

**Self-Assessment of the DOE Idaho Operations Office
Safety Conscious Work Environment
Final Report**

September 2013



Approved:


Assessment Team Leader

9/9/13
Date

Self-Assessment of the DOE Idaho Operations Office Safety Conscious Work Environment Final Report

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This review was performed according to an approved review plan to fulfill a commitment made by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in the Implementation Plan for DNFSB Recommendation 2011-1, *Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant*. The review was performed in accordance with the guidance and focus areas, attributes, and criteria defined in *Safety Conscious Work Environment Self-Assessment Guidance, Revision G*. The methodology for conducting the review was based on a model developed by Utilities Services Alliance, a proven method in commercial industry, and used to evaluate safety culture at commercial nuclear power plants and other industrial facilities. The methodology and scope consisted of conducting an initial anonymous survey of DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE-ID) employees, followed by randomly-selected interviews of management and staff (including field observations), all focused on the results of the survey in order to further evaluate issues that emerged from the survey and obtain additional information.. The survey was conducted during the period July 16-31, 2013; the interview portion of the self-assessment was conducted during the period August 19-20, 2013.

RESULTS

The review team determined the focus areas and attributes of DOE-ID's Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) were implemented and effective, overall, based on the results from the survey, interviews, and observed activities. Most DOE-ID employees felt comfortable and accountable for raising safety issues to their immediate supervisor. They also felt there was an active self-assessment program, including an effort to improve the safety culture within DOE-ID. Based on review of the survey results and comments, and the interview responses, DOE-ID has made some progress in the past two years in improving the SCWE; however, based on those same results, there are opportunities for additional improvement.

The majority of employees felt a lack of engagement between some senior managers (i.e. direct reports to the ID Manager, including the ID Manager) and the employees, which led to a corresponding perceived lack of trust in management by some. There was a consistent message from most employees that they could and would challenge management decisions one-on-one, but not in an open forum, in an effort to remain respectful of management. In general, most DOE-ID employees felt there was inadequate or ineffective communications between the field office and the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Headquarters (HQ) leadership.

The review team identified four Positive Observations, nine Potential Vulnerabilities, and provided five Recommendations for improvement. Areas noted by the review team for continuous improvement included: management to employee communications, teamwork across

organizations, employee trust in ID and HQ Senior Management, and instilling employee confidence in raising concerns in an open forum.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Build trust between DOE-ID senior leadership and the workforce through increased engagement and communications, to foster an environment where employees can challenge management decisions in an open forum.
2. Improve relationships between DOE-ID senior leadership and Headquarters, where decisions can be openly challenged, resolved, and effectively communicated to the DOE-ID workforce.
3. DOE-ID management should strive to promptly resolve internally identified issues (i.e. complete corrective actions), and continue efforts to improve the corrective action management tools (Pegasus); these efforts should include improving performance monitoring.
4. Improve teamwork and communications across organization boundaries.
5. Develop innovative methods to recognize and reward superior employee performance.

INTRODUCTION

Background: This review was performed according to an approved review plan to fulfill a commitment made by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) in the Implementation Plan for DNFSB Recommendation 2011-1, *Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant*. The review was performed in accordance with the guidance and focus areas, attributes, and criteria defined in *Safety Conscious Work Environment Self-Assessment Guidance, Revision G*. The scope of this review was focused on the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) of the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE-ID). Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) is defined in aforementioned guidance as a subset of safety culture related to an environment in which employees feel free to raise safety concerns to management (and/or a regulator) without fear of retaliation. The nine safety culture attributes specified in the guidance were reviewed, along with the supplemental topics Performance Measures and Contract Incentives. Additionally, the review team lead also included the attribute of Conservative Decision-Making in the scope of this self-assessment, based on past historical issues in this area as described in a previous independent review of the Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment Project (a.k.a. Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (IWTU)) safety culture (November 2012).

Methodology: The methodology for conducting the review was based on a model developed by Utilities Services Alliance, which is a proven method in the commercial industry, and used to evaluate safety culture at commercial nuclear power plants and other industrial facilities. The methodology consisted on conducting an initial anonymous survey of DOE-ID employees. In this case, 172 out of 237 employees responded to the survey (73%). The review team then focused interviews to evaluate the top ten and bottom ten lines of inquiry from the survey to evaluate the potential issues from the survey data. These lines of inquiry were developed using the guidance as a foundational document. The DOE Headquarters Office of Environmental Management (EM) also provided seven (7) additional questions to be used in the survey. These questions were used either explicitly or implicitly based on the existing lines of inquiry developed from the SCWE guidance lines of inquiry and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Nuclear Safety Culture Traits crosswalk to SCWE.

Interviews consisted of a random sampling of DOE-ID management and staff, both in Idaho Falls, Idaho offices and laboratory, and at the Idaho Site. Interviews were conducted individually and in small groups (less than or equal to four). The review team interviewed 62 management and staff (26%). The interview portion also included some field observations (6), which included work group meetings, staff meetings, and an integrated project team meeting. Again, the focus of the interviews and observations was to evaluate the results, compare employee perceptions with the survey results, and to also obtain additional information.

Once interviews and observations were completed, the review team assembled as a group and analyzed all data, including survey results, survey comments, interview results, interview comments, and observation results. This team meeting was highly interactive, with all team members actively participating. Although the review team lead initiated the discussions, the review team, themselves, developed conclusions based on review of all data.

The review team collaboratively developed Positive Observations, Potential Vulnerabilities, and Recommendations based on the results of the data. The following definitions are provided to help understand each term:

Positive Observations: entire review team perceives an attribute is met in a repeatable and reliable manner based on survey results and validated through interviews and observations.

Potential Vulnerabilities: entire review team perceives an attribute exhibits weakness in a repeatable and reliable manner based on survey results and validated through interviews and observations.

Recommendations: suggested focus areas for improvement from the review team, based on survey results and interviews, substantiated by identified potential vulnerabilities, with the greatest potential for significant improvement in the SCWE.

This self-assessment was conducted in July and August 2013 using an approved review plan. Specifically, the survey was conducted during the period July 16-31, 2013; the interview portion of the self-assessment was conducted during the period August 19-20, 2013.

The review team consisted of representatives from the DOE Idaho Operations Office (DOE-ID), including a representative from the National Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers Union Local 94, with the Safety Culture Subject Matter Expert from Battelle Energy Alliance (BEA). The review team also included a Team Executive from the DOE Headquarters Office of Environmental Management (EM). This review received oversight from representatives from the DOE Office of Health, Safety, and Security. Specific team members and responsible areas were:

Mark Brown, DOE-ID	Assessment Leader
Todd Lapointe, EM-HQ	Team Executive
Scott Ferrara, DOE-ID	Team Advisor
Ron Elsasser, BEA	Safety Culture Subject Matter Expert
Debbie Shepherd, DOE-ID	Survey Development and Data Manager
Mary Ayers, DOE-ID	Data Entry and Administrative Support
Julie Finup, DOE-ID	Clear Expectations (CE), Contract Incentives (CI), Credibility and Trust (CT), and Questioning Attitude (QA)
Jan Ogilvie, DOE-ID	CE, CI, CT, and QA
James Lovejoy, DOE-ID	Demonstrated Leadership (DL), Conservative Decision-Making (CD), Management Engagement (ME), and Open Communications (OC)
Karen Kubiak, DOE-ID	DL, CD, ME, and OC
William Watson, DOE-ID	Teamwork (TM), Effective Problem Resolution (ER) and Performance Monitoring (PM)
John Gilmore	TM, ER, and PM

RESULTS

The review team determined the focus areas and attributes of DOE-ID's SCWE were implemented and effective, overall, based on the results from the survey, interviews, and observed activities. Most DOE-ID employees felt comfortable and accountable for raising safety issues to their immediate supervisor. They also felt there was an active self-assessment program, including an effort to improve the safety culture within DOE-ID. Based on review of the survey results and comments, and the interview responses, DOE-ID has made some progress in the past two years in improving the SCWE; however, based on those same results, there are opportunities for additional improvement.

