Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled published notice (67 FR 43582, 55776, 58014, 59249, 62224, 64351, 65531 and 68091) of proposed additions to the Procurement List. After consideration of the material presented to it concerning capability of qualified nonprofit agencies to provide the products and services and impact of the additions on the current or most recent contractors, the Committee has determined that the products and services listed below are suitable for procurement by the Federal Government under 41 U.S.C. 46–48c and 41 CFR 51–2.4.

I certify that the following action will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. The major factors considered for this certification were:

1. The action will not result in any additional reporting, recordkeeping or other compliance requirements for small entities other than the small organizations that will furnish the products and services to the Government.

2. The action will result in authorizing small entities to furnish the products and services to the Government.

3. There are no known regulatory alternatives which would accomplish the objectives of the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act (41 U.S.C. 46–48c) in connection with the products and services proposed for addition to the Procurement List.

Accordingly, the following products and services are added to the Procurement List:

Products

Product/NSN: Dual Head Stethoscope 6515–00–NIB–0115
NPA: Central Association for the Blind & Visually Impaired, Utica, New York
Contract Activity: Veterans Affairs National Acquisition Center, Hines, Illinois

Product/NSN: Flashlight, Aluminum
6230–00–NIB–0004 (2AA, Black)
6230–00–NIB–0005 (2AA, Blue)
6230–00–NIB–0006 (2AA, Red)
6230–00–NIB–0007 (2AA, Silver)
6230–00–NIB–0008 (2D, Black)
6230–00–NIB–0009 (2D, Blue)
6230–00–NIB–0010 (2D, Red)
6230–00–NIB–0011 (2D, Silver)
6230–00–NIB–0012 (3D, Black)
6230–00–NIB–0013 (3D, Blue)
6230–00–NIB–0014 (3D, Red)
6230–00–NIB–0015 (3D, Silver)
6230–00–NIB–0016 (4D, Black)
6230–00–NIB–0017 (4D, Blue)
6230–00–NIB–0018 (4D, Red)
6230–00–NIB–0019 (4D, Silver)
6230–00–NIB–0020 (5D, Black)
6230–00–NIB–0021 (5D, Blue)
6230–00–NIB–0022 (5D, Red)
6230–00–NIB–0023 (5D, Silver)
NPA: Central Association for the Blind & Visually Impaired, Utica, NY
Contract Activity: Office Supplies & Paper Products Acquisition Center, New York, NY

Services

Service Type/Location: Base Supply Center, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Brunswick, Georgia
NPA: L.C. Industries For The Blind, Inc., Durham, North Carolina
Contract Activity: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC)

Service Type/Location: Janitorial/Custodial, Army Reserve Center (Fort Harrison), Indianapolis, Indiana
NPA: Child-Adult Resource Services, Inc., Green Castle, Indiana
Contract Activity: HQ, 88th Regional Support Command, Fort Snelling, Minnesota

Service Type/Location: Laundry Service, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland
NPA: Rappahannock Goodwill Industries, Inc., Fredericksburg, Virginia
Contract Activity: 89th Contracting Squadron, Andrews AFB, Maryland

Service Type/Location: Lawn Service Naval Reserve Center, Cleveland, Ohio
NPA: Goodwill Industries of Greater Cleveland, Inc., Cleveland, Ohio
Contract Activity: Officer in Charge of Contracts, NAVFAC, Crane, Indiana

Service Type/Location: Personal Environmental Protection & Survival Equipment Warehousing and Distribution Services, U.S. Army Natick Research Development & Engineering Center, Natick, Massachusetts
NPA: Peckham Vocational Industries, Inc., Lansing, Michigan
Contract Activity: U.S. Army Natick Soldier Center, Natick, Massachusetts

Deletions

I certify that the following action will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. The major factors considered for this certification were:

1. The action may not result in any additional reporting, recordkeeping or other compliance requirements for small entities other than the small organizations that will furnish the products to the Government.

2. The action will result in authorizing small entities to furnish the products to the Government.

3. There are no known regulatory alternatives which would accomplish the objectives of the Javits-Wagner-O'Day Act (41 U.S.C. 46–48c) in connection with the products deleted from the Procurement List.

After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the committee has determined that the products listed below are no longer suitable for procurement by the Federal Government under 41 U.S.C. 46–48c and 41 CFR 51–2.4.

