


**Integrated Safety Management System
Safety Conscious Work Environment
Self-Assessment Report**




February 2013

Report Approval




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Acronyms

ATL	Advanced Technologies and Laboratories International, Inc.
BNI	Bechtel National, Inc.
CAM	Corrective Action Management
CAQ	Condition Adverse to Quality
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DOE HQ	Department of Energy headquarters
DNFSB	Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
DPO	Differing Professional Opinion
Ecology	Washington State Department of Ecology
ECP	Employee Concerns Program
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
FEOSH	Federal Employee Occupational Safety and Health
FPD	Federal Project Director
FY	Fiscal Year
HAB	Hanford Advisory Board
I&E	Implemented and Effective
IPP	Individual Performance Plan
IPT	Integrated Project Team
ISM	Issues Management System
ISMS	Integrated Safety Management System
IST	Issues Screen Team
LCO	Limiting Condition for Operations
LOI	Lines of Inquiry
LO/TO	Lockout/Tagout
MRC	Management Review Committee
NI/NE	Not Implemented or Not Effective
OADB	Operational Awareness Database
OARS	ORP Action Reporting System
ORP	Office of River Protection
PI/PE	Partially Implemented or Partially Effective
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
QA	Quality Assurance
R2A2s	Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities and Accountabilities
RL	Richland Operations Office
SCWE	Safety Conscious Work Environment
SME	Subject Matter Expert
WRPS	Washington River Protection Solutions LLC
WTP	Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project

Executive Summary

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) conducted a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) Self-Assessment as part of the annual Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) declaration report for fiscal year (FY) 2012, as required in the DOE September 26, 2012 Memorandum, from Tracy P. Mustin, Principal Deputy Assistant, Secretary for Environmental Management, "*Fiscal Year 2012 Annual Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) and Quality Assurance (QA) Effectiveness Review Declaration.*"

The ORP SCWE Self-Assessment was conducted from January 22 through February 4, 2013. The assessment consisted of the following objectives:

- Assess the extent that ORP models the behaviors of an outstanding SCWE;
- Assess ORP managers/supervisors role in nurturing a SCWE by demonstrating behaviors such as listening to employees and not allowing safety issues to languish;
- Assess the effectiveness of SCWE-related programs such as the Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) process and the Employee Concerns Program (ECP); and
- Identify strengths and opportunities for improvement in performance effectiveness related to SCWE.

The Integrated Safety Management System Guide, 450.4-1C, identifies Leadership, Employee/Worker Engagement, and Organizational Learning as the three key safety culture focus areas and their fifteen associated attributes. The self-assessment team evaluated the three focus areas during the self-assessment with focus on nine of the fifteen behavior attributes. The assessment team used the Lines of Inquiry (LOIs) provided in the DOE SCWE Assessment Guidance to accomplish the above objectives. After summarizing the collected data, the nine attributes received an overall evaluation that best described the ORP organization level of effectiveness rating of Partially Implemented or Partially Effective (PI/PE). The rating states "Evidence demonstrates that the expectations described in the attribute are not routinely demonstrated in a repeatable, reliable manner. Processes are partially in alignment with outcomes and performance is not monitored to ensure desired results are achieved."

To determine the effectiveness of the attributes, employees were randomly chosen across the organization, making sure to include individuals within each division. Staff participated in the ORP SCWE Self-Assessment and provided suggestions to further improve the organizational culture, the safety culture, and a SCWE. Comments and suggestions for improvement were obtained from employees through individual interviews (31) and focus group sessions (7), to aid in ORP identifying their level of effectiveness. The category of employees who provided information during the two primary methods of data collections were:

- 33 Technical
- 20 Non-Technical
- 10 Managers

The employees input was summarized and evaluated to determine to what extent a SCWE has been established at ORP in the areas of Leadership, Employee/Worker Engagement, Organizational Learning, and performance metrics.

Leadership is the cornerstone to a strong and high performing organization. The self-assessment team rated ***Focus Area 1 – Leadership*** as PI/PE. Although varying degrees existed within this rating, evidence of leadership and the associated attributes were not routinely demonstrated in a repeatable, reliable manner. There is partial alignment of processes and performance is not consistently monitored to ensure desired results are achieved. Specific to integration of safety into daily work activities, employees cited very few examples of how safety was integrated into daily activities.

Employees and their direct supervisors had the most positive results in regards to the leadership attributes evaluated. The demonstration of these attributes diminished further up the chain of command. The reduction in trust between employees and managers above their direct supervisor was partially due to project uncertainty, a lack of communication, and poor Roles and Responsibilities, Authorities and Accountabilities (R2A2s). The addressing of external influences, including media reports or external organizations, is slow, and ineffective communications have generated a feeling of a “black hole” of information. This failure to address issues in a timely or effective manner has reduced morale and trust. A few employees did cite tensions between the cost and schedule focus of Federal Project Directors (FPDs) versus the safety emphasis of support or technical organizations, demonstrated by incomplete involvement of support organizations in project decisions. Interview results indicated that employees trust their immediate management to choose safety over production, and are open to self-identified issues, errors and safety problems. Most employees do feel they can raise issues, self-identified errors or mistakes to line management freely and without fear of reprisal. While some employees expressed that raising issues was “career limiting” the assessment team was not provided with specific examples.

Management’s involvement in their employees work was also inconsistent. This is driven by a large variation in management style and experience. Managers who interacted on a more informal level providing real time feedback and discussion generated the most positive results in the leadership area. Part of this was attributed to a physical distance between management and their employees as well as a large number of competing priorities. This also led to the inability of management to address poor behaviors due to the difficulty, stress, and time required to go through the process, further reducing trust in the organization. Furthermore, due to a matrixed organization, most employee work activities are assigned by a manager other than their direct supervisor so there is no clear line of feedback from the manager assigning the work to the manager performing the performance evaluation.

Teamwork and mutual respect is a key attribute of a healthy safety culture. Every member of the organization must be committed to improving it as they plan their work and interact within ORP and with the contractors and public. Employee responses regarding the attribute of ***Focus Area 2 – Employee/Worker Engagement*** generally indicated that they had frequent and positive interactions with their immediate manager to address issues. However, there were comments that indicated that ORP was less effective at working through difficult issues (i.e. employee

behaviors, controversial technical issues, etc.). Part of building an organization that has teamwork and mutual respect is having the ability to address and clearly communicate resolution of difficult issues when they arise. Employees mostly described frequent interaction with supervisors, but that interaction dropped off substantially between staff and management personnel further up the line. Personnel expressed a wide range of views regarding coaching/mentoring. Some did not believe it was necessary. Others questioned the capability of their direct managers to mentor them and looked to others for that help. Some employees also felt their knowledge and experience are not fully utilized. Most employees believed that increased interaction with management would result in better information flow and improved issue resolution. ORP employee/worker engagement was rated as PI/PE.

Focus Area 3 – Organizational Learning is comprised of credibility, trust and reporting errors and problems, effective resolution of reported problems, performance monitoring through multiple means and questioning attitude. ORP organizational learning was rated as PI/PE. Most employees reported that the level of trust between them and their direct supervisor is excellent. The staff stated that they would not hesitate to raise any concerns, issues or problems with their direct supervisor; however, they would hesitate to raise issues to a manager above their direct supervisor. The weakness in the relationship between staff and managers above their direct supervisor contributed to the lack of trust. ORP can improve its level of trust by encouraging all managers to engage with staff and conduct frequent walk-arounds in both the office and at the site. An improved level of trust will help staff feel free to raise issues with all managers.

The supplemental information provided in **Focus Area 4 – Performance metric insights into SCWE** detail the improvements made in ORP's performance assurance processes and some near term goals for ORP's new IMS. These improvements are expected to nourish a healthy safety culture reporting posture. The ORP performance metric insights into SWCE were rated as PI/PE.

ORP has a policy where safety is everyone's business and anyone can express a safety concern without fear of retribution or penalty. In 2012, ORP Management embarked on safety culture improvement actions. As part of this commitment, IMS was established to improve performance assurance processes. Management pointed to several goals for a new system that included enhanced flow of information and transparency, better reporting and feedback features, stronger management oversight and attention, and easy employee access to a system where ideas to continuously improve operational safety were encouraged. Implementation of the IMS has strengthened problem identification processes at ORP and our ability for employees to make recommendations in a transparent manner knowing they will receive timely and meaningful feedback. The system appears to have already made a positive impact on the safety culture at ORP.

Employee feedback indicated that decisions being made reflect a safety first attitude; however, personnel interviewed stated that this attitude was not consistently displayed. ORP Management systems are in place to emphasize safety first, but improvement is needed in consistent demonstration and communication of safety first by managers.

Overall, the effectiveness rating for ORP's SCWE is PI/PE. ORP has made progress in the last year on instilling the behaviors of an outstanding SCWE into daily work activities; however, significant improvement is still needed. Management would do well by continuing to focus on safety and organizational culture improvements. The assessment identified that most direct supervisors try to nurture a SCWE within their own divisions. However, there are opportunities for improvement in defining and reinforcing the expectations for a SCWE for all levels of management and employees.

Strengths

- Willingness of employees to share their open and honest feedback about the state of the SCWE in ORP.
- Working relationships and trust between employees and their direct supervisor.
- Establishment of the IMS.
- Optimism about the new ORP Manager.

Opportunities for Improvement

- A foundational SCWE program (charter, expectations, training, etc.) based on ISMS Safety Culture Attributes to ensure staff have a consistent understanding of the SCWE fundamentals and concepts is not fully implemented.
- Management presence and interaction between staff and management needs to be strengthened.
- Communication has not been fully effective in certain areas. For example:
 - between divisions (especially where employees are not co-located);
 - about the IMS;
 - opportunities for employee development;
 - events that may impact ORP employees;
 - avenues that are available to them if they perceive unfairness in rewards, discipline, or promotions; and
 - information flow both horizontally and vertically across the organization.
- Staff does not consistently understand ORP priorities and how their daily activities link to the overall mission.
- Roles, Responsibilities, Authorities and Accountabilities (R2A2s) and boundaries at the staff level are not consistently defined and clearly understood.
- Management's expectations for professional behaviors are not consistently demonstrated or reinforced.
- Employees are not being developed to their full potential.
- Some issue resolution and disposition(s) have not been effectively communicated (e.g. letter regarding removal of BNI's design authority).
- ORP has not provided training on Violence in the Workplace.

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
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

DOE-ORP performed a SCWE Self-Assessment as part of the annual ISMS declaration report for FY 2012 as required in the DOE September 26, 2012, Memorandum, from Tracy P. Mustin, Principal Deputy Assistant, Secretary for Environmental Management, "*Fiscal Year 2012 Annual Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) and Quality Assurance (QA) Effectiveness Review Declaration.*" ORP is following the guidance provided in the DOE Memorandum, Criterion 7: *Safety Conscious Work Environment Self Assessment*, which states... "Safety Conscious Work Environment Self Assessments must be conducted and reported using the *Safety Conscious Work Environment Self Assessment Guidance.*" Issues identified during the assessment will be entered into the ORP Issues Management System for evaluation and action.

As part of the 2011-1 Implementation Plan, DOE made a commit to evaluate the existence of SCWE at the various sites, to determine the effectiveness of the program and to identify gaps for improvement. A main focus of SCWE is to ensure that managers are executing a strong SCWE by demonstrating behaviors such as listening to employees and not allowing safety issues to languish.

In response, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2011-1 and the Office of Health, Safety and Security Independent Oversight Assessment Reports, ORP created a Safety Culture Integrated Project Team (IPT) to develop an improvement plan containing response and improvement actions, based on a formal recommendation from DNFSB regarding safety culture. The team obtained feedback on the plan from ORP employees as it identified improvement actions. The improvement plan consists of various improvement actions to be implemented and completed by ORP senior managers by March 31, 2013. The development of the ORP Safety Culture IPT was an initial step for ORP to improve its organizational culture, safety culture and SCWE.



Many employees stated that ORP does not have a safety culture issue, but more so, an organizational culture issue. Diagram 1. Ripple Effect, illustrates the integration of organizational culture, safety culture and a SCWE. In essence, an effective SCWE, depends on the overall effectiveness of an organizational culture. Organizational culture issues create a ripple effect generating safety culture issues, which in turn affects the organization's SCWE.

Diagram 1. Ripple Effect

Self-assessment guidance was provided to evaluate a SCWE at ORP through the use of three focus areas and attributes associated with an excellent safety culture described within DOE Guide 450.4-1C, Integrated Safety Management System Guide. The self-assessment guidance identified the ISMS safety culture attributes that offered the greatest potential for achieving SCWE excellence. The assessment team used the guidance to compare current performance with the provided LOIs that define best practices and standards of excellence, to identify strengths and opportunities for improvement in performance effectiveness.

ORP employees participated in the ORP SCWE Self-Assessment to aid in the improvement of the organizational culture, safety culture and SCWE at the office. The provided lines of inquiry focused on safety culture related attributes such as safety, productions, questioning attitude, team work and leadership.

1.1 Preparation

ORP developed the ORP ISMS Safety Conscious Work Environment Self-Assessment Plan (included as Attachment 2). The ORP SCWE Self-Assessment was conducted from January 22 through February 4, 2013. The following preparations activities were conducted:

1. An ORP ISMS SCWE Self-Assessment Team Lead and assessment team was identified. On December 5, 2012, the assessment team convened to review the Self-Assessment Guidance document.
2. Three assessment team executives were identified: Team Advisor – Mark Steelman; Team Executive – Doug Shoop; and Nuclear Safety Culture Subject Matter Expert (SME) – Ed Kennedy.
3. The ORP ISMS SCWE Self-Assessment Plan was submitted to senior management for review and was approved. The Plan consisted of the provided Focus Areas and associated Attribute LOI. The LOIs and the associated questions to address each LOI are provided in Attachment 1, Table 1.
4. Biographies for each Assessment Team Member were obtained and included in the ORP ISMS SCWE Self-Assessment Plan.
5. A schedule was developed to outline the upcoming week's work activities.
6. Federal employees were randomly selected across the entire ORP organization for both individual interviews and focus group sessions.
7. SCWE training was developed and provided to the Assessment Team.
8. The Assessment Team conducted a dry-run of an individual interview and focus group session. Also, assignments (interviews and focus groups) were provided to the assessment team.
9. On January 17, 2013, the ORP manager sent an electronic All Employee Message to staff notifying them of the upcoming SCWE Self-Assessment.
10. Electronic voluntary participation invites were sent to employees that were randomly selected for individual interviews and focus group sessions.

11. On January 22, 2013, an Entrance Briefing was held for senior management and the assessment team to review the Self-Assessment Plan and assessment etiquette.
12. The assessment team conducted field time during January 23 through February 4, 2013.
13. Daily Status Meetings were held at the end of each day to identify any concerns, issues or problems, discuss observations and interview improvements, and plan any activities or adjustments for the next day.
14. A two-day working session was held on February 6 and 7, 2013, to review the collected data. The working sessions consisted of reviewing the data, summarizing data for each LOI, LOI Attribute and Focus Area and providing an effectiveness ranking for each.

1.2 Team Composition

The ORP assessment team consisted of a team leader, an advisor, a team executive, a nuclear safety culture SME, team members, and administrative support. As required by the DOE Self-Assessment guide, all personnel conducting the self-assessment were knowledgeable of the principles associated with safety culture and a SCWE.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

The LOIs, described in Attachment 1, were developed from the ISMS Guide, DOE G 450.4-1C, and *Fiscal Year 2012 Annual Integrated Safety Management System and Quality Assurance Effectiveness Review Declaration*, dated September 26, 2012. The LOIs were developed for use for the assessment team to perform the ORP ISMS SCWE Self-Assessment.

To develop a complete representation of performance associated with each LOI, the SCWE self-assessment team used a combination of data collection methods. These included personnel individual interviews, focus groups, the recent 2012 Hanford Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey (Speak Up Survey) results, and document analysis.