The majority of employees felt a lack of engagement between some senior managers (i.e. direct reports to the DOE-ID Manager, including the DOE-ID Manager) and the employees, which led to a corresponding perceived lack of trust in management by some. There was a consistent message from most employees that they could and would challenge management decisions one-on-one, but not in an open forum, in an effort to remain respectful of management. However, some employees felt it was career limiting to challenge management decisions, both within the field office, and with the Senior Management within the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) at DOE Headquarters (HQ). There was also a perception with some DOE-ID management and staff that NE HQ has made some unilateral decisions that directly affected the field office, with little input or control by the field office. Most DOE-ID employees felt the communications between the field office and NE HQ was inadequate or ineffective. Improving communications in this regard, including the basis for Senior Management decisions, would be beneficial.

Overall, the three SCWE focus areas of Leadership, Employee/Worker Engagement, and Organizational Learning were found to be implemented and effective for DOE-ID. The SCWE Supplemental Information Topic of Performance Measures and Contract Incentives was determined to be partially implemented or partially effective based on the survey and interview results. Nine of the eleven SCWE attribute areas were found to be implemented and effective. The remaining two SCWE attribute areas of Questioning Attitude and Contract Incentives were determined to be partially implemented or partially effective. The review team identified four Positive Observations, nine Potential Vulnerabilities, and provided five Recommendations for improvement. Although the attribute of Contract Incentives was determined to be partially implemented or partially effective based on the survey and interview results, no Recommendations are provided for this shortfall, since there is enough data to indicate employees may not have completely understood the survey and interview questions in this area.

Result summaries for the Focus Areas and corresponding Attributes are provided below. Detailed results of each Attribute may be found in Appendix A. Graphical representations of data from survey results and interviews can be found in Appendix B. Appendix C provides biographical information for the executive team leading this self-assessment. Lessons Learned developed as a result of conducting this SCWE self-assessment are provided in Appendix D. Interview lines of inquiry are provided in Appendix E.

Leadership

The review team found this focus area and its associated attributes (including Conservative Decision-Making) to be implemented and effective. Some opportunities for improvement were identified. Most federal management and staff felt responsible and accountable for raising safety concerns and for meeting safety standards. Many employees felt DOE-ID management supported conservative decision-making.

Even though many employees felt comfortable raising safety concerns to their immediate supervisor, the review team determined there were some employees that lacked trust in DOD-ID Senior Management. Most employees felt there were poor communications between the field office and NE HQ. There was also a perception by some employees that NE HQ Senior Management has made field office-level decisions in the past without adequate input or discussion with DOE-ID management and staff. Improving communications in this regard, including the basis for Senior Management decisions, would be beneficial.

Many DOE-ID employees felt Senior Management spent an adequate amount of time in the field, with some Senior Management actively engaging with the employees. However, the majority of employees felt this field presence (within the offices, lab, and at the Idaho Site) was focused on conducting tours or communicating with the contractors, with little communication with the federal staff.

Most employees felt they could and would challenge management decisions one-on-one, but not in an open forum, in an effort to remain respectful of management. However, some employees felt it was career limiting to challenge management decisions, both within the field office, and also with the Senior Management at NE HQ.

2012 Independent Safety Culture Review of IWTU: In April and May 2012, the DOE Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) conducted an *Independent Oversight Assessment of Nuclear Safety Culture at the Idaho Cleanup Project Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment Project*; the report was released in November 2012. The report stated that DOE-ID Senior Management needed to fully embrace the value of promoting the behaviors important for a healthy safety culture. The review team specifically reviewed this report and the improvement actions DOE-ID established to address the recommendations provided in the HSS report. The actions were focused on improving the safety culture and behaviors, were appropriate for the recommendations provided in the report, and were completed in early calendar year 2013. Based on the results of this self-assessment, DOE-ID has made progress towards promoting the behaviors of a healthy safety culture within the DOE-ID federal workforce. DOE-ID has taken positive steps to understand and develop standards consistent with a healthy safety culture. There is evidence of organizational learning present in the employee responses regarding the relationship between safety and production and the correct messaging from EM Headquarters to do things right in spite of project schedule.

The conclusions derived through observation, interview, and survey results, indicate definable improvement that has resulted in the following positive changes:

- Collaborative understanding between DOE and CWI about quality over schedule
- Priority on ISM fundamentals and Conduct of Operations standards.
- Increased willingness to raise issues that may impact schedules

The following additional conclusions were drawn based on the results of this self-assessment and considering the results from the 2012 HSS safety culture report:

- a. DOE-ID has taken initiative to understand Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment, including evaluation methods to observe organizational behaviors consistent with supporting a healthy safety culture. Indications of this effort include:
 - DOE-ID supported and facilitated the participation of a staff member in a Commercial Nuclear Station Nuclear Safety Culture Assessment through the Utility Services Alliance (USA). The USA assessment method is considered a standard approach in the Nuclear Industry and this endeavor yielded valuable benchmarking information; the information gained through benchmarking was disseminated through training sessions and management briefings with DOE-ID management and this self-assessment review team
 - Management placed a high degree of importance on gaining employee input through participation in the Safety Conscious Work Environment survey for this self-assessment; participation increased by approximately 30%, compared to the 2012 HSS review
 - The leadership support for the development and conduct of a high quality self-assessment demonstrated a willingness to capture and understand the perceptions of the workforce; the self-assessment results and recommendations were well received by DOE-ID management with many follow-up questions aimed at gaining insight
 - Previous issues perceived as conflicts in organizational standards between the Idaho Cleanup Contractor, CH2M♦WG Idaho, LLC (CWI), URS (the construction subcontractor for the Sodium Bearing Waste Treatment Project, or SBWTP), and DOE during the construction phase of the SBWTP are resolved; conflicts have been eliminated due to greater alignment between CWI and DOE; project construction is complete and URS is no longer involved as a subcontractor; lines of accountability are clearer
 - Employees expressed that they had experienced improved, balanced priorities with respect to safety and production at the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit (a.k.a. SBWTP), and were able to recount specific examples of lessons learned and resultant behavior changes.
- b. Comparison of the 2012 HSS safety culture review and this self-assessment revealed some areas where management should apply ongoing attention or consideration:

- The Employee Concerns Program (ECP) was reviewed including self-assessments from 2007-2012; although the reviews were primarily compliance-based, the program met DOE requirements; however, the most recent anonymous ECP survey results indicate some reluctance to use the program; those results, along with the results from this self-assessment where there were some pockets of individuals that stated they would not openly challenge their managers or supervisors, may point to a weakness in organizational trust
- There exists a perception that the initiatives around Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment apply only to defense nuclear facilities and the initiative will die out
- Several employees interviewed expressed that they did not have regular meaningful engagement with their supervisors and managers
- There is a strong sense of a Chain of Command within DOE-ID; this should be taken into account when evaluating Safety Conscious Work Environment behaviors; sensitivity for potential unintended consequences of communications filtering, either downward or upward, should be maintained
- When employees were questioned about the Differing Professional Opinion (DPO) program, there was a general lack of familiarity; however, based on responses this may have been due to the lack of a perceived need to use the program.

A summary of results for each attribute associated with Leadership are provided below. Details for each attribute can be found in Appendix A.