Accordingly, the following products are deleted from the Procurement List:

Products

Product/NSN: Pencil, Mechanical
7520–00–285–5822
7520–00–285–5823
7520–00–285–5826
NPA: San Antonio Lighthouse, San Antonio, Texas
Contract Activity: Office Supplies & Paper Products Acquisition Center, New York, New York

Sheryl D. Kennerly,

Director, Information Management.

[FR Doc. 02–32146 Filed 12–19–02; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6353–01–P

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

[Recommendation 2002–3]

Requirements for the Design, Implementation, and Maintenance of Administrative Controls

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice, recommendation.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(5) concerning requirements for the design, implementation, and maintenance of administrative controls.

DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the recommendation are due on or before January 21, 2003.

ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, NW., Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004–2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth M. Pusateri or Andrew L. Thibadeau at the address above or telephone (202) 694–7000.

Dated: December 16, 2002.

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

Background

The implementation of an effective and reliable set of controls is one of the most important cornerstones of safe operation at defense nuclear facilities. In this context, the term ''control'' refers to those structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and administrative controls that prevent or mitigate undesirable consequences of postulated accident scenarios. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) has

compiled a set of observations that are particularly relevant to the development and implementation of administrative controls in the Department of Energy's (DOE) defense nuclear complex. The results of these reviews and observations are summarized in this recommendation.

It has been well recognized that administrative controls play an important role in establishing and maintaining overall safety of nuclear activities. Previous technical reports issued by the Board have underscored the need for heightened vigilance in the selection and implementation of task-specific administrative controls, as well as those of a more programmatic nature (*e.g.*, criticality control programs). In particular, in DNFSB/TECH–28, Safety Basis Expectations for Existing Department of Energy Defense Nuclear Facilities and Activities (October 2000), the Board observed the need for DOE to promulgate additional guidance in this area. However, DOE has taken little action to provide the degree of specificity necessary to properly design, implement, and monitor the effectiveness of important administrative controls.

Administrative controls have been defined in the DOE Nuclear Safety Management rule as, ''* * * the provisions relating to the organization, management, procedures, recordkeeping, assessment, and reporting necessary to ensure safe operation of a facility.'' 10 CFR 830.3(a). In practice, however, the concept of an administrative control is used more broadly in the context of hazard prevention and mitigation. In this regard, an administrative control can be viewed as an extension of a hazard control and defined accordingly. Thus from a broader and more operational perspective, some administrative controls should be treated similarly to engineered or design features that are used to eliminate, limit, or mitigate potential hazards.

DOE has promulgated guidance to assist facilities in the classification of controls. In general, controls necessary to prevent or mitigate significant consequences to the public are classified as ''safety-class'' and controls which contribute significantly to defense-in-depth or worker safety are classified as ''safety-significant.'' However, this guidance has been directed primarily at engineered controls and has been largely silent with respect to the functional classification of administrative controls. The Board has observed a number of instances in which administrative controls have been implemented in situations where a corresponding engineered feature would warrant functional classification as either safety-significant or safety-class. A number of defense nuclear facilities have explicitly characterized certain administrative controls as either safety-class or safety-significant from a functional classification perspective in the context of existing DOE guidance.

In addition to controls involving discrete operator actions, a number of administrative controls are more programmatic in nature. Examples of such programmatic controls include combustible loading programs (associated with fire protection programs), operator training programs, and inservice inspection programs. The Board has observed a number of instances, similar to the examples involving specific operator actions, in which such programmatic controls are credited for the prevention and mitigation of specific hazard scenarios.

Weaknesses in the Implementation of Important Administrative Controls

The Board has observed that the development and implementation of important administrative controls have not always conformed to the expectations and quality standards that would be applied to corresponding safety-class engineered features. The following examples illustrate this point:

1. During a review of the process controls for a new aqueous recovery line for plutonium 238 (Pu-238) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the Board found that the facility had placed heavy reliance on administrative controls in lieu of engineered controls. However, LANL had not planned to incorporate many of these administrative controls, some of which were safety-related, into Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) prior to the startup of the Pu-238 recovery process. Examples include procedural controls on the makeup of strong acids used to elute ion exchange resin and procedural controls designed to monitor for resin dryout. Strong acids can react violently with the ion exchange resin, and resin dryout can also lead to energetic reactions. These concerns were communicated to DOE in a Board letter dated April 23, 2002.