2.1 Face-to-face Interviews

The SCWE Self-Assessment team conducted structured face-to-face interviews with thirty-one (31) randomly selected ORP staff. Questions discussed during the interviews were developed based on the provided LOIs and are listed in Attachment 1, Table 1. The Focus Areas and LOI attribute questions were divided into three groups, consisting of fourteen to sixteen questions. Each interview was led by two assessment team members. One team member was assigned to ask the LOI questions and fully engage with the interviewee and the other team member was assigned to gather the data/notes, periodically asking the interviewee for clarification, if needed.

2.2 Focus Groups

The focus groups were guided discussion with a mixture of diverse work area backgrounds, to gather open-ended comments, suggestions and improvements regarding the ORP culture, safety

culture and SCWE based on the provided LOIs. Each session was led by two assessment team leaders in which they selected particular questions from the list of LOI questions. As with the individual interviews, one team member was assigned to ask the LOI questions and fully engage with the interviewee and the other team member was assigned to gather the data/notes, periodically asking employees of the focus group session for clarification, if needed.

2.3 The 2012 Hanford Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey Results

Review of the June 2012 SCWE Survey results were analyzed and compared against the ORP SCWE Self-Assessment data obtained through the interviews and focus groups.

2.4 Document Analysis: Review of Key Safety Culture Related Processes

The SCWE Self-Assessment team reviewed the following types of documentation:

- ECP and DPO procedure
- 2012 Hanford Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey – DOE-ORP Report (Speak-Up Survey)
- 2012 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Report
- DOE-ORP Primary Contractors SCWE Self-Assessment Results
 - Washington River Protection Solutions LLC (WRPS)
 - Advanced Technologies and Laboratories International, Inc. (ATL)
 - Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI)

2.5 Data Gathering

Each assessment team captured responses, suggestions, and improvements ideas for each LOI question on the Assessment Response Form (see Attachment 3). Data obtained from the interviews and focus group sessions were provided to the team lead to transfer to the ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Data Input Table. At completion of the assessment, the LOIs were divided among the team members, in which each person evaluated and developed a summary statement of the gathered data for a set of LOI questions. As a whole, the team collaborated on each LOI summary statement and provided an effectiveness rating for each LOI question, Attribute, and overall Focus Area.

2.6 Effectiveness Evaluation

The DOE Headquarter (HQ) guidance did not require a pass/fail determination with regard to each attribute within a focus area; however, an informal evaluation of the level of implementation and effectiveness of the expectations described in each attribute as one means to guide the assessment team when drawing conclusions and making recommendations for the three focus areas and one supplemental assessment area. The evaluation summaries below are based on the stages that an organization goes through in developing a mature safety culture, as described in Attachment 11 of the ISMS Guide (derived from the International Atomic Energy Agency's Safety Culture Maturity Model). The levels of evaluation represent one way to benchmark the implementation and effectiveness of a safety culture.

The SCWE Self-Assessment team chose a summary evaluation for each LOI Question, Attribute, and Focus Area that best described the level of implementation and effectiveness.

Table 1. Evaluation Summaries

<i>Chose the summary evaluation that best describes the level of Implementation and Effectiveness for each attribute.</i>	
Implemented and Effective (I&E)	Evidence demonstrates that the expectations described in the attribute are routinely demonstrated in a repeatable, reliable manner. Processes are aligned with outcomes and performance is monitored to ensure that desired results are achieved.
Partially Implemented or Partially Effective (PI/PE)	Evidence demonstrates that the expectations described in the attribute are not routinely demonstrated in a repeatable, reliable manner. Processes are partially in alignment with outcomes and performance is not monitored to ensure desired results are achieved.
Not Implemented or Not Effective (NI/NE)	Insufficient evidence-or-evidence demonstrates that the expectations described in the attribute are not being met. Processes are substantially misaligned with outcomes and performance that is not repeatable or is not being achieved.

3.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS

3.1 Focus Area 1 – Leadership

Attribute 1: Demonstrated Safety Leadership

ORP was graded to be PI/PE effective in the area of Demonstrated Safety Leadership. Some supervisors are good at infusing policies, procedures, and work activities with safety goals and requirements and some are not. For example, supervisors discussed attributes in staff meetings, complete Federal Employee Occupational Safety and Health (FEOSH) required activities, and ensure that employees have proper personal protective equipment (PPE). There was some confusion between what procedures apply when developed by other divisions. Perceptions differ, but more people felt that our leaders could do more to acknowledge external pressures and address them.

There is also a lack of understanding by many of the roles and responsibilities outside organization and their interactions with ORP. Very few examples were provided where management was proactive at addressing external influences that might affect safety. (Examples of external influences are DOE-HQ, DNFSB, Hanford Advisory Board [HAB], Washington State Department of Ecology [Ecology]).

Most Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project (WTP) and Tank Farms staff firmly agreed that ORP line managers understand their employees work activities, performance objectives, and how to conduct work safely. Among divisions that provide cross-cutting support (Legal, Environmental, Communications, etc.) there were mixed results as to whether or not employees understood their work activities. Employees of all organizations suggested that staff be provided with more information about their line manager's activities and objectives to help them understand how their organizations fit in.

Management inconsistently enhances work activities, procedures, and process with safety practices and policies. Interaction between managers and employees is sporadic and inconsistent; as a result, the communication of issues and their resolution is sparse or is left to rumor. This is compounded by having to react to external influences. This can be reduced through having a more proactive organization (strategy, policy, communication tools, process, etc.) with a structured approach to external interfaces and influences.

Specific to supervisory behaviors, employees provided mixed results regarding supervisors reinforcing behavioral expectations. Employees provided some examples where managers interacted with staff in scheduled and unscheduled settings, emphasizing safety and asking good questions. Examples of good behaviors included more daily team briefings that kept employees better informed. Senior management luncheons with staff have improved working relationships. Others described very limited interaction with managers and observed little to no specific actions that would demonstrate management commitment to safety. There was some staff that said senior managers rarely interacted with employees including taking the initiative to meeting staff at their offices or work locations. Employees who spoke of the lack of interaction from management attributed this to competing priorities and numerous meetings.

Most employees held the perspective that management would choose safety over production, but provided no examples of actually doing so. A few employees did cite tensions between the cost and schedule focus of FPDs versus the safety emphasis of support or technical organizations, demonstrated by incomplete involvement of support organizations in project decisions. A few also expressed that some project issues are being addressed in an over-conservative manner, delaying progress (for example, the single-shell tank dome cutting, and the double-shell tank sludge height limit).

Attribute 2: Management Engagement in the Field

ORP was graded to be PI/PE in the area of Management Engagement in the field. Most employees reported positive interactions with their direct supervisors, either through frequent involvement in daily activities or availability to help resolve more difficult issues. A few employees noted shortcomings in management abilities and willingness to deal with tough problems, resulting in the tolerance of dysfunctional behaviors. Employees mostly described frequent interaction with supervisors but that interaction dropped off substantially between staff and management personnel further up the line. Many employees felt that they were usually the initiators of discussions between employees and management.

Employees expressed a wide range of views regarding coaching/mentoring. Some employees questioned the capability of their direct managers to mentor them and looked to others to fill that role. It was recommended that upper management seek out assistance from long time employees to best utilize the experience base in the organization. Some reported positive coaching experiences, beyond the required performance evaluation discussions, that helped them perform better. Most employees believed that increased interaction with management would result in better information flow and improved understanding of the issues.

Expectations for management involvement in the field or with their employees are not consistent. Employees were generally unaware of management involvement in continuing or developmental training. Few employees were aware of recent training events designed for management such as SCWE training and "5 Dysfunctions of a Team" training, and this training has not been flowed down to the staff.

Employees felt that management's response to issues is slow and information is inconsistently communicated. Line managers do not identify critical performance elements and monitor them closely. The inconsistency of interactions and perceived favoritism by some over others has affected the level of engagement between management and staff. Some individuals are not engaged either due to being assigned to a distant location or because of avoidance because of dysfunctional behavior.

Attribute 3: Open Communication and Fostering an Environment Free From Retribution

ORP was graded to be PI/PE in the area of Open Communication and fostering an environment free from retribution. While some individuals expressed no trust in the organization, there appears to be a high level of trust between staff and their immediate manager. Trust is less evident between staff and upper management, as well as between organizations within ORP (i.e.

different reporting chains and interactions by WTP with the rest of ORP). The decision making process needs to be more transparent to staff and should include the technical expert(s), after which the decision needs to be communicated to the staff quickly and thoroughly. Many staff felt that the new ORP manager will make a positive impact on open communications.

Most staff felt that they can report errors and unfavorable news; however, there were some instances where a person raised an issue of significant impact and it was not well received. Employees did not have problems raising issues with the immediate manager; however, staff have some concerns that as you go up the management chain, suggestions are not as well received and the actions taken are not very effective or communicated. Most of the staff are aware of the various reporting mechanisms (to direct manager, Operational Awareness Database (OADB), ORP Action Reporting System (OARS), IMS, E-Stars, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), and DPO), but expressed concern that there are too many and that they don't interface with each other. There is also confusion on which one to use and when. Responses to issues or concerns are not always effective or do not specifically address the issue.

There is a belief that communication is getting better and the IMS was given as an example. Most of the staff felt free to raise safety concerns without retaliation; however some staff responded that they do not raise issues because they perceive that management is apathetic. Some staff felt that management has not consistently addressed the chilled effect that resulted from the issues that were raised and poorly addressed or communicated in the past. Some employees mentioned the need to improve discipline methods and were unable to discern consistent approaches to the award or discipline structure. Employees felt that discipline does not occur and that uncorrected negative behaviors influence organizational culture.

Reading about issues first in the local or national newspaper or industry newsletters causes employees to feel that they are left out. This is exacerbated when reports contradict current work focus. This erodes trust within the organization. For example, the S-1 Teams working under a Non-Disclosure Agreement created tension between people and organizations due to the unknown effects caused by this external ad hoc organization and the lack of communication of responsibilities to support them. Some employees discussed the "black hole" of information between employees and line management. Information and issues flow up the chain but not down. There are a few instances where leaders have not addressed situations where a chilling effect currently exists or is propagated by a lack of information (e.g. recent employee concerns and DPO issues).

Attribute 4: Clear Expectations and Accountability

ORP was rated as PI/PE in the area of Clear Expectations and Accountability Employees. Employees stated that they can readily meet with their supervisors but safety was not generally a topic during these interactions. Some employees felt that there was sparse feedback beyond performance reviews and staff meetings. Employees responded that performance plans and direct managers establish expectations for performance. Changing priorities and work assignments cause confusion among employees on expectations and roles and responsibilities. Some employees reported that management does not deal with poor performers and unprofessional behavior causing employees to lose motivation and lowering morale. Some

employees indicated we are not consistently reporting unintended errors or violations (e.g. time card fraud). Some employees stated that when they reported errors, they were more comfortable reporting them to their immediate manager. Some managers said the process for addressing poor performing employees was extremely cumbersome, time consuming, and stressful, so they are reluctant to go through the process.

3.2 Focus Area 2 – Employee/Worker Engagement

Attribute 1: Teamwork and Mutual Respect

Most employees reported positive interactions with their supervisors either through frequent involvement in daily activities or availability to help resolve more difficult issues. A few employees noted shortcomings in management experience and willingness to deal with tough problems, resulting in the tolerance of dysfunctional behaviors.

Employees mostly described frequent interaction with supervisors but that interaction dropped off substantially between staff and management personnel further up the line. Employees are usually the initiators for discussions between employees and management.

Personnel expressed a wide range of views regarding coaching/mentoring. Some did not believe it was necessary. Others questioned the capability of their direct managers to mentor them and looked to others for that help. Upper management should seek out guidance from long time employees. Some reported positive coaching experiences, beyond the required performance evaluation discussions, that helped them perform better.

Most employees believed that increased interaction with management would result in better information flow and improved issue resolution.

Employees were generally unaware of management involvement in continuing or developmental training. ORP was rated as PI/PE in the area of Teamwork and Mutual Respect.

3.3 Focus Area 3 – Organizational Learning

Attribute 1: Credibility, Trust and Reporting Errors and Problems

The majority of employees stated they do have trust for their immediate supervisor and felt free to speak with their direct supervisor, if needed, to raise any concerns, issues or problems. Staff expressed they would be more prone to trust upper level managers, if provided consistency. To enhance trust between employees and line managers, staff suggested that ORP managers engage more with staff, define a clear and consistent ORP mission and priorities for staff and R2A2s at the staff level. ORP was rated as PI/PE in the area of Credibility, Trust and Reporting Errors and Problems.

Attribute 2: Effective Resolution of Reported Problems

ORP was rated as PI/PE in the area of Effective Resolution of Reported Problems. ORP previous used OARS which was structured for the identification, tracking, reporting, and closure

of action items associated with responsible work at ORP. Over the course of the time, ORP identified that the system was not user friendly and the process to close and track actions was not effective. In October 2012, IMS was implemented at ORP replacing OARS. The majority of employees stated that they are aware of IMS and expressed a positive likeness to the new system. Employees are optimistic that the new IMS will provide a better avenue for issue tracking and resolution.

Attribute 3: Performance Monitoring Through Multiple Means

Knowledge of performance indicators, metrics and monitoring is sparse among ORP employees. Some staff stated they used monitoring matrices to monitor their work activities against their Individual Performance Plan (IPP) for the year. Additional examples provided were monitoring through self-assessments, and field time tracking. Employees expressed that some line managers are actively involved in performance monitoring and some were not. Staff expressed that the ORP organizational performance could improve if line managers above their direct supervisors would actively engaged in the oversight activities of staff by conducting more walk-arounds in the office and on-site. Due to the lack of knowledge regarding performance monitoring, a rating of NI/NE was assigned to Attribute 3.

Attribute 4: Questioning Attitude

The assessment team ranked Attribute 4, Questioning Attitude, as PI/PE. Although two of the three LOIs were ranked I&E, the consensus of the team felt that in order for an attribute to receive an I&E rating, all LOIs within that particular attribute had to be rated I&E. Overall, ORP employees felt that they can freely raise and discuss any concerns or problems related to safety to their line manager. In addition, employees expressed the existence of a supportive and good relationship environment among co-workers in their work groups. When asked if employees and their line managers actively seek out alternative methods when scheduled work does not go as planned, staff provided mixed responses. However, many employees stated that they do work together with their line manager to identify alternative methods to complete a task upon changed scheduled work.

3.4 Focus Area 4 – Supplemental Information – Performance Metric Insights Into SCWE

4.1.a: What insight does Performance Assurance System data provide regarding SCWE and whether the organization learns from safety concerns? The recommended team approach is to evaluate the issues management system to determine whether: 1) when employees raise issues, are they involved in determining the solution; 2) do they receive feedback on the resolution of their concerns; 3) do workers actively participate in the preparation and execution of corrective actions; 4) are employees a part of improvement initiatives at their work locations; and 5) whether performance indicator trends show that the system is being effectively used by workers and managers to identify and address issues (e.g., trends could exist in: the rate of corrective action completion, the number of overdue corrective actions, the average age of incomplete corrective actions, or the number of issues deemed as recurring).

ORP's policy is that all employees are responsible for identifying quality problems and are encouraged to suggest improvements but prior to October 12, 2012, the Corrective Action Management (CAM) process that was in place was not transparent because it required that identification of a condition adverse to quality (CAQ) be reviewed and concurred on by the Quality Assurance Team Lead prior to entry of the issue into OARS. The need to prove a CAQ determination prior to entry of a Corrective Action Report into OARS made it impossible to know how many recommendations to improve were initially raised. There was no system that tracked recommendations or planned actions, nor were there mechanisms in place to ensure that feedback was provided to employees.

OARS had weak reporting features that were outdated and difficult to use. While the system provided a structured, consistent approach to identify, track, and close corrective actions related to CAQs, it also housed general action tracking activities used by ORP organizations. CAM due dates were not readily distinguishable from other action tracking activities making ORP priorities difficult to manage.