Demonstrated Safety Leadership: The review team determined the attribute of Demonstrated Leadership (DL) was implemented and effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews and survey results confirmed the lines of inquiry associated with the attribute of “Demonstrated Leadership” (DL) were observed as being evident at all levels of DOE-ID. Most employees felt they were responsible for their safety. This includes all levels, from the employees, to managers that were interviewed. Although not specifically asked or targeted in interviews, many employees felt strong management endorsement of the Federal Employee Occupational Safety and Health program, as evidenced by safety issues being promptly resolved, and by the active ergonomic program. Communication and trust issues were identified as opportunities for improvement between employees and DOE-ID and NE HQ Senior Management.

Management Engagement and Time in the Field: The review team determined the attribute of Management Engagement (ME) was implemented and effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews and survey results confirmed the lines of inquiry associated with the attribute of “Management Engagement” (ME) were observed as being evident at all levels of DOE-ID. Many employees felt Senior Management spent an adequate amount of time in the field; however, they also felt the time spent was not quality time with DOE-ID employees. Specifically, comments reflected that Senior Management was seen in the field during tours and interaction with the contractors, but did not include interactions with DOE-ID employees.

Open Communication and Fostering an Environment Free from Retribution: The review team determined the attribute of Open Communications (OC) was implemented and effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews and survey results confirmed the lines of inquiry associated with the attribute of Open Communication were observed as being evident at all levels of the organization. Most employees felt that management does not tolerate retaliation of any kind for raising concerns. This included all levels, from the employees, to managers that were interviewed. Most employees were reluctant to challenge management decisions in an open forum. However, most stated, due to respect for management, they prefer to challenge management in private rather than a public forum.

Clear Expectations and Accountability: The review team determined the attribute of Clear Expectations and Accountability (CE) was implemented and effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews and survey results confirmed most DOE-ID employees felt they were held accountable through their performance agreements for meeting safety standards. Based on the survey comments and interviews, many employees felt that the 2nd mid-year review was not needed, unless someone was on a performance improvement plan. One potential vulnerability was identified where budget conditions are directly affecting the office's ability to recognize excellent performance. Some employees did state they appreciated the verbal and e-mail recognitions by supervisors and managers, and were understanding of the budget situation.

Risk-Informed, Conservative Decision-Making: The review team determined the attribute of Conservative Decision-Making (CD) was implemented and effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews and survey results confirmed the lines of inquiry associated with the attribute of Conservative Decision-Making were observed as being evident at all levels of DOE-ID. Most employees felt their supervisors supported their right to stop work if they see something unsafe. This includes all levels, from the employees to managers that were interviewed. They also felt that there would be no retaliation if they did stop work. The majority of employees, supervisors and managers feel that conservative decision making is emphasized in DOE-ID project management and execution.

Employee/Worker Engagement

The review team found this focus area to be implemented and effective. Most employees felt there was good engagement, communications, and teamwork within individual workgroups. The review team did find, however, there were indications of less than adequate communications and teamwork between work groups, across organization boundaries, and between DOE-ID and NE HQ.

A summary of results for the attribute associated with Employee/Worker Engagement is provided below. Details for this attribute can be found in Appendix A.

Teamwork and Mutual Respect: The review team determined the attribute of Team Work and Mutual Respect (TM) was implemented and effective based upon the data reviewed. Survey and interview results indicated many employees felt that team work is utilized within the office, especially within their respective work group. However, results also indicated that inter-organizational teamwork and communication, as well with HQ, does not occur in an effective manner. Interviews and survey comments also indicated some employees have seen an improvement in teamwork in the past two years. Overall, results from the interviews and the survey support that although teamwork is utilized within work groups, there is need for improvement in teaming across organizations in DOE-ID and with HQ.

Organizational Learning

The review team found this focus area to be implemented and effective, with some opportunities for improvement identified. Most employees felt the self-assessment program within DOE-ID was effective. Most employees also particularly noted DOE-ID's effort to improve safety culture as an improvement. As previously mentioned, under the focus area of Leadership, the review team found opportunities for improvement in the areas of communications and trust between DOE-ID and NE HQ Senior Management, and between DOE-ID employees. To re-state this, DOE-ID employees felt trust in their immediate supervisors, but lacked trust in DOE-ID and NE HQ Senior Management; contributing to this lack of trust was inadequate or ineffective communications.

A summary of results for each attribute associated with Organizational Learning are provided below. Details for each attribute can be found in Appendix A.

Credibility, Trust, and Reporting Errors and Problems: For the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) attribute of *Credibility and Trust*, the review team determined that the attribute was implemented and effective within DOE-ID. A potential vulnerability was identified by the review team: although the majority of employees felt mistakes were used as opportunities to learn instead of placing blame, some employees felt there was room for improvement in this area. Another vulnerability related to trust and this attribute was previously discussed under the focus area of Leadership and the attribute of Demonstrated Safety Leadership.

Effective Resolution of Reported Problems: The review team determined the attribute of Effective Resolution of Problems (ER) was implemented and effective based upon the data reviewed. Results indicated that most employees feel issues are identified in an adequate manner; however, they also feel that the office does not prioritize or correct those issues in a timely manner, nor adequately analyze them to identify negative performance trends. Most employees also felt that the corrective action system was difficult to use and, in some cases, the preferred method was to work around the system to provide more efficient resolution of issues.

Performance Monitoring through Multiple Means: The review team determined the attribute of Performance Monitoring (PM) was implemented and effective based upon the data reviewed. The active self-assessment program was noted by most employees as a positive aspect of PM. However, some interviewees and those surveyed noted a lack of performance trending or establishment of key performance indicators for federal performance. The general consensus during interviews was that safety performance monitoring was the responsibility of the Health and Safety group. Also, some of the comments indicate there is a perception of improvement in this area in the past two years.

Questioning Attitude: The review team determined the attribute of Questioning Attitude (QA) was partially implemented or partially effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews, observations and survey results and comments were mixed for this attribute. Several employees did not feel they could question senior leaders or HQ on issues for fear it would be career limiting.

When reviewing the results from the attributes of Open Communications and Demonstrated Leadership, it is clear there is room for improvement in the area of Questioning Attitude. Specifically, some employees expressed reluctance to challenge management decisions in an open forum, and some employees did not feel comfortable challenging DOE-ID and NE Headquarters senior management decisions. Also, during interviews, some employees felt a lack of control over decisions made by DOE NE Headquarters senior leadership. Based on this decision-making regime, it was apparent that the basis for such NE Headquarters decisions were not adequately communicated to DOE-ID management and staff.

Performance Measures and Contract Incentives

The review team found this supplemental (per the guidance) area to be partially implemented or partially effective, primarily based on the lower results in the survey responses and interviews. These lower results were attributed to a lack of understanding of the questions, and/or to a belief the questions did not pertain to the employee. Based on survey comments and interviews, many employees felt DOE-ID management would and have taken contractual action for contractor safety issues. However, there were also some employees who felt contract incentives in place were not effective in improving performance.

Details for the attribute associated with this Supplemental Area can be found in Appendix A.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The review team determined the focus areas and attributes of DOE-ID's SCWE were implemented and effective, overall, based on the results from the survey, interviews, and observed activities. Although opportunities for improvement were identified, it was evident by the review team, and verified through the survey and interview results, that ID has made improvements to the SCWE and safety culture over the past two years.

The Recommendations provided below were developed by the review team to provide DOE-ID management focused areas for improvement where the most value for effort can be obtained. Since this review was based on employee perceptions and feelings at the time of the survey and interviews, DOE-ID management should evaluate the results of this report in its entirety, including the attribute details provided in Appendix A. Any improvements considered by DOE-ID as a result of this review should be carefully considered with a focus on the culture and assumptions that drive the behaviors that reflect the organization's safety culture.

