After successfully processing ~211,000 gallons, the facility initiated a controlled shutdown in February 2025 and shortly thereafter entered a maintenance outage to replace granular activated carbon bed media that had become saturated with mercury due to waste treatment. The outage was concluded in June 2025 but during startup activities in July, high differential temperatures were observed in the Carbon Reduction Reformer vessel and a controlled shutdown was initiated to investigate and take corrective action.

Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP)

In FY 2025, shipment of BN510 drums to WIPP continued. An Ultrasonic Testing System was developed and implemented to measure the thickness of the bottom of the BN510 drums. This thickness measurement is to validate the drums remain compliant with Department of Transportation (DOT) 7A requirements. During FY 2025, more than 3,000 drums have undergone Ultrasonic Testing with about 86% passing. The remaining 14% failed the Ultrasonic Testing process due to incomplete scans (13%) and metal thickness less than the DOT 7A specification (1%).

Throughout FY 2025, the AMWTP Treatment Facility continued to repackage drums with pucks containing criticality cleanout waste; 168 drums were repackaged. These product drums were being repackaged due to the degraded interior condition of the drums from corrosion from the crit cleanout waste. Late in FY 2024 (September 23, 2024), while repacking a crit cleanout product drum, there was a flame event with the flame emerging from the bottom of the product drum. The cause was investigated and determined to be the result of some volatile organic compounds not fully squeezed out or adsorbed when previously compacted. Appropriate response actions were taken, additional controls evaluated, and the repackaging of product drums re-initiated. The DOE ICP field office and the contractor discussed the flame event, cause, and follow on actions with the DNSFB multiple times during FY 2025.

Calcine Disposition Project

In the fourth quarter of FY 2024, the Calcine Disposition Project Critical Decision-0, *Approve Mission Need (Revised)* (CD-0R) was approved aligning the project with current cost and schedule projections.

Technology validation studies assessing vitrification technology applicability to calcine high-level waste continued throughout FY 2025 and are anticipated for completion in Q1 FY 2026. The studies support development of conceptual designs for an eventual recommendation of an alternative selection at CD-1, *Approve Alternative Selection*, projected in FY 2030.

The accomplishments in FY 2025 directly support the renegotiated milestones of the Idaho National Laboratory (and ICP) Consent Order in which DOE is required to develop and implement treatment capacities and technologies to meet Resource Conservation and Recovery Act land disposal restrictions for all covered mixed wastes currently in storage and to be generated or received in the future.

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)

The Board visited LANL in August 2025, where they were briefed on current missions, met with Laboratory and Field Office leadership and walked down facilities to include the Plutonium and Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility.

Plutonium Facility–Building 4 (PF-4) (NA)

- Documented Safety Analysis

In FY 2024, DOE provided DNFSB a draft PF-4 DSA prepared in accordance with DOE STD 3009-2014, for review and comment. The NNSA Safety Basis Review Team reviewed and incorporated, as appropriate, DNFSB feedback and input from the Office of Enterprise Assessments. The DSA was submitted for approval in FY 2025.

- Nuclear Criticality Safety Review

On March 17, 2025, Board transmitted a letter to the Secretary sharing the results of a review on nuclear criticality at LANL, SRS, and Y-12. The criticality assessment identified that all three sites have Criticality Safety Programs that are well-established and effectively ensure safe operations. The letter includes recommendations for continuous improvement related to mitigating the impact of contractor retention challenges, implementing effective requirements and guidance to ensure reliable control implementation, and maintaining robust feedback mechanisms.

- Decontamination and Decommissioning Work Planning

On June 12, 2025, Board transmitted a letter to the Secretary sharing the results of a review regarding decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) work planning and control at LANL. The review noted weaknesses in D&D work planning and concluded that LANL should ensure the full project scope is analyzed for potential impacts on safety systems; identify the hazards associated with work activities; establish adequate controls on work scope; ensure work is performed properly by improving document quality and reinforcing expectations for place keeping and signoffs; and improve the development and implementation of D&D work planning procedures.

- Glovebox Integrity Review

On April 10, 2024, the Board issued a letter to the Secretary with a requirement for a briefing to address LANL glovebox safety issues and NNSA's plans for disseminating lessons-learned from the glovebox loss of integrity events investigated at LANL. NNSA and LANL briefed the Board on August 6, 2024. Based on that briefing the DNFSB, has started an assessment, which NNSA is supporting, focused on quality assurance requirements for procuring gloveboxes.