Early in 2012, ORP management embarked on safety culture improvements that, in part, lead to a stronger, more open culture where dissenting views, concerns, issues, and opportunities for improvement are actively sought and where timely feedback is provided. An Issues Resolution Manager was named in June. After benchmarking, the development of system requirements, a procedure and team charters, and after completing employee briefings, ORP stood up an IMS in October 2012. In addition, two separate IMS teams were established. A multi-disciplinary Issues Screen Team (IST) made up of representatives from ORP technical functions and organizations meets weekly with the goal of processing every Issue Report in a timely manner. For each issue, the IST establishes the appropriate organization to lead issue resolution and determines its significance level. ORP established a Management Review Committee (MRC) made up of the ORP Deputy Manager, Assistant Managers, and other senior staff, with the charter of providing leadership and oversight of the IMS.

The IMS is ORP's first "zero threshold" system where employees can enter any issue or recommendation without procedural constraints to identify a CAQ. Employees are given the opportunity to be involved in resolution of issues and recommendations directly through entry into the IMS. The enhanced transparency of the system allows employees easy access to the issues they are responsible for and provides an improved ability to track any ORP issue through to closure. Traceability and records capture immediately improved when the IMS was stood up as pertinent data and correspondence is attached directly to individual Issue Reports. Employees no longer need to spend precious time searching in various databases for information related to specific issues. It is expected that the IMS will also be used to further strengthen the federal oversight process as the Issues Manager is currently evaluating the assessment process used, in part, to document contractor issues, in order to find efficiencies that can be incorporated through use of the IMS.

Since being stood up there have been over 450 issues entered into the IMS, with the bulk of them being entered for ORP employees to track the status of contractor issues found during

federal oversight assessments. Among individual contributors (i.e., issues identified outside of assessment processes) the use of the IMS appears to be gaining momentum. In its first quarter, employees initiated 13 Issue Reports in the IMS, compared to 19 being entered in the first month and a half of the second quarter. A communications plan is in place with the Issues Manager conducting question and answer sessions at staff meetings, a Lunch and Learn briefing, one-on-one sessions, computer based training, electronic access to a User's Manual, and other internal announcements.

The IMS is designed to capture trending information in three ways. Tracking/Trending codes are documented by the IST that identify facility, processes and operations-related information for issues resulting from construction, engineering, maintenance, emergency preparedness, and quality activities. Issue Owners document ISMS codes that identify how the issues are related to the five core functions of the ISMS Guiding Principles. Finally, Cause Codes are identified for issues where the significance level requires an apparent or root cause analysis. In January, the IST requested approval from the MRC to replace the ISMS codes with codes that identify the safety culture attributes found in the ISMS Guide, Attachment 10. The request was approved and the Issue Manager is currently working with IMS programmers to revise the codes in the system.

The ORP Manager and other senior staff receive weekly IMS statistic reports that document system use, significant issues, number of open and delinquent actions, and actions coming due within 7 to 30 days. Performance trends have yet to be identified with the system being so new. The MRC is currently evaluating other performance goals to establish and evaluate related impacts on employees. For instance, the IMS procedure currently set limits on how extension requests are approved, and the system currently tracks the number of days it takes an Issue Owner to evaluate and develop corrective action plans. Other targets in the future may include how long it takes to initiate an Issue Report after issue identification and the days it takes to implement corrective actions.

Implementation of the IMS has strengthened problem identification processes and the ability for employees to make recommendations in a transparent manner with timely and meaningful feedback. One goal of the IMS is to impact safety culture at ORP in a positive way. Employees who have initiated Issue Reports have reported that the system is easy to use and that they appreciate the transparency and timely responses from the Issue Owners. In addition, Issue Owners who have worked through development and closure of corrective actions in the system have also reported ease of use.

4.1.b: What evidence exists to show decision making reflects a safety first attitude? The recommended approach is to evaluate operations and management information/metrics to determine whether trends and changes are present in performance indicators, such as: 1) rate of unplanned Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO) entries; 2) rate and nature of procedural violations; 3) the rate of deferred/overdue training; 4) currency of SCWE-related procedures and policies (e.g., Differing Professional Opinion process, Employee Concerns Program); and 5) number of problem identification reports submitted on a periodic basis (e.g., monthly).

ORP procedures implement management's policy for safety first. MGT-PM-PL-02, *Safety Management Functions Responsibilities and Authorities (FRA) for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection*, states, "The ISMS enables the systematic integration of safety into the management, planning, and execution of work so the missions are accomplished while protecting the public, workers, and environment." MGT-PM-PL-03, *Integrated Safety Management System Description*, states, "Line managers demonstrate their commitment to safety and are the leading advocates of safety and demonstrate their commitment in both word and action. Line managers periodically take steps to reinforce safety, including personal visits and walkthroughs to verify that their expectations are being met. Line managers maintain a strong focus on the safe conduct of work activities. Line managers maintain awareness of key performance indicators related to safe work accomplishment, watch carefully for adverse trends or indications, and take prompt action to understand adverse trends and anomalies. Line managers throughout the organization set an example for safety through their direct involvement in continuous learning by themselves and their staffs on topics related to technical understanding and safety improvement." TRS-ISS-IP-02, *Issue Reporting and Resolution*, states, "ORP fosters and values issue identification and provides an open culture where opportunities to enhance the safety and quality of our operations are actively sought and a healthy nuclear safety culture is maintained."

Examples of where ORP has demonstrated their commitment to safety first in the last year include:

- Performed a "Speak Up" survey for Federal staff.
- Developed an ORP management development program which focuses on improving management's modeling of safety culture attributes.
- Developed and implemented an employee development program containing elements that underpin safety culture attributes.
- Established and implemented a set of management and staff expectations for safety culture attributes as defined in DOE G 450.4-1C.
- Incorporated industry best practices in the development of ORP policy, procedures, and staff and management training documents that emphasize the unique and special nature of nuclear technology and operations.
- Clearly defined R2A2s.
- Implementing an ORP change management process.
- Established and implemented a program for ORP to effectively handle issues. Program elements included feedback mechanisms, transparency, traceability, benchmarking, performance monitoring, trending, and metrics that communicate issue resolution to employees. In addition, this program trends issues for SCWE attributes.
- Evaluated the ECP and is implementing process improvements.
- Maintained the Safety Culture IPT as an integral part of ORP with its primary mission to continuously improve ORP safety culture. The IPT serves as an important, ongoing management tool to reinforce values and identify areas for improvement.

4.1.c What evidence exists to show how effectively the organization monitors the SCWE aspects of their safety culture? The recommended team approach is to evaluate performance assurance system information to determine what trends and changes are present in performance indicators such as: 1) rates of overdue/delayed/cancelled audits & assessments; 2) the number and quality of findings; 3) turnover in audit/assessment staff; 4) rate and nature of externally vs. internally-identified findings; and 5) the rate and nature of reportable events.

As part of ORP's process to improve safety culture, ORP established and implemented a program for ORP to effectively handle issues. This new program trends issues for SCWE attributes which will provide valuable insight into ORP SCWE in the future. Other data include:

1) Rates of overdue/delayed/cancelled audits & assessments

For FY12, ORP assessment statistics are (internal & contractor):

- Assessments/ Surveillances Scheduled: 152
- Assessments/ Surveillances Canceled: 17
- Assessments/ Surveillances completed: 135

2) Number and quality of findings

ORP has three levels of finding:

- Level 1: a major event or systemic breakdown in safety, quality, or Integrated Safety Management.
- Level 2: a non-compliance with a requirement that could affect quality, worker health or safety, the public, the environment, facility operations, or regulatory compliance.
- Level 3: A minor finding identifying non-compliance with a procedure or requirement in a process, program, system, or management structure. A minor finding is an isolated occurrence (one or two instances) with no impact on worker health and safety, the public, the environment, facility operations, or regulatory compliance, and requires only remedial action

For Fiscal Year 12 ORP Finding statistics are (internal & contractor):

- Total Findings: 218
- Level 1 Findings: 6
- Level 2 Findings: 73
- Level 3 Findings: 139

3) Turnover in audit/assessment staff:

Very low turnover and all turn over due to retirement or transfers.

4) Rate and nature of externally- vs. internally-identified findings:

Data unavailable as external findings numbers are not readily available.

5) Rate and nature of reportable events:

For FY12

- # Level 1 Occurrences for ORP – 0
- # Level 2 Occurrences for ORP - 2
- # Level 3 Occurrences for ORP – 21
- # Level 4 Occurrences for ORP – 19
- # R Occurrences for ORP – 0
- Total for ORP - 42

4.1.d: What evidence exists that demonstrates managers/supervisors perform first hand observations of the work environment, listen to workers, and make changes where necessary? The recommended team approach is to evaluate performance assurance system information to determine what trends and changes are present in performance indicators, such as: 1) the number of management observations by senior managers; 2) the number of management observations that identify deficiencies or best practices; and 3) the number of deficiencies or best practices that result in change.

For Federal senior managers, their “workers” are the Federal Division Directors, FPDs and staff. Individual interviews with a sampling of senior and mid-level managers showed that there are no written expectations for management to engage their staff in the Federal work place, but the interviewees described frequent interaction with their staff for the purposes of understanding and providing staff priorities and deliverables. A few managers specifically devoted time to accompanying their staff into their respective project areas at the Hanford Tank Farms and the WTP to personally observe contractor operations and their staff’s interaction with contractor personnel. These results corresponded with the results of the SCWE Self-Assessment individual staff interviews and focus groups where most employees described frequent interactions with their immediate supervisor. These routine interactions are almost always un-documented, so there was no method available to determine identification and resolution of issues.

For Federal senior managers, mid-level managers, and FPDs, written expectations for personal observation of contractor operations at the site – as expressed in performance plans or other documents – varies between a desired number of site visits or hours spent in the field. A couple senior managers made routine visits to the field – approximately monthly – but the others described infrequent visits due to work demands. Where documentation of these visits is required, the most common method identified is use of the OADB, a system designed to capture field oversight input that has been used for years at ORP. Use of the OADB however has varied greatly. Facility representatives made very frequent use – several entries per month with frequent identification of issues that were entered into a separate tracking system if warranted by significance. One FR division director also made frequent use, while the other had not used the system since 2011. Most FPDs and their Deputies used the OADB approximately monthly. From there, use of the OADB by division directors and senior management dropped off by the end of 2010. For the Manager and FPD OADB entries in 2012 and 2013, few described issues that required resolution. There are no performance indicators that show senior management

observation of work activities, nor indicators tracking identification and resolution of issues discovered during these observations.

4.1.e What evidence exists that demonstrates the organization maintains nuclear facilities in a manner that supports both production and the safe performance of work? The recommended team approach is to evaluate facility performance metrics to determine what trends and changes are present in performance indicators such as: 1) the number and age of lockout/tagout (LO/TO) hanging; 2) the number and age of temporary modifications; 3) the rates of deferred maintenance; and 4) the number and age of inoperable or impaired safety systems.

This information is provided in the contractors SCWE Self-Assessment reports and is not duplicated here.

3.5 Document Analysis

3.5.1 ECP/DPO Programs

For the ECP and DPO processes, ORP utilized the Richland Operations Office (RL) program. ORP located the links to ECP and DPO procedures on the ORP Webpage, which linked employees over to the RL document. RL recently also established a turnaround office location in the ORP building to provide ORP employees better access to the resources available. The RL ECP Program Manager maintains metrics on the program which are briefed to ORP and RL management on a monthly and quarterly basis.

Most employees were aware of the ECP and DPO processes. However, employees voiced confusion over which program to use. Some employees doubted the effectiveness of the programs themselves and the whether or not they would use them. The employee comments ranged from a trust in both programs to views that the use of either the ECP or DPO processes will turn employees into pariahs, or be otherwise career-limiting. Some employees stated that they were chilled from using the ECP process and that people in ORP have made the process about the person and not resolving the issue. Specific to the DPO process, employees perceived that the intent of the process is good, but improvements are needed in communications (e.g. process status and decisions, production of clear and concise statements on the decisions made through the process, and ensuring that all information and viewpoints are included in the analysis).

3.5.2 2012 Hanford Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey – DOE-ORP Report (Speak-Up Survey)

In June 2012, The Department of Energy tasked EurekaFacts to conduct a Hanford site-wide (federal and contractor) employee survey. The survey evaluated the current state of Hanford's Organizational Climate, Safety Culture, Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE), and established a baseline to develop and measure continuous improvement efforts. A total of 118 employees at DOE-ORP (Federal employees) participated in the survey.

Mean overall scores for the four safety culture and climate focus areas ranged from 4.02 to 3.84 on a 5-point scale. Focus area Leadership Involvement and Learning Organization was slightly under the Overall ORP Site (Federal and Site Contractor) mean values rating at 3.96 and 3.84. A factor-level score of 4.0 or greater indicates, there is an agreement with the statements that describe a positive climate. A rating of 3.0 to 3.9 is considered mid-range and reflects a moderate agreement with employees regarding the survey statement, indicates that the desirable climate characteristics/factors exist in the organization and that there is a need for growth. A 3.0 rating indicates a disagreement by employees with the survey statements.

The survey identified five areas of strength and weakness. Table 2 and 3 provides the five factors with the highest and lowest scores for the ORP organization.

Table 2. Areas of Strength – 2012 Speak Up Survey Results

Focus Area	Climate Factor	DOE-ORP Mean
FA 4: Safety Conscious Work Environment	Detection and Prevention of Retaliation	4.36
FA 2: Employee Engagement	Personal Commitment to Everyone's Safety	4.31
FA 4: Safety Conscious Work Environment	Management Support/Encouragement to Raise Safety Concerns	4.17
FA 3: Learning Organization	Credibility, Trust and Reporting Errors and Problems	4.17
FA 2: Learning Organization	Participation in Work Planning and Improvement	4.15

Table 3. Areas of Weakness – 2012 Speak Up Survey Results

Focus Area	Climate Factor	DOE-ORP Mean
FA 3: Learning Organization	Questioning Attitude	3.77
FA 2: Employee Engagement	Job Characteristics	3.72
FA 3: Learning Organization	Effective Safety/General Communication	3.70
FA 3: Learning Organization	Use of Operational Experience	3.66
FA 4: Safety Conscious Work Environment	Internal Avenues of Redress	3.43

Employees were asked on the survey the following question.

What one thing would you recommend to improve safety in your company?

Based on responses from employees, eight top common themes were identified.

1. Streamline the Safety System.
2. Set clear expectation and accountability
3. Prioritize safety over production, costs and schedule.
4. Reduce fear of retaliation for reporting safety concerns.
5. Improve resolution of reported problems.
6. Address staffing and skill deficiencies resulting from layoffs.
7. Increase communication across units and between management and workers.
8. "Listen to the workers".

The Hanford site-wide SCWE survey has provided insight for both DOE and their contractors on whether an excellent SCWE exist. The survey identified Focus Area 4 – SCWE as the highest rated mean at 4.02 and Focus Area 3 – Learning Organization as the lowest rated at 3.84. DOE-ORP's current SCWE state was analyzed and recommendations were provided to make the necessary adjustments to improve the overall organizational culture.

3.5.3 2012 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey Report

During April through June 2012, The Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) was conducted to assess the overall government agencies policies, programs, other aspects of the work environment and areas of improvement.

Of 687,687 Government wide, the Office of River protections had 89 employees participate in the 2012 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey. However, not all 89 participants responded to all survey questions. The response to the survey questions ranged from a total of 89-77 participants, with an estimated average of 86 participants for each question. The survey was divided into the following various topics.

