July 16, 2019

The Honorable Bruce Hamilton
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20004

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On April 16, 2019, the Department of Energy (DOE) accepted the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s (Board) Recommendation 2019-1, Uncontrolled Hazard Scenarios and 10 CFR 830 Implementation at the Pantex Plant. Enclosed is an Implementation Plan (IP) responding to the Recommendation.

The IP details a pragmatic approach to address each of the Board’s five specific Sub-recommendations. The Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration is confident that execution of this IP will result in sustained improvements to the content, configuration management, and implementation of the safety basis at the Pantex Plant. Specifically, the IP identifies actions to (a) improve the suite of safety controls for specific hazard scenarios, (b) assure compliance with DOE standards and guidance for generation, maintenance, and implementation of safety basis documents, (c) enhance elements of the special tooling program, and (d) improve training for safety basis personnel. These actions, in tandem with numerous other improvement initiatives already underway, will serve to further reduce the safety risks inherently posed by nuclear explosive operations at Pantex, consistent with Board’s Recommendation and continue to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. Geoffrey L. Beausoleil, at (865) 576-0752.

Sincerely,

Lisa E. Gordon-Hagerty

Enclosure
Implementation Plan for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 2019-1

Uncontrolled Hazard Scenarios and 10 CFR 830 Implementation at the Pantex Plant

July 2019 | Revision 0

This document has been reviewed by a CNS Dual Authority DC/RO and confirmed to be UNCLASSIFIED and contains no UCNI.
Name: Scott Hope
Date: 06/17/2019
eDC/RO ID: 135450
Implementation Plan for the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Recommendation 2019-1
Uncontrolled Hazard Scenarios and 10 CFR 830
Implementation at the Pantex Plant

July 2019
APPROVALS

Jason Armstrong
AM Nuclear Safety & Engineering
NNSSA Production Office

7-10-2019
Date

Geoffrey L. Bonsolej
Manager
NNSSA Production Office

10 JUL 2019
Date
# REVISION LOG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revision No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Pages Affected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>July 2019</td>
<td>Initial issue</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

APPROVALS .............................................................................................................. ii
REVISION LOG .......................................................................................................... iii
TABLES ...................................................................................................................... iv
ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................... v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. vi
1. Purpose ................................................................................................................... 1
2. Background ............................................................................................................. 1
3. Proposed Resolution for Each Sub-Recommendation .............................................. 3
4. Organization and Management .............................................................................. 16
5. References .............................................................................................................. 17

TABLES

Table 1. Status of Extent-of-Condition Reviews ................................................................ 10
### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Corrective Action Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNS</td>
<td>Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>Condition of Approval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNFSB</td>
<td>Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSA</td>
<td>Documented Safety Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Extent-of-condition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAR</td>
<td>Hazard Analysis Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Implementation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>In-service Inspection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVR</td>
<td>Implementation Verification Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCO</td>
<td>Justification for Continued Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTA</td>
<td>Less Than Adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDE</td>
<td>Non-Destructive Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNSA</td>
<td>National Nuclear Security Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPO</td>
<td>NNSA Production Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pantex</td>
<td>Pantex Plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIE</td>
<td>Problem Identification and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PISA</td>
<td>Potential Inadequacy of the Documented Safety Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Specific Administrative Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
<td>Safety Basis Supplement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-21</td>
<td>Seamless Safety for the 21st Century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSC</td>
<td>Structure, System, or Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSR</td>
<td>Technical Safety Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USQ</td>
<td>Unreviewed Safety Question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USQD</td>
<td>Unreviewed Safety Question Determination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this Implementation Plan (IP) is to identify actions the U. S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) is taking to address Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB or the Board) Recommendation 2019-1, Uncontrolled Hazard Scenarios and 10 CFR 830 Implementation at the Pantex Plant, which was issued on February 20, 2019. DOE accepted Recommendation 2019-1 on April 16, 2019. As noted in DOE’s acceptance, processes are in place at the Pantex Plant to ensure all nuclear explosive operations are planned and executed in a manner that protects the environment, the public, and the worker. However, DOE/NNSA agrees with the Board that actions are warranted to further reduce the safety risks inherently posed by nuclear explosive operations. To that end, the actions identified in this IP include the following:

- Enhancing documentation and implementation of safety controls for specific hazard scenarios.
- Revising Pantex procedures to adopt DOE guidance related to maintenance and implementation of safety basis documents.
- Adopting best practices to enhance elements of the special tooling program.
- Developing and delivering additional training for safety basis engineering personnel.

Many of these actions were initiated during the Fall of 2018, and significant progress has been made during the past several months to drive improvements in the content, implementation, and maintenance of the Pantex documented safety analyses.
1. Purpose

The purpose of this Implementation Plan (IP) is to identify actions the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) is taking to address Board Recommendation 2019-1, *Uncontrolled Hazard Scenarios and 10 CFR 830 Implementation at the Pantex Plant*, which was issued on February 20, 2019. The hazard controls derived in the documented safety analyses (DSAs) are implemented to support nuclear explosive operations at the Pantex Plant (Pantex) and ensure the public, environment, and workers are adequately protected. However, DOE/NNSA agrees with the Board that, along with actions already initiated and completed, additional actions can be taken to further reduce the safety risks inherent to nuclear explosive operations at Pantex.

2. Background

Pantex is the primary site for assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons in the United States. Pantex operations include support of nuclear weapon life extension programs, dismantlement campaigns, and component testing and reliability programs. In addition, Pantex operations include requalifying plutonium “pits” (i.e., the core of a nuclear weapon) for future use.