Technical Area 21 (EM)

In September 2024, the DSA Implementation Verification Reviews for Building 257 and Industrial Waste Lines at Technical Area 21 were approved. Full implementation of the DSAs and TSRs was declared on September 25, 2024. Building 257 roof repair was completed in FY 2025, which was necessary to meet the safety requirements for future characterization of the building.

Technical Area 54, Area G (EM)

In FY 2025, DOE continued to proactively communicate with DNFSB regarding Area G activities. Forty-three (43) shipments of (193.4 cubic meters) Transuranic (TRU) waste were sent to WIPP.

In FY 2025, the approved TA-54 DSA/TSR was to be implemented in February 2025. However, EM-LA decided to delay implementation to collaborate with NNSA in order to prioritize venting and disposing of the Flanged Tritium Waste Containers. This also allowed time to reevaluate the DSA/TSR to optimize some challenges that were identified, and a new optimized DSA will be submitted in the second quarter of FY 2026 with implementation by the end of FY 2026.

Remediated Nitrate Salt TRU Waste Stored at Waste Control Specialists, LLC (EM)

In FY 2025, DOE pursued a plan to prepare the LANL-generated TRU waste currently stored at Waste Control Specialists, LLC facility in Texas for shipment to an off-site DOE facility for permanent disposition. The waste will ultimately be disposed of at WIPP. The Board was involved in meetings and discussions regarding this plan.

Nevada National Security Site (NNSS)

The Board visited the NNSS in August 2025, receiving tours and briefings on activities at the Device Assembly Facility, National Criticality Experiments Research Center, Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research Facility and Principal Underground Laboratory for Subcritical Experimentation Facility.

Device Assembly Facility

- Lithium-Ion Battery Uninterruptable Power Supply

On August 13, 2024, the Board issued a letter to the Secretary with a reporting requirement for a written response and briefing regarding identified safety issues associated with the use of lithium-ion batteries at DOE DNF's and specifically at the Device Assembly Facility. The Board noted concerns regarding requirements and guidance to assess the hazards and identify safety controls necessary for the use of lithium-ion energy storage systems in general; and identified specific safety concerns with the new Device Assembly Facility uninterrupted power supply. In response to one concern, a Potential Inadequacy of the Safety Analysis was declared on December 12, 2024. DOE provided a written response to the Board's concerns on March 14, 2025, and DOE briefed the Board on April 28, 2025. As of the end of FY 2025, a compensatory measure remains in place to ensure safe operations while additional analysis is conducted.

- Support for DNFSB Reviews

The NNSS and National Laboratories supported DNFSB reviews of the Enhanced Staging Project and Glovebox Enhancements Project at the Device Assembly Facility.

Principal Underground Laboratory for Subcritical Experimentation Facility

- Facility Design

On July 25, 2024, the Board issued a letter to the Secretary with reporting requirements for a report and briefing that address identified safety-related questions pertaining to the facility design and operations. On December 11, 2024, DOE provided a written response, and on January 30, 2025, DOE briefed the Board on its response.

- Subcritical Experiments Program

During the week of January 20, 2025, DNFSB reviewed the Device Response Methodology process for Subcritical Experiments at Los Alamos National Laboratory. In May 2025, DOE held classified discussions with DNFSB to address follow-up questions. As of the end of FY 2025, DOE was coordinating similar activities with the DNFSB relating to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

In FY 2025, DNFSB observed a Contractor Readiness Activity related to the Subcritical Experiments Program.

Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management

DNFSB routinely visited and observed operations in FY 2025; and in June 2025, the Acting Chairman and DNFSB visited the site.

TRU Waste Processing Center (TWPC)

During FY 2025, the inventory of TRU waste continued to be safely and systematically reduced.

In FY 2025, eight (8) TRU waste shipments to WIPP, and two (2) low-level waste shipments to NNSS, including the Radium Boron source were completed. In FY 2025 processing of cellulosic materials continued with TWPC processing approximately 8 cubic meters. During this FY, the readiness assessment for oxide processing was completed and oxide processing began in late September. DNFSB observed and provided input regarding the federal readiness assessment.