- Personal Work Experiences
- Work Unit
- Agency
- Supervisor/Team Leader
- Leadership
- Satisfaction
- Work/Life Programs
- Demographics

Table 4. 2012 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey – Office of River Protection Results

Survey Topic Questions	Highest Positive Rating Percentage	Lowest Positive Rating Percentage
My Work Experience		
# 7. When needed I am willing to put in the extra effort to get a job done.	97.8%	
# 9. I have sufficient resources (for example, people, materials, budget) to get my job done.		50.6%
Noteworthy Questions	Additional scores > 70% were questions # 2, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17 and 26	There were no additional questions that rated less than 50.6% for this category.
My Work Unit		
# 28. How would you rate the overall quality of work done by your work unit?	81.4%	
# 23. In my work unit, steps are taken to deal with a poor performer who cannot or will not improve.		23.9%
Noteworthy Questions	Additional scores > 70% were questions # 20, and 26	Additional scores < 40% were questions # 22, 24 and 25
My Agency		
# 35. Employees are protected from health and safety hazards on the job.	91.7%	
# 33. Pay raises depend on how well employees perform their jobs.		13.3%
Noteworthy Questions	Additional scores > 70% was question # 36	Additional scores < 40% were questions # 32 and 41.
My Supervisor /Team Leader		
# 50. In the last six months, my supervisor/team leader has talked with me about my performance.	91.4%	
# 46. My supervisor/team leader provides me with constructive suggestions to improve my job performance.		63.5%

Noteworthy Questions	Additional scores > 70% were questions # 42, 43, 47, 48, 49, 51 and 52.	There were no additional questions that rated less than 63.5% for this category.
Leadership		
# 62. Senior leaders demonstrate support for Work/Life programs.	70.5%	
# 53. In my organization, leaders generate high levels of motivation and commitment in the workforce.		33.9%
Noteworthy Questions	There were no additional noteworthy questions for the Leadership category rated greater than 70% or less than 40%. Ten questions were asked under the Leadership category. The remaining eight questions rated between 57.8% and 44.9%.	
My Satisfaction		
# 69. Considering everything, how satisfied are you with your job?	68.1%	
# 67. How satisfied are you with your opportunity to get a better job in your organization?		37.7%
Noteworthy Questions	There were no additional noteworthy questions for the My Satisfaction category rated greater than 70% or less than 40%. Nine questions were asked under the My Satisfaction category. The remaining seven questions rated between 57.3% and 41.0%.	
Work/Life		
The Work/Life category asked a ranged of work life related questions such as Teleworking, AWS Days, Employee Assistance Program, Health and Wellness program etc. The participation level varied ranging from 88 to 2 participants responding to 1 of the 14 questions in the category. Therefore, no high and low percentages were able to be identified.		

The government wide survey provided ORP an alternative perspective to identify areas of strength and improvements. ORP employees rated the majority of the survey questions for categories My Work Experience and My Supervisor/Team Leader with high ratings of 70% of positive agreement. Categories Leadership and My Satisfaction ranked mid-ranges with the majority of questions ranking between 57% – 40 % positive responses. Areas for improvement consisted of My Work Unit and My Agency with positive ratings of 13%-45%.

3.5.4 DOE-ORP Primary Contractors SCWE Self- Assessment Results

3.5.4.1 WRPS

WRPS performed a SCWE Self-Assessment in November 2012 as part of their annual ISMS declaration report. The results were issued in a final report in January 2013, "Washington River Protection Solutions Integrated Safety Management System Safety Conscious Work Environment Self-Assessment," FY2013-ECP-S-0376. WRPS performed their evaluation utilizing the ISMS Focus Areas, Attributes, and LOIs prescribed in DOE's SCWE Assessment Guidance. The self-assessment team consisted of WRPS employees and a DOE representative.

The results indicated that WRPS has effectively implemented all four of the DOE ISMS Safety Culture Focus Areas and their Attributes. The information to reach this conclusion was based on interviews, field work observations, and documentation (including WRPS's All-Employee ISMS SCWE Survey from February 2012 and DOE's Hanford Site Organizational Climate & SCWE Survey in July 2012).

While, WRPS' Self-Assessment indicated that the four focus areas attributes were "implemented and effective" and workforce perceptions continue to show SCWE improvement, WRPS recognized that continual vigilance is necessary to maintain and further improve the SCWE. They called out "Noteworthy Practices" that might be used throughout WRPS and further "Opportunities for Improvement" that were documented in their Problem Evaluation Request process.

3.5.4.2 ATL

ATL performed a SCWE Self-Assessment as directed by DOE-ORP.

The SCWE Self-Assessment was conducted from November 26 through December 12, 2012. The assessment was conducted in parallel with the VPP Self-Assessment which was in progress at the time of receipt of the letter from ORP directing the performance of a SCWE Self-Assessment. As a result, ATL communicated to ORP their intentions to integrate the SCWE focus areas and some lines of inquiry into the VPP Self-Assessment in order to reduce redundancy and improve efficiency in assessing both the VPP and the SCWE. The results from the VPP Self-Assessment relating to SCWE along with the results from *The 2012 Hanford Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey* were used to complete the ATL SCWE Self-Assessment.

Through the use of LOIs and survey data, ATL assessment team assessed the four focus areas and related attributes of a SCWE. The assessment team found all four focus areas and their associated attributes to be "implemented and effective" within ATL. However, ATL identified two areas for improvement. Based on the results, noteworthy practices were identified, as well as potential opportunities for improvement.

Opportunities for Improvement include:

- Improve the quality and effectiveness of employee training.

- Review the lowest scores from the DOE SCWE Survey and consider actions to improve performance.

Assessment results from individual interviews and document reviews validated the July, 2012, Hanford Site Organizational Climate & SCWE Survey (Speak-Up survey) results, or, in most cases, showed even stronger evidence of an effectively implemented SCWE.

3.5.4.3 BNI

BNI completed their SCWE Self-Assessment and transmitted the results to ORP on January 31, 2013. BNI based their self-assessment primarily on a review of project documents. The 2012 Hanford Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey (BNI/URS), performance indicators, self-assessments, and corrective action program data. Where necessary, BNI also contacted management personnel to gain perspective and opinion on matters related to SCWE. BNI did not interview employees or perform focus group sessions to gather data for their self-assessment.

BNI developed their lines of inquiry using the four factors identified in the 2012 Hanford Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey. The four factors are:

- Management Support/Encouragement to Raise Safety Concerns
- Internal Avenues of Redress
- Alternate Problem Identification Process
- Detection and Prevention of Retaliation

The four factors and their associated attributes contain commonalities with the LOIs in DOE SCWE Self-Assessment Guidance, but do not cover all of the elements in the DOE Self-Assessment Guidance.

A majority of the data reviewed by BNI during their self-assessment was from the 2012 Hanford Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey. This survey was performed in June 2012, and the results were issued in October 2012. Prior to the survey, BNI issued their Comprehensive Corrective Action Plan for Strengthening the Nuclear Safety and Quality Culture at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant on May 17, 2012. BNI had commenced actions to improve their safety culture and therefore their SCEW prior to the issuance of this Corrective Action Plan; however, the short time frame between issuance of the Corrective Action Plan and the survey do not allow for actions to be completed or changes in safety culture of SCWE to take effect.

During the performance of the assessment, BNI identified one strength, one weakness, one opportunity for improvement, and two recommendations. BNI identified the recent performance of SCWE training to project personnel as a strength specifically related to improving the knowledge and skills necessary to carry out individual and collective responsibilities for maintaining a SCWE. BNI identified their one weakness in the quality of self-assessments conducted. BNI's identified the opportunity to improve the integration and coordination of project resources through a durable and sustained manner that best serves the WTP's continuous

improvement in SCWE. The two recommendations developed by the self-assessment team are to maintain focus on the deliverables in the Comprehensive Corrective Action Plan for Strengthening the Nuclear Safety and Quality Culture at the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant and to establish a schedule and platform for periodic discussion and review of the newly instituted Nuclear Safety and Quality Culture metrics.

Overall, BNI did not follow the guidance in the DOE SCWE Self-Assessment Guidance. However, BNI did identify improvements that can be made to continue to foster as SCWE.

4.0 CONCLUSION

4.1 Focus Area 1 – Leadership

The inconsistent application of management tools have created an environment where trust is significantly reduced. There were very few sited examples of when safety was integrated into daily activities. Line managers may not understand how to implement this into daily and how it applies to ORP. The addressing of external influences, including media reports or external organizations, is slow, and ineffective communications have generated a feeling of a “black hole” of information. This failure to address issues in a timely or effective manner has reduced morale and trust. Pockets within the organization exist where employees were positive about the direct leadership but diminished further up the chain of command.

Management’s involvement in their employees work was also pocketed. This is driven by a large variation in management style and experience. Managers who interacted on a more informal level providing real time feedback and discussion generated to most positive results in the leadership area. Part of this was attributed to a physical distance between management and their employees as well as numerous commitments. This also lead to the inability of management to address poor behaviors due to the difficulty, stress, and time required to go through the process, further reducing trust in the organization. Role and Responsibilities and Accountabilities and Authorities are still not clear which adds to the confusion and limits holding people accountable for work performed. For example, the S-1 Teams working under a Non-Disclosure agreement created tension between people and organizations due to the unknown affects caused by this external organization and the lack of communication of responsibilities to support them. Furthermore, due to a matrixed organization, the work assigned outside line management so there is no clear line of feedback from the assignment to the line manager to input into performance evaluation. Employees do feel like they can raise issues, self-identified errors or mistakes to their management freely and without fear of reprisal. ORP leadership area was rated as PI/PE.

4.2 Focus Area 2 – Employee/Worker Engagement

ORP has been partially effective in implementing an atmosphere of teamwork and mutual respect. Employees’ immediate managers are engaged with their staff, however, as communication up and down the management chain needs significant improvement as does the valuing of staff’s expertise. ORP employee/worker engagement was rated as PI/PE.

4.3 Focus Area 3 – Organizational Learning

ORP organizational learning focus area was rated as PI/PE. The level of trust between employees and direct supervisor is excellent, however, ORP will need improvement in the trust level between employees and line managers above their direct supervisor. Having an established trust level within the organization will improve the organizational culture, safety culture and SCWE. ORP can improve its' level of trust by encouraging all managers to engage with staff and conduct frequent walk-around in both the office and at the site. It will allow for staff to feel free to raise issues with higher level managers. Although, there are various avenues in place at ORP, the primary method is for staff to be able to communicate with their line managers. Through this self-assessment, insight has been provided by staff on the lack of awareness regarding the performance monitoring assurance program. Overall, employees acknowledged that ORP does have the presence of a questioning attitude working environment.

4.4 Focus Area 4 – Supplemental Information – Performance Metric Insights Into SCWE

ORP performance metric insights into SCWE focus area was rated as PI/PE. Implementation of the IMS has strengthened problem identification processes at ORP and our ability for employees to make recommendations in a transparent manner knowing they will receive timely and meaningful feedback. The system appears to have already made a positive impact on the safety culture at ORP.

Evidence was found that decisions being made reflect a safety first attitude however personnel interviewed stated that this attitude was not consistently displayed. ORP Management systems are in place to emphasize safety first, but constant demonstration and communication of safety first by managers is needed.

As part of ORP's process to improve safety culture ORP established and implemented a program for ORP to effectively handle issues. This new program trends issues for safety conscious work environment attributes which will provide valuable insight into ORP SCWE in the future. Because this is a new system ORP has no data to evaluate SCWE trends in past performance.

Many employees stated that ORP does not have a safety culture issue, but more so, an organizational culture issue. Culture issues create a ripple effect generating safety culture issues, which in turn affects the organization's SCWE.

4.5 Overall Conclusion

The overall effectiveness rating for ORP's SCWE is PI/PE. The self-assessment objectives addressed below provide an overall summary of the feedback received from ORP staff and the opportunities for improvement.

Assess the extent that ORP models the behaviors of an outstanding SCWE

- ORP has made progress in the last year on instilling the behaviors of an outstanding SCWE into daily work activities; however, significant improvement is still needed. Management would do well by continuing to focus on safety and organizational culture improvements.

Assess ORP managers/supervisors role in nurturing a SCWE by demonstrating behaviors such as listening to employees and not allowing safety issues to languish

- The assessment identified that most direct supervisors try to nurture a SCWE within their own divisions. However, there are opportunities for improvement in defining and reinforcing the expectations for a SCWE for all levels of management and employees.

Assess the effectiveness of SCWE-related programs such as the DPO process and ECP

- Most employees were aware of the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and Differing Professional Opinions (DPO) processes. However, employees voiced confusion over which program to use.

Identify strengths and opportunities for improvement in performance effectiveness related to SCWE

Strengths

- Willingness of employees to share their open and honest feedback about the state of the SCWE in ORP.
- Working relationships and trust between employees and their direct supervisor.
- Establishment of the IMS.
- Optimism about the new ORP Manager.

Opportunities for Improvement

- A foundational SCWE program (charter, expectations, training, etc.) based on ISMS Safety Culture Attributes to ensure staff have a consistent understanding of the SCWE fundamentals and concepts is not fully implemented.
- Management presence and interaction between staff and management needs to be strengthened.
- Communication has not been fully effective in certain areas. For example:
 - between divisions (especially where employees are not co-located);
 - about the IMS;
 - opportunities for employee development;
 - events that may impact ORP employees;
 - avenues that are available to them if they perceive unfairness in rewards, discipline, or promotions; and
 - information flow both horizontally and vertically across the organization.
- Staff does not consistently understand ORP priorities and how their daily activities link to the overall mission.

- R2A2s and boundaries at the staff level are not consistently defined and clearly understood.
- Management's expectations for professional behaviors are not consistently demonstrated or reinforced.
- Employees are not being developed to their full potential.
- Some issue resolution and disposition(s) have not been effectively communicated (e.g. letter regarding removal of BNI's design authority).
- ORP has not provided training on Violence in the Workplace.

APPENDIX

Attachment 1

2013 ORP ISMS SCWE Self-Assessment Results Summary Table

Table 1. Lines of Inquiry – Attributes of Safety Culture Excellence –Data Summary

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
Focus Area 1 – Leadership	Focus Area 1 – Leadership		(PI/PE)
Attribute 1: Demonstrated Safety Leadership	Attribute 1: Demonstrated Safety Leadership		(PI/PE)
1.1.a Line managers enhance work activities, procedures and process with safety practices and policies.	1.1.a How has your line manager enhanced work activities, procedures and process by incorporating safety practices and policies?	Some supervisors are good at infusing policies, procedures, and work activities with safety goals and requirements and some are not. For example, supervisors discuss attributes in staff meetings, complete FEOSH required activities, and ensure that employees have proper PPE. However, there is some confusion between what procedures apply when they are not developed by the individuals own division.	(PI/PE)
1.1.b Leaders acknowledge and address external influences that may impose changes that could result in safety concerns.	1.1.b Do you feel that the leaders of ORP acknowledge and address external influences that may possibly require change resulting in safety concerns?	Perceptions differ, but more people feel that our leaders could do more to acknowledge external pressure and address it. One example is reading about how external influences are addressed in the newspaper. There is also a lack of understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the outside organizations and their interactions with ORP. Very few examples were provided where management was proactive at addressing external influences that might affect safety. (Examples of external influences are DOE HQ, DNFSB, HAB, Ecology)	(NI/E)
1.1.c Line managers clearly understand their work activities and performance objectives, and how to safely conduct their work activities to accomplish their performance objectives.	1.1.c Does it appear that ORP line managers clearly understand their work activities and performance objectives? Do you feel that ORP line managers know how to safely conduct their work activities to accomplish their performance objectives? Please elaborate.	Most WTP and Tank Farms staff firmly agreed that ORP line managers understand their work activities, performance objectives, and how to conduct work safely (there was one dissenter in WTP). Among staff in the "other" category there was no clear trend. It was suggested that staff be provided with more information about their line manager's activities and objectives to help them understand how their organizations fit in.	(PI/PE)