2. During a review at the Y–12 National Security Complex, the Board noted that the fire protection program for Building 9212 B–1 Wing identified 21 administrative controls needed to protect the facility during testing and process restart. These administrative controls include operational considerations in the use of organic solvents, a transient combustible control program, control of ignition sources, and designated laydown areas for combustible materials. The Board determined that the various administrative controls were not always updated or modified to reflect changes in plans or equipment, and that there were significant deficiencies in the contractor's compliance with these controls. Most important, there was no program providing for a periodic review to verify that the administrative controls associated with B–1 Wing remained fully effective. Significantly, many of these administrative controls could be supplanted by the installation of an engineered control-a fire suppression system. These issues were communicated to DOE in a letter from the Board dated May 13, 2002.

3. At the Savannah River Site, the safety analysis for HB-Line Phase 2 operations contains requirements for strict control of combustibles in rooms 410N and 410S to protect the process tanks in the area. The controls limit the total quantity of combustibles to 400 pounds wood equivalent and specify separation distances between combustibles and tank supports. However, the transient combustible control procedure did not include this portion of HB-Line, indicating that this administrative control was not complete. Further, a review by Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC) indicated that the quantity of combustibles in the area may actually be as high as 5,670 pounds wood equivalent, providing sufficient fuel to produce a high-temperature (1200°C) flashover fire in the area and boil off the tank contents. As a result, it was determined that combustible control was no longer a viable administrative control for this area. Instead, WSRC has implemented an additional administrative control to limit the concentration of plutonium in the tanks to 5.5 grams per liter to prevent unacceptable consequences of a fire in this area. The details of these issues were documented in a letter from the Board dated July 20, 2001.

Recommendation

The development, selection, and implementation of an effective set of hazard controls are among the most important elements of nuclear safety. At defense nuclear facilities, DOE has established a priority system that favors preventive over mitigative measures, and passive design features over active controls. The approved system recognizes that, where necessary or practical, administrative controls may play an important role in hazard prevention and mitigation.

In the Board's view, the activities associated with the development, implementation, and ongoing verification and validation of safety-class and safety-significant administrative controls should be conducted with the same degree of rigor and quality assurance as that afforded engineered controls or design features with similar safety importance. Therefore, the Board recommends the following:

1. DOE should promulgate a set of requirements for safety-class and safety-significant administrative controls to establish appropriate expectations for the design, implementation, and maintenance of these important safety controls. The requirements should address the following at a minimum:

(a) Specific design attributes to ensure effectiveness and reliability;

(b) Specific TSRs and limiting conditions of operation;

(c) Specific training and qualifications to ensure that the appropriate facility operators, maintenance and engineering personnel, plant management, and other staff properly implement each control;

(d) Periodic reverification that each control remains effective; and

(e) Root cause and failure analyses, similar to those required upon failure of an engineered system.

2. DOE should ensure that all existing administrative controls that serve the function of a safety-class or safety-significant control are evaluated against these new requirements and upgraded as necessary and appropriate to meet DOE's expectations.

John T. Conway,
Chairman.

Appendix—Transmittal Letter to the Secretary of Energy

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

December 11, 2002.

The Honorable Spencer Abraham,
Secretary of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585–1000.

Dear Secretary Abraham: The prevention and mitigation of potential accidents inherent in the mission activities at defense nuclear facilities is a fundamental objective of both the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board). This objective requires DOE and its contractors to identify accident scenarios and then establish effective and reliable safety controls to address them. Engineered controls are preferred over administrative controls because, in general, engineered controls are considered to be more reliable and effective than administrative controls. However, in certain applications, DOE and its contractors have concluded that discrete operator actions or administrative controls are required to address consequences of accidents that would otherwise be unacceptable.

The Board agrees with DOE's overall guidance for a hierarchy of controls and agrees that administrative controls are sometimes appropriate to prevent or mitigate accident consequences—even those that exceed evaluation guidelines for risk to the public. However, the Board has identified a number of administrative safety controls, proposed or in use, at various defense nuclear facilities that are technically inadequate. In many cases, DOE and/or its contractors have asserted that the methods used to establish these administrative controls comply with existing DOE directives. After further analysis, the Board has concluded that the DOE directives system does not contain adequate requirements for the design, implementation, and maintenance of important safety-related administrative controls to ensure that they will be effective and reliable.