Uranium-233 Project

During FY 2025, Uranium-233 Project material continued to be safely managed, stored, and dispositioned.

In FY 2025, the Initial Processing Campaign (IPC) continued processing waste. A total of 78 canisters in the hot cells were processed, approximately 17 grams of thorium have been processed and shipped for beneficial use from project start, and 22 debris tanks of solidified U-233 have been shipped off site for final disposition. Two Radio-Chemical Process canisters were processed in FY 2025 with the remaining scheduled to be processed in FY 2026 and FY 2027.

Safety basis revisions in FY 2025 provided incorporation of new centrifuge operations for IPC material processing, the installation and operation of the new Material Preparation Glovebox, and utilization of various storage areas.

Pantex Plant

In April 2025, the Board's Acting Chairman visited Pantex to tour the site and participate in site management discussions on special tooling, Pantex safety basis and weapon response changes, electro-static dissipative floor challenges, current and upcoming production schedules, pit repackaging, material staging, and aging infrastructure. The Board toured the site and observed an emergency exercise.

- Safety Basis Improvements

In January 2025, the Board notified the acting Secretary that it considered Recommendation 2019-1, *Uncontrolled Hazard Scenarios and 10 CFR 830 Implementation at the Pantex Plant*, to be closed. The Board recognized the safety improvements from the actions associated with the Department's IP to address Recommendation 2019-1, as demonstrated in the B61 Hazard Analysis Report, and that NNSA would continue to implement safety improvements into the remaining Pantex safety basis documents. In the same letter, the Board identified several open safety issues for which it requested a written report from NNSA to discuss any actions taken or planned for these remaining open safety issues and observations and implementation of these actions across other appropriate weapon programs. The open safety issues included: (1) design feature implementation, (2) special tooling performance criteria, (3) procedure compliance assumptions with the safety analysis, (4) soft mitigative surfaces, and (5) electrostatic dissipative footwear. There were also additional observations and positive developments noted in the letter. NNSA provided a written report to the Board in August 2025 addressing the open safety issues and the observations.

As part of safety basis improvements, Pantex developed an alternate methodology for maintaining the Pantex DSA in order to meet 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, *Safety Basis Requirements*. The alternate methodology was approved by the NNSA Cognizant Secretarial Officer in February 2025. Pantex provided DNFSB with the approved version of the alternate methodology. DNFSB performed an onsite review of the alternate methodology in December 2023, and at the end of FY 2025, this review was still on-going.

- Special Tooling

During the Acting Chairman's April 2025 visit, Pantex briefed him on recent improvement initiatives and challenges associated with special tooling. Special tooling is used in the assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons and, in many cases, is credited to provide a means for safe handling of hazardous items. Pantex discussed changes to special tooling processes, such as inspections and tests, to preclude failures in the future.

- Pit Repackaging

In FY 2022, the Board noted the number of pits stored without using sealed insert had increased. Containers with sealed inserts provide for a more robust package. In FY 2024 and FY 2025, the Board requested, and Pantex provided progress updates on Plutonium pit repackaging efforts at Pantex. From FY 2022 to FY 2025, Pantex continued to increase the rate of pit re-packaging into sealed inserts and exceeded the planned number of pit repackaging activities in FY 2025.

- Material Storage

During the Board's site visit, Pantex provided a briefing to the Acting Chairman regarding material storage facilities at Pantex. This briefing included the status and Life Sustainment Plans for Zone 4 facilities, as well as current wildfire mitigation actions. The briefing also discussed the proposed Material Storage Capability facility.

- Fire Protection

Pantex was the first site reviewed under a complex-wide DNFSB review of inspection, testing, and maintenance of fire protection systems. Beginning in August 2025, the DNFSB

review team reviewed documentation, observed facilities, and interviewed Pantex. No major issues were identified through the interactions.

Savannah River Site

Contract Transition

On October 1, 2024 (FY 2025), a transfer of primary authority, accountability, and site stewardship responsibility for SRS from EM Savannah River Operations Office to the NNSA Savannah River Field Office occurred. Operations at the site continue to be executed in a safe manner. However, given the full-year continuing resolution during FY 2025, transition cannot be completed due to the lack of enacted appropriations. The DNFSB were engaged during the process.