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
<p>1.1.d Line managers demonstrate their commitment to safety through their actions and behaviors, and support the organization in successfully implementing safety culture attributes, by conducting walk-throughs, personal visits, and verifying that their expectations are met.</p>	<p>1.1.d How does management, from immediate supervisor to senior managers, demonstrate their commitment to safety through their actions and behaviors?</p> <p>Has your line managers successfully implemented the safety culture attributes by conducting walk-throughs and personal visits?</p>	<p>Employees provided mixed results regarding supervisory behaviors. Employees provided some examples where manager interacted with staff in scheduled and unscheduled settings, emphasizing safety and asking good questions. Examples of good behaviors included more daily team briefings that kept employees better informed. Senior management luncheons with staff have improved working relationships. Others described very limited interaction with managers and observed little to no specific actions that would demonstrate management commitment to safety. Some senior managers rarely interacted with employees including meeting staff at their offices or work locations.</p>	<p>(PI/PE)</p>
<p>1.1.e The organizational mission and operational goals clearly identify that production and safety goals are intertwined, demonstrating commitments consistent with highly reliable organizations.</p>	<p>1.1.e What are some examples that demonstrate the balance between safety and construction/production?</p>	<p>Employees mostly reported the view that management would choose safety over production, but provided no examples of actually doing so. A few employees did cite tensions between the cost and schedule focus of federal project directors versus the safety emphasis of support or technical organizations, demonstrated by incomplete involvement of support organizations in project decisions. A few also expressed that some project issues are being addressed in an over-conservative manner, delaying progress (for example, the single-shell tank dome cutting, and the double-shell tank sludge height limit).</p>	<p>(PI/PE)</p>
<p>Attribute 2: Management Engagement and Time in the Field</p>			<p>(PI/PE)</p>
<p>1.2.a Maintaining operational awareness is a priority. Line managers are in close contact with the front-line employees. Line managers listen and act on real-time operational information. Line managers</p>	<p>1.2.a Does your line manager engage formally and/or informally with you regarding your daily work scope activities and aid in resolving real-time matters. If yes, what are some examples?</p>	<p>Most employees reported positive interactions with their supervisors -- either through frequent involvement in daily activities or availability to help resolve more difficult issues. A few employees noted shortcomings in</p>	<p>(PI/PE)</p>

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
<p>identify critical performance elements and monitor them closely.</p>		<p>management experience and willingness to deal with tough problems, resulting in the tolerance of dysfunctional behaviors.</p>	
<p>1.2.b Line managers spend time on the floor and in employee work areas. Line managers practice visible leadership by placing eyes on the work, asking questions, coaching, mentoring, and reinforcing standards and positive behaviors. Deviations from expectations are corrected promptly and, when appropriate, collectively analyzed to understand why the behaviors occurred.</p>	<p>1.2.b i. How often do you observe your line managers spending time on the floor and in employees work areas (in office and in the field on-site)?</p> <p>ii. Is your line manager engaged in your daily work scope? How?</p> <p>iii. Does your line manager set aside time to coach/mentor to you? Would you like your line manager to coach you or another line manger?</p> <p>iv. Will the presence and increase interaction of management improve work performance by staff (please elaborate)?</p> <p>v. Are you aware of defined expectations for management to spend time in the field (office and/or on site)? If yes, what are the expectations? Are the expectations being met?</p>	<p>Part "i" -- Employees mostly described frequent interaction with supervisors but that interaction dropped off substantially between staff and management personnel further up the line. Employees are usually the initiators for discussions between employees and management.</p> <p>Part "ii" -- No additional summary beyond what was stated above (1.2.a).</p> <p>Part "iii" -- Personnel expressed a wide range of views regarding coaching/mentoring. Some did not believe it was necessary. Others questioned the capability of their direct managers to mentor them and looked to others for that help. Upper management should seek out guidance from long time employees. Some reported positive coaching experiences, beyond the required performance evaluation discussions, that helped them perform better.</p> <p>Part "iv" -- Most employees believed that increased interaction with management would result in better information flow and improved issue resolution.</p> <p>Part "v" -- Expectations for management involvement in the field or with their employees is not consistently defined.</p>	<p>(PI/PE)</p>

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
<p>1.2.c Managers set an example for safety through their personal commitment to continuous learning and by direct involvement in high-quality training that consistently reinforces expected employee behaviors.</p> <p>Attribute 3: Open Communication and Fostering and Environment Free From Retribution</p>	<p>1.2.c How do ORP managers demonstrate safety through their various continuous developmental training?</p> <p>Attribute 3: Open Communication and Fostering and Environment Free From Retribution</p>	<p>Employees were generally unaware of management involvement in continuing or developmental training. A few were aware of recent training events designed for management such as SCWE training and "5 Dysfunctions of a Team" training.</p>	<p>(NI/E)</p> <p>(PI/PE)</p>
<p>1.3.a A high level of trust is established in the organization.</p>	<p>1.3.a Describe the level of trust in your organization. Please elaborate.</p>	<p>While some individuals expressed no trust in the organization, there appears to be a high level of trust between staff and their immediate manager. Trust is less evident between staff and upper management, as well as between organizations within ORP (i.e. different reporting chains and interactions by WTP with the rest of ORP). The decision-making process needs to be more transparent to staff and include the technical expert(s), after which the decision needs to be communicated to the staff quickly. Many staff members felt that the new ORP manager will make a positive impact in this area.</p>	<p>(PI/PE)</p>
<p>1.3.b Reporting individual errors is encouraged and valued. Individuals feel safe from reprisal when reporting errors and incidents.</p>	<p>1.3.b Does the organization encourage employees to report errors and incidents of all nature?</p> <p>Would you feel comfortable reporting an error or incident?</p> <p>What actions are taken, when an employee makes an error or causes an incident regarding safety or production?</p>	<p>Most staff felt that they can report errors and unfavorable news, however there were some incidents where a person raised an issue of significant impact and it was not well received. Most staff felt comfortable raising issues to their direct manager, but not to upper level managers. Staff also felt that once an issue was raised, the actions taken were not adequate or well communicated.</p>	<p>(PI/PE)</p>
<p>1.3.c Individuals at all levels of the organization promptly report errors and incidents and offer suggestions for improvements.</p>	<p>1.3.c Does management welcome and request suggestions from employees when seeking to resolve reported error, incidents or problems?</p>	<p>Yes, with the immediate manager, however staff has some concerns that as you go up the management chain, suggestions are not as well received and the actions taken are not very effective.</p>	<p>(PI/PE)</p>

DOE HSS/EM LOE	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
1.3.d A variety of methods are available for personnel to raise safety issues and line managers promptly and effectively respond to personnel who raise safety issues.	1.3.d Describe your organization's processes and methods for reporting issues, errors and problems. Does your line manager promptly and effectively respond?	Most of the staff are aware of the various reporting mechanisms (to direct manager, Operational Awareness Database (OADB), ORP Action Reporting System (OARS), Issues Management System (IMS), E-Stars, Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), and Differing Professional Opinion (DPO)), but expressed concern that there are too many and that they don't interface with each other. There is also confusion on which one to use. Responses to issues or concerns are not always effective or do not specifically address the issue. There is a belief that things are getting better (the IMS was given as an example).	(PI/PE)
1.3.e Leaders proactively detect situations that could result in retaliation and take effective action to prevent a chilling effect.	1.3.e Do you feel free to raise safety concerns without fear of retaliation? Does management effectively respond to retaliation and the potential for a chilling effect?	Yes. Most of the staff feels free to raise safety concerns without retaliation; however some staff responded that they don't raise issues because management is apathetic. Management has not consistently addressed the chilled effect that resulted from the issues that were raised.	(PI/PE)
1.3.f The organization addresses disciplinary actions in a consistent manner; disciplinary actions are reviewed to ensure fair and consistent treatment of employees at all levels of the organization.	1.3.f Is discipline applied fair and consistent across the organization at all levels? Please elaborate. Are employees who disrupt the work environment promptly addressed by management? Please elaborate.	Some employees mentioned the need to improve discipline methods and were unable to discern consistent approaches to the award or discipline structure. Employees felt that discipline does not occur and that negative behaviors influence organizational culture.	(NI/E)
Attribute 4: Clear expectations and accountability	Attribute 4: Clear expectations and accountability	Attribute 4: Clear expectations and accountability	(PI/PE)
1.4.a Line managers provide ongoing performance reviews of assigned roles and responsibilities reinforcing expectations and ensuring key safety responsibilities and expectations are being met.	1.4.a How often do you meet with your line manager to discuss, review and ensure that your assigned roles, responsibilities expectations and safety responsibilities identified in your IPP are being met?	Employees focused on the ability to meet with their supervisors but did not provide details on how safety is reinforced during these meetings. Some employees felt that there was sparse feedback beyond performance reviews and staff meetings.	(PI/PE)

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
	Does your line manager provide feedback outside of your performance reviews?		
<p>1.4.b Personnel at all organizational levels are held accountable for standards and expectations. Accountability is demonstrated both by recognizing excellent performance as well as identifying less-than-adequate performance. Accountability considers intent and organizational factors that may contribute to undesirable outcomes.</p>	<p>1.4.b Has clear standards and expectations been well defined for employees at ORP by management? Please elaborate.</p> <p>Are all employees held accountable for their work performance? Please elaborate.</p> <p>Do you feel that all employees are reprimanded for unprofessional behavior? Please elaborate.</p>	<p>Employees responded that performance plans and direct managers establish expectations for performance. Changing priorities and work assignments cause confusion among employees on expectations and roles and responsibilities. Some employees reported that management does not deal with poor performers and unprofessional behavior causing employees to lose motivation and morale.</p>	(PI/PE)
<p>1.4.c Willful violations of requirements and performance norms are rare. Individuals and organizations are held accountable in the context of a just culture. Unintended failures to follow requirements are promptly reported, and personnel and organizations are acknowledged for self-identification and reporting errors.</p>	<p>1.4.c Do you feel that our organization is acknowledged for self-identifying errors and failures?</p> <p>To your knowledge, are accidental failures and errors to follow requirements promptly reported by management and employees? Please elaborate.</p>	<p>Some employees indicated we are not consistently reporting unintended errors or violations. Employees who did state that they reported errors were more comfortable reporting them to their immediate manager. One example of an unintended error or violation was the failure to meet a schedule requirement.</p>	(PI/PE)
<p>Focus Area 2: Employee/Worker Engagement</p>	<p>Focus Area 2: Employee/Worker Engagement</p>	<p>Focus Area 2: Employee/Worker Engagement</p>	(PI/PE)
<p>Attribute 1: Teamwork and Mutual Respect</p>	<p>Attribute 1: Teamwork and Mutual Respect</p>	<p>Attribute 1: Teamwork and Mutual Respect</p>	(PI/PE)
<p>2.1.a Open communications and teamwork are the norm.</p>	<p>2.1.a Do open discussions regarding safety issues occur between you, your co-workers and managers?</p>	<p>Many employees throughout ORP observed that discussion is open, but a significant number cited instances of contentious issues that caused discussion to shut down. These include issues between technical and project staff, who have conflicting priorities at times; that have generated a lot of emotion. The expectations for professional behavior and what to do in a workplace violence situation are examples of topics that are not being discussed adequately. Communication is sometimes not effective between organizations or when</p>	(PI/PE)

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
		<p>an employee needs to communicate with their supervisor's supervisor. It appears that more could be done to help employees communicate effectively during difficult conversations.</p>	
<p>2.1.b Individuals at all levels of the organization listen to each other and effectively engage in crucial conversations to ensure meaning, intent and viewpoints are understood; and that differing points of view are acknowledged.</p>	<p>2.1.b Do individuals at all levels of the organization respectfully listen to each other to ensure they understand the meaning, intent, and viewpoints that are being communicated?</p>	<p>Staff whose daily communication is about non-controversial topics noted no problems but those whose work is in controversial areas experience difficulties. Some people have no problems communicating; others feel ignored. Several people said that things are improving or were optimistic that new management would bring improvement.</p> <p>Communication has been enhanced by use of the zero-threshold IMS, but hindered by a lack of feedback on what is being done to resolve an issue after it has been raised.</p> <p>One individual reported feeling pressure from management to approve a Performance Based Incentive and allowable costs that they felt should not have been approved.</p>	(PI/PE)
<p>2.1.c Discussion on issues focus on problem solving rather than on individuals.</p>	<p>2.1.c During discussions regarding an issue, is the focus on resolving the matter? If, no, what is the general focus of discussion?</p>	<p>Generally, employees feel that the focus is on issue resolution, but there were some exceptions. Employees sometimes feel that some managers do not fully listen to their issues and recommendations and make decisions with undue haste. Regarding workplace violence, some employees felt that management is focused on limiting liability rather than resolving the issue. Others thought that issue resolution is side tracked by people taking sides.</p>	(PI/PE)

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
2.1.d Good news and bad news are both valued and shared.	2.1.d When bad news is discussed, what is the tone of the discussion? What is the behavior of the persons involved in the discussion?	Throughout ORP, nearly all interviewees said that both good and bad news are discussed in a professional manner. Some employees expressed that management questioned the validity of the issues that were raised (Questioning Attitude).	(PI/PE)
Focus Area 3: Organizational Learning	Focus Area 3: Organizational Learning	Focus Area 3: Organizational Learning	(PI/PE)
Attribute 1: Credibility, trust and reporting errors and problems	Attribute 1: Credibility, trust and reporting errors and problems	Attribute 1: Credibility, trust and reporting errors and problems	(PI/PE)
3.1.a Credibility and trust are present and continuously nurtured so that a high level of trust is established in the organization.	3.1.a Do you trust your supervisor and higher management team? Please elaborate.	Trust for immediate supervisors varies, but staff generally trusts immediate supervisors more than senior managers. Most stressed the need for consistency and stability of senior management (difficult with senior managers changing so often). Most are hopeful for the new ORP Manager to take actions to improve trust across the organization by doing the right thing.	(PI/PE)
3.1.b Organizations, managers and line supervisors provide accurate, relevant and timely information to employees. Line managers are skilled in responding to employee questions in an open, honest manner.	3.1.b Do managers respond in a timely, effective manner to issues that are brought to their attention? Please elaborate.	Most employees were satisfied with issue responses for standard issues. There were notable exceptions for high visibility, sensitive, and/or difficult issues where managers did not respond in a timely manner.	(PI/PE)
3.1.c Reporting individual errors is encouraged and valued. Individuals are recognized and rewarded for self-identification of errors.	3.1.c Is self-identification/self-reporting of individual errors viewed positive in the organization? Are employees rewarded after self-identifying and reporting an individual error or incident? Should an employee be rewarded after self-identifying and reporting an individual error?	Most felt that self-identifying/self-reporting of errors/issues was positive in the organization. Not many examples were provided of rewards that were received, and some struggled with what reward meant and what rewards should be given. For example, some thought a reward could be monetary, some thought a reward was just positive acknowledgement of efforts, and others did not think a reward was needed because self-identifying and reporting of errors should just be good, standard practice.	(PI/PE)

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
<p>3.1.d Line managers encourage and appreciate safety issue and error reporting.</p>	<p>3.1.d Does your line manager encourage employees to report errors and safety issues?</p> <p>When an issue is reported to management, what happens?</p>	<p>Most felt that their direct supervisor was very encouraging and that there are efforts to fix the issues (an example provided was use of the Issues Management System). Several people said that it was their organization's key function to report errors and safety issues. Other common ways cited for issue response were recurring meetings, reports, and/or surveillances. An employee provided an example where a manager chose to go outside ORP reporting processes to voice technical safety concerns when they felt that ORP management did not address the issue.</p>	<p>(PI/PE)</p>
<p>3.1.e Managers and line supervisors demonstrate integrity and adhere to ethical values and practices to foster trust.</p>	<p>3.1.e How does management demonstrate integrity and ethical values?</p>	<p>Employees provided mixed results on the demonstration of ethics and integrity by managers. Some employees expressed distrust between employees and managers as a result of a lack of response to issues, providing evasive answers, and inconsistency of how employees are treated. Employees stated that there is a lack of transparency as to why decisions are made. Employees also raised several concerns in regards to ethical practices in following government policies/requirements.</p>	<p>(PI/PE)</p>
<p>3.1.f Managers and line supervisors demonstrate consistency in approach and a commitment to the vision, mission, values and success of the organization as well as the individuals (people).</p>	<p>3.1.f Do you believe managers and line managers display a commitment to the ORP vision, mission and values of the success of the organization and the employees? Please elaborate.</p>	<p>Employees voiced confusion as to ORP's mission and priorities which leads to poorly defined R2A2s. Management clearly shows a commitment to the overall goal of clean up however, the current environment of uncertainty is unhelpful and we need to "settle on" or clarify the mission further.</p>	<p>(NI/E)</p>
<p>3.1.g Mistakes are used for opportunities to learn rather than blame.</p>	<p>3.1.g When an employee makes an honest mistake that affects safety, does management focus on the issue or the individual? Please elaborate.</p>	<p>Most employees felt that safety issues focused on the issue rather than on the individual. Employees did not have examples where an individual was the focus of mistakes.</p>	<p>(PI/PE)</p>