Recommendations

1. Build trust between DOE-ID senior leadership and the workforce through increased engagement and communications, to foster an environment where employees can challenge management decisions in an open forum.
2. Improve relationships between DOE-ID senior leadership and Headquarters, where decisions can be openly challenged, resolved, and effectively communicated to the DOE-ID workforce.
3. DOE-ID management should strive to promptly resolve internally identified issues (i.e. complete corrective actions), and continue efforts to improve the corrective action management tools (Pegasus); these efforts should include improving performance monitoring.
4. Improve teamwork and communications across organization boundaries.
5. Develop innovative methods to recognize and reward superior employee performance.

Appendix A
Attribute Evaluation Forms

Attribute Summary and Results Demonstrated Safety Leadership—DL

The review team determined the attribute of Demonstrated Leadership (DL) was implemented and effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews and survey results confirmed the lines of inquiry associated with the attribute of “Demonstrated Leadership” (DL) were observed as being evident at all levels of DOE-ID. Most employees felt they were responsible for their safety. This includes all levels, from the employees, to managers that were interviewed. Although not specifically asked or targeted in interviews, many employees felt strong management endorsement of the Federal Employee Occupational Safety and Health program, as evidenced by safety issues being promptly resolved, and by the active ergonomic program.

Most employees felt that communication between DOE-ID and Headquarters was less than effective. This has the potential to impact how DOE-ID performs oversight and can impact alignment of both production and safety goals.

While employees did indicate a high level of trust and respect for their immediate supervisor, trust seemed to be lacking with certain other lateral or higher level management. Interviews revealed a possible cause for this was due the lack of a developed relationship between workers and senior-level management. Improvement was needed to build relationships and trust between senior-level management and employees.

In comparing the evaluated results of these data sources (survey, survey comments, and interviews), the responses were generally consistent. Any misalignment in data sets is due to the manner in which the interview responses were evaluated.

The following observations were identified:

Positive Observations:

- Most employees felt responsible for their safety

Potential Vulnerabilities:

- Poor communication between DOE-ID and HQ

Additional data from surveys, interviews, and observations

- Some employees felt safety didn’t apply to them in an office environment
- Some supervisors and managers felt a lack of control or engagement over field level decisions made by NE-HQ
- Many employees perceived good management support of the FEOSH program

Attribute Summary and Results Management Engagement--ME

The review team determined the attribute of Management Engagement (ME) was implemented and effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews and survey results confirmed the lines of inquiry associated with the attribute of “Management Engagement” (ME) were observed as being evident at all levels of DOE-ID. Many employees felt Senior Management spent an adequate amount of time in the field; however, they also felt the time spent was not quality time with DOE-ID employees. Specifically, comments reflected that Senior Management was seen in the field during tours and interaction with the contractors, but did not include interactions with DOE-ID employees.

In comparing the evaluated results of these data sources (survey, survey comments, and interviews), the responses were generally consistent. Any misalignment in data sets is due to the manner in which the interview responses were evaluated.

The following observations were identified:

Positive Observations:

- None

Potential Vulnerabilities:

- The majority of employees felt some DOE-ID senior management were not visible and engaged with employees

Additional data from surveys, interviews, and observations

- Personnel perceive DOE management has a direct ability to influence contractor performance, safety, and culture based on presence and attitude
- Most employees felt that management spent an adequate amount of time in the field
- Many employees felt Senior Management spent an adequate amount of time in the field; however, they also felt the time spent was not quality time with DOE-ID employees; specifically, comments reflected that Senior Management was seen in the field during tours and interaction with the contractors, but did not include interactions with DOE-ID employees.

Attribute Summary and Results

Open Communication—OC

The review team determined the attribute of Open Communications (OC) was implemented and effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews and survey results confirmed the lines of inquiry associated with the attribute of Open Communication were observed as being evident at all levels of the organization. Most employees felt that management does not tolerate retaliation of any kind for raising concerns. This included all levels, from the employees, to managers that were interviewed.

Most employees were aware of and have confidence in the employee concerns program. They also expressed that they were willing to use the program if it became necessary. However some employees stated in interviews that the employee concerns program was not effective in resolving issues to a satisfactory level. Most employees were aware of and have confidence in the differing professional opinion process. They also expressed they were willing to use the process for a technical issue if needed.

Most employees were reluctant to challenge management decisions in an open forum. However, most stated, due to respect for management, they prefer to challenge management in private rather than a public forum.

Divergent data exists from interviews and surveys in the areas of Open Communications. This appeared to the review team to be tied to trusting management and the ability to challenge management decisions. Some interviewees felt management decisions were directly driven by direction from DOE Headquarters, without considering input from the field office. Additionally, some employees felt that DOE-ID supervisors and managers made decisions without ensuring employees fully understood the decision logic.

Except as previously noted, in comparing the evaluated results of these data sources (survey, survey comments, and interviews), the responses were generally consistent. Any misalignment in data sets is due to the manner in which the interview responses were evaluated.

The following observations were identified.

Positive Observations:

- None

Potential Vulnerabilities:

- Divergent data exists from interviews and surveys in the areas of trusting management and the ability to challenge management decisions
- Most employees were reluctant to challenge management decisions in an open forum

Additional data from surveys, interviews, and observations

- Strong sense by most employees to use the chain of command

- Many employees interviewed stated they can bring issues to their immediate supervisor
- Disparity between survey and interview may be because of wording in the electronic survey that became evident when asking the questions in an interview; many respondents requested an explanation or context to frame the interview questions.

Attribute Summary and Results Clear Expectations and Accountability—CE

The review team determined the attribute of Clear Expectations and Accountability (CE) was implemented and effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews and survey results confirmed most DOE-ID employees felt they were held accountable through their performance agreements for meeting safety standards. Based on the survey comments and interviews, many employees felt that the 2nd mid-year review was not needed, unless someone was on a performance improvement plan. One potential vulnerability was identified where budget conditions are directly affecting the office's ability to recognize excellent performance. Some employees did state they appreciated the verbal and e-mail recognitions by supervisors and managers, and were understanding of the budget situation.

In comparing the evaluated results of the data sources (survey, survey comments, observation of activities, and interviews) the response evaluation between the survey and interview was in alignment. In reviewing the specific comments to the survey questions and the comments received during interviews, the specific comments were generally consistent.

The following observations were identified.

Positive Observations:

- The majority of employees felt they were held accountable for meeting safety standards

Potential Vulnerabilities:

- The majority of employees felt budget conditions directly affected the ability to recognize excellent performance

Additional data from surveys, interviews, and observations

- Some personnel felt poor performers were not held accountable.
- Many employees stated they appreciated the personal “thank you” given by supervisors and management for good performance (recognized in staff meetings, e-mails, all hands meetings, and verbally in person)
- Some personnel felt that recognition was segmented with FRs or other safety specific disciplines being recognized while others are not.
- Most personnel felt that they received regular feedback on performance

Attribute Summary and Results Conservative Decision-Making—CD

The review team determined the attribute of Conservative Decision-Making (CD) was implemented and effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews and survey results confirmed the lines of inquiry associated with the attribute of Conservative Decision-Making were observed as being evident at all levels of DOE-ID. Most employees felt their supervisors supported their right to stop work if they see something unsafe. This includes all levels, from the employees to managers that were interviewed. They also felt that there would be no retaliation if they did stop work. The majority of employees, supervisors and managers feel that conservative decision making is emphasized in DOE-ID project management and execution.

The majority of employees, supervisors and managers feel that their coworkers follow procedures and make conservative decisions that support safe and reliable operations. However, one exception to this was identified by a few employees related to a DOE-ID EM project that countered the conservative decisions of management (purposely vague to preserve anonymity).

In comparing the evaluated results of these data sources (survey, survey comments, and interviews), the responses were generally consistent. Any misalignment in data sets is due to the manner in which the interview responses were evaluated.