Conduct of Operations (EM)

On July 7, 2025, the Board conveyed a letter for information only to the Secretary, which included a Staff Report on the Evaluation of Nuclear Operations and Maintenance Activities at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). Conduct of Operations issues in DWPF dating back to 2022 led to a period of Deliberate Operations from October 2023 to November 2024. The DNFSB report presents the Board's evaluation of the contractor's corrective actions to enhance disciplined performance in nuclear operations and maintenance activities at DWPF, based on an on-site assessment conducted during the week of September 16, 2025. DWPF management reviewed the deficiencies identified in the Board's Staff Report and developed 29 corrective actions, which were organized into seven key areas of concern outlined in the evaluation. To date, 17 of these corrective actions have been closed. Additionally, the senior management team at DWPF had new appointments for the Facility/Deputy Facility, Operations/Deputy Operations, Engineering, and Maintenance Managers positions.

Furthermore, five independent Conduct of Operations advisors, initially hired in 2023 for Deliberate Operations, continue to support Conduct of Operations enhancement efforts at DWPF.

Savannah River National Laboratory – Safety Basis (EM)

In FY 2025, activities to align Savannah River National Laboratory's (SRNL's) nuclear safety program documentation with DOE-STD-1186-2016, Specific Administrative Controls, continued in response to the April 5, 2023, DNFSB final report regarding a review of the SRNL DSA and TSR. As part of Revision 3 to the SRNL DSA and TSR, which was implemented in July 2024, several administrative controls were evaluated and revised per DOE-STD-1186-2016. The remaining administrative controls will be addressed in Revision 5 of the SRNL DSA and TSR, which is scheduled to be fully implemented by FY 2028.

Building 235-F (EM)

On August 12, 2025, DOE transmitted a report to the Board providing an update on five topic areas related to decommissioning of the F-Area Material Storage Building 235-F, in response to the Board's May 28, 2025, letter to Secretary Wright. The Board's letter modified the annual reporting requirement for briefing on risk reduction and formally closed Recommendation 2012-1.

Building 235-F decommissioning is scheduled to be initiated in FY 2027 with in-situ grouting and installation of an engineered roof as the regulatory approved end state. The decommissioning is scheduled to be completed in FY 2030.

Liquid Waste Operations (EM)

In FY 2025, a strategy of aggressive risk reduction resulted in the Salt Waste Processing Facility, DWPF, and Saltstone Disposal Facility collectively processing and stabilizing over 7 million curies of radioactive waste from the Tank Farms into inherently safe glass and grout. During preparation of Sludge Batch 11 feed for DWPF, the last transfer of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Materials and the first set (of two) Fast Critical Assembly transfers from H-Canyon were added.

In FY 2025, EM received concurrence from State and Federal Regulators that Tanks 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, and 15 achieved Preliminary Cease Waste Removal status and could proceed to the next step in the closure process, achieving Federal Facility Agreement milestones up to 27 months ahead of schedule.

During FY 2025, DWPF produced and leak-checked 33 canisters. In addition, canister storage capacity was increased by completing the addition of another 150 storage locations via double-stack modifications in Glass Waste Storage Building #2. Several improvement initiatives were accomplished to improve reliability and availability such as: upgrades to the main process cell crane, creating 10,000 gallons of lag storage for cesium-bearing strip solution from the Salt Waste Processing Facility to de-couple the facilities during unplanned outages, addition of a feed jumper for strip solution feed to an additional tank to provide processing flexibility and streamline processing cycle times.

The Saltstone Disposal Facility processed 3 million gallons of low-level waste into grout while replacing the Grout Pump, Saltstone Hopper Overflow Container, and installation of a new Dry Feeds Screw Feeder.

The Salt Waste Processing Facility processed 2 million gallons of waste from the Tank Farms while undertaking several improvement initiatives such as: installing larger, higher capacity crossflow filters, attaching enhanced vibration monitoring instrumentation onto contactors, adding 20 new spare contactors for rapid changeouts, and replacing two failing feed pumps in a high radiation area. Following the outage, a new monthly processing record of 517,000 gallons was achieved.

Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility (NA)

In FY 2025, the NNSA took action to improve Savannah River Plutonium Processing Facility worker protection by continuing to upgrade gloveboxes, hoods, and material transfer system as well as adding local alarms, upgrades to the building fire suppression systems, and a robust outer oxide container (safety significant). These safety significant controls represent a substantial safety upgrade to the facility and will enhance facility worker protection. On May 21, 2025, the Board transmitted a letter to the Secretary regarding its review of facility worker safety. In this letter, the Board commended the upgraded safety controls and provided safety observations for information and use.

Tritium Facilities (NA)

The Tritium Facilities successfully implemented the Combined Tritium Facilities safety basis in October 2024, combining the existing safety basis documents into a single DSA and TSR. The Combined Tritium Facilities DSA and TSR represent an improvement to the overall safety posture by adding new credited controls and elevating elements of safety management programs and administrative controls to specific administrative controls. These controls improve the safety posture for certain events analyzed in the consolidated hazard analysis involving fires, critical lifts, and/or vehicle impacts. In May 2025, the NNSA Administrator transmitted its annual report to the Board regarding these safety improvements and provided a briefing.

Facility Representative (FR) Program (EM)

On November 13, 2024, the DOE-SR Manager briefed the Board on its letter to the EM Assistant Secretary dated June 14, 2024. The briefing highlighted that DOE-SR has an effective and efficient FR Program at the Savannah River Site and is continuously looking for ways to improve the FR program, which includes recruiting, training, and retaining qualified FRs to support the safe operations of its facilities in a manner that protects the workers, the public, and the environment. The DOE-SR report on its FR Program was officially submitted to the Board on December 12, 2024.

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

General Interactions

The Board Chairman and DNFSB were at WIPP to observe the Calendar Year 2024 Annual Emergency Response Exercise on October 2, 2024. In addition, DNFSB were at WIPP to observe the Calendar Year 2025 WIPP Annual Emergency Response Exercise on September 10, 2025. No concerns were expressed by the Board or DNFSB regarding the conduct of the exercises.

During February 3-5, 2025, DNFSB were on site reviewing conduct of maintenance during the WIPP Annual Maintenance Outage. At the conclusion of their review, the DNFSB shared their observations on maintenance with Carlsbad Field Office management. No significant concerns were expressed by the DNFSB.

Disposal Operations

DNFSB was regularly informed of progress as WIPP reached and exceeded its FY 2025 goal for the receipt of 425 waste shipments. Emplacement of waste in Panel 8 continued in FY 2025, with the completion of filling Rooms 5 and 4. At the close of the year, emplacement was in progress in Room 3.

Capital Asset Projects

At the close of FY 2024, Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System (SSCVS) project construction was complete and commissioning testing underway in preparation for turnover from the construction contractor to the Management and Operations contractor, Salado Isolation Management Contractor (SIMCO). During FY 2025 multiple assessments were conducted to verify that the SSCVS was ready to safely operate as the new Underground Ventilation System. Following successful completion of the assessments, the new Underground Ventilation System entered service on July 12, 2025. DNFSB closely followed the assessment activities, making four site visits; observing a Management Self-Assessment and both the

SIMCO Contractor Readiness Assessment and the Federal Readiness Assessments with their subsequent formal out-briefs. In addition, the DNFSB held weekly telephone discussions with Carlsbad Field Office management personnel regarding both readiness activities and WIPP routine operational activities.

The Utility Shaft project also continued in FY 2025. Sinking of the shaft had been completed in FY 2023; but mining of the horizontal drifts to connect the Utility Shaft with the existing WIPP underground continued during FY 2024 to completion in March 2025. Breakthrough from the existing WIPP underground to the Utility Shaft drifts was made on August 24, 2025. DNFSB was kept informed of project status during both weekly calls and site visit discussions.

A new Capital Assets project, the Hoisting Capability Project, to modernize WIPP's hoisting systems was approaching CD-1 at the close of FY 2025. This project is anticipated to become active in FY 2026 and continue into the early 2030s.

Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System Continuous Air Monitors

In May 2024, the Board expressed concerns in a letter to the Secretary whether the continuous air monitoring system can reliably perform its safety functions in the expected operating environment. In a September 2024 briefing to the Board and subsequent November 14, 2024, written report, DOE and SIMCO replied that they had determined the SSCVS would operate in full filtered mode during its initial operation and that SIMCO planned to conduct operability testing of the continuous air monitoring system to ensure reliable performance.