As a result, the Board on December 11, 2002, unanimously approved Recommendation 2002–3, Requirements for the Design, Implementation, and Maintenance of Administrative Controls, which is enclosed for your consideration. After your receipt of this recommendation and as required by 42 U.S.C. 2286d(a), the Board will promptly make it available to the public. The Board believes that the recommendation contains no information that is classified or otherwise restricted. To the extent this recommendation does not include information restricted by DOE under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2161–68, as amended, please see that it is promptly placed on file in your regional public reading rooms. The Board will also publish this recommendation in the **Federal Register**. The Board will evaluate the Department of Energy response to this recommendation in accordance with Board Policy Statement 1, Criteria for Judging the Adequacy of DOE Responses and Implementation Plans for Board Recommendations.

Sincerely,
John T. Conway,
Chairman.

[FR Doc. 02–32033 Filed 12–19–02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3670–01–P

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request

AGENCY: Department of Education.

SUMMARY: The Leader, Regulatory Management Group, Office of the Chief Information Officer invites comments on the submission for OMB review as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.

DATES: Interested persons are invited to submit comments on or before January 21, 2003.

ADDRESSES: Written comments should be addressed to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Attention: Lauren Wittenberg, Desk Officer, Department of Education, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street, NW., Room 10235, New Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20503 or should be electronically mailed to the Internet address *Lauren.Whittenberg@omb.eop.gov.*

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section 3506 of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35) requires that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provide interested Federal agencies and the public an early opportunity to comment on information collection requests. OMB may amend or waive the requirement for public consultation to the extent that public participation in the approval process would defeat the purpose of the information collection, violate State or Federal law, or substantially interfere with any agency's ability to perform its statutory obligations. The Leader, Regulatory Management Group, Office of the Chief Information Officer, publishes that notice containing proposed information collection requests prior to submission of these requests to OMB. Each proposed information collection, grouped by office, contains the following: (1) Type of review requested, *e.g.* new, revision, extension, existing or reinstatement; (2) Title; (3) Summary of the collection; (4) Description of the need for, and proposed use of, the information; (5) Respondents and frequency of collection; and (6) Reporting and/or Recordkeeping burden. OMB invites public comment.

Dated: December 16, 2002.

John D. Tressler,

Leader, Regulatory Management Group, Office of the Chief Information Officer.

Federal Student Aid

Type of Review: New.

Title: FSA Students Portal Web site.

Frequency: On occasion, monthly, annually.

Affected Public: Individuals or household; Federal Government; State, Local, or Tribal Gov't, SEAs or LEAs.

Reporting and Recordkeeping Hour Burden:

Responses: 5,000,000.

Burden Hours: 200,000.

Abstract: Federal Student Aid (FSA) of the U.S. Department of Education seeks to establish a registration system within the ''Students Portal'', an Internet Portal Web site (hereafter ''the Web site'') The Web site will make the college application process more efficient, faster, and accurate by making it an automated, electronic process that targets financial aid and college applications. The Web site uses some personal contact information criteria to automatically fill out the forms and surveys initiated by the user. The Web site will also provide a database of demographic information that will help FSA target the distribution of financial aid materials to specific groups of students and/or parents. For example, studies have shown that providing student financial assistance information to middle school (or elementary school) students and/or their parents dramatically increases the likelihood that those students will attend college. The demographic information from the Web site will help us to identify potential customers in the middle school age range and is information that was previously unavailable to us.

Written requests for information should be addressed to Vivian Reese, Department of Education, 400 Maryland Avenue, SW., Room 4050, Regional Office Building 3, Washington, DC 20202–4651 or directed to her e-mail address *Vivian.Reese@ed.gov.* Requests may also be faxed to 202–708–9346. Please specify the complete title of the information collection when making your request. Comments regarding burden and/or the collection activity requirements should be directed to Joseph Schubart at his e-mail address *Joe.Schubart@ed.gov.* Individuals who use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) may call the Federal Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1–800–877–8339.

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