The following observations were identified:

Positive Observations:

- Most employees feel their supervisors support their right to stop work in a safety situation

Potential Vulnerabilities:

- None

Additional data from surveys, interviews, and observations

- The majority of people feel management supports conservative decision-making

Attribute Summary and Results Team Work and Mutual Respect—TM

The review team determined that employee perception of Team Work and Mutual Respect (TM) within the office was generally positive, implemented and effective based upon the data reviewed. Survey and interview results indicated many employees felt that team work is utilized within the office, especially within their respective work group. However, results also indicated that inter-organizational teamwork and communication, as well with HQ, does not occur in an effective manner. Some interviewees and survey comments also indicated that some employees have seen an improvement in teamwork in the past two years. Overall, results from the interviews and the survey support that although teamwork is utilized within work groups, there is need for improvement in teaming across organizations in DOE-ID and with HQ.

When comparing the evaluated results from the data sources, the team found that the interview and survey results were in alignment overall. Responses in the survey were generally more negative as expected, and a positive shift in one sub-category during interviews was observed in keeping with human nature expectations. During the team's review of responses in this sub-category, the shift was attributed to the fact that many interviewees gave credit to the office for focusing on solutions, with only a few isolated instances of focus on blame, ultimately resulting in many positive evaluations.

The following observations were identified:

Positive Observations:

- None

Potential Vulnerabilities:

- Most employees felt teamwork and communication outside of their work group could be improved

Additional data from surveys, interviews, and observations

- Many employees felt that good news was shared more openly than bad news
- Some employees appreciated the teamwork present within the new first level supervisors group
- Some employees noted an improvement in teamwork in the past two years
- One employee felt poor team and inter-team communications have contributed to a discouraging effect on the differing professional opinion process
- Some employees felt that teamwork within the office is adequate, but not so with NE Headquarters
- Many employees felt that teamwork happens in informal teams, but some organizations within DOE-ID don't communicate well and are mostly personality driven

Attribute Summary and Results

Credibility, Trust and Reporting Errors and Problems—CT

For the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) attribute of *Credibility and Trust*, the review team determined that the attribute was implemented and effective within DOE-ID. A potential vulnerability was identified by the review team: although the majority of employees felt mistakes were used as opportunities to learn instead of placing blame, some employees felt there was room for improvement in this area.

In comparing the evaluated results of the data sources (survey, survey comments and interviews), survey responses were generally more positive than interview results. Although the survey responses were more positive the variation between the positive survey and interview responses was all less than 10 points with 2 deviations. The first deviation was CT.1 where employees were asked if they trusted their management. The survey responses were 19.9% neutral, 59.1% positive and 21% negative, but the interview responses were 53% neutral, 30% positive and 17% negative. The other exception was for CT.5a where employees were asked if their management had their trust because they were ethical and CT.5b where employees were asked if management treated them with dignity and respect. The survey responses were 16.8% neutral and 65% positive and 18.2% negative but the interview responses were 45% neutral, 45% positive and 10% negative. For both CT.1 and CT.5 the negative survey and interview responses were mostly in alignment. The increase in neutral responses may be due to the manner in which the interview responses were evaluated by the review team.

The following observations were identified:

Positive Observations:

- None

Potential Vulnerabilities:

- Although the majority of employees felt mistakes were used as opportunities to learn instead of placing blame, some employees felt there was room for improvement in this area

Additional data from surveys, interviews, and observations

- Some employees felt they were not treated with dignity and respect
- Two employees felt some level of distrust of DOE-ID EM management due to decisions pushed down that they perceived as not ethical (employment actions and project decisions made without Federal Project Director—FPD input) or without sufficient technical basis (Occupational Safety and Health Administration Lockout/Tagout exception at IWTU) (from OC.1)
- Some surveyed employees felt that they did not trust their management because of micro-management by NE Headquarters
- Some employees felt a strong distrust of NE-HQ due to decisions pushed down without sufficient technical basis regarding equipment maintenance (Advanced Test Reactor—ATR Life Extension Program) (from OC.1)

Attribute Summary and Results

Effective Resolution of Reported Problems—ER

The review team determined that employee perception of Effective Resolution of Problems (ER) within the office was generally positive, implemented and effective based upon the data reviewed. Results indicated that most employees feel issues are identified in an adequate manner; however, they also feel that the office does not prioritize or correct those issues in a timely manner, nor adequately analyze them to identify negative performance trends. Most employees also felt that the corrective action system was difficult to use and, in some cases, the preferred method was to work around the system to provide more efficient resolution of issues.

When comparing the evaluated results from the data sources, the team found the interview results were generally more neutral as compared to those from the survey. As expected, the difference appears to be due to the more candid and anonymous nature of the survey as compared to the interview. Supporting this conclusion is the fact that many interview comments reflect the same frustrations with resolution of issues as many of those from the survey, but some interview comments also gave some credit for adequate identification of issues through self-assessments. Another minor contributor to the lack of results correlation was the lack of sufficient interview data in one sub-category. Also worth mentioning is the fact that this sub-category was not one of the top or bottom ten response areas in the survey and therefore was not pursued with the vigor of the other sub-categories during the interview process.

The following observations were identified:

Positive Observations:

- None

Potential Vulnerabilities:

- Most employees felt that although issues are identified, the organization does not prioritize or correct those issues in a timely manner; most employees also felt trending was not performed
- Many employees expressed a dislike for and avoidance of the use of the corrective action management system (Pegasus)

Additional data from surveys, interviews, and observations

- Some employees felt performing the SCWE self-assessment was a benefit to the DOE-ID organization
- Some employees felt causal analysis of identified problems was not well-performed
- Several employees felt that if they raised an issue they should be part of the solution; however, many did not feel that they were included or given feedback on resolution of the issue

Attribute Summary and Results Performance Monitoring—PM

The review team determined that employee perception of Performance Monitoring (PM) within the office was generally positive, implemented and effective based upon the data reviewed. The active self-assessment program was noted by most employees as a positive aspect of PM. However, some interviewees and those surveyed noted a lack of performance trending or establishment of key performance indicators for federal performance. The general consensus during interviews was that safety performance monitoring was the responsibility of the Health and Safety group. Also, some of the comments indicate there is a perception of improvement in this area in the past two years.

When comparing the interview and survey results, the team observed little correlation between many of the attribute sub-categories. In those sub-categories where sufficient interview data exists, responses were generally positive and consistent with those comments received in the survey. A majority of the uncorrelated results is thought to be attributed to the lack of data during the interview portion of the assessment. Although this is supported with the fact that five of the seven sub-categories did not have a sufficient quantity of data during the interview phase, it should be noted that these did not have significant comments during the survey and were not in the top or bottom ten attribute areas. Therefore, these sub-categories were not pursued with the vigor of the others during interviews by the review team.

The following observations were identified:

Positive Observations:

- Most employees felt there was an active self-assessment program, including an effort to improve the safety culture

Potential Vulnerabilities:

- None

Additional data from surveys, interviews, and observations

- Many employees viewed this assessment as an indicator that management is interested in the safety culture of the office and is engaged in monitoring the performance of our Integrated Safety Management System
- Although employees felt federal performance was monitored, there was a perception of lack of corrective action and follow-through
- Some employees noted a lack of key performance indicators for the office
- Many employees felt that trending of federal performance was not performed (see ER section for potential vulnerability)

Attribute Summary and Results

Questioning Attitude—QA

The review team determined the attribute of Questioning Attitude (QA) was partially implemented or partially effective for DOE-ID based on the data reviewed. Interviews, observations and survey results and comments were mixed for this attribute. Several employees did not feel they could question senior leaders or HQ on issues for fear it would be career limiting. When reviewing the results in this area to results from the attributes of Open Communications and Demonstrated Leadership, it is clear there is room for improvement in *this* area. Specifically, some employees expressed reluctance to challenge management decisions in an open forum, and some employees did not feel comfortable challenging DOE-ID and NE Headquarters senior management decisions. Also, during interviews, some employees felt a lack of control over decisions made by DOE NE Headquarters senior leadership—decisions that should have been made at the field level. Based on this decision-making regime, it was apparent that the basis for such NE Headquarters decisions were not adequately communicated to mid-level management and staff.