At the end of FY 2025, SIMCO was finalizing selection of the appropriate placement location for the Continuous Air Monitors and its subject matter expert was developing a testing plan. When complete, the testing plan will be provided to the DNFSB for information.

Aging Mine Hoists and Escapeways

DNFSB expressed concern in multiple FY 2024 Monthly Reports over the safety and reliability of the WIPP mine hoisting system due to its age, and repeated those concerns during verbal interactions in FY 2025. Ultimately, in a June 18, 2025, Board letter to the Secretary, the Board requested a briefing and report that describe: (1) the timeline and plan to reduce the risk from degraded escapeway hoists to facility workers, including any interim compensatory measures necessary to ensure the safety of ongoing operations; and (2) an evaluation of the adequacy of existing site aging infrastructure management processes based on recent experiences with degraded shafts and escapeway hoists. The Board briefing took place on September 30, 2025. During the briefing, DOE told the Board it agrees with the Board's concern over reliability but disagrees that there are safety concerns. The written report will be provided to the Board early in FY 2026.

Reflecting DOE's shared concerns on reliability, a mining contractor, Cementation, was employed by SIMCO to repair and refurbish the Salt Shaft, Salt Hoist Shaft Station and Salt Pocket. That work was completed in September 2025. In addition, repair work on the Waste Hoist and Shaft is planned for the FY 2026 Annual WIPP Maintenance Outage.

Ultimately, the Hoisting Capability Project will provide a more comprehensive approach to fully address the aging concerns and provide improved reliability to continue to safely support WIPP operations well into the future. The planned scope of the project will integrate all shafts and hoists, including the recently completed Utility Shaft. It will further modernize existing Salt

and Waste Shafts hoisting systems and add new hoists in the Utility Shaft and the Air Intake Shaft. The planned scope of the project was discussed with the Board during the September 30, 2025, Board briefing.

Y-12 National Security Complex

In June 2025, the Board visited Y-12 to observe the Y-12 full participation Emergency Management Exercise and obtain mission updates on future Directed Stockpile Work, the Building 9212 Transition Strategy and projects needed to modernize Y-12's strategic material streams.

Building 9212 Out-of-Service Systems

On July 7, 2021, the Board transmitted a letter to the Secretary regarding concerns with the criticality safety risk with Building 9212's out-of-service systems with uranium holdup. In response to the Board's concerns, Y-12 continued to complete actions to permanently isolate out-of-service systems, consistent with the Building 9212 Transition Strategy risk reduction plan. Y-12 permanently isolated an additional 5 out-of-service systems in FY 2025. Another key element of the Building 9212 Transition Plan—the Decontamination, Sort, and Segment facility—reached beneficial occupancy in September 2025. The facility will play an integral role in both decommissioning and waste cleanout of Building 9212.

Y-12 Fire Protection Review

In FY 2024 and FY 2025, DNFSB conducted a review to evaluate the adequacy of selected portions of the Y-12 fire protection program. The review focused on the site fire protection water supply, fire protection-related aspects of the Building 9204-2E and Building 9215 Extended Life Program, and specific fire protection topics related to Buildings 9720-5 and 9212. Teleconferences were conducted in July and September 2025 to discuss DNFSB feedback and responses to their questions. DNFSB noted several good practices and posed several follow-up questions.

Uranium Processing Facility (UPF)

The Board toured the UPF construction site in June 2025. The tour focused on processes and equipment within the Main Process Building. There were no issues identified. On July 27, 2025, a meeting was conducted with DNFSB to discuss DSA post seismic fire analyses. Results of the discussion indicated no concerns with the DSA control sets, but DNFSB recommended consideration of adding key assumptions to support unmitigated analyses. DNFSB comments will be considered during the next DSA update, which is scheduled to occur in 2026.

C. Other Responses to DNFSB

Requests for Information

In FY 2025, the Department responded to 181 specific requests for information that resulted in the Department providing over 3,000 documents to DNFSB.

Meetings and Briefings with the Board

The Department participated in 12 meetings or briefings with the Board in FY 2025. Table 3.1 identifies the meetings and briefings, and the DOE Program office(s) involved.