In 2001, DOE issued 10 CFR Part 830, *Nuclear Safety Management*, which includes requirements for developing DSAs and deriving hazard controls that ensure workers, the public, and the environment are adequately protected. During the decade that followed, personnel responsible for managing and operating Pantex developed these DSAs and associated hazard controls.

In parallel with this multi-year effort, Pantex personnel also began implementing other fundamental safety improvements to Pantex operations. One of these initiatives was adopting Seamless Safety for the 21st Century (SS-21) principles, which included simplifying processes, reducing hazards (e.g., reducing the number of steps in which explosive components are lifted), and improving procedures. Other examples of safety improvements made during this timeframe included: (a) installing conductive flooring and making other equipment modifications intended to prevent the buildup of electrostatic charge during operations, and (b) upgrading emergency lighting, fire protection, and hoisting equipment in nuclear facilities.

These improvements made during the 2000s (development and implementation of new DSAs, implementation of SS-21 principles, and other safety upgrades) inarguably and immeasurably improved the nuclear safety posture at Pantex.

In a July 2010 letter to DOE, the Board identified multiple weaknesses in the DSAs for Pantex operations. One of the identified weaknesses was the practice of screening scenarios from further evaluation based on a very low probability of occurrence that was determined by combining a Pantex initiating event frequency with the Design Agency weapon response. Pantex personnel made multiple improvements to the content, maintenance, and implementation of DSAs subsequent to receiving the July 2010 letter.

During 2017 and 2018, the DOE/NNSA Production Office (NPO) identified weaknesses in (a) the content of the effective (approved and implemented) safety basis documents at Pantex and (b) the quality of individual safety basis submittals. While actions were taken in real time to address specific individual issues, Pantex management (both federal and contractor) recognized that more comprehensive programmatic improvements were warranted.

The first step of the comprehensive response was to develop a Safety Basis Supplement (SBS) that fulfilled two primary objectives. The first objective of the SBS was to provide a framework for analyzing
and addressing legacy issues in the Pantex safety basis associated with scenarios previously determined to not require application of safety controls despite being identified as credible in the analysis. In short, execution of the SBS will ensure that these scenarios are identified and either (a) controlled or (b) determined to be incredible. The SBS requires that any scenarios that could not be binned (i.e., the scenario is determined to be credible and existing controls are not already in place to prevent or mitigate the hazard) be addressed via the Pantex Problem Identification and Evaluation (PIE) process (this process ensures that appropriate operational restrictions and compensatory measures are formally identified and implemented while resolving any potential safety issues associated with the adequacy of safety controls).

The second objective of the SBS was to identify several Specific Administrative Controls (SACs) for preventing hazardous consequences that could result from Falling Man scenarios (i.e., potential scenarios involving production technicians falling and tripping into sensitive components during weapon assembly or disassembly operations). These new SACs were implemented in all active nuclear explosive bays and cells by the end of February 2019. The SBS was approved by DOE/NNSA in September 2018. The second step of the comprehensive response was to develop a corrective action plan, RPT-0020, Corrective Action Plan for DSA Quality Issues (referred to as the CAP), which includes numerous actions for improving the Pantex safety basis development process and addressing legacy weaknesses in the currently effective safety basis documents. Execution of this plan will facilitate achieving a step-function improvement in the overall quality of the Pantex safety basis. This CAP was approved by DOE/NNSA in November 2018.

On February 20, 2019, the Board approved Recommendation 2019-1, which includes the following five Sub-recommendations:

1. Implement compensatory measures to address all of the deficiencies described in two reports appended to the Recommendation.
2. Perform an extent-of-condition (EOC) evaluation of the Pantex safety basis.
3. Implement actions to ensure process design and engineering controls that eliminate or protect a unit from impact and falling technician scenarios.
4. Ensure the design, procurement, manufacturing, and maintenance of special tooling is commensurate with its safety function.
5. Train safety basis personnel to ensure future revisions to the safety basis comply with 10 CFR 830 requirements.

DOE/NNSA recognizes the importance of correcting the weaknesses identified in Recommendation 2019-1 and on April 16, 2019, DOE accepted the Recommendation. The purpose of this IP is to identify actions DOE/NNSA is taking to address each of the Board’s five Sub-recommendations. This IP was developed in coordination with senior leadership representing DOE Headquarters elements, DOE/NNSA field office personnel, and the contractor responsible for managing and operating Pantex (Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC).

**Underlying Causes**

In Recommendation 2019-1, the Board deems that “deficiencies exist within the processes used to ensure operations at Pantex have a robust safety control strategy – the safety basis is inadequate and credible accident scenarios with high consequences exist with insufficient or no controls.”

A series of causal analysis sessions employing a senior-level “performance excellence team,” in addition to subject matter experts (SMEs) in safety analysis and special tooling, were conducted to identify corrective actions that result in sustainable long-term improvements and prevent recurrence of the identified issues. The causal analysis was used to perform an in-depth evaluation of four of the five Sub-recommendations provided by the Board and determine the contributing factors and root causes of the
The fifth Sub-recommendation regarding training was covered under the evaluation of the other four Sub-recommendations. The analysis identified the following contributing factors and root causes. In some cases, the causal analysis identified factors that contributed to more than one of the issues, as identified by the Board in the Sub-recommendations. The causal analysis team mapped the Cause Codes found in DOE-STD-1197-2011, Occurrence Reporting Causal Analysis, dated September 2011, to the issues in Recommendation 2019-1. Based on the Causal Analysis results, the Causal Analysis Team identified the Root Cause as "Differing Interpretation of Existing Requirements." The Causal Analysis has two major branches, one is the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) and the other is Tooling. The DSA branch identified four areas: Design/Engineering Problem, Human Performance Less Than Adequate (LTA), Management Problem, and Communications LTA. The Tooling branch identified four areas: Design/Engineering Problem, Equipment/Material Problem, Human Performance LTA, and Management Problem using the various cause codes listed below.