In comparing the evaluated results of the data sources, the response evaluation between the survey and interviews were mostly in alignment. However, there were insufficient interview data points to ensure reliability and repeatability of the interview data. There was one noted area of divergence between the survey and interview responses when employees were posed with the statement, “Everyone questions deviations, and does not get complacent based on past successes.” This divergence was attributed to the how the question was raised in the interviews. In reviewing the specific comments to the survey questions and the comments received during interviews, the responses were also generally aligned.

The following observations were identified.

Positive Observations:

- None

Potential Vulnerabilities:

- None

Additional data from surveys, interviews, and observations

- Some employees did not feel comfortable challenging DOE-ID senior leadership and NE-HQ
- Several employees felt that if they questioned management/HQ on an issue it would be career limiting

Attribute Summary and Results

Contract Incentives—CI

For the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) attribute of *Contract Incentives*, the review team determined that the attribute was partially implemented and partially effective within DOE-ID based on the lower results in the survey and interview responses. The review team determined that some of the interviewees did not understand the question or did not believe that the question pertained to them. Although the attribute of Contract Incentives was determined to be partially implemented or partially effective based on the survey and interview results, no Recommendations are provided for this shortfall, since there is enough data to indicate employees may not have completely understood the survey and interview questions in this area.

A review of the CWI contract, DE-AC07-05ID14516, *Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) Contract*, and the ITG contract, DE-EM0001467, *Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP)*, revealed the presence of Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation (DEAR) 952.223-76, “Conditional Payment of Fee or Profit—Safeguarding Restricted Data and Other Classified Information and Protection of Worker Safety and Health” in both contracts. A review of the Battelle Energy Alliance (BEA) contract, DE-AC07-05ID14517, *Management and Operation of the Idaho National Laboratory (INL)*, revealed the presence of DEAR Clause 970.5215-3, “Conditional Payment of Fee, Profit, and Other Incentives--Facility Management Contracts, Alternative II (JAN 2004).” The review team lead reviewed past DOE use of these clauses with all three contractors and found its use to be effective in improving contractor performance when appropriate and needed to improve safety performance.

In comparing the evaluated results of the data sources (survey, survey comments and interviews); the neutral responses went from 29.4% for the survey to 41% for the interviews. Some interviewees appeared to have difficulty understanding the question and as a result gave a neutral response to the question. Based on the interview responses received, the review team determined this area of questioning should be revised in future self-assessments to be more understandable by the respondents/interviewees.

The following observations were identified:

Positive Observations:

- None

Potential Vulnerabilities:



- None

Additional data from surveys, interviews, and observations

- Some employees felt that contract incentives in place to ensure safe performance of work may not be effective in improving performance.

- Some employees felt contract incentives (Performance Evaluation Management Plan—PEMP) were not aligned with DOE-ID Senior Management performance agreements. However, employees also felt “what gets incentivized gets done.”
- Many employees felt that DOE-ID management would and has taken contract action for safety issues.

Appendix B
Survey and Interview Data



DOE-ID Survey Results by SCWE Focus Area and Attribute Area: These charts graphically represent the results of the survey data for the indicated SCWE focus areas and attributes; the survey was administered during the period July 16-31, 2013. The Red (left bar) indicates negative responses in the displayed area. The Green (middle bar) represents positive responses in the displayed area. The Blue (right bar) represents neutral responses in the displayed area.

Row Labels	- Negative	+ Positive	O Neutral	Grand Total
CD.1	13.6%	75.5%	10.9%	100%
CD.2	19.8%	62.1%	18.1%	100%
CD.3	2.4%	93.3%	4.3%	100%
CE.1	16.0%	71.8%	12.2%	100%
CE.2	10.6%	82.5%	6.9%	100%
CE.3	27.5%	51.3%	21.2%	100%
CI.1	27.2%	43.3%	29.4%	100%
CT.1	21.0%	59.1%	19.9%	100%
CT.2	12.7%	74.9%	12.4%	100%
CT.3	16.2%	56.3%	27.5%	100%
CT.4	7.1%	67.9%	25.0%	100%
CT.5	18.2%	65.0%	16.8%	100%
CT.6	24.4%	57.4%	18.2%	100%
DL.1	23.3%	67.6%	9.0%	100%
DL.2	13.6%	71.2%	15.2%	100%
DL.3	12.0%	86.9%	1.1%	100%
DL.4	18.8%	66.7%	14.5%	100%
DL.5	21.5%	63.5%	14.9%	100%
DL.6	13.5%	69.6%	17.0%	100%
ER.1	23.5%	43.3%	33.1%	100%
ER.2	17.7%	49.8%	32.4%	100%
ER.3	24.7%	44.3%	31.0%	100%
ER.4	16.3%	59.9%	23.8%	100%
ER.5	14.7%	58.3%	27.0%	100%
ER.6	18.0%	61.7%	20.4%	100%
ME.1	31.6%	50.3%	18.2%	100%
ME.2	28.7%	54.6%	16.7%	100%
ME.3	21.9%	51.3%	26.7%	100%
OC.1	25.6%	57.8%	16.6%	100%
OC.2	17.6%	68.1%	14.4%	100%
OC.3	19.8%	73.8%	6.4%	100%
OC.4	23.5%	63.1%	13.5%	100%
OC.5	34.3%	43.8%	21.9%	100%
PM.1	13.6%	59.2%	27.2%	100%
PM.2	15.2%	67.7%	17.0%	100%
PM.3	19.3%	60.8%	19.9%	100%
PM.4	15.7%	66.9%	17.5%	100%
PM.5	18.5%	59.5%	22.0%	100%
PM.6	17.9%	59.5%	22.6%	100%
PM.7	10.0%	70.0%	20.0%	100%
QA.1	13.8%	69.2%	17.1%	100%
QA.2	19.0%	45.2%	35.7%	100%
QA.3	6.5%	58.1%	35.5%	100%
TM.1	26.9%	59.4%	13.7%	100%
TM.2	24.9%	57.8%	17.3%	100%
TM.3	21.6%	51.1%	27.3%	100%
TM.4	14.5%	68.7%	16.8%	100%
Grand Total	18.7%	62.3%	19.0%	100%

DOE-ID Survey Results by Question per Attribute Area: This table represents the results of the survey data for the indicated attribute question from those employees that took the anonymous survey during the period July 16-31, 2013. This chart also represents how the top ten positive results and bottom ten negative results were used to guide the interview process.

