ENCLOSURE 1

Summary of Deliverable Actions Determined by Environmental Management Headquarters' Review

High Priority Facilities

Waste Treatment Plant (WTP)
Memorandum and Independent Review Panel (IRP) report on Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 2004-2 review of ventilation systems dated July 9, 2009, is enclosed, completing commitment 8.6.5 for the WTP. This documentation was previously transmitted to the Board staff via email.

Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Plant (AMWTP)
Memorandum and IRP report on DNFSB Recommendation 2004-2 review of ventilation systems date December 30, 2009, is enclosed, completing commitment 8.6.5 for the AMWTP.

U233 Project
The 3019 major modification project design is currently being completed, consistent with DOE-STD-1189; consistent with the approach discussed in our letter dated June 8, 2007. EM has recently completed an evaluation of the existing ventilation system in Building 3019, this evaluation will be incorporated into a crosscutting review discussed in this letter. EM will continue to follow this project to ensure that an appropriate confinement ventilation system is designed.

Medium and Low Priority Facilities

Office of River Protection (ORP) 242 Evaporator Facility
The gap identified with respect to DOE-STD-1066 will be further evaluated as part of a revision to the facility's Fire Hazard Analysis and a determination whether modifications are needed.

Oak Ridge Office (ORO) Liquid Low-Level Waste System
The ventilation systems were not evaluated against the safety significant criteria of the evaluation guidelines, as was required for a Hazard Category 2 facility. The TAB instructed the field team to re-perform the evaluation against safety-significant criteria, instead of defense-in-depth. This report was received on December 18, 2009; the results will be incorporated into the cross-cutting review discussed in this letter.

Richland (RL) Waste Encapsulation and Storage Facility

The ventilation systems were not evaluated against the safety significant criteria of the evaluation guidelines, as was required for a Hazard Category 2 facility. The TAB instructed the field team to re-perform the evaluation against safety-significant criteria, instead of defense-in-depth. DOE-RL is developing a schedule for completion of this re-evaluation; the results will be incorporated into the cross-cutting review discussed in this letter.

Savannah River Site (SRS) Tank Farm Waste Tank and Transfer Facility

An equivalent process to that required by DNFSB Recommendation 2004-2 was conducted during the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) upgrade process for the Tank Farm Waste Tank and Transfer Facility. Vulnerabilities identified, equivalent to "gaps" are identified and prioritized in the DSA. These vulnerabilities are required to be updated annually and tracked for execution as funding becomes available.

Savannah River Site (SRS) H-Canyon and HB-Line Facilities

Upgrades to the H-Canyon and HB-Line ventilation systems are being evaluated during the H-Canyon and HB-Line Safety Basis upgrade. The safety basis document is under review by DOE-SR. The TAB requested a briefing on the results of the Safety Basis Upgrade upon approval, and a presentation on the DOE-SR conclusions on ventilation system upgrades in light of current and future missions of H-Canyon and HB-Line.

Savannah River Site (SRS) Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) and Savannah River Site (SRS) F&H Area Analytical Laboratories

The TAB recommended that DOE-SR review the potential for unfiltered and unmonitored releases from "tertiary" clean areas of these buildings and determine if closure of identified gaps for the tertiary area ventilation is warranted.