Table 3.1. FY 2025 DOE – Board Meetings or Briefings

Date	DOE Program Office	Subject
10/9/2024	EM	Progress toward resolving the identified shortcomings with DOE-SR’s Facility Representative program
12/10/2024	NNSA	Results of the Recommendation 2019-1 Implementation Plan effectiveness review
01/08/2025	EHSS	DOE's path forward for issuing DOE Order 421.1, <i>Nuclear Safety Basis</i>
01/30/2025	NNSA	Safety design basis documents for projects at NNSA’s Principal Underground Laboratory for Subcritical Experimentation (PULSE)
04/25/2025	NNSA	Safety of lithium-ion batteries stored at NNSA Device Assembly Facility (DAF) and throughout DOE
05/12/2025	NNSA, EM	FY 2024 annual Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Metrics
05/29/2025	NNSA	Annual briefing on DOE’s progress on safety improvements at Savannah River Tritium Enterprise (SRTE)
09/12/2025	NNSA	Periodic discussion with NNSA Administrator
09/19/2025	DOE	Periodic discussion with the Secretary
09/22/2025	EM	Hanford 242-A Evaporator Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and semi-annual briefing for seismic engineered controls
09/22/2025	EHSS	DOE STD-3009-2014 Implementation
09/30/2025	EM	WIPP Shafts and Escapeway Hoists

Reporting Requirements

The following table provides the status of DOE responses to Board reporting requirements pursuant to 42 USC section 2286b(d).

Table 3.2. Status of Board Reporting Requirements

Date of Letter	DOE Program Office and Site	Reporting Requirements	Completion Date
11/02/2021	EM, SRS	Annual report and briefing regarding SRS Building 235-F safety	Report: 08/12/2025
01/06/2022	NA, EM	Annual report and briefing regarding Nuclear Criticality Safety Programs	Report: 03/20/2025 Briefing: 05/12/2025
06/27/2023	EM, Hanford	Semi-annual briefings of the proposed path forward for seismic engineered controls at the Hanford 242-A Evaporator	Briefing: 09/22/2025

Date of Letter	DOE Program Office and Site	Reporting Requirements	Completion Date
10/04/2023	NA, SRS	Report and briefing on DOE’s progress on safety improvements at Savannah River Tritium Facilities to include progress of the facility and system upgrades, decisions made for proposed upgrades and analytical initiatives, and the impacts of safety risk reduction	Report: 05/05/2025 Briefing: 05/29/2025
12/05/2023	EHSS	Report and briefing on DOE’s path forward for DOE O 425.1D, <i>Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities</i> , revision	Report: 11/26/2024
05/15/2024	EM, WIPP	Report and briefing to address the Board’s safety concerns over whether the WIPP continuous air monitoring system can reliably perform its safety functions	Report: 11/14/2024 Briefing: 09/06/2024
06/03/2024	NA, Pantex	A briefing regarding the results of NNSA’s IP 2019-1 effectiveness review	Briefing: 12/10/2024
06/14/2024	EM, SRS	Report and briefing regarding progress toward resolving identified issues with the SRS FR program	Report: 11/13/2024 Briefing: 12/12/2024
07/25/2024	NA, NNS	Report and briefing that address identified safety-related questions pertaining to the NNS PULSE Facility (formally U1a Complex) design and operations	Report: 12/11/2024 Briefing: 01/30/2025
08/13/2024	NA, NNS	Written response and briefing regarding identified safety issues associated with the use of lithium-ion batteries at DOE DNF’s and specifically at the NNS Device Assembly Facility	Report: 03/14/2025 Briefing: 04/28/2025
11/15/2024	EHSS	Report and briefing regarding DOE’s path forward for issuing DOE Order 421.1, <i>Nuclear Safety Basis</i>	Report: TBD Briefing: 01/8/2025
12/6/2024	EHSS	Report and briefing regarding the implementation of STD-3009-2014, specifically DOE’s plans to update DSAs to 3009-2014, rationale for not updating DSAs, and plans to ensure implementation of new safe harbors	Report: 06/20/2025 Briefing: 09/22/2025
01/30/2025	NA, Pantex	Report regarding B61 Hazard Analysis Report open safety issues	Report: 08/21/2025