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
3.1.h Individuals are recognized and rewarded for demonstrating behaviors consistent with the safety culture principles.	3.1.h How are individuals recognized and rewarded for positive safety culture behaviors?	ORP does not consistently recognize positive safety culture behaviors. Some felt recognition was unwarranted and others did not feel comfortable with public acknowledgement. Employees stressed that awards are limited due to budget restrictions. Some believed management didn't have the skills and resources to recognize employees' contributions, leading to some negativity.	(NI/E)
Attribute 2: Effective Resolution of Reported Problems	Attribute 2: Effective Resolution of Reported Problems	Attribute 2: Effective Resolution of Reported Problems	(PI/PE)
3.2.a Vigorous corrective and improvement action programs are established and effectively implemented, providing both transparency and traceability of all corrective actions. Corrective action programs effectively prioritize issues, enabling rapid response to imminent problems while closing minor issues in a timely manner to prevent them from escalating into major issues.	3.2.a Do you believe the previous corrective action management program/process was effective in identifying and resolving issues? Are you aware of the new Issues Management System?	The previous system (OARS) was difficult to use and lacked effectiveness. Employees are optimistic that the new Issues Management System will provide a better avenue for issue tracking and resolution. Several employees are still unfamiliar with the new IMS.	(PI/PE)
3.2.b Results from performance assurance activities are effectively integrated into the performance improvement processes, such that they receive adequate and timely attention. Linkages with other performance monitoring inputs are examined, high-quality causal analyses are conducted, as needed, and corrective actions are tracked to closure with effectiveness verified to prevent future occurrences.	3.2.b What mechanisms are used to monitor safety performance at ORP? (e.g., number of skin contaminations/month)	Employees are aware of performance monitoring for contractors, but are not aware of any mechanisms used specifically for ORP.	(NI/E)
3.2.c Processes identify, examine and communicate latent organizational weaknesses that can aggravate relatively minor events if not corrected. Organizational trends are examined and communicated.	3.2.c What processes are in place at ORP to identify and examine organizational weaknesses?	Employees are aware of the use of management self-assessments as a process to examine organizational weaknesses. However, areas for improvement and results from the self-assessments are not consistently shared with employees. Employees could not identify	(PI/PE)

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
		any other examples of processes.	
<p>3.2.d Organizational systems and processes are designed to provide layers of defenses, recognizing that people are fallible. Lessons Learned are shared frequently; prevention and mitigation measures are used to preclude errors from occurring or propagating. Error-likely situations are sought out and corrected, and recurrent errors are carefully examined as indicators of latent organizational weaknesses.</p>	<p>3.2.d As it is known, people are not perfect and do make mistakes, describe the organizational systems and processes that are in place at ORP as protection and preventive layers. (e.g., Lessons Learned, Communication)</p>	<p>Employees listed examples such as DPO process, EEO process, lessons learned, and peer reviews.</p>	(PI/PE)
<p>3.2.e Incident reviews are conducted promptly after an incident to ensure data quality and to identify improvement opportunities. Causal analysis expertise is applied effectively to examine events and improve safe work performance. Causal analysis is performed on a graded approach for major and minor incidents, and near-misses, to identify causes and follow-up actions. Causal analysis incorporates multi-discipline analytical perspectives. Even small failures are viewed as windows into the system that can spur learning.</p>	<p>3.2.e Describe your organization's incident/event investigation process.</p>	<p>Employees are not aware of an incident or event investigation process for ORP.</p>	(NI/E)
<p>3.2.f Performance improvement processes require direct worker participation. Individuals are encouraged, recognized and rewarded for offering innovative ideas to improve performance and to solve problems.</p>	<p>3.2.f Are employees encouraged to suggest innovative ideas to improve performance and to solve problems? Are employees rewarded and acknowledged for suggesting innovative ideas to improve performance and to solve problems?</p>	<p>Employees are mixed in their responses. Some employees feel that they are encouraged to suggest new ideas, while others do not. The execution of new ideas does not always meet the expectations of the employees who raised them.</p>	(PI/PE)

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
Attribute 3: Performance Monitoring Through Multiple Means	Attribute 3: Performance Monitoring Through Multiple Means	Attribute 3: Performance Monitoring Through Multiple Means	(NI/E)
3.3.a Line managers maintain a strong focus on the safe conduct of work activities. Line managers maintain awareness of key performance indicators related to safe work accomplishment, watch carefully for adverse trends or indications, and take prompt action to understand adverse trends and anomalies. Management employs processes and special expertise to be vigilant for organizational drift.	3.3.a Does ORP use effective performance indicators related to safe work accomplishment, identifying trends or indications that warrant prompt action to address adverse trends or anomalies?	Employees are not aware of any performance indicators for ORP.	(NI/E)
3.3.b Performance assurance consists of robust, frequent, and independent oversight conducted at all levels of the organization. Performance assurance includes independent evaluation of performance indicators and trend analysis.	3.3.b Does ORP have a strong performance assurance programs, that effectively evaluate performance indicators and analyze trends? If no, what are some suggestions of improvement?	ORP employees' responses indicated that performance indicators are sparse, inconsistent, not well understood, and ineffective.	(NI/E)
3.3.c Line managers throughout the organization set an example for safety through their direct involvement in oversight activities and associated performance improvement.	3.3.c Does management, from immediate supervisor to senior managers, demonstrate their commitment to safety through their involvement in oversight activities and associated performance improvement?	ORP personnel have seen little or no management involvement in oversight of activities above their first line supervisors. Personnel felt that safety would benefit if managers were to perform walkthroughs of work areas.	(NI/E)
3.3.d The organization actively and systematically monitors performance through multiple means, including leader walk-arounds, issue reporting, performance indicators, trend analysis, benchmarking, industry experience reviews, Specialty Assessments, peer reviews, and performance assessments.	3.3.d Describe the various means of how management monitors organizational performance (e.g. trending, self-assessments, walk-arounds).	Lots of examples were given of monitoring contractor performance. A few employees used monitoring matrices as an example of monitoring their activities against their individual performance plan for the year. Examples of monitoring given were IPP performance, self-assessments, and field time tracking.	(PI/PE)
3.3.e The organization demonstrates continuous improvement by integrating the information obtained from performance monitoring to improve systems.	3.3.e How are the results from the various organizational performance monitoring methods used to improve overall organizational performance?	Little evidence was provided that organizational performance monitoring is being used to improve ORP performance.	(NI/E)

DOE HSS/EM LOs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
structures, processes, and procedures.			
3.3.f Line managers are actively involved in all phases of performance monitoring, problem analysis, solution planning, and solution implementation to resolve safety issues.	3.3.f Is your line managers actively involved in all phases of performance monitoring, problem analysis, solution planning, and solution implementation to resolve safety issues? If no, why do you feel your line manager is not involved in all phases?	Responses indicated that some managers were actively involved in performance monitoring and some were not.	(PI/PE)
3.3.g The organization maintains an awareness of its safety culture maturity. It actively and formally monitors and assesses its safety culture on a periodic basis.	3.3.g What methods are used to periodically monitor Safety Culture at ORP?	Examples given were: Safety Culture IPT, surveys, and this self-assessment. Many people stated that they did not know what methods were being used to monitor Safety Culture.	(PI/PE)
Attribute 4: Questioning Attitude	Attribute 4: Questioning Attitude	Attribute 4: Questioning Attitude	(PI/PE)
3.4.a Line managers encourage a vigorous questioning attitude toward safety, and foster constructive dialogues and discussions on safety matters.	3.4.a Does your line manager encourage a questioning attitude toward safety and are they willing to engage in discussions regarding safety matters?	Yes, employees do feel that their line managers do encourage staff to have a questioning attitude related to safety. Employees are able to discuss issues with their line manager.	(I&E)
3.4.b Individuals cultivate a constructive, questioning attitude and healthy skepticism when it comes to safety. Individuals question deviations, and avoid complacency or arrogance based on past successes. Team members support one another through awareness of each other's actions and constructive feedback when necessary.	3.4.b Do you and your co-works/workgroups feel free to have a questioning attitude regarding safety? Do you and your co-workers/workgroups support each other and provide positive feedback to one another?	Employees do feel free to raise concerns related to safety and consider relationships with co-workers within their work group to be in good standing. Employees expressed that the majority of co-workers are supportive of each other. Some noted that there are areas for improvement.	(I&E)
3.4.c Individuals pay keen attention to current operations and focus on identifying situations where conditions and/or actions are diverging from what was assumed, expected, or planned. Individuals and	3.4.c Do you and your line manager actively seek out and develop alternative methods on how to get the job done when conditions change from the planned work?	Employees gave mixed results to whether or not employees and their line manager actively seek out and develop alternative methods when work does not go as planned. Sometimes organizational direction changes	(PI/PE)

DOE BSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
leaders act to resolve these deviations early before issues escalate and consequences become large.		too quickly without a disciplined decision process. Many employees work together to identify alternative methods to complete task upon change planned work.	
Focus Area 4: Supplemental Information	Focus Area 4: Supplemental Information	Focus Area 4: Supplemental Information	(PI/PE)
Attribute 1: Performance Metric Insights into SCWE	Attribute 1: Performance Metric Insights into SCWE	Attribute 1: Performance Metric Insights into SCWE	(PI/PE)
<p>4.1.a What insight does Performance Assurance System data provide regarding SCWE and whether the organization learns from safety concerns? The recommended team approach is to evaluate the issues management system to determine whether: 1) when employees raise issues, are they involved in determining the solution; 2) do they receive feedback on the resolution of their concerns; 3) do workers actively participate in the preparation and execution of corrective actions; 4) are employees a part of improvement initiatives at their work locations; and 5) whether performance indicator trends show that the system is being effectively used by workers and managers to identify and address issues (e.g., trends could exist in: the rate of corrective action completion, the number of overdue corrective actions, the average age of incomplete corrective actions, or the number of issues deemed as recurring).</p>		See Assessment Results for details. (Page 10)	(PI/PE)
<p>4.1.b What evidence exists to show decision making reflects a safety first attitude? The recommended approach is to evaluate operations and management information/metrics to determine whether trends and changes are present in performance indicators, such</p>		See Assessment Results for details. (Page 12)	(PI/PE)

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
as: 1) rate of unplanned LCO entries; 2) rate and nature of procedural violations; 3) the rate of deferred/overdue training; 4) currency of SCWE-related procedures and policies (e.g., DPO process, ECP); and 5) number of problem identification reports submitted on a periodic basis (e.g., monthly).			
4.1.c What evidence exists to show how effectively the organization monitors the SCWE aspects of their safety culture? The recommended team approach is to evaluate performance assurance system information to determine what trends and changes are present in performance indicators such as: 1) rates of overdue/delayed/cancelled audits & assessments; 2) the number and quality of findings; 3) turnover in audit/assessment staff; 4) rate and nature of externally vs. internally-identified findings; and 5) the rate and nature of reportable events.		See Assessment Results for details. (Page 14)	(PI/PE)
4.1.d What evidence exists that demonstrates managers/supervisors perform first hand observations of the work environment, listen to workers, and make changes where necessary? The recommended team approach is to evaluate performance assurance system information to determine what trends and changes are present in performance indicators such as: 1) the number of management observations by senior managers; 2) the number of management observations that identify deficiencies or best practices; and 3) the number of deficiencies or best practices that result in change.		See Assessment Results for details. (Page 15)	(PI/PE)

DOE HSS/EM LOIs	ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Questions	Data Summary	Rating
<p>4.1.e What evidence exists that demonstrates the organization maintains nuclear facilities in a manner that supports both production and the safe performance of work? The recommended team approach is to evaluate facility performance metrics to determine what trends and changes are present in performance indicators such as: 1) the number and age of LO/TO hanging; 2) the number and age of temporary modifications; 3) the rates of deferred maintenance; and 4) the number and age of inoperable or impaired safety systems.</p>		<p>This information is provided in the contractors SCWE Self-Assessment reports and is not duplicated here.</p>	<p>N/A</p>

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of River Protection
January 2013

Integrated Safety Management System
Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE)
Self-Assessment Plan

Attachment 2

ISMS SCWE Self-Assessment Plan

January 2013

**Integrated Safety Management System
Safety Conscious Work Environment
Self-Assessment Plan**



January 2013

Plan Approval

Approved: 
DaBrisha Smith, Team Lead
Tank Farms Programs Division
Office of River Protection

Date: January 10, 2013

1.0 Purpose & Scope

The Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) is performing a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) Self-Assessment as part of the annual Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) declaration report for fiscal year (FY) 2012 as required in the Department of Energy September 26, 2012 Memorandum, Tracy P. Mustin - Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, *Fiscal Year 2012 Annual Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) and Quality Assurance (QA) Effectiveness Review Declaration*. ORP is following the guidance provided in the DOE Memorandum, Criterion 7: *Safety Conscious Work Environment Self Assessment*, which states... "Safety Conscious Work Environment Self Assessments must be conducted and reported using the *Safety Conscious Work Environment Self Assessment Guidance*. Issues identified during the assessment will be entered into the ORP Issues Management System for evaluation and action.

The results of the ORP SCWE Self-Assessment will be reported in the format outlined in the SCWE Self-Assessment guidance in a stand-alone report due to DOE Headquarters by February 28, 2013.

The attributes of safety culture excellence *italicized* below most clearly support SCWE at DOE facilities:

Focus Area 1: Leadership

- a. *Demonstrated safety leadership*
- b. Risk-informed, conservative decision-making
- c. *Management engagement and time in the field*
- d. Staff recruitment, selection, training, and development
- e. *Open communication and fostering an environment free from retribution*
- f. *Clear expectations and accountability*

Focus Area 2: Employee Engagement

- a. Personal commitment to everyone's safety
- b. *Teamwork and mutual respect*
- c. Participation in work planning and improvement
- d. Mindful of hazards and controls

Focus Area 3: Organizational Learning

- a. *Credibility, trust and reporting errors and problems*
- b. *Effective resolution of reported problems*
- c. *Performance monitoring through multiple means*
- d. Use of operational experience

e. Questioning attitude

Focus Area 4: Supplemental Information SCWE

a. Performance Metric insights into SCWE

Team Members

The SCWE Self-Assessment team is shown below. Team biographies are included in Attachment 2.

Team Leader:	DaBrisha Smith
Team Advisor:	Mark Steelman
Team Executive:	Doug Shoop
Safety Culture SME:	Ed Kennedy
Tank Farms Project:	Steve Pfaff
Tank Farms Project:	Dan Knight
Tank Farms Programs Division:	Billie Mauss
WTP Engineering Division:	Garth Reed
WTP Construction Oversight and Assurance Division:	Bradley Eccleston
WTP Start Up and Commissioning Integration:	Pam Logan and Joe Renevitz
Nuclear Safety Division:	Tom Nirider
Environmental Compliance Division:	Jim Lynch
Contracts and Property Management:	TBD
Safety and Health Division:	Brian Harkins
Safety and Health Division:	Pamela Bailey
Administrative Support:	Shannon Tobias

2.0 METHODOLOGY

The lines of inquiry (LOIs), described in Attachment 1, were developed from the ISMS Guide, DOE G 450.4-1C, and *Fiscal Year 2012 Annual Integrated Safety Management System and Quality Assurance Effectiveness Review Declaration*, dated September 26, 2012. This set of LOIs has been developed for use by the assessment team to perform this SCWE self-assessment.