Leadership				Engagement				Learning				Incentives			
DL.1	+ 25 0 4 - 2	31		TM.1	+ 29 0 7 - 17	53		CT.1	+ 9 0 16 - 5	30		CI.1	+ 19 0 22 - 13	54	
DL.2	+ 31 0 10 - 4	45		TM.2	+ 31 0 10 - 14	55		CT.2	+ 13 0 5 - 2	20		PM.7	+ 0 0 0 - 0	0	
DL.3	+ 39 0 5 - 0	44		TM.3	+ 27 0 6 - 8	41		CT.3	+ 3 0 8 - 3	23		CD.1	+ 4 0 2 - 1	7	
DL.4	+ 27 0 7 - 4	38		TM.4	+ 12 0 3 - 3	18		CT.4	+ 12 0 4 - 2	15		ME.2	+ 0 0 0 - 0	0	
DL.5	+ 18 0 5 - 5	28						CT.5	+ 13 0 13 - 3	29		DL.5	+ 0 0 0 - 0	0	
DL.6	+ 33 0 3 - 10	46						CT.6	+ 22 0 9 - 12	43					
CD.1	+ 39 0 9 - 2	50						ER.1	+ 3 0 12 - 6	21					
CD.2	+ 19 0 4 - 2	25						ER.2	+ 5 0 8 - 6	19					
CD.3	+ 32 0 6 - 2	40						ER.3	+ 14 0 15 - 10	39					
ME.1	+ 41 0 10 - 8	59						ER.4	+ 7 0 3 - 3	13					
ME.2	+ 29 0 7 - 6	42						ER.5	+ 1 0 1 - 0	2					
ME.3	+ 9 0 3 - 1	13						ER.6	+ 1 0 6 - 5	25					
OC.1	+ 33 0 18 - 6	57						PM.1	+ 2 0 3 - 3	8					
OC.2	+ 19 0 3 - 1	23						PM.2	+ 10 0 3 - 1	14					
OC.3	+ 37 0 9 - 5	51						PM.3	+ 0 0 0 - 0	0					
OC.4	+ 23 0 8 - 5	36						PM.4	+ 8 0 1 - 0	9					
OC.5	+ 33 0 9 - 7	49						PM.5	+ 4 0 0 - 0	4					
OC.6	+ 0 0 1 - 0	1						PM.6	+ 0 0 3 - 1	4					
CE.1	+ 34 0 6 - 1	41						PM.7	+ 25 0 8 - 3	36					
CE.2	+ 30 0 12 - 2	44						QA.1	+ 13 0 9 - 5	27					
CE.3	+ 23 0 11 - 13	47						QA.2	+ 1 0 7 - 2	10					
								QA.3	+ 8 0 5 - 0	13					
Total	+ 574 0 150 - 86	810		Total	+ 99 0 26 - 42	167		Total	+ 218 0 144 - 74	436		Total	+ 23 0 24 - 14	61	

DOE-ID Interview Results by Question per Attribute Area: This table represents the results of the interview data for the indicated attribute question from those employees interviewed during the period August 19-20, 2013. This chart also represents how the top ten positive results and bottom ten negative results were used to guide the interview process.

Appendix C

Executive Team Biographies

Self-Assessment Executive Team Member Biographies

Mark C. Brown—Team Lead: Mark Brown is the Assistant Manager for Nuclear and Safety Performance for the DOE Idaho Cleanup Project (ICP) within the DOE Idaho Operations Office. He is responsible for providing subject matter expertise in safety, health, and quality areas, supporting line management to facilitate achievement of the DOE Environmental Management (EM) cleanup mission. Specific programs and areas of responsibility include ICP oversight process, operational metrics, Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) implementation and review, nuclear safety (including Safety System Oversight resources), radiological controls, quality assurance, and industrial safety. Mr. Brown has been with DOE since 1995, and has over 27 years of experience with nuclear operations and providing oversight of environmental restoration activities. Mr. Brown has received formal training in Safety Culture attributes, including a DOE National Training Center course on Safety Conscious Work Environment.

Todd N. Lapointe—Team Executive: Mr. Todd Lapointe is the Director of the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM), Office of Safety Management (EM-41) at DOE Headquarters in Washington, D.C. Todd is responsible for ensuring proper implementation and continuous improvement of Integrated Safety Management Systems (ISMS) across the EM complex and serving as a focal point for EM safety standards and policy development and interpretation and interfaces with internal/external oversight organizations. Todd is also responsible for serving as the focal point within EM on all Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) related issues and ensuring timely and technically sound resolution of its recommendations and concerns. As a DOE recognized Senior Technical Safety Manager and Nuclear Executive Leader, Mr. Lapointe has over 25 years of engineering, operations and management experience.

Scott E. Ferrara—Team Advisor: Scott currently serves as a Senior Facility Representative for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) at the Advanced Test Reactor at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Scott has over 20 years of experience in the nuclear industry in Nuclear Operations, Facility Management, Production Management and Federal Regulation. Scott has served as a Federal Regulator for DOE at the INL for the last six years. He has trained and assessed Safety Culture with the Utilities Services Alliance (USA) in Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulated Facilities.

Ronald E. Elsasser—Team Safety Culture Subject Matter Expert: Ron Elsasser is currently the Deputy Director for Performance Improvement and Learning for the Advanced Test Reactor Program at the Idaho National Laboratory. He has been a member of Safety Culture working groups and has presented to Federal and Nuclear Industry audiences on the subject of Safety Culture and Safety Conscious Work Environment. Ron has been an Oversight and Assurance Manager, Lead Assessor, Corrective Action and Issues Management Program Owner for the Advanced Test Reactor. He is the Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Plan author for the Nuclear Facilities at Idaho National Laboratory. Ron has experience with Utilities Services Alliance (USA), Synergy, and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Safety Culture/Safety Conscious Work Environment assessments. He has attended the Morgan Lewis Safety Conscious Work Environment for Senior Nuclear Plant Managers training.

Appendix D
Self-Assessment Lessons Learned

DOE-ID SCWE Self-Assessment

Lessons Learned

The self-assessment of DOE-ID SCWE immediately followed the CWI SCWE self-assessment, which was the first of its kind conducted at the Idaho Site. Most of the federal staff conducting the DOE-ID review also participated in the CWI review. There were many lessons learned gathered by both review teams during the reviews to improve future similar reviews. Many of the lessons learned gleaned from the CWI SCWE self-assessment were incorporated into the DOE-ID SCWE self-assessment. The following provides a comprehensive listing of the lessons learned from both reviews, which should be used to guide any similar follow-on reviews.

Overall

- Allow sufficient preparation time for the review, including survey development and testing, communications to employees, time to analyze survey data prior to interviews, team member training
- The assessment duration should not be underestimated—allow sufficient time to conduct interviews and field observations; length of assessment should carefully consider logistics (if interviews/observations are required in different geographical locations), number of employees, availability of interview rooms, and also allow sufficient time for the team members to conduct in-process and end-of-assessment data review and analysis
- Provide clear examples of positive observations, negative observations, and recommendations (e.g. format and style) prior to the review to assist team members during the review
- Provide clear examples and format of expected area write-ups for use by the team members to facilitate report development (and to get consistency)
- HQ-provided SCWE guidance for team composition was very important and invaluable—initial impression was team overkill; however, the data manager, Executive, Advisor, and safety culture SME were invaluable members of the team
- Federal Employee Viewpoint – Federal Employees had difficulty differentiating between Federal SCWE and Contractor SCWE when conducting the survey and answering interview questions; ensure survey and interview questions are focused on the federal perspective and culture, and not on the contractor
- Schedule interview locations and team meeting conference rooms sufficiently far in advance to ensure adequate space available
- HQ-provided SCWE self-assessment guidance was minimal and insufficient to execute an adequate and systematic self-assessment; this review benefited greatly from local field office experience conducting a safety culture review at a commercial nuclear power plant
- The DOE complex would benefit greatly by developing a SCWE self-assessment working group to standardize methods for conducting the self-assessments (EFCOG could be considered as well)

Survey

- Incorporate demographics if possible—it could be advantageous to understand several demographics associated with those conducting the survey, including data such as: length of service with the company, manager/supervisor or worker, age, and work location
- Include ability of those taking the survey to comment on each question—this capability was included, and the information provided another source of data to understand the basis of responses
- Reduce the number of survey questions to a minimum set—this survey was on the order of 63 questions, and was considered long by many surveyed (however, based on trial runs, the survey only took 15-20 minutes to complete per individual)
- Consider options for employees to *more* anonymously respond to the survey, through the use of paper surveys, stand-alone computers (i.e. computers not assigned to the employees), etc.
- Communications: ensure organization being surveyed has communicated to all employees the purpose of the survey, expected length of time to complete the survey, and how the survey results will be used