- Design/Documentation LTA
- Skill Based Error
- Rule Based Error
- Change Management LTA
- Written Communications Method of Presentation LTA
- Written Communication Content LTA
- Written Communication Not Used
- Design Input LTA
- Design Output LTA
- Design/Installation Verification LTA
- Inspection/Testing LTA
- Knowledge Based Error
- Management Methods LTA
- Resource Management LTA

3. Proposed Resolution for Each Sub-Recommendation

Recommendation 2019-1 includes five specific Sub-recommendations that are addressed by this IP.

Board Sub-recommendation 1: Implement compensatory measures to address all the deficiencies described in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.

Issue Description and Proposed Resolution with Milestones and Deliverables

Appendices 1 and 2 of Recommendation 2019-1 are reports authored by the Board’s staff (last updated in July 2018). These reports identified several issues related to development, maintenance, and implementation of safety basis documents at Pantex. These issues were binned into seven categories, each of which are discussed below.

Issue 1.1, Weapon-specific Concerns Identified in Hazard Analysis Reports

Recommendation 2019-1 states the following:

The Board’s staff team reviewed the hazard disposition tables and related hazard and accident analyses located in the approved hazard analysis reports (HARs) for B61, W76,
W78, W87, and W88 operations to identify the controls relied upon to prevent hazard scenarios from resulting in high order consequences. While the safety bases identify adequate controls for the vast majority of credible hazard scenarios, the Board’s staff team identified credible hazard scenarios with unscreened weapon responses for inadvertent nuclear detonation and high explosive violent reaction for which the safety bases either do not define credited safety controls or for which the credited safety controls are not sufficient.

Pantex personnel reviewed each of the weapon-program-specific scenarios identified by the Board’s staff. The results of these reviews are as follows:

- The B61 and W88 scenarios were all addressed by revisions to the subject DSAs that were submitted to DOE/NNSA in January 2019 and approved by DOE/NNSA in March 2019 and February 2019, respectively.
- The W76 scenarios were all reviewed and addressed by November 2018.
- The W78 scenarios were all reviewed and addressed by November 2018.
- The W87 scenarios identified in Appendices 1 and 2 of the Recommendation will be reviewed by August 2019 consistent with the commitments to perform an EOC review.

**Action 1.1.1:** Review and disposition specific issues identified by the Board within documented safety analyses that cover B61 operations.

Deliverable: Revised DSAs (HARs/SARs)
Completion Date: March 2019 [Complete]

**Action 1.1.2:** Review and disposition specific issues identified by the Board within documented safety analyses that cover W76 operations.

Deliverable: Transmittal to NPO with Table documenting EOC review
Completion Date: December 2019

**Action 1.1.3:** Review and disposition specific issues identified by the Board within documented safety analyses that cover W78 operations.

Deliverable: Transmittal to NPO with Table documenting EOC review
Completion Date: January 2020

**Action 1.1.4:** Review and disposition specific issues identified by the Board within documented safety analyses that cover W87 operations.

Deliverable: Transmittal to NPO with Table documenting EOC review
Completion Date: August 2019

**Action 1.1.5:** Review and disposition specific issues identified by the Board within documented safety analyses that cover W88 operations.

Deliverable: Revised DSAs (HARs/SARs)
Completion Date: February 2019 [Complete]

**Action 1.1.6:** Review and disposition specific issues identified by the Board within documented safety analyses that cover Transportation and Sitewide operations.
Deliverable: Revised DSAs (HARs/SARs)
Completion Date: September 2019

**Issue 1.2, Timeliness of Annual Updates to Documented Safety Analyses**

Recommendation 2019-1 states the following:

CNS has struggled to complete and obtain NPO approval of the yearly updates required by 10 CFR § 830.202. Starting in 2015, NPO has not approved the annual updates CNS has submitted for the Sitewide SAR. In 2016, CNS was unable to meet the annual DSA update requirements for the Sitewide and Transportation SARs and the W76 and W78 HARs. As NPO rejected CNS's submittals, a backlog developed. This process culminated in three rejected submittals and five approvals total in 2017. Overall, this resulted in 11 of 16 SARs and HARs not being approved for annual updates in 2017. In particular, the Sitewide SAR has not been successfully updated and approved via the annual update process since 2014.

The Board’s concern was based on data collected during 2017. At that time, a number of Pantex DSAs had not been updated within the past year, most notably the Sitewide SAR. As of February 2019, all Pantex DSAs have been updated within the past year consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR § 830.202, Safety Basis.

A contributing cause to DSAs not being updated on an annual basis was that additional changes, some fairly complex, were occasionally included in these “Annual Update” DSA change packages. To preclude recurrence of this issue, this IP will include an action for revising Pantex procedures to codify the expectation that “Annual Update” DSA change packages be submitted within 12 months and be limited to changes previously developed and made effective via both the Pantex change control process and the Pantex Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ) process.