To develop a complete representation of performance associated with each LOI, the SCWE self-assessment team will use a combination of data collection methods. These include personnel interviews, focus groups, the recent 2012 Hanford Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey (Speak-Up Survey) results and document analysis.

2.1 Face-to-face Interviews

The SCWE Self-assessment team will use structured face-to-face interviews with random ORP staff. Questions to be discussed during the interviews will be developed based on the provided LOIs.

2.2 Focus Groups

The focus groups will be a guided discussion with a mixture of diverse work area backgrounds, to gather open-ended comments, suggestions and improvements regarding the ORP safety culture based on the provided LOIs.

2.3 The 2012 Hanford Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey results

Team members will review the June 2012 SCWE Survey results, in which many Hanford employees participated. The focus of the review will be concentrated on the ORP results.

2.4 Document Analysis: Review of key Safety Culture related processes

The SCWE self-assessment team will review the following types of documentation. Specific documentation to be reviewed includes, but is not limited to:

- 2012 Hanford Organizational Climate and SCWE Survey – DOE-ORP Report (Speak-Up Survey)
- Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and Differing Professional Opinions (DPO) procedure
- DOE – ORP Primary Contractors SCWE Self- Assessment Results
 - Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS)
 - Advanced Technologies and Laboratories International, Inc. (ATL)
 - Bechtel National, Inc.

3.0 Schedule

The performance period for this ORP SCWE Self-Assessment campaign is from December 10, 2012 to February 15, 2013 (including preparation time and reporting of results). The ORP Manager will issue an approved report no later than February 28, 2013 to DOE Headquarters.

Daily status briefings will be held during January 22 – January 31, 2013 at 3:00pm at 2440 Stevens Center, Richland, WA.

Table 1. ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Plan Schedule

Date	Items
December 10 – December 20, 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meet with team, review SCWE guide, develop SCWE Self-Assessment plan.
December 24 – December 28, 2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Setup Team Members Training.
January 2 – January 11, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hold Team Members Training, obtain biographies for each team member, and develop interview and focus groups questions. • Obtain documentation, select and setup personnel interview schedule, arrange focus groups, setup focus groups schedule.
January 16 , 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team review ORP SCWE Self-Assessment Plan, provide team assignments and conduct a mock one-on-one personnel interview and focus group session for timing purposes.
January 22 – January 31, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Entrance Briefing, conduct personnel interviews, focus groups and document reviews.
February 4 – February 14, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prepare Draft Report.
February 14, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exit Briefing on report and result to management
February 15 – February 22, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ORP management and team members review and provide comments on Draft Report.
February 25 – February 26, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Incorporate edits and comments into Draft Report
February 27- February 28, 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtain ORP Manager’s signature and issue Approved Report to HQ.

4.0 Final Report

The team leader will develop a report to document the results of the ORP SCWE Self-Assessment. The final approved report will be submitted to DOE Headquarters (HQ).

Team members will be asked to sign the report, indicating they concur with the report in the areas of their expertise. The ORP Manager will transmit the report to DOE-HQ by February 28, 2013. The following paragraphs describe the final report format and provide a brief discussion of the material to be included in each section.

Title and Signature Page(s) - The cover and title page state the subject, and the date of the verification. A signature page will be provided. The final report will either include signatures from all team members or a signature from the team leader and team advisor that signify the team's agreement as to the report content and conclusions.

Executive Summary - The summary is a synopsis of the review, strengths and weaknesses identified, and conclusions drawn. The executive summary will include:

- a brief synopsis of the self-assessment which provides information concerning the team's evaluation,

- a discussion of noteworthy practices and opportunities for improvement,
- a conclusion regarding the effectiveness of SCWE-related processes and whether noted opportunities for improvement indicate a need for a further, more in-depth assessment of safety culture, and
- the team's recommendations for improvement.

Introduction - The introduction will provide information related to the team composition, use of the LOI's, and a summary of the review process and methodologies used in the self-assessment.

Assessment Results - The report will present both a summary level discussion of self-assessment results as they pertain to the three ISM safety culture Focus Areas and the supplemental review area previously discussed within this guidance document, along with an analysis as they pertain to each of the SCWE-related attributes under each focus area. The Safety Conscious Work Environment Self-Assessment attribute-level analysis will include the team's summary evaluation of the level of implementation and effectiveness for each attribute.

Conclusions and Recommendations - This section summarizes the team's overall interpretation of the self-assessment results. It will include a discussion concerning the effectiveness of SCWE-related processes, (including but not limited to ECP and DPO). This section will also include an overview of SCWE-related opportunities for improvement, the team's recommendations for improvement, and the team's conclusion as to whether a further, more in-depth assessment of safety culture is needed.

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Integrated Safety Management System
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Attachment 1
Lines of Inquiry

Table 2. Lines of Inquiry – Attributes of Safety Culture Excellence

DOE HSS/EM LOI (9/26/2012 Memo)
Focus Area 1 - Leadership
Attribute 1: Demonstrated Safety Leadership
1.1.a Line managers enhance work activities, procedures and process with safety practices and policies.
1.1.b Leaders acknowledge and address external influences that may impose changes that could result in safety concerns.
1.1.c Line managers clearly understand their work activities and performance objectives, and how to safely conduct their work activities to accomplish their performance objectives.
1.1.d Line managers demonstrate their commitment to safety through their actions and behaviors, and support the organization in successfully implementing safety culture attributes, by conducting walk-throughs, personal visits, and verifying that their expectations are met.
1.1.e The organizational mission and operational goals clearly identify that production and safety goals are intertwined, demonstrating commitments consistent with highly reliable organizations.
Attribute 2: Management Engagement and Time in the Field
1.2.a Maintaining operational awareness is a priority. Line managers are in close contact with the front-line employees. Line managers listen and act on real-time operational information. Line managers identify critical performance elements and monitor them closely.
1.2.b Line managers spend time on the floor and in employee work areas. Line managers practice visible leadership by placing eyes on the work, asking questions, coaching, mentoring, and reinforcing standards and positive behaviors. Deviations from expectations are corrected promptly and, when appropriate, collectively analyzed to understand why the behaviors occurred.
1.2.c Managers set an example for safety through their personal commitment to continuous learning and by direct involvement in high-quality training that consistently reinforces expected employee behaviors.
Attribute 3: Open Communication and Fostering and Environment Free From Retribution
1.3.a A high level of trust is established in the organization.
1.3.b Reporting individual errors is encouraged and valued. Individuals feel safe from reprisal when reporting errors and incidents.
1.3.c Individuals at all levels of the organization promptly report errors and incidents and offer suggestions for improvements.
1.3.d A variety of methods are available for personnel to raise safety issues and line managers promptly and effectively respond to personnel who raise safety issues.
1.3.e Leaders proactively detect situations that could result in retaliation and take effective action

DOE HSS/EM LOI (9/26/2012 Memo)
to prevent a chilling effect.
1.3.f The organization addresses disciplinary actions in a consistent manner; disciplinary actions are reviewed to ensure fair and consistent treatment of employees at all levels of the organization.
Attribute 4: Clear Expectations and Accountability
1.4.a Line managers provide ongoing performance reviews of assigned roles and responsibilities reinforcing expectations and ensuring key safety responsibilities and expectations are being met.
1.4.b Personnel at all organizational levels are held accountable for standards and expectations. Accountability is demonstrated both by recognizing excellent performance as well as identifying less-than-adequate performance. Accountability considers intent and organizational factors that may contribute to undesirable outcomes.
1.4.c Willful violations of requirements and performance norms are rare. Individuals and organizations are held accountable in the context of a just culture. Unintended failures to follow requirements are promptly reported, and personnel and organizations are acknowledged for self-identification and reporting errors.
Focus Area 2: Employee/Worker Engagement
Attribute 1: Teamwork and Mutual Respect
2.1.a Open communications and teamwork are the norm.
2.1.b Individuals at all levels of the organization listen to each other and effectively engage in crucial conversations to ensure meaning, intent and viewpoints are understood; and that differing points of view are acknowledged.
2.1.c Discussion on issues focus on problem solving rather than on individuals.
2.1.d Good news and bad news are both valued and shared.
Focus Area 3: Organizational Learning
Attribute 1: Credibility, Trust and Reporting Errors and Problems
3.1.a Credibility and trust are present and continuously nurtured so that a high level of trust is established in the organization.
3.1.b Organizations, managers and line supervisors provide accurate, relevant and timely information to employees. Line managers are skilled in responding to employee questions in an open, honest manner.
3.1.c Reporting individual errors is encouraged and valued. Individuals are recognized and rewarded for self-identification of errors.
3.1.d Line managers encourage and appreciate safety issue and error reporting.
3.1.e Managers and line supervisors demonstrate integrity and adhere to ethical values and practices to foster trust.

DOE HSS/EM LOI (9/26/2012 Memo)
3.1.f Managers and line supervisors demonstrate consistency in approach and a commitment to the vision, mission, values and success of the organization as well as the individuals (people).
3.1.g Mistakes are used for opportunities to learn rather than blame.
3.1.h Individuals are recognized and rewarded for demonstrating behaviors consistent with the safety culture principles.
Attribute 2: Effective Resolution of Reported Problems
3.2.a Vigorous corrective and improvement action programs are established and effectively implemented, providing both transparency and traceability of all corrective actions. Corrective action programs effectively prioritize issues, enabling rapid response to imminent problems while closing minor issues in a timely manner to prevent them from escalating into major issues.
3.2.b Results from performance assurance activities are effectively integrated into the performance improvement processes, such that they receive adequate and timely attention. Linkages with other performance monitoring inputs are examined, high-quality causal analyses are conducted, as needed, and corrective actions are tracked to closure with effectiveness verified to prevent future occurrences.
3.2.c Processes identify, examine and communicate latent organizational weaknesses that can aggravate relatively minor events if not corrected. Organizational trends are examined and communicated.
3.2.d Organizational systems and processes are designed to provide layers of defenses, recognizing that people are fallible. Lessons learned are shared frequently; prevention and mitigation measures are used to preclude errors from occurring or propagating. Error-likely situations are sought out and corrected, and recurrent errors are carefully examined as indicators of latent organizational weaknesses
3.2.e Incident reviews are conducted promptly after an incident to ensure data quality and to identify improvement opportunities. Causal analysis expertise is applied effectively to examine events and improve safe work performance. Causal analysis is performed on a graded approach for major and minor incidents, and near-misses, to identify causes and follow-up actions. Causal analysis incorporates multi-discipline analytical perspectives. Even small failures are viewed as windows into the system that can spur learning.
3.2.f Performance improvement processes require direct worker participation. Individuals are encouraged, recognized and rewarded for offering innovative ideas to improve performance and to solve problems.

Attribute 3: Performance Monitoring Through Multiple Means
3.3.a Line managers maintain a strong focus on the safe conduct of work activities. Line managers maintain awareness of key performance indicators related to safe work accomplishment, watch carefully for adverse trends or indications, and take prompt action to understand adverse trends and anomalies. Management employs processes and special expertise to be vigilant for organizational drift.
3.3.b Performance assurance consists of robust, frequent, and independent oversight conducted at all levels of the organization. Performance assurance includes independent evaluation of performance indicators and trend analysis.
3.3.c Line managers throughout the organization set an example for safety through their direct involvement in oversight activities and associated performance improvement.
3.3.d The organization actively and systematically monitors performance through multiple means, including leader walk-arounds, issue reporting, performance indicators, trend analysis, benchmarking, industry experience reviews, Specialty Assessments, peer reviews, and performance assessments.
3.3.e The organization demonstrates continuous improvement by integrating the information obtained from performance monitoring to improve systems, structures, processes, and procedures.
3.3.f Line managers are actively involved in all phases of performance monitoring, problem analysis, solution planning, and solution implementation to resolve safety issues.
3.3.g The organization maintains an awareness of its safety culture maturity. It actively and formally monitors and assesses its safety culture on a periodic basis.
Attribute 4: Questioning Attitude
3.4.a Line managers encourage a vigorous questioning attitude toward safety, and foster constructive dialogues and discussions on safety matters.
3.4.b Individuals cultivate a constructive, questioning attitude and healthy skepticism when it comes to safety. Individuals question deviations, and avoid complacency or arrogance based on past successes. Team members support one another through awareness of each other's actions and constructive feedback when necessary.
3.4.c Individuals pay keen attention to current operations and focus on identifying situations where conditions and/or actions are diverging from what was assumed, expected, or planned. Individuals and leaders act to resolve these deviations early before issues escalate and consequences become large
Focus Area 4: Supplemental Information
Attribute 1: Performance Metric Insights Into SCWE
4.1.a What insight does Performance Assurance System data provide regarding SCWE and whether the organization learns from safety concerns? The recommended team approach is to evaluate the issues management system to determine whether: 1) when employees raise issues,

are they involved in determining the solution; 2) do they receive feedback on the resolution of their concerns; 3) do workers actively participate in the preparation and execution of corrective actions; 4) are employees a part of improvement initiatives at their work locations; and 5) whether performance indicator trends show that the system is being effectively used by workers and managers to identify and address issues (e.g., trends could exist in: the rate of corrective action completion, the number of overdue corrective actions, the average age of incomplete corrective actions, or the number of issues deemed as recurring).

4.1.b What evidence exists to show decision making reflects a safety first attitude? The recommended approach is to evaluate operations and management information/metrics to determine whether trends and changes are present in performance indicators, such as: 1) rate of unplanned LCO entries; 2) rate and nature of procedural violations; 3) the rate of deferred/overdue training; 4) currency of SCWE-related procedures and policies (e.g., Differing Professional Opinion process, Employee Concerns Program); and 5) number of problem identification reports submitted on a periodic basis (e.g., monthly).

4.1.c What evidence exists to show how effectively the organization monitors the SCWE aspects of their safety culture? The recommended team approach is to evaluate performance assurance system information to determine what trends and changes are present in performance indicators such as: 1) rates of overdue/delayed/cancelled audits & assessments; 2) the number and quality of findings; 3) turnover in audit/assessment staff; 4) rate and nature of externally- vs. internally-identified findings; and 5) the rate and nature of reportable events.

4.1.d What evidence exists that demonstrates managers/supervisors perform first hand observations of the work environment, listen to workers, and make changes where necessary? The recommended team approach is to evaluate performance assurance system information to determine what trends and changes are present in performance indicators such as: 1) the number of management observations by senior managers; 2) the number of management observations that identify deficiencies or best practices; and 3) the number of deficiencies or best practices that result in change.

4.1.e What evidence exists that demonstrates the organization maintains nuclear facilities in a manner that supports both production and the safe performance of work? The recommended team approach is to evaluate facility performance metrics to determine what trends and changes are present in performance indicators such as: 1) the number and age of LO/TO hanging; 2) the number and age of temporary modifications; 3) the rates of deferred maintenance; and 4) the number and age of inoperable or impaired safety systems.

Table 3. Evaluation Summaries

The SCWE Self-Assessment team will choose the summary evaluation for each attribute that best describes the level of implementation and effectiveness.	
Implemented and Effective (I&E)	Evidence demonstrates that the expectations described in the attribute are routinely demonstrated in a repeatable, reliable manner. Processes are aligned with outcomes and performance is monitored to ensure that desired results are achieved.
Partially Implemented or Partially Effective (PI/PE)	Evidence demonstrates that the expectations described in the attribute are not routinely demonstrated in a repeatable, reliable manner. Processes are partially in alignment with outcomes and performance is not monitored to ensure desired results are achieved.
Not Implemented or Not Effective (NI/NE)	Insufficient evidence -or- evidence demonstrates that the expectations described in the attribute are not being met. Processes are substantially misaligned with outcomes and performance is not repeatable or not being achieved.