Interviews

- Conducting practice interviews in the team training session prior to the review was extremely beneficial in giving interviewers experience conducting interviews, taking notes, compiling data, and in instilling a sense of confidence in the interviewers in the process
- Provide an option for employees to answer “I don’t know” or “not applicable” to the interview questions—otherwise, the responses may erroneously skew data to the neutral side (e.g., in the case of ‘contract incentives’, most workers were not knowledgeable of specific contract incentives and measures in place to conserve the employee’s ability to raise safety concerns in a heavily-incentivized production contract)
- Provide for adequate time for the team to conduct the interview portion of the review:
 - Individual interviews usually take a minimum of 45-60 minutes
 - Team members should have 20-30 minutes between interviews to review interview results, document results, and provide a rest period for interviewers
 - Group interviews take longer than individual interviews, and can take 60-90 minutes
- Make sure interview setting is sufficiently private, accessible, and appropriate
- Optimal interview sequence is to interview workers first, followed by supervisors, then mid-level management, then senior management
- When developing the review team members and interviewers, *consider* not having managers interviewing workers
- Ensure interview questions are laid out in a question format, and not just an attribute statement
- Plan ahead to ensure interview data sheets can be scanned and emailed in a timely manner to the data manager/upload individual for those interviews conducted at remote locations

- Communications: Ensure the organization communicates to all employees: purpose of interviews, expected length of interviews, how interviewees were selected (randomly), anonymity of interviews, and how the results of the interviews will be used

Team Meetings

- Allow sufficient time for daily team meetings—one hour is insufficient to also allow time for problem statement development and data analysis
- Plan ahead how to conduct team meetings to include those members at remote locations
- Daily team meetings were sufficient to share information/observations/trends

Appendix E
SCWE Interview Lines of Inquiry

SCWE Interview Lines of Inquiry

Question ID	Category and Questions
DL.1a	Managers and Supervisors ensure work activities, procedures, and processes are performed with safety as the overriding priority.
DL.2a	My Managers and Supervisors communicate upcoming changes and ensure the changes do not result in safety issues for me.
DL.3a	I understand that I am personally responsible for safety and clearly understand my work activities and performance objectives.
DL.4a	My Manager and Supervisor clearly demonstrate safety in their actions and behaviors by performing walk-throughs and personal visits verifying expectations are met.
DL.5a	Management ensures production and safety goals are tied together to produce high reliability within my organization.
DL.4b	Management ensures any concerns raised are addressed. *
DL6a	The organization maintains facilities in a manner that supports both production and the safe performance of work.
CD.1a	My co-workers follow procedures and make conservative decisions that support safe and reliable operations.
CD.2a	Management fully supports conservative decision-making despite cost or schedule pressure.
CD.3a	My immediate supervisor supports my right to stop work if I see something unsafe.
ME.1a	Management makes it a priority to spend time in the field and listen to employees so they have real time information.
ME.2a	My Management puts eyes on the work in the field and asks questions, coaches, and mentors to reinforce safe behaviors.
ME.3a	Management is directly involved in providing high quality training that demonstrates expected behaviors.
OC.1a	I can trust my management and the decisions they make.
OC.2a	Management wants concerns reported and willingly listens to problems.
OC.3a	I feel free to approach Management with any concerns I have.
OC.4a	Management does not tolerate retaliation of any kind for raising concerns.
OC.4b	I would report a problem to the Employee Concerns Program if needed.
OC.4c	How would you feel about using the differing professional opinion process when faced with disagreement on a technical issue if not resolved through other means.
OC.5a	I can openly challenge decisions made by Management.
CE.1a	Managers and Supervisors review key safety roles and responsibilities and ensure expectations are being met.
CE.1b	My Manager and Supervisor give me feedback regularly on my performance.
CE.2a	All personnel at the site are held accountable for meeting safety standards and reporting concerns.
CE.3a	Personnel are recognized for excellent performance as well as for identifying areas of performance that need improvement.
CE.4a	I am responsible for identifying problems.

Question ID	Category and Questions
TM.2	Open communication and teamwork are the way we always do business.
TM.2	Employees at all levels listen to each other, work together, and respect differing opinions.
TM.3a	When problems occur, everyone focusses on problem solving not individuals.
TM.4a	My Management values and shares both good and bad news.
TM.5a	Helpful (constructive) criticism is encouraged.*
CT.1a	I trust my Management Team and they continually earn my trust through their actions and decisions.
CT.2a	My Management openly and honestly provides me with accurate and timely information.
CT.3a	Reporting individual errors is encouraged and valued.
CT.4a	Line Managers and Supervisors appreciate and value safety issue and error reporting.
CT.5a	My Managers and Supervisors have my trust because they are honest and ethical.
CT.5b	People are treated with dignity and respect by the Leadership.
CT.6	Mistakes are used as opportunities to learn vice placing blame.
ER.1a	Our corrective action program prioritizes and corrects identified issues in a timely manner.
ER1.b	My company's corrective action system is easy to use.
ER.2a	The corrective action process gets to the real issue and corrective actions help prevent recurrence.
ER2.b	Performance assurance activities and cause analysis performed are effective.
CT.3	Weaknesses in performance are trended, communicated, and corrected.
ER.4a	Our organization uses relevant Lessons Learned in our work to help prevent similar errors or safety concerns from occurring.
ER.5a	Incidents are reviewed quickly and with a graded approach to identify improvement opportunities.
ER.6a	We are encouraged, recognized and rewarded for offering innovative ideas to improve performance and to solve problems.
ER6.b	When I raise issues, I am involved in determining the solution to the problem.
ER.6c	When I raise issues, I do receive feedback on the resolution of the issue.
ER.6d	I am given the opportunity to be involved with identifying and completing corrective actions for safety issues.
ER.6e	I feel adequately involved in improvement initiatives at my work location.
PM.1a	My manager maintains awareness of key performance indicators related to safe work accomplishment, watches carefully for adverse trends or indications, and takes prompt action to understand adverse trends and anomalies.
PM.2a	Performance assurance consists of frequent and independent self-assessment conducted at all levels of the organization.
PM.2b	I am encouraged to disclose information fully and completely to audit and independent oversight personnel.
PM.3a	My Managers and Supervisors take part in oversight activities in the field and improve work activities from the results.

Question ID	Category and Questions
PM.4a	My organization monitors performance through multiple means, including walk-arounds, issue reporting, performance indicators, trend analysis, benchmarking, industry experience reviews, self-assessments, peer reviews, and performance assessments.
PM.5a	Our site continually improves systems, structures, processes, and procedures through performance monitoring.
PM.6a	I have confidence my Management is involved in all phases of performance monitoring, problem analysis, solution planning, and solution implementation to resolve safety issues.
PM.7a	Our organization is concerned with our safety culture and monitors it periodically.
QA.1a	My management encourages a questioning attitude toward safety, and supports constructive discussions by everyone involved on safety matters.
QA.1b	People at our site are comfortable challenging each other, regardless of position or level, if they feel something isn't right.
QA.2a	Everyone questions deviations and does not get complacent based on past successes.
QA.3a	When issues arise that are out of the normal, a focus on proving why it is safe to proceed is supported vice why it isn't unsafe.
CI.1a	Incentives are in place that help prevent budget or schedule pressures from influencing people's willingness to identify concerns or reducing the effectiveness of safety management programs.
CI.1b	Our contract incentives balance production and safety.
CI.1c	Has current contract fee negotiations affected working relationships with CWI contractor personnel?

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= Top Ten Survey Results

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= Bottom Ten Survey Results