**Action 1.2.1:** Bring all Pantex documented safety analyses into compliance with the 10 CFR 830 requirement of being updated annually.

Deliverable: Revised DSAs (HARs/SARs)
Completion Date: February 2019 [Complete]

**Action 1.2.2:** Revise Pantex procedures to explicitly capture the expectation that “Annual Update” documented safety analysis change packages be submitted within 12 months and limited to previously approved changes.

Completion Date: September 2019

**Issue 1.3, Discrepant-as-found Conditions and the Unreviewed Safety Question Process**

Recommendation 2019-1 states the following:

The site USQ procedure, approved by NPO, does not comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 830 or recommendations of DOE Guide 424.1-1B ... In situations when a "discrepant as-found condition" is observed for a [Technical Safety Requirement]-related control, the procedure allows returning the system to the original condition as described in the documented safety analysis (DSA) within three days without having to declare a PISA, formally notifying DOE, performing an extent of condition review, or implementing any compensatory measures.
During the past several months, several improvements have been made to the Pantex USQ Program via development and implementation of CD-3014, *Pantex Plant Unreviewed Safety Questions Procedure*, Issue 20. One of the improvements was to clarify the Pantex PIE and process question regarding SACs. Specifically, CD-3014 allowed Pantex personnel to process SAC deficiencies using the PISA process rather than developing a TSR change package. The Pantex USQ Program is compliant with 10 CFR 830 requirements and consistent with the general guidance contained in DOE Guide 424.1-1B, *Implementation Guide for Use in Addressing Unreviewed Safety Question Requirements*. DOE Guide 424.1-1B, Section C.2 states, “It is appropriate to allow a short period of time (hours or days but not weeks) to investigate the conditions to confirm that a safety analysis is potentially inadequate before declaring a PISA.”

The focus of this Board concern, as captured in the Recommendation, centers on treatment of “discrepant as-found conditions.” In general, these conditions do not represent inadequacies in the DSA; rather, they reflect a non-conformance with the DSA (rare exceptions to this generality occasionally surface). This is clear in DOE Guide 424.1-1B, which states, “[i]f the corrective action is to bring the item into conformance ... then it may be reportable under Occurrence Reporting and Processing System requirements, but it would not require a Unreviewed Safety Question Determination (USQD).” Upon discovering a “discrepant as-found condition,” Pantex procedures drive the following actions to be taken:

- Take actions to ensure operations are in a safe condition
- Notify DOE
- Determine causes, perform EOC reviews, and take necessary corrective actions

As an action of this IP, DOE/NNSA will ensure that Pantex procedures are revised to explicitly state these actions are required.

**Action 1.3.1:** Revise Pantex Plant Unreviewed Safety Question Procedure to ensure the following actions are required to be taken upon identification of a “discrepant as-found condition:”

- Actions are implemented to ensure safe conditions
- Notifications are made to DOE
- Causal analyses are performed, extent-of-condition reviews are executed, and corrective actions are implemented

**Deliverable:** Revised Pantex procedure (CD-3014)

**Completion Date:** April 2019 [Complete]

**Action 1.3.2:** Revise Pantex Plant Unreviewed Safety Question Procedure to clarify the Pantex PIE process question regarding SACs.

**Deliverable:** Revised Pantex procedure (CD-3014)

**Completion Date:** April 2019 [Complete]

**Issue 1.4, Timeliness in Dispositioning Justifications of Continued Operations**

Recommendation 2019-1 states the following:

Contrary to DOE G 424.1-1B, NPO and CNS revise existing JCOs instead of issuing new ones, thereby extending the expiration date and reliance on the compensatory measures beyond a year ... Some JCOs last for several years without updating the relevant safety basis document, relying on compensatory measures without implementing rigorous controls (e.g., engineered design features).
The Board identified three specific Justifications for Continued Operation (JCOs) in its Recommendation that were effective for multiple years:

- PX-JCO-14-04, Justification for Continued Operation for W80 ESD
- PX-JCO-14-05, Justification for Continued Operation for B61 ESD
- PX-JCO-17-09, Justification for Continued Operation for W88 Uncased HE Operations

All three JCOs have been archived and the applicable safety basis documents have been updated to include the subject analysis and controls. Currently, there are three JCOs that are effective at Pantex, and all were developed and initially issued within the past year.

JCOs are required to identify any compensatory measures necessary for ensuring operations can be performed safely and adequate protection is provided for workers and the public. DOE agrees that, consistent with DOE Guide 424.1-18, the life of JCOs should be as short as practical while allowing sufficient time to perform necessary safety analysis and implement necessary controls. As a best practice at Pantex, outstanding JCOs are regularly reviewed and DOE approval is obtained for any JCO that is extended or remains in place for more than a year. DOE recognizes that granting of these extensions should be the rare exception.

Action 1.4.1: Revise Pantex Plant Unreviewed Safety Question Procedure to require the contractor organization to obtain DOE/NNSA approval/concurrence for any JCOs that are unable to be archived within a year of being initially approved by DOE/NNSA.

Deliverable: Revised Pantex procedure (CD-3014)
Completion Date: April 2019 [Complete]

Issue 1.5, Periodicity for Revalidating Implementation of Administrative Controls

Recommendation 2019-1 states the following:

Contrary to DOE Guide 423.1-1B, CNS does not re-assess procedural controls via implementation verification reviews (IVRs) every three years.