Date of Letter	DOE Program Office and Site	Reporting Requirements	Completion Date
06/12/2025	EM, Hanford	Report and briefing regarding the SIL for 242-A Evaporator at Hanford	Report: FY2026 Briefing: 09/22/2025
06/18/2025	EM, WIPP	Report and briefing regarding safety of WIPP shafts and escapeway hoists	Report: FY2026 Briefing: 09/30/2025

IV. Status of DOE Implementation Plans

A. Process Overview

The Board issues recommendations to the Secretary, via letter and publication in the *Federal Register*, regarding measures it believes the Department should adopt to ensure adequate protection of workers and the public from activities conducted at DOE DNFs. By law, the Secretary is required to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the Board recommendation within 45 days of its publication in the *Federal Register* unless granted an extension by the Board. If the Secretary accepts all or part of the recommendation, an IP addressing the recommendation’s concerns is required to be transmitted to the Board within 90 days of the publication of the Secretary’s response, or an additional 45 days may be permitted upon notice of the need for additional time sent to Congress and the Board.

The Secretary is required to complete the items in the IP within a year of issuance. If additional time is needed, DOE is required to submit a report to Congress discussing the reasons for delay and when implementation will be completed. Generally, due to the scope and technical complexity of the safety issues at DOE DNFs, more than a year is usually required to complete items in an IP.

Board recommendations, IPs, and a chronological record of related correspondence between DOE and the DNFSB are available on the DOE Office of the Departmental Representative to the DNFSB website at: <https://ehss.energy.gov/deprep/>.

B. Implementation Plan Status

Recommendation 2019-1: Uncontrolled Hazard Scenarios and 10 CFR 830 Implementation at the Pantex Plant

Issue Date: February 20, 2019.

In January 2024, NNSA notified the Board that all actions identified in its IP were completed. On June 3, 2024, the Board issued a letter noting the FY 2024 annual status briefing was no longer required and adding a requirement for a briefing associated with IP effectiveness review. A briefing on the results of the IP effectiveness review was conducted on December 10, 2024. This recommendation is closed, via Board letter dated January 30, 2025.

Recommendation 2020-1: Nuclear Safety Requirements

Issue Date: February 21, 2020.

In December 2024 and May 2025, the Department notified DNFSB about a delay in three deliverables (5.2.3, 5.3.2, and 5.5.2). Actions associated with these deliverables have been initiated. However, development, issuance, and revisions to DOE Standards and Directives are currently on pause to address Executive Orders. The IP contains 17 milestones, 11 of which were completed prior to FY 2025.

Recommendation 2023-1: Onsite Transportation Safety

Issue Date: January 26, 2024.

Recommendation 2023-1, *Onsite Transportation Safety*. IP issued on October 7, 2024, containing six deliverables. On August 22, 2025, the Department transmitted Deliverable 2.C, *Extent of Condition Summary Report*. Actions associated with IP Deliverable 2.A have been initiated. However, development, issuance, and revisions to DOE Standards and Directives are currently on pause to address Executive Orders.

Appendix. Acronyms and Abbreviations

AEA	Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended
AMWTP	Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project
Board	Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
CD	Critical Decision
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
Department	Department of Energy
DNF	Defense Nuclear Facility
DNFSB	Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
DOE	Department of Energy
DOT	Department of Transportation
DSA	Documented Safety Analysis
DWPF	Defense Waste Processing Facility
EHSS	Office of Environment, Health, Safety, and Security
EM	Office of Environmental Management
FR	Facility Representative
FY	Fiscal Year
Hanford	Hanford Site
ICP	Idaho Cleanup Project
IP	Implementation Plan
IPC	Initial Processing Campaign
LANL	Los Alamos National Laboratory
LAW	Low Activity Waste
NA or NNSA	National Nuclear Security Administration
NNSS	Nevada National Security Site
O	Order
Pantex	Pantex Plant
PF-4	Plutonium Facility–Building 4
SC	Office of Science
Secretary	Secretary of Energy
SIMCO	Salado Isolation Management Contractor
SRS	Savannah River Site
SRNL	Savannah River National Laboratory
SSCVS	Safety Significant Confinement Ventilation System
STD	Standard
SWOC	Solid Waste Operations Complex
TRU	Transuranic
TSR	Technical Safety Requirement
TWPC	TRU Waste Processing Center
USC	United States Code
WRAP	Waste Receiving and Processing Facility
WIPP	Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
Y-12	Y-12 National Security Complex