Attachment 2
Team Biographies

I. Executive Biographies

Mr. Ed Kennedy

Mr. Kennedy has over 40 years of project and program management experience predominantly in the nuclear industry, including commercial nuclear and DOE facilities. He has performed as Senior Director of Environmental, Safety & Health (ES&H) at the country's largest uranium mining and milling facility, Project Manager for contracts at numerous DOE facilities and DOE HQ, including the last 15 years performing in various management positions at Hanford Tank Farms. Hanford Tank Farm Contractor positions include Radiological Controls Assessment Manager, Price Andersons Amendment Act (PAAA) Manager, Assessment Program Manager, Manager of Waste Feed ESH&Q, Chemical Vapors Control Manager, Vice-President ES&H, Safe Work Environment Manager, and Employee Concerns Program Manager. His experience includes employee concerns program investigations, Safety Conscious Work Environment program development and institutionalization into ISMS and Safety Management Programs functions and processes, Human Performance Improvement, SCWE Survey Development and analysis, assessment program development and implementation, NRC License Radiation Safety Officer, causal analysis, and corrective action plan development and implementation. Mr. Kennedy has performed at Team Lead on self-assessments of a variety of different programs and processes throughout his career, including NRC License compliance, EPA and Agreement State permits and licenses, ES&H Program, emergency preparedness, employee exposure control, RadCon Program Triennial Assessments, Chemical Vapor Control Program, ISMS, VPP, Safe Work Environment. Most recently, Mr. Kennedy performed as the Assessment Team Leader for the November 2012 WRPS SCWE Self-Assessment. Mr. Kennedy is trained and has performed in numerous Root and Apparent Cause Analysis and Corrective Action Plan Development. He supported the original development and implementation of the TOC Safe Work Environment Program, DOE's Safety Culture and Organizational Climate Survey at Hanford, and DOE's SCWE Training module. Mr. Kennedy is a graduate from Humboldt State University.

Mr. Doug S. Shoop **Richland Operations Office Deputy Manager**

Mr. Shoop was named the Deputy Manager for the U.S. Department of Energy's Richland Operations Office (RL) in February 2008. In this position he is responsible for the oversight of daily operations, program planning, project execution, budgeting, compliance with the Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement-TPA), and safe, environmentally acceptable and responsible management of the DOE Hanford Site.

RL oversees multiple Hanford contractors involved with cleanup of the 586-square mile former nuclear weapons production site. Previously, Mr. Shoop was the Assistant Manager for Safety and Engineering for RL, where he managed three divisions providing contract and regulatory oversight of numerous technical disciplines including nuclear safety, criticality safety, radiation protection, occupational safety, occupational health, fire protection, quality assurance, engineering, safeguards and security, emergency preparedness, and environmental protection.

Mr. Shoop has more than 24 years of management and technical experience with the DOE, private industry and academia. Prior to his employment with DOE, he was employed by Fluor Hanford, Inc., Westinghouse Hanford Company and at the Idaho National Environmental Engineering Laboratory where he managed staff and programs associated with the characterization and remediation of multiple, complex hazardous waste sites; facility decontamination and decommissioning; and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) Treatment, Storage and Disposal (TSD) operations.

Mr. Shoop also spent approximately eight years in academia conducting clinical research in collaboration with various universities and hospitals throughout the United States. He has authored numerous professional publications in internationally recognized scientific journals and had numerous abstracts accepted for presentation at national scientific meetings.

Mr. Shoop holds a master's degree in industrial hygiene/environmental engineering and a bachelor's degree in medical microbiology. He is certified by the American Board of Industrial Hygienists.

Mr. Mark Steelman

Mr. Steelman has more than 38 years of project management experience including projects within the government and commercial nuclear sectors. His experience also includes employee concern program investigations, safety conscious work environment development/survey and analysis, root cause analysis, training, design, licensing, construction, operation, and outage planning/maintenance of commercial nuclear plants. Mr. Steelman is an operational readiness subject matter expert and has led more than 60 operational readiness reviews and/or readiness assessments in accordance with DOE Order 425.1, ISMS Phase I and Phase II assessments and Safety Culture assessments. He also has expertise in the restart and recovery of troubled nuclear plants and DOE facilities and has dealt with and is familiar with NRC and DOE regulations and requirements. Mr. Steelman was the Director of Regulatory Integration at Rocky Flats and the Director of the Facility Evaluation Board at Hanford. He established a compliant ISO 9000-2001 QA Program for the Alyeska Pipeline Services Company and led several root cause analyses there. He has also evaluated nonconforming conditions and prepared root cause and collective significance evaluations of problem commercial and DOE facilities including management, health and safety, and environmental aspects. He has supported engineering design, construction reviews, and employee concern investigations including chilled worker/retaliation and regulatory reviews and assessments for the Hanford Cleanup in Richland, Washington for several years. He supported the original development and deployment of the NRC Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) initiative, including training, and has developed and delivered dozens of Safety Culture Surveys across DOE, NRC, and the oil and gas industry. He has recently been supporting DOE-RL, MSA and WRPS with their Safety Culture Survey's in FY 2012. Mr. Steelman is a graduate from the University of Washington and a Certified Professional Environmental Auditor (CPEA).

II. Team Members Information

Pamela Bailey Issues Manager

Pamela joined ORP in 2010 as a Public Affairs Specialist supporting involvement with regulatory agencies, stakeholders, Tribal Nations, and the public. She transitioned to her current role in the Safety and Health Division in 2012.

Previously, Pamela served on the Yucca Mountain Project (YMP) as Operating Experience/Lessons Learned Program Manager in the Continuous Improvement Division where corrective action management was an extensive part of her duties. Prior to that, she worked 12 years for the Yucca Mountain Project M&Os in various engineering, science, and management administrative support organizations. She volunteered as a board member for the International Council of Systems Engineering Silver State Chapter for over 10 years and was the 2010 Chapter President.

Pamela holds an Associate's Degree in General Studies from the College of Southern Nevada and a Systems Engineering Certificate from the University of Nevada Las Vegas.

Brad Eccleston Federal Project Director (High-Level Waste)

Brad joined ORP in 2008. He is a Mechanical Safety System Oversight (SSO) engineer and is currently qualified as the Facility Representative for the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Project's High-Level Waste Facility.

Brad served in the Navy Nuclear Power Program for six years before attending college. He started his career with Puget Sound Naval Shipyard as a nuclear shift test engineer and assistant chief test engineer on Nimitz class aircraft carriers.

Brad holds a Bachelor's Degree and a Master's Degree in Nuclear Engineering from Oregon State University.

Brian Harkins Safety and Health Division Director

Brian joined DOE in 1994 as a Project Engineer at the Tank Farms (TF). As part of his current duties as Safety and Health Division Director, Brian manages several safety & health programs and provides support for several cross-cutting functions in ORP.

Previously, he was the start-up manager for Tank Farms Operations Division and a Facility Representative, both in the TF and on the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant Project construction site. Brian has performed numerous event investigations using Human Performance Tools (HPI) and has taught HPI fundamentals both in the United States and abroad. Brian was promoted to the TF Division Direction in 2008 and became the SHD Division Director in late

2009. Prior to joining DOE, Brian worked as a Radiological Engineer at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, and worked as a Radiological Waste Engineer at West Valley Demonstration Project in New York.

Brian holds a Bachelor's Degree in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Idaho.

Dan Knight
Project Controls Officer

Dan joined ORP in December 2010. Dan is responsible for the Tank Operations Contract (TOC) Project Controls, Acquisition and Budget Formulation/Execution support for multiple levels of the TOC project. Dan is also the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) Program Manager for Hanford Site.

He has over 17 years of experience managing a variety of nuclear, waste retrieval, oil/gas, coal-steam reforming project planning, project scheduling, project estimates, acquisitions, financial plans and baseline performance. His experience encompasses all levels of production planning, cost analysis for short or long term deliverables, and managing contract requirements and scope for project initiation to closeout.

Previous endeavors include, eight years of Naval Service, consulting positions at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWARS), Nuclear, oil/gas and coal-steam facilities across the country.

Dan holds a Bachelor's Degree in Business Management and a Masters of Business Administration from the University of Phoenix.

Dr. Pamela Logan, PhD., PMP
General Engineer

Pam joined ORP in 2007. She currently supports WTP Startup, Commissioning and Integration. She was previously a part of the LAW-BOF-LAB team and the Interim Pretreatment System project team.

Pam has completed two- and three-month details at DOE headquarters, Idaho, California, and within the Communications and Environmental Compliance divisions of ORP, and she is a member of the Hanford Speakers Bureau. Her work experience includes a 3-year post doctorate at UCLA doing laser diagnostics on the turbulent flow inside a dump combustor; her doctoral dissertation was on laser induced fluorescence measurements within a supersonic turbulent boundary layer.

Prior to coming to DOE she led the nonprofit organization Kham Aid Foundation, which provided development and humanitarian assistance to Tibetans in western China from 1997 to 2010. She has published articles in technical and nontechnical journals and authored two nonfiction books.

Pam holds a Doctorate in aeronautical and astronautical science from Stanford University. She holds a Bachelor's Degree in Engineering & Applied Science and a Master's Degree in Mechanical Engineering from the California Institute of Technology.

James Lynch
General Engineer

Jim joined ORP in September 2008 as part of the DOE-HQ's Environmental Management Professional Development Corps (EMPDC) Program. He now works in ORP's Environmental Compliance Division and supports the Hanford Tri-Party Agreement, National Environmental Policy Act, as well as other environmental compliance assignments.

Before coming to DOE, Jim spent time as a researcher for the National Science Foundation as a risk communications grantee for Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Groundwater and Drinking Water, and as an energy analyst for SAIC.

Jim holds a Bachelor's Degree in Environmental Engineering from the University of Wisconsin-Platteville, and a Master's Degree in Engineering Management focused on Environmental

Billie Mauss
Supplemental Treatment and Sampling

Billie joined ORP in 2000. She is the Program Manager for Supplemental Treatment and Tank Sampling. This includes being the technical lead for Secondary Liquid Waste Treatment, Supplemental Pretreatment, and Supplemental LAW Immobilization, as well as supporting the ORP Safety Culture Integrated Project Team. She has extensive background in waste form development, chemical separations, and process flow sheet development.

Prior to her ORP tenure, she worked at the Richland Operations Office for six years in the Tanks Focus Area technology development as the Program Manager. Other experience prior to DOE includes expert chemist for the Washington State Department of Ecology Nuclear Division, Forensic Scientist for the Washington State Patrol and Process Control Chemist for Hanford Site contractors (Rockwell and Westinghouse) at the 222-S Laboratory and Tank Farms and Evaporator Engineering.

With her 29 years of scientific experience, she has expertise in program and project management across the DOE complex, environmental laws and regulations, nuclear waste management, quality assurance, analytical chemistry, and forensic science including testifying as an expert witness in courts of law.

Billie holds a Bachelor's Degree in Chemistry and a Bachelor's Degree in Biology from the University of Oregon and Eastern Washington University.

Tom Nirider
Nuclear Safety/AB

Tom joined ORP in 2010. He is the lead Criticality Safety Engineer and Nuclear Safety Specialist for ORP with responsibility for the Pretreatment, High-Level Waste, and Balance of Facilities at the WTP Project. Previous to this position, Tom served as the Senior Scientist at the Plutonium Finishing Plant. He has 27 years of progressive experience in the nuclear industry.

Prior to coming to Hanford, Tom spent seven years working as a Specialist Engineer at Boeing Defense and Space Group. He began his career at the University of Washington Nuclear Physics Laboratory.

Tom holds a Master's Degree in Physics from the University of Washington and a Bachelor's Degree in Physics from Eastern Washington University.

Steve Pfaff
Federal Project Director (Supplemental Treatment)

Steve joined DOE's Tank Farms Project in 1994. In his current role as the Federal Project Director for Supplemental Treatment and Secondary Waste Treatment, he leads efforts to design and construct the necessary complementary facilities to enable Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Project to operate at full capacity.

Prior to that, his training and experience included nine years active duty in the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program. Steve left the Navy in 1992 and began working for DOE at the Rocky Flats Site as a Facility Representative in several of the plutonium facilities. After his transfer to Hanford, Steve continued field oversight work in the Tank Farms and the WTP.

Garth Reed
Supervisory Chemical Engineer

Garth joined ORP in November 2008. Garth is currently a Supervisory Chemical Engineer. Since joining ORP, Garth has worked as a Facility Engineer on the Analytical Laboratory, Balance of Facilities, and the Low Activity Waste Facility. In 2011 he qualified as Facility Representative on the Analytical Laboratory and Balance of Facilities.

Garth previously spent more than six years working for the Department of Defense at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNS) in the Nuclear Test Engineering Division. He started out at PSNS in the shift test engineering program and qualified on three different reactor plant types prior to taking over the Quality Assessment Group within the Nuclear Test Engineering Division. As Quality Assessment Group Manager, he managed the division's assessment program including evaluation of performance data for trend analysis and process improvement, including development of new methods for tracking performance. Garth also facilitated and trained issue resolution teams in problem analysis and development of corrective actions.

Garth holds a Bachelor's Degree in Chemical Engineering from Washington State University.

Joseph Renevitz
Start-up Engineer

Joe joined ORP in 2011 as a Project Controls Officer. He currently is responsible for the oversight of facility startup, testing, and commissioning of the Analytical Laboratory.

Prior to joining ORP, Joe worked at Energy Northwest Nuclear Power Plant as a Control Room Supervisor and at San Onofre Nuclear Generation Station as a Maintenance Supervisor. Before that, he served six years in the US Navy as a nuclear trained Electronics Technician.

Joe has a Bachelor's Degree in Nuclear Engineering Technology from Thomas Edison State College, and a Master's Degree in Business Administration from Cal State San Marcos. Joe also holds an EIT certificate in General Engineering.

DaBrisha Smith
Waste Feed Delivery

Dabrisha joined ORP in August 2008 as an Environmental Management Professional Development Corps (EMPDC) intern. She currently works on Waste Feed Delivery projects.

Prior to ORP, she was a Chemist at Teva Pharmaceutical's Inhalation/Respiratory Research and Development Department in Florida.

Dabrisha holds a Bachelor's Degree and Master's Degree in Chemistry from Florida A&M University.

Shannon Tobias
Secretary/Administrative Support
YAHSGS (GSSC)

Shannon joined ORP in March 2008 as a GSSC employee. She is an Administrative Secretary to the Tank Farms Project Division. As part of her duties, she maintains and updates the ORP senior-level staff calendars, coordinates travel arrangements for ORP staff as well as office moves, prepares, edits, and finalizes correspondence, maintains and updates the office filing system.

She began her Federal career at Hanford in 1990 for Westinghouse. Over the past 20 years, she has worked for various contractors supporting the environmental, construction, and engineering industry. Her experience includes OSHA records management, worker's compensation, and government contracts.

Shannon attended Trend College for Business Information Processing.

Attachment 3

Line of Inquiry Questions Response Form

(Used in interviews and Focus Group Sessions to obtain employees comment and suggestions.)

Date of Interview:	Time of Interview:	Interviewee Initials:	Position Title:
Group 1: Assessment Team Interview Leads			
Focus Area 1: Leadership			
Attribute 1: Demonstrated Safety Leadership			
Lines of Inquiry Questions		Comments/Suggestions	
1.1.a How has your line manager enhanced work activities, procedures and process by incorporating safety practices and policies?			
1.1.b Do you feel that the leaders of ORP acknowledge and address external influences that may possibly require change resulting in safety concerns?			
1.1.c Does it appear that ORP line managers clearly understand their work activities and performance objectives? Do you feel that ORP line managers know how to safely conduct their work activities to accomplish their performance objectives? Please elaborate.			
1.1.d How does management, from immediate supervisor to senior managers, demonstrate their commitment to safety through their actions and behaviors? Has your line managers successfully implemented the safety culture attributes by conducting walk-arounds and personal visits?			
1.1.e What are some examples that demonstrate the balance between safety and construction/production?			