Pantex procedures currently require implementation of administrative controls to be reviewed and re-verified every five years, contrary to the suggestion of DOE Guide 423.1-1B, Implementation Guide for Use in Developing Technical Safety Requirements, that implementation of administrative controls be re-verified every three years. The Guide states that its purpose is to provide supplemental information rather than imposing additional requirements. That said, DOE/NNSA encourages its contractors across the nuclear complex to adopt best practices. As an action of this IP, the results of all past IVRs1 of administrative controls at Pantex (which, as noted above, are performed at least every five years) will be reviewed. If these reviews demonstrate that administrative controls at Pantex are prone to degradation, DOE/NNSA will evaluate the cost and benefit of requiring that the implementation of all administrative controls be re-verified every three years.

---

1 At Pantex, re-verifying the implementation of safety controls (including both engineered and administrative controls) is achieved through execution of Safety Basis Control Owner Assessments. In order to re-verify the implementation of controls every five years, implementation of roughly 20 percent of the total population of controls is re-verified each year.
Action 1.5.1: Review the results of all past IVRs of administrative controls at Pantex and, if these reviews demonstrate that administrative controls at Pantex are prone to degradation, determine appropriate verification frequency.

Deliverable: Report documenting review and determination of prudent time cycle for re-verification of SACs

Completion Date: March 2020

Issue 1.6, Crediting Safety Management Programs

Recommendation 2019-1 states the following:

CNS has identified key elements of safety management programs, or the falling man awareness protocol, as the controls relied upon for preventing high order consequences for some of the hazard scenarios that the staff review team identified as lacking credited controls. However, relying on key elements of safety management programs does not provide a level of protection equivalent to an engineered [Structure, System, or Component (SSC)] or a properly implemented Specific Administrative Control (SAC), and does not comply with codified expectations in DOE directives.

Multiple SACs for preventing Falling Man scenarios have been identified. As noted above, these new SACs were implemented in all active nuclear explosive bays and cells by the end of February 2019.

As an action of this IP, DOE/NNSA will ensure that all Pantex documented safety analyses are reviewed to identify and address any instances in which elements of Safety Management Programs are solely relied upon for preventing or mitigating scenarios that could potentially result in high-order consequences (e.g., inadvertent nuclear detonation, aerosolized dispersal, or high explosive violent reaction).

Action 1.6.1: (a) Review all Pantex documented safety analyses to identify all instances in which elements of Safety Management Programs are solely relied upon for preventing or mitigating scenarios that could potentially result in high-order consequences (e.g., inadvertent nuclear detonation or aerosolized dispersal), and (b) develop a schedule—not to extend past August 2021—for addressing any issues identified during these reviews.

Deliverable: Report documenting review and schedule

Completion Date: February 2020

Issue 1.7, Timely Disposition of Conditions of Approval (COAs)

Recommendation 2019-1 states the following:

NPO and CNS have been unable to resolve several legacy conditions of approval.

In the reports appended to the Recommendation, the Board’s staff acknowledged that “[the contractor organization] has committed to working down a set of ‘legacy’ COAs that existed prior to the creation of NPO [in 2012]” and that “... there were 40 COAs in this category, and 5 currently remain open” (note: there were actually six open COAs). A plan and schedule for resolving these six outstanding conditions of approval has been issued. In addition, Pantex procedures were previously revised (e.g., Work Instruction 02.01.06.02.01, (U) Develop and Control Documented Safety Analyses) to include additional formal mechanisms for tracking and closing COAs to prevent recurrence of COAs languishing.

Action 1.7.1: Develop a schedule—not to extend past December 2022—for resolving the six “legacy” open conditions of approval.

Deliverable: CNS letter, Legacy Conditions of Approval and Planned Improvements Upgrades,
Board Sub-recommendation 2: Perform an extent-of-condition evaluation of the Pantex safety basis (including the procedures for development and configuration control of the safety basis documents) and implement subsequent corrective actions to ensure compliance with DOE regulations and directives.

Issue Description and Proposed Resolution with Milestones and Deliverables

As discussed above, a framework has been developed for analyzing existing scenarios in the Pantex safety basis that are identified as credible but for which safety controls had not been identified because the scenarios were evaluated to have a very low probability of occurrence. This framework called for using seven categories to determine whether either of the following is true:

a) Controls already exist to prevent or mitigate the hazard but are not properly identified or mapped to the subject scenario, or

b) A documented basis exists for determining that the scenario is not credible.

Also discussed above, a schedule was created for performing EOC reviews of all 16 Pantex DSAs with the purpose of identifying and binning all of the credible uncontrolled scenarios into the seven categories. Any scenarios that could not be binned (i.e., the scenario is credible and existing controls are not already in place to prevent or mitigate the hazard) are to be addressed via the Pantex PIE process. Specifically, the PIE process is a formal mechanism for ensuring that appropriate operational restrictions or compensatory measures are implemented while resolving any potential safety issues associated with the adequacy of safety controls.

To date, the subject EOC reviews have been completed for 10 of the 16 total Pantex DSAs. Table 1 identifies which DSAs have been reviewed and the schedule for completing the remainder of these reviews.

As actions of this IP, DOE/NNSA will ensure that:

- The remaining EOC reviews are completed on schedule,
- A schedule is developed for revising each of the 16 DSAs to properly address each identified credible uncontrolled scenario (i.e., properly mapping controls to scenarios, documenting the basis for determining scenarios are not credible, and incorporating information applicable to how any identified issues were resolved via the PIE process).

To address weaknesses related to procedures for development and configuration control of the safety basis documents, actions are included in this IP to: (a) develop a project plan with near-term, mid-term, and long-term actions for improving the processes Pantex personnel use to develop new and revised DSAs and (b) make improvements to the Pantex Safety Analysis Engineering Manual.

In addition, actions to improve the training of Safety Analysis Engineering personnel are included below in the section that covers Sub-recommendation 5. These actions will also serve to improve “development and configuration control of the safety basis documents,” as suggested per this Board Sub-recommendation (i.e., Board Sub-recommendation 2).
Table 1. Status of Extent-of-Condition Reviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title and Document Number</th>
<th>Scheduled Completion Date</th>
<th>Transmittal Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W76-0/1 SS-21 Assembly, Disassembly &amp; Inspection, and Disassembly for Life Extension Program Operations Hazard Analysis Report, RPT- HAR-255023</td>
<td>November 2018</td>
<td>November 30, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W78 Step II Disassembly &amp; Inspection and Repair Hazard Analysis Report, AB-HAR-319393</td>
<td>November 2018</td>
<td>November 30, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W80 SS-21 Assembly, Disassembly &amp; Inspection, and Dismantlement Hazard Analysis Report, AB-HAR-941189</td>
<td>December 2018</td>
<td>December 31, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B83 SS-21 Disassembly &amp; Inspection and Dismantlement Hazard Analysis Report, AB-HAR-940341</td>
<td>December 2018</td>
<td>December 31, 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacuum Chamber and Manifold Safety Analysis Report, AB-SAR-940025</td>
<td>March 2019</td>
<td>March 28, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W84 SS-21 Surveillance Disassembly, Disassembly &amp; Inspection, and Known State Hazard Analysis Report, AB-HAR-941514</td>
<td>April 2019</td>
<td>April 30, 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W87 Step II Assembly and Disassembly &amp; Inspection Hazard Analysis Report, AB-HAR-940626</td>
<td>June 2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Safety Analysis Report, AB-SAR-940317</td>
<td>June 2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sitewide Safety Analysis Report, AB-SAR-314353</td>
<td>July 2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bays and Cells Safety Analysis Report, AB-SAR-333384</td>
<td>August 2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W88 SS-21 Disassembly &amp; Inspection and Assembly Hazard Analysis Report, AB-HAR-941335</td>
<td>September 2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B61 SS-21 Disassembly &amp; Inspection, and Rebuild Hazard Analysis Report, AB-HAR-940572</td>
<td>September 2019</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Action 2.1.1: Perform Extent-of-Condition (EOC) reviews on all 16 Pantex documented safety analyses to identify and address all credible scenarios for which safety controls had not been identified.

Deliverable: Transmittal to NPO with a table identifying and documenting the results of the EOC review
Completion Date: March 2020

Action 2.1.2: Develop a schedule—not to extend past June 2025—for revising each of the 16 documented safety analyses to properly address each scenario identified while performing the EOC reviews associated with Action 2.1.1.

---

1 Dates in Table 1 are internal delivery dates between CNS and NPO
2 Although the W88 and B61 DSAs were recently rewritten, CNS will still conduct EOC reviews
Deliverable: Schedule
Completion Date: June 2020

Action 2.1.3: Develop a project plan for making necessary improvements to the configuration management processes Pantex personnel use in developing new and revised documented safety analyses.
Completion Date: March 2019 [Complete]

Action 2.1.4: Revise the Pantex Safety Analysis Engineering Manual to make necessary improvements related to development of the documented safety analyses.
Completion Date: December 2019

Board Sub-recommendation 3: Implement actions to ensure process design and engineering controls (including the use of special tooling) eliminate or protect a unit from impact and falling technician scenarios, including those scenarios identified in Enclosure 1.

Issue Description and Proposed Resolution with Milestones and Deliverables

As discussed above, improvements to safety protocols have been realized for preventing significant consequences that could result from Falling Man scenarios. In particular, several SACs have been designed to preclude operators from falling into sensitive weapon configurations. These new SACs were implemented in all active nuclear explosive bays and cells by the end of February 2019. These controls address all Falling Man scenarios, including those identified by the Board’s staff in the report identified as Enclosure 1 of Recommendation 2019-1.

Action 3.1.1: Develop a safety basis document that includes safety controls that address Falling Man scenarios, including those identified by the Board’s staff in the report identified as Enclosure 1 of Recommendation 2019-1.
Deliverable: Safety Basis Supplement for Legacy Issues Associated with DSA at Pantex (SB-SBS-942190 Revision 1)
Completion Date: September 2018 [Complete]

Action 3.1.2: Implement safety controls identified in Action 3.1.1 for all active nuclear explosive operations at Pantex.
Deliverable: IVR Memo for DSA Change Package AB-18-58
Completion Date: February 2019 [Complete]

Board Sub-recommendation 4: Ensure the design, procurement, manufacturing, and maintenance of special tooling is commensurate with its safety function (see Enclosure 1).

Issue Description and Proposed Resolution with Milestones and Deliverables

On October 17, 2018, the Board sent the Secretary of Energy a letter that identified five weaknesses within the special tooling program. Significant effort was expended to revamp and improve the Pantex special tooling program in the 2004 – 2006 timeframe. Below is additional information regarding the five
weaknesses identified by the Board and actions taken and planned to make improvements to the Pantex special tooling program.

**Issue 4.1, Application of the Special Tooling Design Manual**

The Board's staff identified instances where requirements and guidance of the Pantex Special Tooling Design Manual were not being met (note: no DOE Directives or Industry Consensus Standards exist that identify detailed requirements specific to the design, fabrication, inspection, and maintenance of “tooling”). Subsequent to the on-site review performed by the Board's staff in September 2017, all deviations from the manual were reviewed to confirm that continued use of the subject tools meet the applicable requirements and ensure the safety of ongoing operations. The Tooling design staff is trained and qualified to DOE O 426.2, Personnel Selection, Training, Qualification, and Certification Requirements for DOE Nuclear Facilities, requirements applicable to technical staff. This training includes covering the requirements of the manual. While employed safety factors are typically 3 to 1 or greater, load conditions and safety factors are currently at the discretion of the design engineers based on their training; however, the subject procedure is being revised to require management approval for deviations to the required standard safety factors not relied upon in the DSA.

Action 4.1.1: Review each individual deviation from the Pantex Special Tooling Design Manual identified by the Board's staff to confirm that continued use of the subject tools meets the applicable requirements and ensures the safety of ongoing operations.

Deliverable: Report documenting review
Completion Date: October 2019

Action 4.1.2: Revise the Pantex Special Tooling Design Manual to apply a consistent yield safety factor and require management/designee approval for deviations from standard safety factors.

Deliverable: Revised Pantex Special Tooling Design Manual
Completion Date: June 2020

**Issue 4.2, Weld Quality and Application of Non-destructive Evaluation Techniques**

The Board's staff expressed concern that other Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) techniques should be used to inspect welds. The Pantex Welding and Supplier Quality programs ensure that welds are performed and inspected by qualified personnel in accordance with code requirements. The welding program has been enhanced within the last five years to include assigning qualified welding engineers to oversee the program. In addition, qualified weld inspectors perform oversight of vendors that supply tooling to Pantex. In December 2018, an independent welding expert travelled to Pantex to review the welding program as applied to tooling. This expert concluded that the program was consistent with industry requirements and guidance and provided two areas for improvement: (a) evaluating potential application of additional industry welding codes and standards and (b) adopting additional NDE techniques beyond current Pantex practices. These recommendations are incorporated as actions in this IP.

Action 4.2.1: Execute an independent review of the observations made by the Board's staff related to the Pantex welding program, with the focus on identifying any inconsistencies between the Pantex program and industry requirements and guidance.

Deliverable: Memorandum: Review of DNFSB October 17, 2018 Letter to U.S DOE Secretary Perry
Completion Date: December 2018 [Complete]
Action 4.2.2: Evaluate application of additional industry welding codes and standards to enhance the Pantex welding program for special tooling.
Deliverable: Report documenting evaluation
Completion Date: October 2019

Action 4.2.3: Revise both the Pantex Special Tooling Program and Pantex Welding Program to adopt recommendations made in the evaluation performed for Action 4.2.2 above.
Deliverable: Revised program manuals
Completion Date: June 2020

Issue 4.3, Preventive Maintenance and In-service Inspection Programs for Special Tooling

The Board’s staff expressed concern that Pantex relies on “skill-of-the-craft” for proper execution of special tooling inspection, maintenance, and testing activities to ensure tooling meets applicable safety requirements. Pantex tools are currently fabricated, tested, and maintained by trained and qualified journeymen mechanics and electricians. All tooling is inspected by specialized tooling inspectors prior to being released for initial use. The tooling is also inspected subsequent to being modified or repaired. Formal in-service inspections (ISIs) are prescribed by design engineering personnel and procedurally implemented to assure continued reliable performance. Following an assessment NPO conducted in June 2018, corrective actions were developed to require ISIs be established for all new or modified safety-credited tools. The Tooling Design Manual is scheduled to be revised by June 2020 to incorporate this requirement. For existing tooling, there is an action to review and make necessary improvements to ISIs. In-service inspections of special tolling are performed through a controlled process that provides adequate and repeatable elements for trained and qualified craft technicians. This process includes maintenance work orders for each specific tool, tool design documents for requirements (e.g., drawing, support data sheet, etc.), and PX-3107-T form to document completion and acceptance.

Action 4.3.1: Revise the Pantex Special Tooling Design Manual to incorporate a requirement that ISIs be identified for new or modified safety-credited tools.
Deliverable: Revised Pantex Special Tooling Design Manual
Completion Date: June 2020

Action 4.3.2: Review in-service inspection requirements for existing special tooling and issue a plan that includes a schedule—not to extend past June 2023—for making improvements.
Deliverable: Plan based on documented review that includes the scope and schedule for ISI improvements
Completion Date: June 2020

Issue 4.4, Special Tooling Performance Criteria as Identified in Documented Safety Analyses

The Board’s staff expressed concern that the safety basis documentation contains a general safety factor requirement rather than tool-specific performance criteria (i.e., a general design criteria rather than “several 100” specific performance criteria). There are actions for establishing expectations associated with identification of performance criteria for special tooling and that those expectations are implemented for all special tools.

Action 4.4.1: Establish expectations for identifying performance criteria for special tooling, and issue a plan that includes a schedule—not to extend past December 2022—implementing those expectations for all special tools.
**Issue 4.5, Special Tooling Loading Conditions**

The Board’s staff identified concerns related to analysis and performance testing associated with mechanical impact scenarios for low-probability events. An Implementation Plan for Procurement of Safety-Related Special Tooling to NQA-1 (IPLAN-0085) was developed to adopt NQA-1 (in addition to NAP-24A) for special tooling credited in the applicable DSA. This change will provide specific acceptance requirements and criteria to procured special tooling or tooling components that will provide additional assurance of the performance of the credited safety function for special tooling. Separately, Pantex has and is planning further destructive testing of special tools to confirm design modeling and analysis techniques used by Pantex tooling designers are appropriately conservative.

**Action 4.5.1:** Perform destructive testing of two special tools to validate the modeling and analysis techniques used by Pantex tooling designers are appropriately conservative.

**Deliverable:** Report documenting results of destructive testing

**Completion Date:** February 2020

**Action 4.5.2:** Develop business processes and supporting procedures to improve procurement, acceptance, and special tooling supplier quality, consistent with the subject Implementation Plan (Implementation Plan for Procurement of Safety-Related Special Tooling to NQA-1, IPLAN-0085).

**Deliverable:** New Business Processes and Procedures

**Completion Date:** October 2020

**Board Sub-recommendation 5:** Train safety basis personnel to ensure future revisions to the safety basis comply with 10 CFR 830 requirements.

**Issue Description and Proposed Resolution with Milestones and Deliverables**

The training and qualification process for new safety analysis engineers at Pantex requires completing courses 604.65, Documented Safety Analysis Development, and 517.17, USQ Evaluator Qualification Course. These courses are focused on elements of Subpart B of 10 CFR 830 and include guidance for developing and implementing safety basis documents, responding to the discovery of a PISA, and performing USQDs. There are several actions associated with improving training for safety analysis to ensure alignment with DOE requirements (e.g., 10CFR830, DOE-STD-3009, DOE-STD-NA-3016, DOE-STD-1186, etc.), including updates to courses 604.65 and 517.17. In addition, the Pantex USQ process was recently revised, approved by DOE, and implemented. This revision included multiple improvements including: (a) new screening and exemption criteria, (b) use of a new USQ database, (c) an expert USQ process, and (d) guidance for developing SBS.

There are also actions to revise the Pantex Safety Analysis Engineering Manual that governs the work of the Safety Analysis Engineering department. This revision will include additional guidance and expectations associated with the development of safety basis documents. All Pantex analysts will be trained to the new requirements and guidance contained in the revised manual.

In addition to these initiatives, additional training improvement actions included in this IP:

- Update qualification cards for safety analysis engineers
- Update training materials for courses related to the roles and responsibilities of Safety Analysis Engineering
- Utilize training courses available through the DOE's National Training Center

**Action 5.1.1: Simplify the Pantex Plant Unreviewed Safety Questions Procedure and conduct training for Evaluators and Peer Reviewers on the new revision.**

Deliverable: Revised procedure (CD-3014) and evidence of completed training for Evaluators and Peer Reviewers

Completion Date: April 2019 [Complete]

**Action 5.1.2: Develop and conduct improved training courses for USQD authors and reviewers.**

Deliverable: Lesson plans and evidence of completed training for SAE analysts

Completion Date: June 2019 [Complete]

**Action 5.1.3: Update the training materials for the following courses. The majority of these courses have already been updated and training has been provided.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Number</th>
<th>Course Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CR 517.17</td>
<td>USQ Evaluator Qualification Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR 517.67</td>
<td>USQ Evaluator Re-qualification Course</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR 500.61</td>
<td>Expert USQD Evaluator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR 604.64</td>
<td>DSA for Engineers, Project Managers, &amp; Manufacturing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR 604.65</td>
<td>Document Safety Analysis Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB 563.73</td>
<td>USQ Screener Refresher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR 563.73</td>
<td>USQ Screener Initial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB 583.00</td>
<td>USQ Screener</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>CASTLE-PX Training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deliverable: Revised training courses

Completion Date: August 2020
Action 5.1.4: Revise the following qualification cards to incorporate recent lessons learned.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qual Card Number</th>
<th>Qual Card Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QC 607.30</td>
<td>USQ Screener Qual Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QC 526.64</td>
<td>USQ Evaluator Qual Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QC 604.91</td>
<td>AB Analyst I Qual Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QC 604.93</td>
<td>AB Analyst III Qual Card</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QC 604.13</td>
<td>USQ Independent Reviewer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QC 500.62</td>
<td>Expert USQ Evaluator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QC 500.63</td>
<td>Expert USQ Independent Reviewer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deliverable: Revised Qualification Cards
Completion Date: December 2019

Action 5.1.5: Incorporate DOE National Training Center training courses into the required curriculum for SAE analysts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Training Center Safety Basis Courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Course Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA-100DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA-110DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA-120DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA-130DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA-140DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA-150DE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBA-160DE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Deliverable: Revised curriculum
Completion Date: December 2019

4. Organization and Management

Overall execution of this IP is the responsibility of the NPO Manager. Completion of the individual tasks identified within this IP is the responsibility of NPO’s Assistant Manager of Nuclear Safety and Engineering. All actions identified in this IP will be entered and tracked in the Pantex Issues Management System (i.e., the Pantex PER/ESTARS systems). DOE/NNSA will provide written notification to the Board if any IP deliverables will not be completed by the schedule specified in the IP or if DOE/NNSA determines that the scope of any IP actions needs to be modified. DOE/NNSA will brief the Board every six months to summarize progress made on completing the actions identified in this IP. Six months after completing the final action of this IP, DOE/NNSA will initiate an effectiveness review of all actions taken.
5. References